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ABSTRACT  
 
The tendency today is to conceive of Aquinas’ virtue theory in individualistic terms, as 
though the practice of virtue is a personal matter for each one of us in isolation from the 
communio of the Church.  This individualistic reading of virtue has led to some confusion 
about, and criticism of, Aquinas’ notion of person and his ecclesiology.   Indeed, Aquinas has 
often been accused, in following the Boethian formula of person, of robbing the person of its 
essential relationality, in contrast (it is claimed) to the accounts provided by Richard of St 
Victor and Bonaventure.   
 This confusion, however, has largely arisen from an interpretation of Aquinas’ virtue 
theory inherited not from Aquinas himself, but from his later commentators.  In fact, there is no 
such thing as virtue properly speaking detached from the ecclesial communio in Aquinas, for 
whom all virtue, both acquired and infused, finds its expression within the context of 
interpersonal relations.  The form of the infused virtues is friendship with God, with whom a 
relationship is not simply unmediated, but mediated through the Church in Christ. 
 In his hierarchy of the “virtues of indebtedness”, Aquinas places gratitude last, 
following upon religion, piety and observance.  Gratitude is last, not because it is of least 
significance, but because it represents the turning point in the exitus et reditus of God’s creative 
plan.  It is only when one recognises the debitum imposed by grace, which is a debt of love, that 
one is able to respond to that gift and make grateful return in love and friendship.  Given that an 
infinite gulf exists between God and the creature, the return of gratitude to God is only possible 
through participating in the gratitude of Christ.  Consequently, gratitude properly speaking has a 
liturgical and sacramental character.  All other acts of gratitude between creatures are grateful 
only by analogy.  It is for this reason that Aquinas’ preferred term for gratitude towards God 
throughout his corpus is “gratiarum actio”: a term which has a distinctive liturgical character, 
and descriptive of praise and worship.  In the exchange of gift and gratitude, free agents are 
bound in a mutual exchange of love.  For Aquinas, this paradigm is most perfectly exemplified 
in the totally gratuitous self-offering of Christ to the Father, and the participation of the rational 
creature in that offering.   
While a number of philosophical and theological treatments of the notion of gift have 
emerged in recent years, there has been very little attention given to the corresponding notion of 
gratitude.  And, similarly, while the notion of gift in Aquinas has been the subject of 
considerable contemporary study, the necessary corresponding notion of gratitude in Aquinas 
has not.  Where gratitude has emerged as a topic of study, it has largely been from a political 
and psychological point of view.  More often than not in these studies, gratitude is treated of as 
an emotion or affective state.  For Aquinas, gratitude is not an emotion, but a habitual openness 
to the process of theosis. 
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THE VIRTUE OF GRATITUDE ACCORDING TO ST THOMAS AQUINAS 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 A study of the virtue of gratitude and thanksgiving in the writings of St Thomas 
Aquinas reveals much about his understanding of the notions of virtue and person.  It also 
reveals by extension an insight into his notion of Church.  Gratitude for Aquinas is not simply 
an emotion or affection of the heart for perceived gifts, but it is, rather, the first and essential 
step in establishing friendship with God.  This is because establishing friendship with God is not 
simply a subjective move, but is primarily a liturgical one in which God, in the first instance, 
extends friendship to the human person.  According to Aquinas, there can be no friendship with 
God without this expression of gratitude which he considers primarily to be an act of praise and 
worship.  Hence, it is not surprising to find that Thomas refers to friendship repeatedly 
throughout his treatment of the virtue of religion, and in his unfinished treatise on the 
sacraments.   
The praise and worship of God, moreover, is not simply achieved on the part of the 
individual in isolation from the communio.  Given the infinite gap between God and the 
creature, creaturely praise and worship is bound to fall short of bridging this gap.  Rather, it is 
Christ who bridges this gap, and so is, consequently, Christ who provides us with the means of 
gratitude, of due praise and worship to God, as required by the virtue of religion.  Christ is the 
normative means of satisfying the dictates of the virtue of religion, inasmuch as he provides us 
with the sacramental means of efficaciously honouring God.  Hence gratitude to God has a 
liturgical character, and it is the ecclesial communio which makes this possible.  In short, 
gratitude to God—which is the paradigm of all gratuitous action—is not simply a private 
expression of thanks, but the act of the individual who finds perfection by participation in the 
sacramental and liturgical life of the Church. 
 There has been very little systematic study to date done on the notion of gratitude and 
thanksgiving in the writings of Aquinas.  This is surprising, given the importance Aquinas 
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places on thanksgiving, and the way in which it ultimately determines praise and worship of 
God which are the normative means of establishing the divine life.  Recently, there have been 
signs of an emerging interest in the concept of gift, both as treated by Aquinas and from a 
psychological and historical perspective in general.2  Yet for Aquinas, the notion of gift includes 
gratitude by necessity.  This study is not interested in gratitude so much from a historical or 
political perspective, but from a theological and ecclesiological perspective according to 
Aquinas. 
 The method of this dissertation relies on a close reading of the primary texts of Aquinas 
himself, given that there has been, to now, very little treatment of gratitude in Aquinas from 
other scholars.  Also, as Angela McKay rightly notes, commentaries on Aquinas give disparate 
accounts of the virtue and person in Aquinas and so it is necessary to allow the texts explicate 
themselves the notion of virtue and person, of gift and gratitude.3  Among these primary texts is 
the specific treatment of gratitude that Aquinas gives in questions one hundred and six and one 
hundred and seven of the secundae secunda partis of the Summa.  While these two questions are 
the most obvious treatments of gratitude in the Summa and perhaps all of Aquinas’ writings, 
they cannot be read in isolation from his treatise on virtue in general, nor especially in isolation 
from what I refer to as the “virtues of indebtedness”, which include religion, piety and 
observance, along with gratitude itself.  These in turn need to be examined in the context of the 
treatise on justice; within that treatise, questions eighty one through one hundred—which deal 
with the virtue of religion—need to be read in conjunction with the treatise on the sacraments in 
the tertia pars. 
                                                          
2 I am in particular grateful to Joseph Vnuk, O.P, for sharing with me his own research and dissertation, 
Full of grace and truth: the sacramental economy according to Thomas Aquinas (July, 2013).  I am also 
indebted to Angela McKay, whose dissertation The infused and acquired virtues in Aquinas’ moral theory 
(April 2004) has been instrumental in my own reading of virtue in Aquinas. 
3 The most common texts used include the following with the translation edition: the Benziger Brothers 
edition of 1947 and the Fathers of the English Province of the Dominicans of 1920 for the Summa; for 
the English texts of the De Veritate I have used the translation of Robert Mulligan, S.J (1952); the 
translations of Anton Pegis, James Anderson and Vernon J. Burke of 1955-1957 for the Summa Contra 
Gentiles; the translation of Ralph McInerny for the De Virtutibus (1999); and the translations of Fabian 
Larcher, O.P, Matthew Lamb, O.C.S.O, Michael Duffy, O.P., and Ralph McInerny for the various 
Commentaries on the Pauline Epistles.  I have also included the original Latin texts of these works when 
cited, for the purpose of comparison, and also to highlight those instances where I have chosen different 
translations, in order to provide continuity for the cited texts. 
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 In addition to the rich material found in the Summa, Aquinas has much to say about 
gratitude and thanksgiving in his various commentaries on the Pauline epistles, where the notion 
of gratitude as a liturgical and ecclesiological concern most clearly emerges.  There is also much 
relevant material in the De Veritate, De Virtutibus, De Malo and the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
sermons and various other opuscula.  Relevant background information is also extracted from 
the various commentaries on Boethius (De Trintate) and Aristotle (most notably, the Ethics).  In 
general, I read these texts through the lens of Aquinas’ Dionysian theology, relying on both the 
original works by Dionysius, and most significantly on the landmark study done by Fran 
O’Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas (2005).   
 In chapter two of this study, “What is Gratitude?” I focus on the notion of gratitude in 
general, and attempt to place it in a philosophical, theological and historical context, starting 
with Cicero and Seneca (who provide a starting point for Aquinas), Epicurus and the early 
Christian liturgical notion of the gratiarum actio (thanksgiving).   
Recent studies of gratitude in general tend to treat of gratitude as either a psychological 
state or a routine of social cohesion.  At the time of writing this dissertation, a recent publication 
by Peter Leithart has come onto the market.4  Gratitude: An Intellectual History (2014) 
promises to make a significant impact on the study of the political and social history of gratitude 
through the ages.  Before this study, Robert Emmons and Michael McCullough released an 
influential study called Psychology of Gratitude (2004).  As the name of this important work 
suggests, it examines gratitude from a psychological point of view.  Emmons is perhaps one of 
the foremost scholars today working on the notion of gratitude from the point of view of 
psychology.  While this text provides limited insight into gratitude as a theological subject, it 
makes an important contribution for the way in which it demonstrates how gratitude is generally 
understood in affective terms today, and so provides a very useful starting point for recovering 
gratitude as a theological and philosophical subject.  A psychology of gratitude can also assist in 
                                                          
4 See Leithart, Peter J. Gratitude: an Intellectual History. Waco: Baylor University Press, 2014. The 
general release date for this book is February 15th, 2014.  While Leithart’s book was not available for the 
writing of this dissertation, I am familiar with the various articles written by him on gratitude.  For 
example, see Leithart, Peter J. "Gift and Gratitude in the Middle Ages." Leithart.com. N.p., 28 Mar. 2006. 
Web. 30 Oct. 2013. <http://www.leithart.com/archives/001944.php>. 
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identifying certain material features of gratitude and so provides an insight into the 
anthropological expression of the virtue.  As Nicholas Lombardo has shown in an important 
study on the notion of emotion and desire in Aquinas (The Logic of Desire, 2011), the affections 
and emotions are not irrelevant to Aquinas’ understanding of virtue and gratitude.  But at the 
same time, gratitude cannot be reduced to, or defined by, an affective state. 
 The starting point for chapter two is the inherited notion of gratitude we must work 
from today.  That inherited notion is largely derived from post-Enlightenment studies in 
economics and anthropology and so I attempt to extract Aquinas’ notion from this milieu.  
Looming large in the foreground of that milieu is the critique of the notion of gift and gratitude 
put forward by a number of 18th and 19th century American and British pragmatists, as well as 
Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and Marcel Mauss in The Gift: Forms 
and Functions of Exchange (1967) in particular.  While this study does not engage in an 
exhaustive treatment of these contributions, I thought it important to place the notion of gift and 
gratitude in Aquinas within the context of this starting point, since these modern concerns 
highlight the way in which the ‘ontology of the gift’ has undergone a radical sea-change from 
Aquinas to the present day, and especially following Derrida’s critique of the “impossible gift”. 
 In chapter three, “Virtues & the Virtues of Indebtedness”, the dissertation aims to place 
Aquinas’ understanding of gratitude within the broader context of virtue in general.  It is not 
possible to extract any virtue, much less gratitude, in Aquinas from his treatment of virtue in 
general, since for him, all the virtues are connected in terms of their form—which is love 
(caritas)—and their end—which is friendship (amicitia).  While we may possess different 
virtues in varying degrees, it is not possible to be devoid of certain virtues while living out 
others.  This is especially true of the virtues of religion and gratitude, which are intimately 
linked in Aquinas’ ecclesiology.  I have rooted much of this discussion in my interpretation of 
the work of Rudi te Velde who, in his Participation and substantiality in Thomas Aquinas 
(1995) and Aquinas on God: the 'divine science' of the Summa Theologiae (2006) in particular, 
provides what is, in my view, one of the most coherent accounts of grace and the analogia entis 
in Aquinas, both of which figure prominently in this discussion.  
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 Also in chapter three is a discussion of the important distinction between the acquired 
and infused virtues.  The distinction between these has not always been clear in treatments of 
virtue according to Aquinas.5  But the distinction impinges significantly on the difference 
between gratitude as a political or sociological concern and gratitude as an infused virtue and 
the means of establishing friendship with God. 
 In chapter four, “The Grateful Person” I examine what the concept of person is for 
Aquinas in general, and a grateful person by extension.  Aquinas has often been criticised, along 
with Augustine and Boethius, for his ‘static’ notion of person in contrast, it is suggested, to a 
more relational account of person found in the likes of Richard of St Victor and Bonaventure.  
Adopting Norris W. Clarke’s method of ‘creative retrieval’ and his work on recovering the 
notion of person in Aquinas, I challenge the assumption of Balthasar, et al, who have this view 
of Aquinas, and show instead, along with Clarke, that Aquinas does indeed provide a rich 
relational account of the notion of person, and that such an account of the person hinges on the 
relationship between gift and gratitude.  Clarke argues that ‘being’ is best understood in 
Aquinas in terms of person, and the notion of the ‘grateful person’ certainly supports this view, 
for it is in the context of gratitude that Aquinas’ notion of person takes on its full force. 
 Furthermore, the ‘person’ in Aquinas is best understood in the context of Dionysian 
participation, and so this chapter will also consider the notion of person in the context of this 
debate.  Here again, I will adopt the work of te Velde in positioning myself on this question, 
along with that of Jean-Pierre Torrell O.P., who also provides a rich personalist account of the 
human person in relation with God through Jesus Christ.  Torrell’s work has the added 
dimension of not losing sight of the mystical dimension of Aquinas’ notion of person as a 
sacramental being; likewise with Michael Sherwin O.P whose important work, By Knowledge 
& Love (2005) contributes to a recovery of the person as relational in Aquinas.  The specific 
character of this relational dimension of the human person is not only exemplified in the virtue 
                                                          
5 Angela McKay (see note 2) gives what is perhaps the most systematic study of the difference between 
the acquired and infused virtues that was available at the time of my writing this study. 
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of gratitude, but it is, in effect, produced by gratitude as a participation in the gratuitous gift of 
God.  Gratitude is the virtue by which God’s invitation to friendship is realised.   
I am also indebted in this chapter to Martin Rhonheimer, whose work on recovering the 
concept of natural law in Aquinas—which is at the root of the virtues, and the virtues of 
indebtedness in particular—has helped me shape this discussion and orient the notion of person 
as being naturally inclined to friendship and love.6  For Aquinas, the natural law is at the root of 
the virtues, inasmuch as the function of virtue is to render the precepts of the natural law 
habitual.  But these precepts do not constitute an interior lexicon of action, but are rather the 
principles of action rooted in the general precept of justice: namely, to do good and avoid evil.  
Natural law must be, says Aquinas, informed and educated.  That education is derived from the 
divine law, which also gives us the Church and the precepts of religion.  Obedience to these is 
itself a precept of natural law and forms the basis of Aquinas’ ecclesial vision. Many of the 
well-known controversies surrounding discussions of the natural law stem from thinking of 
natural law from the perspective of the subject in isolation from the communio.  Both the 
essentialist and consequentialist varieties of natural law theory, for example, frequently fall into 
this trap.  Natural law, to be sure, is the participation of the individual in the eternal law; but 
what constitutes a participation in the eternal law is not determined by the individual, but by the 
ecclesial community in Christ.  The person, fully alive, fully perfected, is not simply a 
relational person but an ecclesial person for Aquinas.   
                                                          
6 The on-going (and even sometimes polemic in tone) debate between Jean Porter and Martin 
Rhonheimer has been well-publicised in recent months and years.  Rhonheimer, for example, has 
charged Porter with failing to address the inherently rational nature of natural law, and to treat natural 
law in the essentialist manner.  Rhonheimer rejects what he understands to be revisionist Catholic moral 
theology of the post-conciliar generation, among whom he includes Jean Porter in a critique of her 
influential book, Nature as Reason: A Thomistic Theory of the Natural Law (Eardmans Co., 2005). 
Rhonheimer argues that Porter is in fact far from a genuinely Thomistic view, and that she in fact 
“obscures Thomas’ ‘core [Thomistic] doctrine’ of the natural law as the capacity of our natural reason to 
attain moral truth…because it thereby neglects a central implication of the doctrine of man as the image 
of God….” See William F. Murphy’s introduction to Rhonheimer, Martin. The Perspective of the Acting 
Person Essays in the Renewal of Thomistic Moral Philosophy. Washington, D.C.: Catholic U of America, 
2008, p.xxxvii.  It is not my intention here to address this ongoing debate between Rhonheimer and 
Porter, given the complexity and scope of the discussion.  I have, however, chosen to follow Rhonheimer 
on the natural law in this thesis, as I find his explication of the Thomistic theory of natural law as he sees 
it, coheres with my own understand of virtue in Aquinas. 
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 In chapter five, “Aquinas’ Ecclesiology”, I aim to bring the notion of gratitude, virtue 
and person together in the unifying ecclesiology as understood by Aquinas.  It should be noted 
that along with the critiques of Aquinas’ notion of person, there is also a trend to critique 
Aquinas for his lack of any De ecclesia treatise.  This was certainly a concern of Congar who 
argued that Aquinas’ ecclesiology is in fact contained in his treatment of the human person in 
the secunda pars of the Summa: his ecclesiology is, in other words, personalist and relational.  
The primary focus of chapter five then is an effort to support this contention through a recovery 
of the notion of Church in Aquinas as relational, and which emerges clearly in Aquinas’ Pauline 
commentaries; in conjunction with the treatise on religion and the sacraments, the 
Commentaries form a rich source for recovering Aquinas’ ecclesiology and sacramentology. 
 It is within his treatment of the Church as communio, as opposed to simply a polis, that 
Aquinas’ doctrine of gratitude as praise and worship comes into full force.  There is in fact no 
concept of a ‘virtuous person’, much less a grateful person in Aquinas that is independent of the 
salvific work of Christ through the Church and the sacraments.  Gratitude and gift represent two 
complimentary and essential dimensions of friendship; and these are expressed in terms of 
salvation and worship in terms of friendship with God. Salvation is offered as a free gift: the 
response to that gift is gratiarum actio, or thanksgiving, in the liturgical setting of praise and 
worship. 
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CHAPTER ONE: WHAT IS GRATITUDE? 
 
2.1 Gift & Gratitude 
 
Despite the emphasis on the notion of gift today in contemporary theology and 
philosophy, very little attention has been given to the corresponding notion of gratitude from a 
theological, much less a Thomistic, point of view.  While there are several treatments of the 
notion of gift in Aquinas, there are no systematic treatments of gratitude in Aquinas as of today.  
Many excellent contributions in recent years have explored the significance and central role of 
the notion of gift in theology.7  The notion of gift, however, is—at least according to Aquinas—
fundamentally incomplete without the corresponding notion of gratitude.  As I explore in 
greater depth in the chapter on the notion of person, gratitude is not simply the virtue by which 
we receive gifts.  It is also the virtue by which we repay gifts; in other words, it is the virtue by 
which we become like our benefactor, and the virtue by which we are transformed from passive 
recipients to active agents of love, in the image of our benefactor.  Gratitude to God therefore is 
foundational in the process of divinisation. 
For Aquinas, the very understanding of a gift requires an intuition of the intention of the 
donor (ST II-II, q.106, a.5).8  Such intuition of the donor’s intention provides both the 
                                                          
7 Communio: International Catholic Review for example, has an excellent on-going series of articles 
dealing with the notion of gift in theology over the years.  See for example, Grygiel, Stanislaw. “Existence 
Precedes Essence”: Fear of the Gift (Summer 1999); Healey, Nicholas. The World as Gift (Fall 2005) and 
also by Healy, Caritas in Veritate and Economic Theory (Winter 2010); Schindler, David L., America's 
Technological Ontology and the Gift of the Given: Benedict XVI on the Cultural Significance of the 
Quarere Deum (Summer 2011); and Henri De Lubac’s Duplex Hominis Beatitudo (Winter 2008). 
8 I should make note here of the discussion in contemporary philosophy centring on the distinction 
between “intention” and “motivation”.  In question 106, Aquinas himself uses—when speaking of the 
“intention of the donor”— secundum voluntatem beneficiantis (see for example ST II-II, q.106, a.6).  His 
use of the noun voluntas is suggestive of a disposition or inclination towards the recipient.  It also 
connotes desire and favour.  As James Keenan notes, the distinction in philosophy today between 
intention and motivation is a relatively new discussion in philosophy: one can have a right motivation 
but wrong intention, or a right intention lacking prudence and thereby make a wrong choice (Keenan, 
p.14).  That is not to say that there is no such distinction in Aquinas; but given that there is no real 
distinction in Aquinas between God’s essence and attributes, there is no distinction to be made 
between God’s goodness and rightness, nor between God’s intending and reason for intending.  
Intention does, however, correlate closely in Aquinas to the whole notion of choice, and he dedicates a 
significant treatise in the Summa to the very question of choice, action and intention (see ST I-II, q.6-19, 
for example).  While this treatise in the Summa focusses on human action, there is a sense here of the 
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grounding for our understanding of gift and, at the same time, constitutes the grounding of 
gratitude.  By focussing on the intention of the donor rather than simply the gift, Aquinas has 
already begun to conceive of gift and gratitude as an inter-personal dynamic.  Aquinas dedicates 
a whole question in the Summa to the notion of intention (ST I-II, q.12).  In article one, he 
identifies intention with an act of the will.  The very word “intention” signifies, he says, an 
inclination towards something chosen.  Such is the nature of love, which is likewise constituted 
by acts of the will and is the first of the concupiscible passions (ST I-II, q.25, a.2).  It is for this 
reason that it is necessary to understand the intention of the donor of a gift, so that one can 
determine what is being chosen by the donor through the medium of the gift.  Given that all acts 
of genuine beneficence are acts of love as expressions of friendship (ST II-II, q.31, a.1), it is 
clear that Aquinas understands the genuine intention of the donor to be in general an offering of 
love and friendship.  This is certainly true on the part of God, who loves all things and who 
extends his love to all things (ST I, q.20, a.2).  Thus, in saying that gratitude must consider the 
intention of the donor, Aquinas is essentially saying that gratitude is the recognition of the 
gratuitous extension of love and friendship.  Nor is the recognition of the intention of the donor 
simply an intellectual assent.  In recognising the intention of the donor, one is obliged, 
according to the moral debt, to return the gift in kind (ST II-II, 106).   
Aquinas gives us three conditions required for the observance of gratitude: the first is to 
recognise the intention behind the gift; the second to give thanks for it; and the third is to repay 
the gift in kind (ST II-II, q.107, a.2).  The most egregious act of ingratitude is to fail to 
recognise a gift in the first place because the awareness of gift and corresponding acts of 
gratitude stand and fall together and it is on this awareness and reciprocation that friendships are 
built.  Given that the intention of the donor is love, ingratitude amounts to a repudiation of that 
love.  There is, in other words, a single grounding for both gift and gratitude, and the one is 
incomplete without the other: there can be no genuine recognition of a gift without there being 
                                                                                                                                                                          
participatory nature of human nature in the divine will, worthy of further study in reference to the 
question of gift and gratitude.  For the purpose of this study in the meantime, I have chosen to render 
‘voluntas’ as ‘intention’, following the 1920 translation of the Summa by the Fathers of the English 
Dominican Province. 
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the impetus towards acts proper to the virtue of gratitude at the same time.  Gift and gratitude 
are thus essentially complementary in Aquinas and they form the foundation of friendship itself.  
It is for this reason he gives the word gratia three related meanings: love, gift and thanks.9 
Gratitude then is not simply the virtue of responding to perceived gifts; it is, for 
Aquinas, the virtue by which we both recognise and respond to the gifts as signs of friendship 
within a fluid movement that leads us ultimately to God, through Jesus Christ.  The grateful 
response—which is the act of thanksgiving, or gratiarum actio—is equivalent to the giving of 
praise and worship: it is an act of praise culminating in acts of worship, consummately so within 
the liturgy and Eucharist.  It is instructive to observe that Aquinas places his treatment of 
gratitude following, and contingent upon, his extensive treatment of the virtue of religion, which 
he calls “chief among the moral virtues” (religio est praecipua inter virtutes morales; ST II-II, 
q.81, a.6)  and under which he includes gratitude, following the related virtues of piety and 
observance.  Indeed, the virtue of religion says Aquinas, commands and governs all the virtues 
inasmuch as it directs all virtuous action to the praise and honour of God (ST II-II, q.81, a.1, 
ad.1).  Consequently, the virtues following religion, namely piety, observance and gratitude, 
must be considered together and in the context of the virtue of religion, as can be seen with the 
example of piety: 
The greater includes the lesser: wherefore the worship due to God 
[according to the virtue of religion] includes the worship due to our 
parents [according to piety] as a particular. Hence it is written: “If I be 
a father, where is my honour?” Consequently the term piety extends 
also to the divine worship.10  
 
Unfortunately today, gratitude is almost invariably associated with an affective or 
episodic emotional state; a feeling of thankfulness for a perceived gift.  One even finds this 
notion of gratitude in theological treatments of the gift.  In part, this is due to the disintegration 
of gift economies and their replacement, at least in the West, with consumer economies.  It is 
                                                          
9 ST I-II, q.110, a.1.  I shall return to this significant relation in the Conclusion of this study. 
10 ST II-II, q101, a1, ad.1: in maiori includitur minus. Et ideo cultus qui Deo debetur includit in se, sicut 
aliquid particulare, cultum qui debetur parentibus. Unde dicitur Malach. I, si ego pater, ubi honor meus? 
Et ideo nomen pietatis etiam ad divinum cultum refertur. 
 
18 
 
also due in part to the shift in emphasis in philosophy from the perceived constraint on human 
freedom imposed by obedience, in deference to an individualist notion of liberty; it was an ideal 
that came to the fore in the 18th century, for example in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  
Prior to the decline of Scholastic metaphysics, and by extension mysticism with it, reason was 
conceived of as being commanded by the will, which in turn was to be informed by natural law 
under the guidance of the divine law.  With this in mind, one can see why Aquinas places his 
treatment of gratitude immediately following his treatment of obedience and why, furthermore, 
the notion of law plays such a prominent role in his treatment of religion.  With the liberation of 
natural reason from authority, one finds a gradual shift towards the identification of reason with 
affection, especially in British and Scottish philosophical circles, as discussed below. 
Gratitude, however, is ultimately incoherent when characterised in affective terms.  
Rather, for Aquinas, gratitude—whether oriented to God or human persons—is a virtue and, 
like all virtues, is thus a habit or disposition of the will toward a certain way of acting.  Habits 
place the virtuous person in potency towards specific acts; when actualised, virtuous habits are 
manifested in specific actions which not only actualise the habits, but the whole person.  
Gratitude is the orientation to grateful acts; the work of gratitude—gratiarum actio—are the 
actualisation of the habit in the person.11  Grateful acts make for a grateful person; and that 
person is one to whom everything is understood as being given within the plan of Providence. 
Gratitude is a species of action and specifically a species of action which has as its 
object acts of praise and worship within a communion of persons.  Ultimately, when gratitude 
has praise of God as its object, it falls under the virtue of religion which in turn disposes the 
virtuous person towards participation in the sacramental life of the Church. Not only can the 
virtues in general be detached from an orientation to God within the context of the communion 
of saints, neither can they be understood in terms of the individual alone, isolated from the 
salvific mission of Christ through the Church.  This is no less true of the virtue of gratitude, 
                                                          
11 See Agamben, Giorgio, & Adam Kotsko, trans. Opus Dei: an archaeology of duty. Stanford, CA.: 
Stanford University Press, 2013.  Karol Wojtyla’s Acting Person also makes this point: the actualisation of 
our habits is not simply an actualisation of something external to the person, but the actualisation of the 
person as moral agent. 
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which—as a virtue falling under justice—cannot be understood independently of our obligation 
to the community of persons in Christ.  In short, all of the virtues are part of Aquinas’ 
ecclesiological theology; and gratitude in particular is a key way in which we respond to the 
redemptive gifts wrought in the world by Jesus Christ through the Church.  
In article two of question fifty five in his Treatise on Human Acts, Aquinas insists that 
each virtue is not only a habit, but is a certain kind of habit: an operative habit (habitus 
operativus).  In other words he says, citing Aristotle (Ethics II.6), “virtue of a thing is that which 
makes its work good.”  Therefore, in understanding the virtues, we must look to a particular 
work that is specified by the habit of each virtue.  Gratitude will likewise be identified with a 
specific work.  It is the works of virtue which give human persons their character and identity as 
being either good or evil, meritorious or not. 
Although not explicitly stated in his treatment of gratitude in question one hundred and 
six of the secunda secundae partis, gratitude is a virtue which is ultimately oriented towards the 
work of praise and honour, and ultimately—in reference to God, to whom the highest praise and 
worship is owing—liturgy and sacrifice.  It is only when one reads the treatise on gratitude 
within the larger framework of the treatise on religion, piety and observance that one sees 
Aquinas’ intention is to assign gratitude and the related virtues to a class of acts which have an 
ecclesial character. 
Employing what Norris W. Clarke has called the “creative retrieval” of Thomistic texts, 
I wish to show that not only is gratitude for Aquinas oriented to praise and worship, it is more 
specifically oriented to, and finds its fulfilment in, the sacramental life of the Church as the 
source of perfection for the virtuous life.  It is fully realised, furthermore, in an understanding of 
virtue itself which is likewise often overlooked today: namely, that for Aquinas, there can be no 
true virtuous life without the sacraments.  The very notion of personhood requires this holistic 
view of the perfection of the individual through the ecclesial community in Jesus Christ, 
mediated through the sacramental life of the Church.  It is in this context, that of a sacramental 
ecclesiology, that one must read the virtues, and particularly the virtue of gratitude, according to 
Aquinas. 
20 
 
 
2.2 The Moral Object of Giving Thanks 
 
The inspiration for this thesis on gratitude came to me following a walk one December 
morning a few days before Christmas along a river on the outskirts of Banff in the Canadian 
Rockies.  Just beyond the town, a trail winds its way through the trees and along a creek 
towards Vermilion Lakes.  In a clearing by the first lake—which was solidly frozen that time of 
year—I came upon a park bench which had been positioned for visitors to sit and admire the 
stunning view across the lake towards Mount Bourgeau towering in the distance, and covered in 
snow and reflected on the ice as it was that year.  It was too cold to sit on the bench, and so I 
stood behind it, admiring the view. While standing there, I noticed that on the back of the 
wooden bench, some visitor before me had written with a black marker in large, bold letters, 
“Thank you Mother Earth!” in praise of the spectacular surroundings and incredible view.  As I 
looked closer, I then noticed that a second previous visitor, in reply to the first, had written with 
a lesser pen underneath this hymn of praise, the fainter, smaller words of praise, “Thank you 
Father, God Creator!” 
It seemed clear to me why the second passer-by had written what he or she had.  It was 
an apparent indignant corrective to the inadequacy of expressing gratitude to some entity such 
as ‘nature’ which lacked any intention in giving.  The corrective was aimed to show that 
gratitude could only be an expression between two communicating parties.  One could not, the 
objector was suggesting, praise “Mother Earth”, if by that term we are to understand nothing 
more than nature itself, as without an intention in giving, there could be coherent notion of gift 
for which we can give thanks.  It was a very Thomistic correction. 
The exchange on the bench reminded me of those debates one occasionally comes 
across on blogs and forums—namely, whether or not atheists and materialists are able to give 
thanks for creation, or whether they can only stare blankly with wonder at creation without 
having anyone to thank for it.  The materialist will often reject this suggestion that there can be 
no gratitude for creation on the part of the materialist or atheist, and will insist that he or she can 
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indeed feel gratitude for the universe and creation.  It is common to find the materialist equating 
gratitude for creation to unrequited love: they have the emotion or feeling of gratitude, but that 
there is simply no one to receive it.  But the feeling of gratitude, they may say, is there 
nonetheless.  Indeed, if gratitude were nothing more than a subjective feeling or emotion, then 
this claim would be difficult to counter. 
Nor is it a new argument.  Epicurus provides one of the earliest philosophical treatments 
of gratitude.12  For Epicurus, there is no need for gratitude to the gods, and they have no need of, 
or interest in, our gratitude.  There is, however, a place for gratitude to Nature: “Gratitude must 
be vouchsafed to blessèd Nature because she has made the essential things easy to procure and 
those things that are hard to procure non-essentials.”13 One can and should be grateful to nature 
because it benefits us, and gratitude is all about acknowledging benefits received, the 
Epicureans held. 
Yet the Epicurean notion of gratitude is wanting.  As DeWitt notes, Epicurus’ treatment 
of “Nature” already entails a personification of at least some kind of benevolent deity or 
intelligence, especially since he endows this “Nature” with the attribute of Wisdom—one of her 
principal gifts which is safeguarded by the philosophers.  Even the notion of “unrequited 
gratitude” presupposes and personifies some missing or lacking response that must at least be 
possible or intelligible for a response to be unrequited.  But already we find in the Epicurean 
notion of gratitude a petition to higher powers for guidance and succour: gratitude is, even in 
Epicurus’ somewhat whimsical treatment, oriented towards recognising the intention of a 
beneficiary through both petition for further favours and honour for favours received.   
The petitionary notion of gratitude is not, DeWitt’s research shows, exclusive to 
Epicurus in the ancient world.  Epicurus lays down a principal ingredient of gratitude common 
                                                          
12 For a detailed discussion of Epicurus on gratitude, see DeWitt , Norman W., The Epicurean Doctrine of 
Gratitude. The American Journal of Philology. Johns Hopkins University Press. Vol. 58, No. 3 (1937), pp. 
320-328. 
13 DeWitt p. 321. 
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among the ancient commentators: that of offering for benefits received.14  We find similar 
treatments of gratitude for example, in the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius (99BC-55BC) 
who treats of gratitude as something requiring offering and in doing so, his understanding of 
thanksgiving “leans more towards veneration than gratitude.”15  And we must not forget the 
extensive treatments of religion, piety, observance and gratitude found in Seneca and Cicero, 
who, along with Macrobius, Aquinas cites as authorities on the subject. 
 
2.3 Overview of Gratitude in Aquinas 
 
 Aquinas treats of gratitude systematically in just two questions in the secunda secondae 
partis of the Summa: question one hundred and six, which deals with gratitude in general, and 
question one hundred and seven, which deals with the opposing vice of ingratitude.  There are, 
however, extensive treatments of thanksgiving throughout his works, and especially in his 
Commentaries on the Pauline epistles. 
 Taken together, the two questions in the Summa offer what might seem at first glance an 
unremarkable and straightforward description of gratitude: we should be grateful to benefactors, 
and avoid ingratitude.16  In article one, Aquinas establishes that gratitude is a distinct virtue in 
its own right, although it is annexed to justice; in article two, he establishes that the penitent is 
more bound to give thanks than the innocent, since there is a greater debt in someone who is 
forgiven more than someone who needed to be forgiven little; in article three, he declares that 
we are always obliged to be grateful for favours, as much as circumstances allow, and given that 
the favour itself is objectively good; in article four he considers the time element in repaying a 
favour: if we repay a favour too quickly, we run the risk of giving the impression that the gift 
was a burden; if we take too long in repaying, we may seem ungrateful; in article five, Aquinas 
asks if gratitude should be made according to the nature of the gift, or according to the intention 
                                                          
14 DeWitt p. 322, ff. The Epicurean community, DeWitt explains, were required to make offerings or 
contributions to the Philosophers who taught their disciples, since Wisdom, which the teachers 
bestowed, is the highest of all Nature’s gifts. 
15 Ibid. 
16 ST II-II, 106 & 107. 
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of the giver—to which he answers repayment should be made according to the mind or intention 
of the giver;  finally, he asks in article six, whether or not we should repay more than we have 
been given.  Again, he answers in the affirmative: we should strive to outdo the kindness of 
benefactors as much as our circumstances allow, since in this way friendship is forged and 
grows and doesn’t resemble commutative justice. 
Aquinas’ treatment of gratitude places it last in a sequence of related virtues, following 
religion, piety and observance.  Together with gratitude, these virtues comprise a sub-section in 
the Treatise on Justice in the Summa dealing with what I will refer to as “virtues of 
indebtedness”.   
Why am I calling just these four virtues “virtues of indebtedness” and not all of the 
virtues annexed to justice, such as retribution (vindicatio) and truth (veritas), which follow in 
the Treatise on Justice?17  Primarily this is so because Aquinas himself relates these four virtues 
to each other himself, showing how they are linked in a hierarchy of participation.  That 
hierarchy is a hierarchy of debt and based on the hierarchy of causes giving rise to the various 
modes of indebtedness (ST II-II, q.106, a.1).  Thus, our chief debt is to God and repayment of 
this debt pertains to the virtue of religion.  Secondly, we owe a debt to our parents, who are the 
proximate cause of our existence, and the repayment of this debt pertains to piety.  Thirdly, we 
owe a debt of obedience and reverence to our superiors, who represent God for us, and the 
repayment of this debt pertains to observance.18  Finally, we owe a debt of thanks to our 
benefactors who, in giving us gifts and benefits, represent and participate in Providence; and the 
repayment of this debt belongs to gratitude. 
On further reflection we also find that not all of the virtues listed by Aquinas towards 
the end of the Treatise deal with the same matter.  Retribution, for example, is not concerned 
with the same kind of debt as the virtues of indebtedness; retribution is concerned with seeking 
                                                          
17 Vindicatio is most commonly translated as ‘vengeance’ in various editions of the Summa.  I have 
chosen to use ‘retribution’ here, since the word ‘vengeance’ does not carry the same connotation for 
modern minds as it did for Aquians and his contemporaries.  For Aquinas, there is a difference between 
retribution or vengeance as an act of retaliation, versus retribution rooted in the restoration of justice 
through the punishment of sin and crime.   
18 Aquinas lists obedience as belonging to the virtue of observance since observance is primarily 
concerned with authority. ST II-II, q.80, a.1, ad.3. 
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satisfaction for a different kind of debt than that with which the virtues of indebtedness are 
concerned: namely, the debt of punishment (reatus poenae), while the virtues of indebtedness 
are concerned with a specific kind of moral debt (debitum morale; ST II-II, q.108, a.2, ad.1).   
Truth similarly is a general virtue which applies to what one person communicates to 
another. Given its universal scope, truth is common to all virtues (ST II-II, q.109, a.2, ad.3).  In 
other words, the obligation to tell the truth exceeds the object of a virtue of indebtedness, which 
deals specifically with acts of praise and worship.  One should, he says, be truthful in praise, but 
the virtue of truth is not limited to praise, but extends to everything which a person utters when 
a truth claim is being made and so applies to all virtues.  The same point can be made of 
liberality (which deals with money) and epikeia (the “spirit of the law”).  Each of these have a 
character which either exceeds the scope of the virtues of indebtedness or, as in the case of 
liberality, have an even more limited scope.  All of the virtues Aquinas discusses from question 
eighty to one hundred and twenty have something in common, inasmuch as they are potential 
parts of justice, falling under the more perfect notion of justice; but the virtues of indebtedness 
have a unique reference point insofar as they are each concerned with the notion of gift.19   
In establishing the kind of virtue that gratitude is, Thomas sets out to establish first, that 
gratitude is both connected to justice but not simply identical with it; and secondly, that 
gratitude is part of a fourfold hierarchy of the virtues of indebtedness (religion, piety, 
observance and gratitude).  I am calling these virtues ‘virtues of indebtedness’ furthermore 
because, in the first place, they are also intimately linked with one another in a hierarchy of 
indebtedness to a benefactor—the archetype of whom is God.   
Man becomes a debtor to other men in various ways, according to 
their various excellences and the various benefits received from them. 
On both counts God holds first place, for He is supremely excellent, 
and is for us the first principle of being and government.20 
 
Secondly, Thomas describes and delimits each of these virtues within the context of a 
theology of debt which he works out in a discussion of these virtues in particular and which will 
                                                          
19 One final virtue in Aquinas’ list following the virtues of indebtedness remains to be examined: that of 
friendliness (amicitia) which does have a unique relationship to the virtues of indebtedness and which 
will be treated of later in the discussion. 
20 ST II-II, q.101, a.1. 
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be explored in greater depth in the next chapter.  But in what sense are these virtues potential 
parts of justice and thus indicative of indebtedness?  Thomas describes the virtues of 
indebtedness as being virtues annexed to justice though not properly identified with special 
justice or justice properly speaking.  Given that Thomas identifies at least different species of 
justice, such as distributive and commutative, the first thing which needs to be clarified is 
whether or not the virtues of indebtedness are annexed to either species, both or some other 
species.21 
In fact, it is clear that for Thomas the link between justice and the virtues of 
indebtedness exists on account of the obligation placed upon the recipient, and not on account 
of any contract which exists on the part of the donor of a gift.  “Voluntary commutations are 
when a man voluntarily transfers his chattel to another person. And if he transfer it simply so 
that the recipient incurs no debt, as in the case of gifts, it is not an act of justice but of 
liberality.”22  So gratitude does not correspond to commutative justice.  Nor, as it turns out, does 
it correspond to distributive justice, which is concerned with the sharing out of goods common 
to all.  Gift-giving is not an act of distributive justice, which is concerned with giving each 
person his due (ST I, q.21. a.1).  Gifts are not due to anyone. 
The principal reason why the virtues of indebtedness are distinct from justice properly 
speaking is that special or proper justice is defined by a kind of binding commutation by 
analogy: “the matter of justice is external operation, in so far as an operation or the thing used in 
that operation is duly proportionate to another person, wherefore the mean of justice consists in 
a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person.”23  But there 
cannot be this kind of equality of binding commutation with the virtues of indebtedness strictly 
speaking; rather, the virtues of indebtedness involve a kind of metaphorical commutation of the 
                                                          
21 ST II-II, q.61, a.1 
22 ST II-II, q.61, a.3.  It may seem curious that Thomas implies here that there is no debt for the recipient 
of a gift, which extends from the donor on account of liberality rather than obligation, since Thomas is at 
pains elsewhere to identify the virtues of indebtedness with objects of debt.  This apparent 
contradiction will be dealt with in the section on debts and is made clear from the fact that Aquinas uses 
the term of debt analogously, one in reference to the legal debt, and again in reference to a moral debt, 
or the “commutation of the heart”. 
23 ST II-II, q.58, a.10 
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heart: they represent an exchange of love, which cannot be quantified externally in the way that 
the things of justice are weighed up and measured. “Gratitude,” says Aquinas, “depends chiefly 
on the heart” (recompensatio magis in affectu consistit). This commutation of the heart is the 
essence of friendship, and the function of gratitude: 
Since true friendship is based on virtue, whatever there is contrary to 
virtue in a friend is an obstacle to friendship, and whatever in him is 
virtuous is an incentive to friendship. In this way friendship is 
preserved by repayment of favours, although repayment of favours 
belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.24 
 
Each of the virtues of indebtedness share the common feature of a certain kind of 
obligation, or indebtedness, to another.  This particular kind of obligation is to be distinguished 
from other kinds of obligation which Aquinas deals with in the Treatise on Justice.  The kind of 
debt which the virtues of indebtedness deal with is not a legal debt (debitum legale) but rather a 
moral debt (debitum morale).  This distinction is key for Aquinas, although it has not been 
widely explored in studies of Aquinas’ treatment of Justice in general.  The virtues of 
indebtedness thus involve an indebtedness of a moral kind as opposed to a legal kind; in other 
words, it is a moral indebtedness of love.  Each of the virtues of indebtedness—religion, piety, 
observance and gratitude—thus have this essential feature in common; the form of each is 
constituted in what could be termed a voluntary commutation of the heart, or of love and 
friendship.  They also share in common the payment of honour or worship, which is the special 
feature of gratitude.  Thus gratitude is linked to all four virtues of indebtedness as it is the virtue 
whose specific matter deals with the repayment of moral debts (recompensatio debiti moralis; 
ST II-II, q.108, a.2, ad.1). 
 
2.3.1 Aquinas’ Logic of Gratitude 
 
Throughout the ancient world, taking us all the way up to Aquinas, we find that 
gratitude is understood to be intrinsically linked with the notion of the debt of praise, worship 
and offering.  In a liturgical setting within Judaism and Christianity, this notion of offering is 
                                                          
24 ST II-II, q.106, a.1, ad.3:  
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further refined into the notion of sacrifice.  Aquinas’ preferred term for gratitude to God is,  in 
fact, the closely linked term thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) which suggests liturgical action.  In 
this, he draws heavily on Dionysius, for whom thanksgiving and praise are intimately linked; 
specifically, he draws on the Dionysian understanding of ‘action’, which can refer to either act 
in terms of the ‘form’ of a thing, or act in terms of ‘doing’.  The verb agere includes both 
meanings; and Aquinas applies both to the concept of gratitude; since through one’s virtuous 
actions one ‘becomes’ divinised; and what one is, in form, likewise determines the motivation 
for and character of one’s actions.  In this way, the gratiarum actio implies more than simply 
doing, but also includes being in a specific way. 
Aquinas uses gratia, gratitudo and gratiarum actio to identify gratitude and its related 
acts throughout his treatment of the virtue in question one hundred and six in the secunda 
secundae partis.  He also uses, with considerable frequency, the transitive verb recompenso in 
conjunction with gratia (to return a favour or thanks) to describe the effect of gratitude, so that 
the virtue clearly implies the necessity of return or repayment: gratitude is not simply a passive 
state of reception.  Both gratitudo and gratiarum actio are used to describe habits, since all 
virtues belong to the genus of habits.  Aquinas does not explicitly state what the distinction is 
between the works of gratitude and thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) in question one hundred and 
six explicitly, although the distinction becomes clearer from an analysis of the primary texts, 
and would have been readily understood by his contemporary reader as is suggested by the 
historical context in which Aquinas is writing.  His preferred term throughout his works which 
treat or touch upon the notion of gratitude or thanksgiving is gratiarum actio, especially when 
the concept of gratitude is applied to the works of religious practice and the worship of God.  In 
fact, he does not generally use gratitudo at all in reference to the thanks we owe to God: 
gratitude is generally, though not exclusively, reserved for thanks to our human benefactors, 
which is only a participation in the ultimate gratitude to God.  In speaking of gratitude to God, 
he will also often use gratia, which simultaneously connotes grace and gift by way of 
correspondence.  Aquinas treats of gratitude to God under the acts of religion.  The term 
gratiarum actio is more commonly used to describe works of gratitude to God and is linked to 
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the notion of praise and prayer, so that we find in his treatise on the Eucharist the expression, 
“oratio gratiarum actionis” to denote parts of the liturgy in which prayers of thanksgiving are 
offered. 
Gratitudo describes the virtue of gratitude properly speaking; that disposition whereby 
one is habitually inclined to giving thanks for benefits received and the commensurate acts that 
such thanksgiving demands.  Gratitudo is mostly reserved by Aquinas for describing our 
indebtedness to friends and benefactors.  It follows the virtues of observance, by which we 
honour persons of dignity, which in turn follows piety, by which we honour our parents and 
homeland.  Piety in turn is further subordinated to the virtue of religion, by which we honour 
God.  These four virtues (gratitude, observance, piety and religion) which share the character of 
indebtedness, are linked together and follow a hierarchical scheme of participation. 
…the nature of the debt to be paid must vary according to the various 
causes giving rise to the debt, so that the greater debt always includes 
the lesser. Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in 
God, in that He is the first principle of all our goods: secondarily it is 
found in our father, because he is the proximate principle of our 
begetting and upbringing; thirdly it is found in the person that excels 
in dignity, from whom general favours proceed; fourthly it is found in 
a benefactor, from whom we have received particular and private 
favours, on account of which we are under particular obligation to 
him.25 
 
 One cannot separate the virtues of indebtedness out from one another; there is, in other 
words, no genuine virtue of religion without the prerequisite virtue of gratitude or piety.  One 
could not, for example, serve and worship God in acts of religion authentically while at the 
same time hating one’s parents.  Aquinas understands Christ’s command in Luke 14:26 (“If 
anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother, wife and children, brothers and 
sisters, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple”) in this context.  He understands the 
pericope to be referring to the proper ordering of love of God in the context of the hierarchy of 
                                                          
25 ST II-II, q.106, a.1: …secundum diversas causas ex quibus aliquid debetur, necesse est diversificari 
debiti reddendi rationem, ita tamen quod semper in maiori illud quod minus est continetur. In Deo autem 
primo et principaliter invenitur causa debiti, eo quod ipse est primum principium omnium bonorum 
nostrorum. Secundario autem, in patre, quod est proximum nostrae generationis et disciplinae 
principium. Tertio autem, in persona quae dignitate praecellit, ex qua communia beneficia procedunt. 
Quarto autem, in aliquo benefactore a quo aliqua particularia et privata beneficia percepimus, pro 
quibus particulariter ei obligamur. 
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the virtues of indebtedness: God comes first; and on account of the diffusive love of God, which 
is reflected in Creation, one ought on that account to show filial piety and respect to our elders.  
But our love of parents and country is related to God as cause is to effect, and so our first 
obligation is to God which in turn puts all other obligations into context.  Where there is a 
tendency to love of country, elders or kin over and against love of God, we ought on that 
account to hate (odire) our parents (ST II-II, q.26, a.2) since such a love is already distorted and 
not true love: “we are commanded to hate in our relatives, not their kinship, but only the fact of 
their being an obstacle between us and God.”26  There is then, among the virtues of 
indebtedness, a trajectory of thankfulness from benefactors to parents which ultimately leads us 
to God.  It is for this reason that Aquinas places gratitude last in the list of virtues of 
indebtedness; in keeping with his understanding of the acquisition of truth those things which 
are first principles, while better known in themselves, are more removed from us, and thus the 
last things we come to know; our knowledge is first rooted in what sense presents to us, and 
from there we ascend to first principles: “therefore it must be that, according to the progress of 
its natural manner of cognition, the reason advances from the things that are posterior to those 
that are prior, and from creatures to God.”27  
What distinguishes each of the four virtues of indebtedness is an objective measure: it is 
the intention of the benefactor to whom the debt is owed and not, as some would have it, to any 
subjective value placed on a gift by the beneficiary (ST II-II, q.106, a.5).  It is for this reason 
that gratitude to benefactors is subordinate—but ultimately contingent upon—thankfulness to 
God in this hierarchical scheme. 
Accordingly, since what we owe God, or our father, or a person 
excelling in dignity, is not the same as what we owe a benefactor from 
whom we have received some particular favour, it follows that after 
religion, whereby we pay God due worship, and piety, whereby we 
worship our parents, and observance, whereby we worship persons 
excelling in dignity, there is thankfulness or gratitude, whereby we 
                                                          
26 II-II, q.26, a.7, ad.1: in propinquis nostris non praecipimur odire quod propinqui nostri sunt; sed hoc 
solum quod impediunt nos a Deo. Furthermore, in II-II, q.34, Aquinas explains that hatred of God is 
brought about through an inordinate or distorted love of creatures.  Hatred of things which prevent us 
from reaching God is thus an act of genuine love. 
27 De Trinitate, Proemium (Recensio Vulgata): Unde oportet ut secundum naturalis cognitionis 
progressum ratio a posterioribus in priora deveniat et a creaturis in Deum. 
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give thanks to our benefactors. And it is distinct from the foregoing 
virtues, just as each of these is distinct from the one that precedes, as 
falling short thereof.28 
 
 Aquinas’ placement of gratitude last in the order of virtues of indebtedness needs to be 
understood in the context of this Dionysian hierarchy and metaphysical chain of knowing: 
gratitude is that virtue by which we first recognise gifts from human benefactors.  This is in fact 
our first contact with God; the daily reception of gifts and acts of generosity directed towards us 
are the normative entry points into the ultimate appreciation of God as the First Cause of all our 
goods.  Benefactors play their role within the context of Providence; through the hand of the 
benefactor closest to us, the ultimate benefaction of God is intimated and revealed: “The 
principle and chief cause of all our goods is found in God.”29    
But at the same time, it would be incorrect to think of gratitude’s subordination to 
observance, piety and religion as being a subordination of value or importance; indeed, as Jean 
Porter shows, there could be no higher virtues of observance and religion without the grounding 
of these virtues in their principle, which is gratitude.30  Thus, gratitude is not the last in a 
hierarchy of descent, but rather the first virtue in the hierarchy of ascent.  Observance, piety and 
religion are grounded in gratitude, which is the foundation upon which we begin to make the 
climb to God.  Catherine Pickstock has argued that all philosophy broadly considered, 
                                                          
28 Quia ergo non quidquid debemus Deo vel patri vel personae dignitate praecellenti, debemus alicui 
benefactorum a quo aliquod particulare beneficium recepimus; inde est quod post religionem, qua 
debitum cultum Deo impendimus; et pietatem, qua colimus parentes; et observantiam, qua colimus 
personas dignitate praecellentes; est gratia sive gratitudo, quae benefactoribus gratiam recompensat. Et 
distinguitur a praemissis virtutibus, sicut quaelibet posteriorum distinguitur a priori, quasi ab eo 
deficiens. 
29 ST II-II, q.106, a.1: In Deo autem primo et principaliter invenitur causa debiti, eo quod ipse est primum 
principium omnium bonorum nostrorum. 
30 See Porter, Jean. The recovery of virtue: the relevance of Aquinas for christian ethics. 
Louisville: J. Knox Press, 1990, p.138ff.  Porter has further argued that moral reasoning for 
Aquinas is rooted in a dialectical process rather than a deductive one.  This theory has the 
advantage of accounting for the unity of all the virtues, and helps explain the way in which 
gratitude and piety, for example, can remain distinct virtues in their own right, while at the 
same time being part of a wider experience of life in which the agent draws upon the full 
panoply of reason’s insights and judgements in order to make sense of what our moral 
obligations are.  Porter, Jean. Moral action and Christian ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995. 
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culminates in what she calls “doxological language”, or liturgy.  John Baldovin SJ summarises 
Pickstock’s project: “all thought, all language has praise as its true goal.  One is reminded of 
Alexander’ Schmemann’s understanding of the human being as fundamentally Homo 
Adorans—the creature whose main goal is to adore….”31   I find this characterisation of 
philosophy to be in keeping with Aquinas’ own understanding of the way in which a study of 
virtue points us to the practice of religion, “chief among the virtues” and culminating in the 
praise of God.  Therefore, the “subordination” of gratitude to observance, piety and religion 
needs be understood in the context of gratitude’s participation in the superlative gratiarum 
actio, which is the matter of religion. 
   
 
2.3.2 “Gratiarum Actio”  
 
The gratiarum actio associated with gratitude to God is, historically, an expression tied 
to both pagan, Jewish and Christian liturgy and ritual.  In the Imperial Roman court, it was used 
as panegyric praise in deference to the Emperor.  The Roman gratiarum actio was an act of 
praise of the Emperor for benefits received; such orations typically spell out, in superlative 
language, the beneficence of the Emperor and praise him for his generosity, wisdom and 
protection. 
Perhaps one of the best known examples of such a panegyric is that of Ausonius (ca.310 
– ca.395), whose prosaic work, Gratiarum actio dicta domino Gratiano Augusto, is a 
conventional panegyric oration in praise of and thanks to Gratian for making Ausonius a 
consul.32  It likely received a reading at Trier in 379, and would have been delivered in a 
ritualistic style typical of such panegyrics.  The reading has a remarkably liturgical flavour to it; 
the opening line of Ausonius’ work—“Ago tibi gratias, imperator Auguste”—is suggestive of 
                                                          
31 Baldovin SJ, John F. in Johnson, Clare V., and Nathan Mitchell. Ars liturgiae: Worship, Aesthetics, and 
Praxis: Essays in Honor of Nathan D. Mitchell. Chicago, IL: Liturgy Training Publications, 2003, p.59. 
32 See Decimus Magnus Ausonius. "Gratiarum actio dicta domino Gratiano Augusto." IntraText. N.p., n.d. 
Web. 16 Mar. 2014. <http://www.intratext.com/X/LAT0298.htm 
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the Christian liturgical formula, “Gratias tibi ago, Domine, sancte Pater,” as are many other 
pseudo-liturgical elements of Ausonius’ text which praise Gratian for his beneficence.  The 
document is infused throughout with the language of praise and glory which parallel the essence 
of the Christian liturgical rites from the earliest times.  Ausonius’ text is, in many respects, an 
extended type of Gloria, with clear echoes of the oration “tibi laus, tibi gloria, tibi gratiarum 
actio” directed to the Emperor.33 
Liturgical reference in the New Testament, such as Paul’s instructions regarding the 
celebration of the Lord’s Supper typically use eucharisteo for thanksgiving (for example, in 
those places in First and Second Letters to the Corinthians and the Letter to Ephesians which 
treat of the prayer and thanksgiving): “Do not get drunk on wine, which leads to debauchery. 
Instead, be filled with the Spirit, speaking to one another with psalms, hymns, and songs from 
the Spirit. Sing and make music from your heart to the Lord, always giving thanks to God the 
Father for everything, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Ephesians 5:18-20).  Aquinas’ 
always translates eucharisteo as gratiarum actio in his commentaries on the Pauline Epistles.34  
The third effect [of the Holy Spirit] is thanksgiving because, when 
someone is influenced in these ways toward God, he recognizes that 
everything he has is from God. For the more a person is affected by 
his relation to God and knows him, the more does he see God as 
greater while he himself becomes smaller, indeed almost nothing, in 
comparison with God…. So he declares giving thanks always for all 
things, for all his gifts, whether of prosperity or adversity. “I will bless 
the Lord at all times; his praise shall be always in my mouth” (Ps. 
33:1).35 
                                                          
33 Certainly, the notion of liturgy (from the Greek, leitourgia), predates the Christian use of the term, 
and means simply the public service to the polis or state, or—as in the Imperial court—the worship of 
the gods.  Both the concept and formula of liturgy as public service was readily adopted and adapted by 
the Christian Church on account of the various benefits it provided, not least of which was the 
structuring of acts of praise.  See Fortescue, Adrian. "Liturgy." The Catholic Encyclopedia. Vol. 9. New 
York: Robert Appleton Company, 1910. 16 Mar. 2014 
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09306a.htm>. 
34 This rendering is not an innovation of Aquinas and his rendering of eucharisteo as gratiarum actio has 
been the common practice of translators throughout antiquity, even prior to Jerome’s translation.  It has 
been the standard use from the very earliest of times in both East and West.  Any of a great number of 
examples suffice, but we have a good example of this in the close contemporary Latin translations of 
Theodore of Mopsuestia’s (ca. 350-428) commentaries on the Pauline epistles.  See Greer, Rowan A. 
Theodore of Mopsuestia: The commentaries on the minor Epistles of Paul. Atlanta: Society of Biblical 
Literature, 2010, introductory notes on the translations.   
35 Commentary on Ephesians, 5-7:  Tertius effectus est gratiarum actio: quia ex hoc quod aliquis sic 
affectus est ad Deum, recognoscit se omnia habere a Deo. Quanto enim aliquis magis afficitur ad Deum, 
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It is well known that the Eucharist has always been identified intimately in Christian 
theology with an act of thanksgiving; indeed, it represents the superlative thanksgiving possible 
to the human race through the sacrifice of Christ.  The liturgical action, which finds its roots in 
the Jewish Passover, is identified with the action of praise and thanks to God the Creator 
through Jesus Christ.36  Simply put, the notion of thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) is intrinsically 
linked to the action of the liturgy: the “actio eucharistica” is identified with the “gratiarum 
actio” in Christian theology and certainly in Aquinas.37  
In Patristic theology, gratitude to God is also typically understood in terms of praise, 
worship and liturgical sacrifice.  A few brief examples help illustrate the point. Among the 
Church Fathers we find, for example, the identification of gratitude with the redemptive mission 
of the Church in Christ in St Athanasius.38  St Irenaeus of Lyons likewise clearly understands 
gratitude in the liturgical framework of sacrifice and oblation: 
The oblation of the Church, therefore, which the Lord gave 
instructions to be offered throughout all the world, is accounted with 
God a pure sacrifice, and is acceptable to Him; not that He stands in 
need of a sacrifice from us, but that he who offers is himself glorified 
in what he does offer, if his gift be accepted…. We are bound, 
therefore, to offer to God the first-fruits of His creation, as Moses also 
says, “You shall not appear in the presence of the Lord your God 
empty;” so that man, being accounted as grateful, by those things in 
                                                                                                                                                                          
et ipsum cognoscit, tanto videt eum maiorem et se minorem; imo prope nihil, in comparatione ad 
Deum…. Et ideo dicit gratias agentes semper pro omnibus, scilicet donis, vel prosperis, vel adversis. 
36 It is not my intention to provide an exhaustive treatment of the relationship between thanksgiving 
and the Eucharist here, as this has been treated of extensively by historians of the liturgy.  A number of 
studies have explored and detailed the relationship between the Eucharistic and the notion of 
thanksgiving; see for example, Bouyer, Louis. Eucharist: theology and spirituality of the Eucharistic 
prayer. London: Notre Dame Press, 1968; and Vagaggini, Cipriano. Theological dimensions of the liturgy: 
a general treatise on the theology of the liturgy. Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1976, both of which 
treat of the Jewish notion of thanksgiving in the context of sacrificial atonement, and the inclusion of 
the awareness of the connection between thanksgiving and praise in the Christian liturgy.  See also Dix, 
Gregory. The shape of the liturgy. [New ed]. London: Continuum, 2005. Dix traces out the notion of 
thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) through the early centuries of the Church. 
37 See Bouyer, Louis. The Church of God: Body of Christ and Temple of the Spirit. San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 2011.  Here, Bouyer identifies the actio eucharistica with the entire work of Christ as the 
proclamation of the cosmic mystery of the whole of Scripture—a theme which I believe is echoed in 
Aquinas’ treatment. 
38 “Thanksgiving is, for Athanasius, the initial and even primary response to the work of redemption.” 
See Weinandy, Thomas G.. Athanasius: A Theological Introduction. Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2007, 
p.123 
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which he has shown his gratitude, may receive that honour which 
flows from Him.39 
 
In Book VIII of the Confessions, we find Augustine extolling gratitude in liturgical 
tones: “O my God, let me remember with gratitude and confess to you your mercies toward me. 
Let my bones be bathed in your love, and let them say: ‘Lord, who is like you? You have 
broken my bonds; therefore I will offer you the sacrifice of thanksgiving.’”40 This notion of 
offering thanks by way of sacrifice is a recurring theme in Augustine; M. Clement Eagan notes 
that Augustine’s use of gratiarum actio typically carries with is allusions to the Eucharist.41 
Anselm of Canterbury also understands gratitude in terms of the redemptive mission of 
Christ.  Gratitude, he argues in Book V of Cur Deus Homo is elicited in us by the awareness 
that Christ’s atoning sacrifice was not accomplished out of necessity on God’s part, but as a 
totally gratuitous gift.  Had it been out of necessity, gratitude would be compelled by necessity 
and therefore hollow.  But the work of atonement is totally gratuitous, deserving of greater 
thanks than had it been of necessity.  This totally gratuitous gift of redemption is therefore 
identified as a sacrifice in Book XVI; and so the human person’s participation in this sacrifice is 
nothing less than an act of gratitude for this work of salvation through Christ. 
Aquinas does not cite many of these sources in his own treatment of the gratiarum 
actio, but his own treatment of it is certainly in keeping with this tradition and presupposes it.  
What Aquinas gives us furthermore is perhaps the most detailed and sustained treatment of 
gratitude as both a liturgical formula and a key element of his Dionysian doctrine of 
participation.  He does also refer to Aristotle’s ethics in a number of places, where we find that 
Aristotle likewise links the notion of thanks to praise: “Gratitude is felt towards him who gives, 
and praise also is bestowed on him” (Ethics, IV.1). 
                                                          
39 Against Heresies, Book IV.18: Concerning sacrifices and oblations, and those who truly offer them. 
40 Confessions, Book VIII.1: Deus meus, recorder in gratiarum actione tibi, et confitear misericordias tuas 
super me. Perfundantur ossa mea dilectione tua, et dicant: Domine, quis similis tibi? Dirupisti vincula 
mea: sacrificem tibi sacrificium laudis. Peter J. Leithart argues that Augustine’s De Trinitate was both the 
most important source for the development of Western Trinitarian theology and the corresponding 
theology of gift and gratitude.  See Leithart, Peter J.. "Gift and Gratitude in the Middle Ages." 
Leithart.com. N.p., 28 Mar. 2006. Web. 30 Oct. 2013. <http://www.leithart.com/archives/001944.php>. 
41 See the footnote on page 313 in her translation of Augustine’s “The Excellence of Widowhood” found 
in Treatises on Various Subjects by St Augustine (Vol 16), Catholic University of America Press, 1952. 
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2.5 Gratitude in Contemporary Discourse 
 
 By way of a preliminary observation, and in order to contrast this original historical 
understanding of gratitude leading at least up to Aquinas, I wish to sketch out the contemporary 
understanding of gratitude which tends to obfuscate this original theological meaning of 
gratitude as a virtue, and may help explain why even among theologians and philosophers of 
religion today there is scant attention to the rich concept of gratitude as a virtue in Christian 
theology and particularly in Aquinas (who, while innovative in his treatment of gratitude is by 
no means working in isolation of both his own historical context and the patrimony of the 
theology of gratitude in both pagan and Christian antiquity).  This brief sketch will help clarify 
some key elements of Aquinas’ understanding of gratitude by way of contrast. 
It is instructive to trace the decline of gratitude since the high Scholasticism of Aquinas 
and the rise of gratitude as a purely psychological or affective state in its place following the 
18th century “liberation from authority”.42  In doing so, I hope that in so contrasting the modern 
devolution of gratitude I can set the stage for Aquinas’ understanding of gratitude that is 
obscured by the modern conceptions.  For Aquinas, virtues—including gratitude—are habitual 
dispositions of the will to certain species of human acts.  The acts of indebtedness furthermore 
have a specific character: they are the acts associated with praise and worship under two 
species: both latria (to God) and dulia (to persons of dignity). 
What we find in the 19th century especially, at which time gratitude is a popular concept 
in both philosophy of mind and natural theology, is the separation of the concept of virtue from 
habits of the will and a move towards thinking of virtues as being psychological and subjective 
states.  This voluntaristic trend has continued into modern treatments of gratitude, which 
frequently place it in the category of affective and psychological states.  I do not intend here to 
go into all the multifarious reasons for this shift of emphasis, but simply to show at least some 
                                                          
42 For a detailed study of the 18th-20th century effort to liberate the individual from authority, both 
religious and political, see Luxon, Nancy. Crisis of Authority: Politics, Trust, and Truth-Telling in Freud 
and Foucault. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
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of the reasons indicating that such a shift has occurred and the impact this shift has had on the 
popular perception of gratitude which persists to this day. 
There is in fact a notable trajectory from Aquinas to our present day in which the 
decline of gratitude, from the status of virtue as understood since Aristotle to that of an emotion 
or passion, can be seen.  Nor is it simply polemical to call this trajectory a “decline”.  The 
reduction of ‘virtue’ to affective states poses all kinds of theological and philosophical 
problems, not least of which is the elevation of the sensitive appetites above the will. 
One can find the full force of this shift in emphasis from virtue to a state of mind by 
picking up a copy of Emmons’ and McCullough’s The Psychology of Gratitude, a work which 
is considered to be influential in resurrecting the “neglected emotion” from a scientific point of 
view.43  One can also trace the effects of this decline of the notion of gratitude as virtue in 
recently published essays by philosophers trying to get a handle on gratitude in the aftermath of 
this sea change, as well as in recent popular literature on the topic—a great deal of which 
reinforces the notion of gratitude as an episodic, emotional state or psychological attitude.  
Patrick Fitzgerald, for example, insists that “Gratitude is an emotion or a set of feelings. One 
feels grateful…. One cannot be grateful without feeling grateful.”  There are many other such 
characterisations of gratitude in recent philosophical literature.44  But when conceived of from 
this affective and psychological point of view, gratitude appears as something paradoxical, as 
Margaret Visser for example discovers in her survey of cultural attitudes to gratitude around the 
                                                          
43 Emmons, Robert A., and Michael E. McCullough. The Psychology of Gratitude (Series in Affective 
Science). New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2004. 
44 Fitzgerald, Patrick. "Gratitude & Justice." Ethics 109.1 (1998), p.120.  Fitzgerald, like Visser, recognises 
that the affective treatment of gratitude is problematic: “The emotional component of gratitude poses a 
difficulty that philosophers commonly recognize” because emotions are subjective and difficult to fit 
into any coherent taxonomy.  It is rather remarkable therefore that he continues to insist on the 
affective characterisation of gratitude, without taking this recurring problem as an indication that 
something is perhaps wrong with the modern definition of gratitude in these affective terms.  Part of 
Fitzerald’s difficulty lies in his inability to see gratitude as being a virtue: while he does acknowledge that 
gratitude is not “merely an emotion” it remains that the “emotional component of gratitude is what 
differentiates it from the virtue of reciprocity.” The claim that gratitude is a virtue is, for Fitzgerald, 
“controversial.”  The reason it seems controversial is that it is nigh impossible to classify a set of 
emotions as being virtuous.  Once gratitude is labelled affective, any resemblance it has to a coherent 
definition of virtue quickly dissipates since the object becomes confused with the matter and subject. 
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world.45  The recurring difficulty for sociologists, psychologists and philosophers who count 
gratitude as an affective, purely subjective mental state is that one cannot place affections into 
any meaningful taxonomic framework: emotions shift, change, vary in degree; they are 
spontaneous, irregular and inconsistent.  Expressions of gratitude change furthermore from time 
to time and from place to place, from culture to culture, and valuations of gift-giving likewise 
change and are fluid and resistant to ready classification. 
 
2.5.1 Gratitude as Affective 
 
For Aquinas, gratitude is not an emotion or feeling.  Contra Fitzgerald, Aquinas would 
hold that one can indeed be grateful without feeling grateful.  In fact, we have an obligation to 
give thanks even in the absence of any concomitant emotion.  Gratitude for Aquinas is not 
simply an affective or psychological state, as it has widely come to be understood today.  
Gratitude is a virtue, and as such is a habit of the will oriented to some sort of specific action 
rooted in justice and charity, neither of which is affective: 
Thus, there are two virtues in will as in a subject, namely, charity and 
justice. A sign of this is that these virtues, although they pertain to 
appetite, are not about emotions, as temperance and courage are, and 
thus, it is clear that they are not in sense appetite in which the 
emotions are found, but in rational appetite, that is, will, in which 
there are no emotions.46 
 
To say that for Aquinas gratitude is not an emotion is not to say that he dismisses the 
role of the passions in the exercise of virtue.  His account of the virtues and of gratitude in 
particular is based on an anthropology rooted in love and friendship.47  Nicholas Lombardo 
                                                          
45 See, Visser, Margaret. Gift of Thanks: The Roots, Persistence and Paradoxical Meanings of a Social 
Ritual. New York: HarperCollins, 2008. Print.  Visser’s, like other contemporary commentaries on 
gratitude which suffer from the psychologism I here intend to explore, struggles to provide any coherent 
account of the virtue since the concept of the finality of the moral object has been eroded. 
46 De Virtutibus, q.1, a.5: Sic ergo duae virtutes sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto; scilicet caritas et 
iustitia. Cuius signum est, quod istae virtutes quamvis ad appetitivam pertineant, tamen non circa 
passiones consistunt, sicut temperantia et fortitudo: unde patet quod non sunt in sensibili appetitu, in 
quo sunt passiones, sed in appetitu rationali, qui est voluntas, in quo passiones non sunt. 
47 For an excellent treatment of the notion of love and friendship in Aquinas, see Sherwin, Michael S. By 
knowledge & by love: charity and knowledge in the moral theology of St. Thomas Aquinas. Washington, 
D.C. Catholic University Of America Press, 2011. 
38 
 
provides a thoroughgoing account of the way in which the passions are at the root of the virtues 
for Aquinas and shows how his account of justice, of which gratitude is a part, is infused with 
this rich anthropology which accords the passions a foundational role in the motivation of the 
human person.48  Lombardo shows that Aquinas’ treatment of the passions, which centre on his 
account of desire for the supernatural, is central not only to the Summa (being the longest 
sustained treatise on the emotions ever written by its time) but to Aquinas’ overarching theology 
of creation throughout his entire works. 
Lombardo argues that the passions are naturally inclined towards reason, and, when 
properly ordered to reason, compliment it and “fill out”, so to speak, the human person.  Rightly 
ordered passions of the soul, such as delight, joy and love, complement the virtuous life and 
help orient it.49  The passions, so ordered, are therefore not simply accidental to the human 
person in the sense that they are dispensable or irrelevant to the exercise of virtue.   
For Aquinas, ethics involves more than the analysis of discrete 
choices: it is concerned with persons more than their actions. The 
virtuous life is about the cultivation of a fully human 
personality...virtue is the expansion of the self to its fullest potential 
for greatness, happiness and creativity. The parameters of virtue are 
determined by the teleology of human nature not by rules or 
conventions.50 
 
The passions are rather essential to the perfection of the human person, for it is through 
our passions that we not only know what is good, but also desire the good.  Mercy and 
compassion, for example, would be hollow and mechanical if it weren’t for the role of desire in 
moving the heart to pity and sorrow.  Similarly, joy and hope are infused with the language of 
desire in the Summa.  Lombardo notes that Aquinas’ treatise on justice is similarly infused with 
the language of affection, so that it is not simply a legalistic treatment of rights and wrongs 
measured mechanistically, but rather is informed by a humane and sensitive understanding of 
the human person:  
                                                          
48 See Lombardo, Nicholas E., The logic of desire: Aquinas on emotion. Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2011. 
49 ST I, q.20.  Aquinas does not treat of love, properly speaking, as being a “passion” simply speaking. 
Charity is a theological virtue; but love is often treated of in various and often analogical ways which 
include not only the exercise of charity but concomitant emotions which often accompany the exercise 
of such virtues, as Lombardo shows. 
50 Lombardo, p.242. 
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Throughout the questions on justice, Aquinas’s primary interests are 
the nature of just human relationships and the affective dimensions of 
various virtues and vices, not the resolution of complex cases of 
conscience.  In fact, in the questions on justice, Aquinas uses the 
terms “affection” and “interior passions” with some frequency.  It 
seems plausible that his sustained reflection on justice generated a 
deeper sensitivity to the category of affectus, since the virtue of justice 
involves, in Aquinas’s account, precisely those appetitive movements 
that are not passions and yet are still constitutive of character and 
personality.51   
 
We find similar references to the affections identified by Lombardo in the treatise on 
Justice specifically in the treatment of gratitude as well.  Aquinas, in fact, identifies affection 
(affectus) as being the chief motivation for wanting to repay a favour.52  And in question one 
hundred and six, he says that a gift should be repaid “in the heart” before anything else. 
Gratitude or thankfulness can certainly be expressed affectively.  We could even go so 
far as to say gratitude is enlivened and perfected by the orientation of the heart.  This affectivity, 
however, does not constitute gratitude, but rather points to it or accompanies it and may indeed 
“fill it out”.  But strictly speaking, such affectivity is accidental to the nature of gratitude itself, 
and so cannot be our starting point in trying to get a handle on the nature of gratitude.  In fact, 
when one does reduce gratitude to the affective, it becomes very difficult to define it at all.  
Aquinas certainly understood this: one cannot derive definitions of things from their accidental 
properties alone.  This explains why a number of commentators seem to be so perplexed about 
gratitude and how to get a handle on it.  But one cannot define a thing through its accidental 
properties. 
The contrast between Aquinas’ notion of gratitude as a virtue as a habit of the will 
oriented towards particular species of human acts and the emergence of the psychological 
“virtues”, on the other hand, which describes a wholly subjective state, is clearly seen in various 
works of the British and Scottish empiricists following the Enlightenment, and in the American 
pragmatists.  We find such an interest in gratitude on both sides of the Atlantic in 19th century 
philosophical circles owing to the liberal exchange of ideas and mutual appreciation between 
the American, British and Scottish schools of philosophy.  The period witnessed a surge of 
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52 ST II-II, a.106, a.3, ad.6: …recompensatio beneficii praecipue pendet ex affectu. 
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interest in the notion of gift and gratitude, largely due to the study of gift economies in 
anthropology following the West’s discoveries in the Pacific and elsewhere of “primitive 
peoples and practices,” and also because of the emergence of the philosophy of mind as a 
precursor to contemporary psychology. 
 
2.5.2 19th Century Notions of Gratitude 
 
The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation by the Pennsylvanian minister James Barr 
Walker (1805-1887), for example, went through several editions in England where it was both 
popular and influential.  Gratitude is a constant theme in this anthropological survey of 
primitive religions which he suggests are precursors to Christian worship.  Despite the book’s 
pretentions at being a philosophy, the work is pietistic and appeals to emotion rather than any 
real, worked out philosophical methodology, and to “Revelation”, which is often a synonym for 
speculations in natural theology.  Walker’s Plan of Salvation does have important features; it 
recognises, for instance, that the human creature “becomes assimilated into the moral character 
of the object which he worships.”53  Aquinas would say similarly that “it is evident that to 
render anyone his due has the aspect of the good, since by rendering a person his due [including 
God in worship], one becomes suitably proportioned to him.”54  Consequently, through the 
works of thanksgiving to God, we become “divinised”.  Gratitude is thus a means by which we 
become united to our benefactors.  Walker even approaches something of a metaphysic in this, 
understanding that this principle “operates with the certainty of cause and effect.”  But, unlike 
Aquinas, Walker’s metaphysical insight reveals that it is rooted in an appeal to subjective 
emotional states: the quality of worship, for Walker, is rooted in the quality of desire in the 
individual and his enthusiasm for ritual.  For Walker, distraction in prayer is thus the dilution of 
the efficacy of prayer, whereas for Aquinas, the occasional distraction in prayer does not 
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54 ST II-II, q.81, a.2: Et ideo necesse est dicere omnem actum bonum ad virtutem pertinere. Manifestum 
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necessarily undermine the efficacious nature of prayer, since prayer has, for Aquinas, an 
objective value of praise (ST II-II, q.83, a.13).  For Walker, praise is a subjective emotion. 
The cause and effect Walker has in mind is the cause and effect of emotional states of 
the individual.  True worship of God, for Walker, requires “sympathy”, right “affections of the 
soul”, properly oriented “affectionate obedience”.   Chapter five of the Plan treats of passion 
and affection as being the foundation of gratitude and worship.  In fact, Walker subordinates the 
will to affection as a motivation: “the affections, although not governed by the will, do 
themselves greatly influence the will.”55  Virtue, for Walker—and in this, he is emblematic of 
this period of philosophy—arises, not from a perfection of the will which governs and orders 
the emotions, but from emotional states which inspire love, conceived of in purely affective 
terms.  Virtue is, by extension, conceived of in purely axiological terms.  The result is that 
gratitude, for Walker, focusses on the perception and affection of the beneficiary rather than the 
intention of the donor: “Keeping in mind the fact that the more we need a benefactor and feel 
that need, the stronger will be our feelings of gratitude and love the being interposes on our 
behalf….”56  For Aquinas, gratitude involves an evaluation of the intention of the donor and not 
the value of the beneficiary (ST II-II, q.106, a.5: gratitude is measured according to the 
disposition of the giver, rather than the effect, namely the disposition or intention of the 
beneficiary).  Walker’s conception of gratitude is consequently of an idealist strain.  Much of 
Walker’s very interesting treatment of idolatry in primitive worship, which idolatry could only 
be overcome through the Incarnation, ironically leaves one with a purely subjective view of 
gratitude, worship and virtue in general.  Walker’s placement of the passions and affections in 
the category of motive causes for virtue furthermore sits in stark contrast to Aquinas, who 
maintains that the passions and emotions cannot directly move the will, but only indirectly in 
the person who is inattentive and confused (ST I, q.77, a.1). 
Like Walker, the Scottish moral philosopher and political economist Adam Smith 
(1723-1790) places a lot of emphasis on the value of gratitude.  Smith places gratitude, much in 
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the same way that Marcel Mauss will do in The Gift of 1925, as a social construct within a 
framework of gift exchange and reciprocity.  Smith’s celebrated Theory of Moral Sentiments 
(first published in 1759) dedicates much to the concept of gratitude within this framework.  
Several elements of Smith’s treatment echo elements of Aquinas’ treatment of gratitude.  For 
example, Smith understands gratitude as a being motivated by indebtedness.57  But unlike 
Smith, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of indebtedness: the legal debt (debitum 
legale) and the moral debt (debitum morale).  The legal debt is a requirement of commutative 
justice, namely, that I repay what I have been given or loaned equitably and in a timely fashion.  
The moral debt, however, is only a debt by analogy; the debitum morale, of which species the 
debt of gratitude falls under, is the insatiable debt of love and friendship.58  For Smith, no such 
distinction between a legal debt and moral debt of this kind is made; Smith’s understanding of 
the debt of gratitude parallels Aquinas’ notion of legal debt, an obligation of an economic kind 
which functions as a commutative exchange for the benefit of society.  For Aquinas, to treat a 
gift with the obligation of legal due is to be ungrateful (ST II-II, q.107, a.1, ad.3). 
Like Walker, Smith sees the motive cause of gratitude as being rooted in sentiment and 
emotion, and particularly in sympathy.59  Smith also understands that gratitude often 
accompanies love.  But at the same time, Smith draws a distinction between love and gratitude.  
Love, Smith argues, is concerned with seeking the happiness of the object of our love.  We seek 
in love, in other words, a change in the other.  Gratitude, on the other hand, has no such object; 
                                                          
57 “If the person to whom we owe many obligations, is made happy without our assistance, though it 
pleases our love, it does not content our gratitude. Till we have recompensed him, till we ourselves have 
been instrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourselves still loaded with that debt which his 
past services have laid upon us.” See Smith, Adam. Theory of Moral Sentiments.  A. Millar: London. 1761.   
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legal debt occurring within the context of economic gift exchange. 
59 Cf. Smith, particularly chapter one, “On Sympathy” and chapter five, “Of the Amiable and Respectable 
Virtues” for example.  This identification of gratitude with psychological states such as sympathy (and, 
by extension, guilt and shame) continues to persist to this day.  See for example, McNamara, Patrick. 
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its aim, rather, is the satisfaction of a legal due according to social norms, and can be executed 
in the absence of love.  Gratitude is about shedding one’s own personal sense of obligation.  
Our love, however, is fully satisfied, though his good fortune should 
be brought about without our assistance. All that this passion desires is 
to see him happy, without regarding who was the author of his 
prosperity. But gratitude is not to be satisfied in this manner. If the 
person to whom we owe many obligations, is made happy without our 
assistance, though it pleases our love, it does not content our gratitude. 
Till we have recompensed him, till we ourselves have been 
instrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourselves still loaded 
with that debt which his past services have laid upon us.60 
 
For Aquinas, the form of all the virtues is love (ST II-II, q.23, a.8) and gratitude is 
incoherent as a concept both as a legal due and as independent of love and friendship (q.23, a.1).  
Smith’s notion of indebtedness is a burden which must be shed through the repayment of a due.  
For Aquinas, this understanding of indebtedness in fact equates to ingratitude (ST II-II, q.106, 
a.4).  One should repay, Aquinas says, the debt of gratitude (debitum morale) quickly according 
to “the affection of the heart”; but while a legal debt (debitum legale) should be repaid at once 
(q.106, a.4, ad.1), the moral debt needs to be repaid “according to the demand of the rectitude of 
the virtue” (secundum quod exigit rectitudo virtutis).  This rectitude of the virtue is not for 
Aquinas, as it is for Smith, determined according to the emotions of the recipient, or on account 
of a sense of legal obligation, but rather according to the nature of the gift and the intentions of 
the benefactor.  The “rectitude of the virtue” requires praise and worship in the form of ritual. 
Along with Walker and Smith, the Scottish physician and philosopher John 
Abercrombie (1780-1844) sits at a pivotal juncture in this transitional phase and exemplifies the 
slide into psychologism also disguised as natural theology in his treatment of gratitude.  In one 
respect, Abercrombie is emblematic of the Enlightenment project in Scotland which aimed to 
reform metaphysics, and the influence of his predecessors is clearly seen in his attitude towards 
virtue and gratitude in particular.  Abercrombie seems to be aware of the consequences of the 
unravelling of metaphysics in contemporary philosophy, and he struggles to give the virtues and 
gratitude any coherent meaning, although he is not, along with Walker, able to see why and 
therefore not in a position to properly address the decline. 
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Not much has been written on the work of Abercrombie; partly because, from a 
philosophical point of view, his insights contribute little to the study of philosophy or 
metaphysics and his misreading of Scholasticism is evident from reading his works.  From a 
scientific point of view, he belongs to the long-since discredited discipline of phrenology.  
Despite the fact that he has contributed little to philosophy or science however, Abercrombie 
remains of interest for at least one other significant reason.  One can see in his writing that he is 
something of a melting pot of British and Scottish empiricism.  He is strongly influenced by 
both Locke and Hume.  At the same time, he appeals to the American pragmatist movement and 
natural theology typified by Walker, and the emerging science and philosophy of mind.  For 
Abercrombie virtue is not a habit of the will but rather a reasoned judgement—independent of 
any authority—which must also be made independently of the affections or emotions which 
influence, often unduly, the exercise of sovereign reason.  There is no distinction in 
Abercrombie’s system between speculative reasoning and practical reasoning; he conflates 
prudence and justice.  Truth only has value insofar as it has practical applications for right 
conduct: “it appears then, that the exercise of reason is precisely the same, and is guided by the 
same laws, whether it be applied to the investigation of truth, or to the regulation of conduct.”61 
While Abercrombie does not share Walker’s emphasis on the role of affections in 
motivating a subjective notion of virtue, he shares with Walker the separation of the will from 
his understanding of virtue.  The same difficulty, however, arises for him in this move. Just as 
affections do not lend themselves to a description of action, neither do reasoned judgements 
which evaluate gifts in terms of their subjetice value, rather than the intention behind the giving 
of them.  Human reason, for Abercrombie, must overcome the will, which he tends to conflate 
with wilfulness.  “In every exercise of judgement, it is of essential importance, that the mind 
shall be entirely unbiased by any personal feeling or emotion which might restrain or influence 
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its decisions.  Hence the difficulty we feel in deciding on a subject in which we are deeply 
interested….”62  
Thus, also, we may say to a man of strict integrity and virtue, that he 
has not the power to commit murder or robbery, or any act of gross 
injustice or oppression. He may reply, that he has the power to do it if 
he willed: and this is granted, for this is free agency; but it is not the 
question in dispute.  We do not say that he has not the power to do any 
or all of these acts, if he willed, but that he has not the power to will 
such deeds.63 
 
Practical reason must set aside will and affection in order to establish a rational 
foundation for moral action.  Gratitude is therefore annexed to prudence rather than justice in 
Abercrombie’s system. The reason the moral agent does not have the “power to will” is because 
his will has been subordinated to reason.  Such a view is borne out of Abercrombie’s mistrust of 
Scholastic metaphysics, and an objective notion of the “good” as something ontological in its 
own right.  For Aquinas, the object of the will is the good, while the object of reason and 
intellect is the true (ST I, q.16, a.1ff).  For Walker, Smith and Abercrombie, the notion of the 
good is established either as an affective state (Walker), a social construct (Smith) or a 
prudential judgement (Abercrombie).  All three attitudes share a subjective and voluntaristic 
view of gratitude which in effect radically alter the nature of the virtue of gratitude as a response 
to the instigation of friendship, according to the Aristotelian-Thomistic definition.  
More contemporaries of Walker, Smith and Abercrombie could be added to the list:  
Francis Hutcheson (1694 –1746) and Thomas Chalmers (1780-1847) also have treatments of 
gratitude which mirror much of what their contemporaries understood gratitude to be: in short, 
emotive states or rational or appetitive constructs which reduce gratitude to the subjective, 
psychological arenas.  Virtue thus becomes the domain of either sociology, as in the case of 
Smith, or of the philosophy of mind (the precursor to psychology) for Abercrombie and 
Chalmers. We can give the final word to Chalmers, who encapsulates this theme running 
throughout the period:  
Mental science makes still larger contributions to the Philosophy of 
Morals; and the latter is still more dependent on the former, for the 
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solution of certain of its questions….  It is thus that the virtuousness of 
a right belief the virtuousness of certain of the emotions, as of 
gratitude for example, require for the demonstration that we should 
advert to the constitution of the mind, and evince therefrom the 
dependence of an intellectual state in the one case, and of a state of 
emotion in the other, on certain antecedent volitions which had given 
them birth.64 
 
 I am conscious that this is a brief survey of 18th and 19th century treatments of gratitude, 
one which focusses on one particular and localised period in philosophy.  But at the same time, 
it is accurate to say that it is broadly representative of the attitude toward gratitude in 
philosophy in the West at the time which persists today; furthermore, the period represents a 
radical departure from the way in which virtue and in particular the virtue of gratitude has been 
understood at least up until Aquinas.65  What all of these treatments have in common is this 
displacement of the individual from the context of the community.  For Aquinas, gratitude can 
only be properly understood within this context of community, which itself is not simply 
accidental to the human person, but constitutive of human nature.   
 
2.5.3 Modern Philosophical Developments 
 
Following the reduction of gratitude to subjective, physiological and affective states 
gratitude has since then fallen victim to the ‘deconstruction of the gift’ most famously 
associated with Jacques Derrida (1930 - 2004). 
For Derrida the notion of gift and gratitude present us with a paradox.  Derrida’s famous 
maxim that the gift is annulled by the very notion of gift, it turns out, highlights the problem 
with the modern, affective, understanding of gratitude.  In many respects, Derrida’s critique is a 
vindication of Aquinas’ understanding of gratitude, against the modern attempts to place the 
virtue within the boundaries of subjective, affective states.  The rejection of gratitude by Derrida 
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is a rejection of the psychological treatment of gratitude developed in the two centuries leading 
up to the present day. 
Contemporary psychology aims to avoid the perceived paradox of the gift by distancing 
the notion of gift from the affective experience of thankfulness.  It thus often forces a dichotomy 
between gratitude and gift so that the notion of gift disappears altogether.  What it leaves us 
with is perhaps a useful description of an emotion—but it is one detached from an origin in 
intention which gives it meaning and that preserves it from falling into voluntarism.  This trend 
is already evident in Marcel Mauss, who, in his influential essay on The Gift (1923), barely 
mentions gratitude in his ethnographic survey of gift-giving.  For Mauss, the gift is reduced to a 
sociological symbol of binding communities together.  There is no place for authentic gratitude 
in such a functionalist and obligatory account of the gift.  Neither Mauss nor Derrida find an 
intrinsic relationship between gift and gratitude, because both understand the gift as being a 
symbol of indebtedness.  As Derrida puts it, “this simple recognition [of gift as gift] suffices to 
annul the gift.  Why?  Because it gives back, in the place, let us say, of the thing itself, a 
symbolic equivalent.”66 
Aquinas’ treatment of might be criticised for the way in which gratitude is subordinated 
to obligations demanded by justice in general and the related virtues of indebtedness making 
genuine gratitude impossible.  Where one would expect to find further developments of 
gratitude or thankfulness (such as in the tertia pars where the Eucharist is treated of), there is no 
explicit treatment at all.  Why is there no reference to gratitude in the treatment of a sacrament 
whose very etymology implies thankfulness?  Yet in contrast to this perceived limitation of the 
treatment of gratitude, Aquinas’ treatment and reference to the gift is ubiquitous—throughout 
his works in general and the Summa specifically, spanning all three parts.  And yet we do not 
find an explicit treatment linking the notion of gift and gratitude generally speaking in his work.  
‘Gift’ in his theological landscape is applied primarily as a Divine Name for the Holy Spirit (ST 
I, q.38) and is not, generally speaking, mapped out alongside any systematic treatment of 
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gratitude.  Rather, the notion of gift subsides when the virtues of indebtedness are discussed by 
Aquinas, and in the place off ‘gift’ we find a preponderance of language relating to debt and 
obligation. 
Is this evidence then in suspecting in this that there is indeed an inevitable dichotomy 
between gift and gratitude?  Is the relationship between gift and gratitude an irresolvable 
dialectic?  Derrida declares, “The simple identification of the gift seems to destroy it.”67  Indeed, 
there are moments in reading the Summa where one begins to suspect that Derrida has a case to 
be answered.  Aquinas seems on the surface to have some difficulty in balancing gift and 
gratitude against justice and obligation, to the extent that he has been accused of obligating 
gratitude with such force within deontological language so as to rob gratitude of any sincerity or 
meaning. 
Many of these difficulties arise, not so much from Aquinas’ treatment of gratitude itself, 
but rather from the later, inherited notion of gift and gratitude derived largely from the 19th 
century commentators which does not correspond to Aquinas’ understanding.  We see this 
difficulty in the narrative of the gift and gratitude taken up by Derrida.   
Derrida held that there is no such thing as a gift freely given or freely received and that 
consequently the very notion of gift is destroyed in a kind of violence: the very act of giving at 
the same time involves coercing the recipient and placing an expectation of return on the part of 
the donor.  Mauss, whom Derrida both draws on and critiques in his own work on gift-giving, 
sums up the apparent paradox of the nature of the gift in the introduction to his celebrated essay: 
We intend in this book to isolate one important set of phenomena: 
namely, prestations which are in theory voluntary, disinterested and 
spontaneous, but are in fact obligatory and interested. The form 
usually taken is that of the gift generously offered; but the 
accompanying behaviour is formal pretence and social deception, 
while the transaction itself is based on obligation and economic self-
interest.68 
 
When Derrida takes up this narrative, he adds that as soon as gift giving is transacted, 
the donor places a burden on the recipient, drawing him back into this economic circle, the 
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“symbolic circle”, of giving and receiving.  In this circle, the recipient of a gift is “on trial” so to 
speak, in which he is under an obligation to repay in some way; until he has repaid, he is a 
debtor. 
[Recipients] are summoned to pay and to acquit themselves.  They 
must restitute and enter again into the symbolic circle.  They are on 
trial, they appear before the donee's court as before the law.  With the 
result that in the final accounting, at the end of this trial, it will be a 
question of their own gratitude with regard to whoever accepts their 
damage payment ….69 
 
 This is not to say that we may not have the intention of giving a gift, but time itself, or 
the temporal context in which the giving and receiving occurs, eventually destroys any 
possibility of the genuine gift. 
The temporalization of time...always sets in motion the process of a 
destruction of the gift: through keeping, restitution, reproduction, the 
anticipatory expectation or apprehension that grasps or comprehends 
in advance.  In all these cases, the gift can certainly keep its 
phenomenality or, if one prefers, its appearance as gift.  But its very 
appearance, the simple phenomenon of the gift annuls it as a gift, 
transforming the apparition into a phantom and the operation into a 
simulacrum.70 
 
 Interestingly, Derrida touches on an aspect of gift giving and gratitude that Aquinas 
himself tackled: the concept of the gift and gratitude in time.  For Aquinas, the role of memory 
is central to the relationship between gift-giving and gratitude.  Aquinas would not share 
Derrida’s concern that the temporalisation of the gift destroys the gift, and rather insists, in 
opposition to Derrida, that it is rather forgetfulness that destroys the gift: temporality and 
forgetfulness are not synonymous for Aquinas.  The only true gift for Derrida would be one 
where neither the donor had any expectation of return or where the recipient felt no obligation to 
make such a return.  But this would require a forgetfulness or lack of awareness of the exchange 
on part of both giver and receiver, which itself negates the possibility of the gift since gift 
necessarily involves recognition of value.  Thus, genuine gift giving becomes an impossibility, 
annulled in the very temporal exchange between donor and recipient. 
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 Given that no genuine gift is possible, it follows that neither is there any possibility of 
any genuine gratitude.  For Derrida, gratitude is not simply the recognition of a gift but a kind 
of enslavement; as soon as one is aware of there being a gift, there is an obligation, and the very 
nature of the gift is thereby annulled, making genuine gratitude likewise dissolve.71   
 Derrida’s critique of the gift and gratitude certainly poses a challenge to anyone 
wanting to retrieve gratitude from the work of Aquinas.  The impossibility of a free gift, outside 
of the economic circle of “trial” and repayment, may seem to be confirmed by a certain reading 
of Aquinas’ understanding of gratitude.  At times, Aquinas may seem to fall prey to Derrida’s 
critique, for example, when he says that a gift or favour “should be repaid in due time according 
as the rectitude of virtue demands” (ST II-II, q106, a4, ad1); and that since “the benefactor of 
his own free-will gave something he was not bound to give, so on the other hand the beneficiary 
repays something over and above what he has received” (ST II-II, q.106, a.6, ad.3); and all this 
is because “repayment of favours belongs specially to the virtue of gratitude.”  The language of 
economic exchange is difficult to miss in question one hundred and six.  It is a language of debt 
(debitum), owing (debere) and repayment (reddere)—and such language runs through every 
article. The challenge, however, turns out to be a challenge to the modern notion of gratitude, 
and not to the theological notion held by Aquinas.  Rather, overcoming the modern conception 
of gratitude as an affective state—as Derrida wanted to do—is the first step in recovering an 
authentic notion of gratitude as understood by Aquinas. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the notion of gift and gratitude as 
understood by Aquinas, in distinction to the way in which it is understood by Derridais that for 
Aquinas, an act of genuine gratitude—and the subsequent return of the gift—is not simply a 
symbolic gesture.  Gratitude for Aquinas is not simply a symbolic gesture of friendship 
mediated through a reciprocation of gift-giving.  Gratitude is already, in itself, the initiation of, 
and participation in, friendship.  The gift itself is less important than the intention or will of the 
donor (ST II-II, q.106, a.6), which is an invitation to the donee to enter into friendship.  The gift 
is a sign of friendship, and the act of gratitude is an acceptance of that offer.  As such, the 
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donee, in Aquinas’ system, does not simply attempt to match the gift with a symbolic 
equivalent, but understands the gift as a gesture of reciprocal friendship.   
John Milbank has shown however that this notion of reciprocity is present in Mauss, 
and is what distinguishes his treatment of the gift from that of Derrida whom Milbank criticises 
for misreading Mauss and being “unable to assimilate the more truly critical lesson of Mauss.”72   
Mauss understands that in the process of gift giving, there is a reciprocity of not just things, but 
of persons, who are mediated through the things that they give: “the thing given is not inert.  It 
is alive and often personified, and strives to bring to its original clan and homeland some 
equivalent to take its place.”73   Furthermore, Mauss understands that the reciprocity of the gift 
exchange is not something merely economic, but a gesture which is primarily spiritual and 
transcendent of any simple economic value placed on the thing given.  Gifts are, according to 
Mauss’ survey, not simply given for any value inherent in the gift itself, but rather they are 
given for what they represent.74   The gift, in other words, is enlivened by the reciprocal process 
of gift giving to the extent that a gift derives its meaning from the return-in-kind which it aims 
to generate.  The gift is therefore part of a discourse of bonding so to speak, and would have no 
meaning if considered simply as an object in itself.  That bonding is not simply economic, but 
embraces the legal, moral, cultural and religious strands of the donee’s self-identification.   
In this reading of primitive gift-giving cultures, Mauss is perhaps more in tune with 
Aquinas’ own understanding of the function of the gift-exchange than is Derrida, who is 
perhaps more focussed on the way in which Western societies have monetised the gift as a 
thing-in-itself. For Aquinas, the notion of reciprocity is central to the notion of friendship, or 
self-donation: 
In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be 
understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends return 
love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another.75  
 
                                                          
72 Milbank, John. Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon. London: Routledge, 2003, p. 156 
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Mauss is perhaps correct in noting that gift-giving is never free in that it necessitates a 
reciprocation, just as a gesture of friendship is not free without a reciprocal gesture.  To refuse 
to reciprocate a gesture of friendship is equivalent to a rejection of that friendship.  The very 
essence of friendship is reciprocity; and the very essence of reciprocity is gratitude and hence 
friends “return love for love.” 
Milbank has spent much of his career attempting to recover a notion of gift and 
gratitude within a theology of grace.  This understanding of gratitude within the context of 
reciprocity has largely been lost in modernity.  The failure of modernity, or what Milbank 
frequently describes as ‘liberalism’ is, in essence, the failure to understand the notion of gift and 
givenness—the failure to understand the “politics of the soul” in human governance and society, 
and consequently, to force a subordination of the givenness of the human person and 
interpersonal relationships (which are integral to the very givenness of the person) to economies 
which are fundamentally inhuman. 
Thus liberalism declares, as we have seen, that all is natural and yet all 
is artificial, because it cannot admit that we are "supposed to be 
cultural," that nature most fully reveals herself in the human 
experience of love for nature, for other humans and for the divine. 
This duality further plays itself out in the contradictory demand that 
all sacrifice their liberty to the needs of growth, and yet that the 
"rights" of all to assert their negative liberty and material comfort 
against this need are equally absolute; in the view that we must submit 
to inexorable economic necessities, and yet that economic processes 
are the ultimate expression of human freedom; in the demand that we 
work all the time, and yet equally relax and consume all the time; in 
the view that all our significant actions impinge on the freedom of 
others and so must mostly be criminalised and exposed to public 
ridicule in the name of "transparency," while equally we enjoy a right 
of absolute privacy to do what we like so long as it is (supposedly) 
done "only to ourselves." This despite the fact that any damage we did 
truly to ourselves and our own soul would render us the most 
dangerous of citizens. Whoever loses his own soul, cannot in fact gain 
even the world, because thereby he has helped to destroy the human 
world also.76  
 
Milbank recognises that in recent times, there has been both an awareness of this 
subordination of the givenness of the person to sterile economies and an attempt to rethink a 
theology of grace in its aftermath by Catholic and Anglican theologians.  Such a rethinking has 
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taken the shape of a resurgence of interest in the notion of person (about which much has been 
written in recent decades by numerous theologians and philosophers).  There is, as a result, a 
great deal of consensus among these that the human person is only properly understood 
‘dyadically’ or in terms of reciprocal giving against the cynicism of the liberal view of the 
human person. 
In the course of the nineteenth century, various socialisms, co-
operative movements and finally Catholic and much Anglican social 
teaching started to realise these more egalitarian implications of 
Christianity, not in the name of the liberal left, but precisely in 
criticism of its egoistic pessimism. Indeed, they appealed, as Michea 
argues, to what George Orwell called "common human decency," 
which Michea equates with the practice of gift-exchange or of 
reciprocity.77 
 
While not confined in his study to Aquinas, Milbank’s underscores at least two key 
elements of Aquinas’ own understanding of gift and gratitude. 
First, that the ‘gift’ is not simply something ontological or static; the gift, by its very 
nature, is the initiation of a relationship of mutual self-giving and it is through this process that 
the person is fully realised. In theological terms, the human person is a gift in essence; but even 
material gifts between two parties are a sign, or what Milbank calls a “point of intersection 
between the real and signifying.”78  Similarly, we find in Aquinas the recognition that, between 
friends, there is often an identification of choice for the same things, which accounts for the 
reason why friends like and dislike the same things.79   The things in themselves signify the 
unification of the will between friends, just as gifts signify, in a sense, a self-donation mediated 
through some vehicle.80   The gift, in other words, is an extension of the self—a sign of love 
extended through some medium—and the act of gratitude is in turn a reciprocation of that love 
so as to bring about a unification of the donor and donee in love.  The gift of the creation of the 
human person contains within it from the outset a sharing in the divine life through this very act 
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of giving.  The person who recognises this gift of creation becomes vivified, or fully alive, in 
gratitude that constitutes a full and proper understanding of self as given. 
Secondly, that reconciliation of the human person with God is a primary means through 
which the exchange of gift and gratitude takes place.  Given that the human person is by 
definition a gift of divine love, and given that human nature is in need of redemption, 
reconciliation with God becomes the second most important “point of intersection” between 
donor and donee for without reconciliation, the gift of self is itself lost.81   The person who 
experiences divine forgiveness by God re-enters the mystery of deification, or theosis through 
the invitation of divine forgiveness, enabled by the Incarnation.82   To know that one is forgiven, 
and to accept that forgiveness, is in that very act an act of gratitude.  It is perhaps not surprising 
therefore that Aquinas, in question one hundred and six dealing with gratitude, turns almost 
immediately in article two to the question of the gratitude owed by the penitent.  It is through 
the gratitude of the penitent—that is, through the experience of forgiveness—that the originary 
gift of self-discovery is redeemed and renewed. 
For Milbank, the gift reveals itself only as a coherent concept when understood in terms 
of such reciprocal giving; first, in the act of creation, the reciprocation of self-donation in 
gratitude establishes the bonds of love and friendship; secondly, given that human nature is 
fallen, the acceptance of forgiveness and response to reconciliation renews and strengthens 
these bonds.  I will return to these key themes in more detail throughout this study, following 
the placement of Aquinas in his historical context. 
2.6 Historical Context for Aquinas’ Treatment of Gratitude 
 
Not only do Abercrombie and Walker, et al, turn Scholastic moral theory on its head, 
but in doing so, they also lose sight of the historical understanding of gratitude up to their day.  
Indeed, one often finds in their writing a treatment of gratitude and gift-exchange in medieval 
and “primitive cultures” as little more than anthropological curiosities.   
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While innovative and unique in his sustained treatment of the virtues of indebtedness, 
Aquinas’ is not writing in a historical vacuum.  Not only is his thinking rooted in the ancient 
texts of Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, St Paul, Augustine and Dionysius, but it is also borne out of 
his lived experience in 13th century Europe which willingly inherited the Greco-Roman 
emphasis on gratitude as the means of social cohesion.  As Catherine Dunn has shown, gratitude 
was not only understood as being a virtue, but in Europe at his time it provided the very 
framework for social cohesion, based on varieties of the Teutonic notion of comitatus between 
the king and his subjects, and the corresponding loyalty that subjects owed to the king, the state 
and duly appointed representatives of these.  Ingratitude was thus not simply an unpleasant 
thing, but could in fact constitute treason.83  “In the Middle Ages and Renaissance,” Dunn 
writes, “the evil [of ingratitude] assumed overwhelming proportions and was regarded with 
horror scarcely explicable to the modern mind.”84 Ingratitude was considered a gross violation 
of the natural law, and for Aquinas at least, also a violation of the Divine Law. 
Aquinas’ treatment of gratitude is somewhat heterogeneous and so we cannot speak 
simply of gratitude in his philosophy as though there is only one concept here.  First of all, 
Aquinas treats of gratitude in both a perfect and imperfect sense.  In other words, he has in mind 
gratitude as it pertains to our temporal relationships to benefactors in general and more perfectly 
as it pertains to our relationship with God.  These distinctions run throughout his treatment of 
gratitude and the virtues of indebtedness in general.  In other words, he treats of gratitude as an 
acquired virtue and gratitude as an infused virtue (although it must be noted that his distinction 
between these is not always immediately clear or explicit in his treatment of the virtues of 
indebtedness). 
In the former treatment, gratitude as an acquired virtue, one needs to keep in mind the 
medieval gift economy in which we can place Aquinas’ thinking.  In this respect, gratitude 
reflects an element of the feudal and manorial system in Medieval Europe which put 
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considerable stock in reciprocal gift-giving, as well as that fealty owed to the head of state.85  
One’s place in society in the 13th century was determined by social status which in turn was 
determined by role, which extended for example from peasant to nobleman, including the 
various clerical offices. Hence, much of Aquinas’ discussion of gratitude treats of it as a social 
norm and here it has more of the character of commutative justice (the debitum legale to which 
we will return later) and the obligation one has to people according to their social standing.  
Such justice is relative according to one’s state in life.86  We have a right to expect certain things 
from one another and each must honour this responsibility that comes with living in a human 
society.  In this respect, gratitude is an obligation to honour a debt or a benefaction as a means 
of both encouraging liberality (no one wants to give to the ungrateful) and loyalty (one is bound 
to one’s benefactor).  This sort of gratitude qualifies as an acquired virtue and falls short of a 
more perfect form of gratitude.  One finds that gratitude is occasionally a mechanical enterprise 
in these kinds of situations, and so Aquinas’ language often slips into a more general discussion 
of justice in these instances.  But the acquired, social virtue, always remains a participation of 
our obligation to God, the first cause of all our goods. 
 Aquinas moves fluidly, and without explicit distinction, between discussions of 
imperfect and acquired gratitude to gratitude as an infused virtue.  The difference between the 
acquired virtues and the infused virtues is that the former correspond to our earthly happiness 
and the functioning of a well-ordered society.  These virtues can be acquired through regular 
practice and discipline (for example, one can teach oneself to overcome a fear of dogs through 
repeated practice). Hence acquired gratitude is also essential for social harmony and temporal 
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happiness but does not guarantee total Beatitude that supersedes human nature in its present 
state. 
Infused virtues on the other hand correspond to our eternal destiny and our life in God 
and have God as their effective principle.  While acquired virtue does not go beyond the 
limitations of natural human efficacy in respect to the powers of the soul, the infused virtues 
exceed the capacity of human nature. 87  The infused virtues have life in God and our eternal 
destiny as their proper end.   
The infused virtues ultimately have eternal life and friendship with God as their object.  
But this supernatural end is not something private to the individual; the infused virtue of 
gratitude to God is not something exclusively lived out in the quiet and secret of one’s heart, 
detached from the communio of God’s people.  This ecclesial notion of gratitude will be 
explored in a subsequent chapter, but for now it is worth noting that for Aquinas, the highest 
form of treason with its “horror of overwhelming proportions” is that treason against the Church 
itself in the form of heresy. Quoting Gregory VII’s decree at the 5th Roman Council, Aquinas 
writes, “Holding to the institutions of our holy predecessors, we, by our apostolic authority, 
absolve from their oath those who through loyalty or through the sacred bond of an oath owe 
allegiance to excommunicated persons: and we absolutely forbid them to continue their 
allegiance to such persons, until these shall have made amends” (ST II-II, q.12, a.2).  Heresy is 
disobedience to the Church, and by extension, disobedience to God.  It is, for Aquinas, the 
ultimate ingratitude. 
The class structure or hierarchy that existed in society between peasants all the way up 
to the king is the subject, for Aquinas, of the acquired virtues.  But this same class structure 
provides an anagogical image of the hierarchical participation of creatures in God which is the 
subject of the infused virtues.  The earthly city is a representation of the heavenly: “To him that 
despises earthly things, heavenly things are promised” (ST II-II, q.161, a.5, ad.3). 
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2.7 The Placement of Gratitude in Aquinas 
 
Aquinas treats of gratitude (gratitudo) and thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) primarily in 
question one hundred and six of the secunda secundae partis of the Summa.  Ingratitude is 
treated of in question one hundred and seven.88  There are also several other treatments of 
gratitude and thanksgiving throughout the Summa and elsewhere, and these are almost 
invariably used in connection to the precepts of religious practice and ritual.   
For example, gratitude and thanksgiving is linked to prayer (ST II-II, q.83, a.17 and the 
Commentary on First Thessalonians 1.1, where thanksgiving is treated of as the essence of 
“continuous prayer”); to petitionary prayer (Commentary on Philemon, 1); to praise (ST II-II, 
q.3, a.1, ad.1) and blessing (Commentary on Job, 1:4); to penance (ST III, q.88, a.4 where the 
focus is on ingratitude); to the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law (ST I-II, q.103, a.3); and to 
devotion (Commentary on First Corinthians, 1:12).  Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find, 
outside of question one hundred and six, any reference in the entire works of Thomas that treat 
of gratitude or thanksgiving in any context other than one which is intrinsically connected to the 
practice of the requirements of the virtue of religion.  A brief sketch of the treatise on justice is 
helpful to put it into textual context. 
The Treatise on Justice spans sixty-five questions in the secunda secundae partis from 
question fifty seven through one hundred and twenty two.  Justice is a general virtue in that it is 
concerned with relationships between at least two people.  It is divided between commutative 
and distributive justice, and annexes the entire class of virtues of indebtedness—religion, piety, 
observance and gratitude, which also deal with inter-personal relationships where a specific 
kind of debt (debitum morale) is owed. 
From question eighty of the treatise, he deals with the potential parts of justice, or those 
virtues annexed to justice.  His treatment of the virtue of religion, which he calls the “most 
important” or “chief part” of justice (potissima pars iustitiae; ST II-II, q.122, a.1), falls within 
the overarching treatise on the virtue of justice in the secunda secundae partis from question 
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fifty seven through one hundred and twenty two.  Aquinas’ treatise on gratitude falls within this 
broader treatment of justice, of which gratitude is “a special part” (specialem iustitiae partem; 
ST 11-11, q.106. a1) and classified under the virtues of observance.   Within the treatment on 
justice, Aquinas groups together a number of connected virtues with a shared character of 
indebtedness towards persons of excellence.  These virtues are observance itself (question 102), 
which is the umbrella virtue in this grouping and which deals with paying “worship and honour 
to those in positions of dignity”; this is followed by honour (dulia), which “denotes witnessing 
to a person’s excellence” including honour to the saints in prayer (question 103); obedience 
(obedientia), by which virtue “inferiors are bound to obey their superiors” (question 104) and 
disobedience (question 105); gratitude (gratitudine) by which virtue we repay our debts 
(question 106) and its opposite vice, ingratitude (question 107); retribution (vindicatione) by 
which justice is restored through the punishment of sins and crimes; (question 108); truth 
(veritas) which is the virtue of being habitually honest (question 109); and finally friendship 
(amicitia, philia) which is the virtue of friendliness or affability (ST I-II, q.65) and the vices 
opposed to it.89 
All of these virtues, annexed to the more general virtue of justice, need to be read in 
context together.  All of them furthermore contain elements of one another and Aquinas 
frequently has an on-going explication of one in the treatment of another.  Before proceeding to 
make sense of his overall plan in the treatise, we should take note that some elements of the 
treatise appear quite heterogeneous at times, which perhaps is not surprising, given its scope and 
range.  The final three articles of the treatise appear to be appended somewhat incongruously 
with the overall plan of the treatise.  Question one hundred and twenty deals with the virtue of 
epikeia or equity and is the virtue which considers the “spirit of the law” as opposed to the 
“letter of the law”, allowing for prudential judgement and even mercy in legal matters. In 
question eighty of the treatise, Aquinas acknowledges that this virtue is not found in the schema 
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provided by Cicero which he generally follows (ST II-II, q.80, a.1, ad.5) and his inclusion of it 
where it is does not seem to contribute directly to the development of religion, piety, observance 
and gratitude which precede it. 
It remains to figure out why Aquinas has chosen to group these particular virtues in this 
particular manner and order.  On one level, the grouping seems to be an attempt to 
accommodate Cicero’s classification found in the De Inventione (II:22 & 53) and which 
classification Aquinas defends in question eighty of the Treatise on Justice.  It also contains a 
concession to Aristotle, with the inclusion of epikeia in question one hundred and twenty.  On 
another level, the classification of these virtues seems heterogeneous and somewhat arbitrary.  
Why, for example, does Aquinas prefer Cicero’s classification rather than Macrobius’ (whom 
Aquinas cites as an authority for other things) grouping found in his Commentary on the Dream 
of Scipio, which is raised in an objection and which Aquinas glosses over?  Macrobius himself 
uses Cicero as an authority for his own list and although Aquinas does not explicitly say so, the 
list of Macrobius loses some of the coherence Cicero tried to give his own list.  The reason 
Aquinas adopts—and adapts—Cicero’s list becomes clearer when one considers the Dionysian 
pattern of exitus et reditus employed in the classification of the virtues of indebtedness.  
Cicero’s list includes six principle virtues annexed to justice: religion, piety, gratitude, 
vindication, observance and truth (religio, pietatas, gratia, vindicatio, observantia, veritas). 
While Aquinas adopts these six, he rearranges the order so that his own list runs: religion, piety, 
observance, obedience, gratitude, vindication and truth.  Cicero’s treatment at times conflates, 
or at least combines, a treatment of observance (to persons of dignity) and obedience.   
While he moves observance immediately behind piety, Aquinas retains the link between 
observance and obedience (ST II-II, q.80, a.1, ad.3): respect of persons of dignity or those in 
positions of authority over us, involves, necessarily, obedience since such persons are deserving 
of respect precisely on account of their authority: “Insofar as [obedience] proceeds from 
reverence for a superior, it is contained, in a manner, under the virtue of observance; insofar as 
it follows upon the reverence owed to one’s parents, it is contained under piety; and insofar as it 
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proceeds from reverence to God, it falls under religion and relates to devotion, which is the 
principle act of religion.”90  
It is interesting to note here that Aquinas provides a similar reasoning for placing 
gratitude after religion and piety as he does for observance: “Just as religion is superexcelling 
piety, so also is it excelling thanks or gratitude (gratitudo); so giving thanks (gratiarum actio) to 
God is counted among those things pertaining to religion.”91 Here we now find that observance 
and obedience is omitted from the comparison, but they still retain their relevance in the list 
when one considers them in sequence:  first, there is our duty to praise and worship God in 
religion; then, the most proximate likeness to God is our parents, who begot us and so are 
deserving of worship and honour in second place; then, we owe honour and obedience to our 
superiors which extends beyond the family and kin to the king and state and religious superiors; 
finally, there is honour due to anyone at all who meets the criteria of a benefactor, and who 
participates in this hierarchy of benefaction.   
In this explanation of the relatedness of obedience to observance (primarily), and then 
to piety and religion (by way of participation), Aquinas does not provide any immediately 
obvious link between obedience and gratitude, which falls after obedience in Aquinas’ re-
organising of Cicero’s list.  Nor does he provide any direct link in either question one hundred 
and two (dealing with observance) and one hundred and six (dealing with gratitude) between 
observance and gratitude.  So while observance and obedience are always considered within a 
hierarchy of participation to piety and religion, and while gratitude is likewise considered in the 
hierarchy of piety and religion, observance and gratitude are not so compared to each other.  
Perhaps it is easy to make too much of this omission, but I am inclined to think that it is at least 
an indication of the overall relationship between the virtues of indebtedness as Aquinas sees 
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them and which is borne out throughout his treatment of these virtues and not simply an 
immaterial omission. 
In fact, the reason becomes clearer on further analysis of the questions dealing with 
observance and gratitude.  Both these virtues have an idiosyncratic element not present in piety 
and religion.  Not everyone, for example, stands in the same to relationship to others in society.  
Observance is concerned with persons of dignity; but it is clear that in any given society, some 
persons have greater dignity than others: as for example the king over and against his subjects.  
Likewise with gratitude, some are in a better position to give and receive than are others.  But 
while observance and gratitude retain this variable element, every human person has a duty to 
parents, regardless of their station in life; and every human person has a duty to God in acts of 
religion, again, regardless of one’s state in life.  Piety and religion are thus universal virtues of 
indebtedness.   
With this in mind, it is worthwhile noting that the tendency has frequently been, by 
some commentators of Aquinas, to assume that Aquinas’ reversal of observance and gratitude is 
to place gratitude as a virtue annexed to observance as though gratitude were a part of 
observance itself.  We see this in one of the only sustained treatments of the virtue of 
observance in Aquinas by Benedict Joseph O.P. for example.92  Jospeh follows the classification 
in the table of contents given by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province in their 1920 
edition of the Summa, which also lists gratitude as being annexed to observance. 
This assumption—that Aquinas intends us to think of gratitude as being a part of 
observance—is, I believe, mistaken and there does not appear to be any justification for it from 
examining the texts themselves.  First of all, Aquinas himself is clear that both observance and 
gratitude are distinct virtues, each with a distinct object: both are special virtues in their own 
right (cf. II-II, q.102, a1 and II-II, q.106, a.1).  Secondly, as noted above, they are distinct by 
virtue of their subjective order in the hierarchy of the mystical ascent to God, which moves 
through distinct stages in increasing degrees of perfection.  It does not make sense to simply 
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think of gratitude as being a part of observance.  Both gratitude and observance find their 
fulfilment in their placement within the hierarchy of participation in reference to piety and 
religion.  Furthermore, the eliciting virtue that observance commands is obedience, while the 
eliciting virtue gratitude commands is religion more perfectly.  Both gratitude and observance 
represent different, albeit related, stages on the ascent to God.  Gratitude is the beginning point; 
observance is a part of the journey begun in gratitude, because the human person—having 
recognised that he is given in relation in this first instance—then discovers that he is, by nature, 
oriented to communion with others.  This communion is represented in three stages: that of 
communion among friends and equals; that of communion among those in positions of authority 
or dignity over us; and that communion of family and relatives, which is the most perfect of the 
three stages since it more perfectly represents our eternal destiny in the familial relationship of 
the Trinity.  All three of these stages find their fullest expression in the virtue of religion. 
There is a third factor, to which I will return in the next chapter, and that involves a 
distinction which needs to be made between infused and acquired virtues.  Aquinas does not 
make this distinction explicit in the Treatise on Justice, so it is not clear which virtues he 
considers to be infused and which are not, or where the line of demarcation lies in 
distinguishing these.  The answer to this problem is found, not in the Treatise itself, but rather in 
the treatment of virtue in general spread throughout his corpus.  But it is a significant 
consideration; for while gratitude “sits at the bottom” of the hierarchy, the virtue of gratitude 
does not preclude gratitude to God, which culminates in the top virtue in the hierarchy: that of 
religion.  Gratitude is carried all the way through the virtues of indebtedness, so to speak.  It is 
this third consideration which gives us a clue to the reason behind Aquinas’ inclusion of, then 
reordering of Cicero’s list.   
Cicero’s own reasoning behind listing religion, piety, gratitude, observance, vindication 
and truth is that each of these virtues represents something innate in us; they are virtues which 
are not derived from custom but from natural law or innate, instinctive principles in human 
nature itself.  One passage in the De Inventione in particular is of significance:  
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Justice is a habit of the mind which gives every man his dignity and 
preserves the common good. Its first principles proceed from nature; 
then it is established by custom, from a consideration of their 
usefulness; afterwards, the fear of the laws and religion govern actions 
which originated in nature, and had been approved of by custom.93 
 
Cicero gives us here his rationale for including the virtues of indebtedness within the 
embrace of justice: they are virtues which are in us by nature, as innate principles, and which 
are confirmed and recognised in both law and custom through the exercise of reason.  They 
provide, essentially, the rational framework for the proper and effective ordering of society 
according to natural law.  While Aquinas does not cite this particular text directly, it seems to 
me to provide something of a blueprint—with key modifications—for his own schema of the 
virtues of indebtedness. 
This is indeed what Aquinas has in mind in his consideration of these virtues of 
indebtedness: “Now all the virtues, both intellectual and moral, that are acquired by our actions, 
arise from certain natural principles pre-existing in us.”94  He treats of this process in some 
detail in question fifty-one of the first of the second part where he explains that virtues arise in 
us according to both an inner, and an exterior principle. It is a theme he returns to often.  Virtues 
are thus not purely innate; nor are they purely imposed on us from without, but are grounded in 
a stable inner disposition towards acts with exterior motivations.    
In a number of places, Aquinas refers to these innate or inchoate principles which are 
the foundation of the virtues as “seeds of virtue” (seminaria virtutum).95 These seeds of virtue 
can lead to both natural and infused virtue.96  The moral and intellectual virtues activate, so to 
                                                          
93 De Inventione, II, 53:6: Justitia est habitus animi, communi utilitate conservata, suum cuique tribuens 
dignitatem.  Eius initium est ab natura profectum; deinde quaedam in consuetudinem ex utilitatis ratione 
venerunt: postea res et ab natura profectas et ab consuetudine probatas legum metus et religio sanxit. 
94 ST I-II,  q.63, a.3: Omnes autem virtutes tam intellectuales quam morales, quae ex nostris actibus 
acquiruntur, procedunt ex quibusdam naturalibus principiis in nobis praeexistentibus. 
95 Angela Mckay, to whom I am here indebted, provides an excellent study of these “seeds of virtue”: 
see McKay,  Angela. The Infused & Acquired Virtues in Aquinas’ Moral Philosophy. University of Notre 
Dame. Indiana. April 2004. Online copy: http://etd.nd.edu/etd_data/theses/available/etd-04152004-
125337/unrestricted/McKayAM052004.pdf. 
96 For example, in his Commentary on Job, Aquinas gives us an indication of such infused “seeds”: 
“Certain seeds of virtue are divinely infused together with the rational soul into man, some common to 
all and others special to the individual. For this reason, some men are naturally disposed to one virtue; 
others to another.” (Commentary on Job 10:1): quaedam seminaria virtutum, aliqua quidem 
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speak, these natural inclinations in us and bring the acquired virtues to life in the form of 
virtuous action.  God also infuses in us certain habits or dispositions which give rise to the 
infused, theological virtues.  This natural inclination to virtue is nothing less than natural law, 
which operates as the principle for all good, moral action. 
This does not mean, however, that the virtues themselves are in us by nature.  Aquinas 
is quite explicit about this in his discussion of the cause of virtue (ST I-II, q.63).  What is 
natural to the human person however are the principles of knowledge and action which give rise 
to the virtues, and in this sense they are in us inchoately: “in man’s reason are found the 
naturally known principles of knowledge and action which are instilled by nature, and which are 
the nurseries of the intellectual and moral virtues, and insofar as there is in the will a natural 
appetite towards the good in conformity with reason.”97  Thus we have, by nature, a natural 
aptitude for the virtues but this aptitude is only enlivened by the exercise of virtues which are 
rooted in these principles—in other words, in natural law, to which I shall return shortly. 
 
2.7.1 Gratitude in Time & Memory: “Propinquitas” 
 
 One of the recurring features of Seneca’s treatment of gratitude in De Beneficiis is the 
role of memory as the vehicle for gratitude.   “Even the ungrateful remember us by our gifts,” 
Seneca writes, “when [these gifts] are always in their sight and do not allow themselves to be 
forgotten, but constantly stamp upon the mind the memory of the giver.  As we never ought to 
remind men of what we have given them, we ought all the more to choose presents that will be 
permanent; for the things themselves will prevent the remembrance of the giver from fading 
away” (De Beneficiis, I:12); for as the memory of benefaction fades away, so too does gratitude, 
and hence friendship with it. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
communiter omnibus, aliqua vero specialiter aliquibus secundum quod homines quidam sunt naturaliter 
dispositi ad unam virtutem, quidam ad aliam. 
97 ST I-II, q.63, a.1: Secundum quidem naturam speciei, inquantum in ratione homini insunt naturaliter 
quaedam principia naturaliter cognita tam scibilium quam agendorum, quae sunt quaedam seminalia 
intellectualium virtutum et moralium; et inquantum in voluntate inest quidam naturalis appetitus boni 
quod est secundum rationem. 
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 Taking a cue from Seneca, Aquinas places significant emphasis on the role of memory 
in eliciting acts of the virtues of observance, and of gratitude in particular.   Memory (memoria), 
says Aquinas, is the holding of the past in the present, or the measuring of the past according in 
reference to the here and now.  Memory looks to the past with reference to the present.98  Yet 
memory is more than simply the recalling of past experiences.  Certainly, memory can reach 
into habitual knowledge and make it active, like recalling the way through a maze of streets 
once travelled many years ago.  Or one may recall with fondness a dinner with friends in years 
past, or a holiday destination one might like to visit again.  But the active contemplation of past 
contingent events is not the whole story about the dignity of memory, which, for Aquinas, finds 
its greater function in leading the human person into a stable friendship with God, most clearly 
seen in the Eucharist, which he often refers to as the ‘memorial’ of Christ’s Passion. 
Aquinas lists memory as the first quasi-integral part of prudence and its quest for the 
truth.  Quoting Aristotle’s ethics, he notes that “intellectual virtue is stimulated and fostered by 
experience and time.”99  Thus memory is ultimately ordered towards the perfection of virtue 
since memory of the past is essential for prudential judgement about the good which should be 
done in the future.  For this reason, memory needs to be cultivated, so that those things which 
are proper to virtue are recalled with greater ease and become more habitually entrenched within 
us.  Without memory, we would not be able to orient our actions to specific ends.100 
Primary among the functions of memory is that of establishing relationship.  In the 
second treatise of De Sensu et Sensato on memory and reminiscence, Aquinas notes that 
memory helps us establish at least three kinds of relationship: that of likeness (similitudo), for 
example when one is reminded of the wisdom of Plato when thinking of the wisdom of 
Socrates; or that of contrast (contrarietas) when one thinks of Achilles when thinking of Hector; 
                                                          
98 De Veritate, q.10, a.11.  See also, ST, II-II, q.49, a.1.   
99 ST II-II, q.49, a.1: virtus intellectualis habet generationem et augmentum ex experimento et tempore.  
The whole question of the role of memory was a going concern for medieval philosophers and 
theologians and Aquinas’ emphasis on the relationship between memory and virtue is not unique but is 
rather indicative of the elevated role that memory plays in the religious quest for union with God.  One 
is reminded, for example, of Duns Scotus and Peter John Olivi and their emphasis on the role of memory 
in reference to the Son of God as the ‘Verbum’ of the Father. 
100 See for example, Commentary on Metaphysics, Book 1, L.1. 
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or that of closeness or connectedness (propinquitas) such as being reminded of the son when 
recalling the father.101  It is this third action of memory—propinquity—which lies at the heart of 
gratitude and the virtues of indebtedness. 
The vision of God is not simply known through the first kind of memory of 
similitude.102  The knowledge of God, when it is attained through a vision, such as St Paul’s on 
the road to Damascus, or the perfect vision of God in beatitude, is not a vision derived from this 
first kind of likeness, but rather it is the vision of God in his essence.  The apprehension of 
things by similitude is an act of the imagination.103 Like opinion, though distinct from it, the 
imagination can be true or false but is, of itself, unable to distinguish between the true and the 
false.104  There is a certain subjectivity in the act of the imagination which finds corollaries 
between things.  There is, in other words, any number of conceptual relationships we may 
dream up between things and such relationships do not necessarily describe any actual relation 
of things in reality.  This is why, in receiving gifts, Aquinas says we must consider the intention 
of the giver, and not simply the gift itself, which is subject to personal valuation and the 
vagaries of imagination. We derive an understanding of value, not from the perception of things, 
but from understanding why thy have been given, and for what purpose. 
As for the second kind of relationship brought about through contrast, this is a key 
feature of the virtue of hope.  For hope consists in longing for that which is currently not 
present.105 But unlike hope itself, memory will not pass away in the attainment of perfect 
beatitude, for memory and knowledge have one act: knowledge, in other words, is one habit 
corresponding to memory and understanding.   
In a passage in his commentary on De Caelo, Aquinas notes that the more lasting 
something is, the greater the time required to notice it change.  Thus, we might not notice much 
                                                          
101 Sentencia De sensu, tr. 2, l. 5, n. 6. 
102  See ST I, q.12, a.9. 
103 ST I-II, q.15, a.1. 
104 De Anima, III, c.2, l.4, ff. 
105 Hope, unlike memory, is in the will as its subject, thus we could not say that hope is in the memory 
(ST II-II, q.18. a.1), but memory nonetheless plays an integral role.  See also for example, De Sensu, t.2, 
l1; Commentary on Metaphysics, Book XII, L.8.  Furthermore, in the Commentary on Job, l.3, c.1, 
Aquinas notes that things hoped for or recalled become clearer in their contrast.   
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of a physical change over the span of a year or two in an adult human, but will see more of a 
change in an animal, such as a dog, over the same time period since dogs have a shorter life 
span than humans and age more rapidly.  On the other hand, human memory is not sufficient to 
notice a change in the heavenly bodies, such as the moon, since these are subject to a longevity 
that exceeds the lifespan of not just one but a great many generations of peoples.106  All the 
more, then, the case that in the unchanging God, there will be nothing subject to memory, since 
there will be no change to be observed as the subject of memory.  But it does not follow that 
there is no role for memory in friendship with God which will culminate in beatitude; for, in the 
first place, memory maintains the contrast between the vision of God and the awareness of self.  
The self is not lost, so to speak, in beatitude as though something subsumed to the point where 
individual identity is overcome.  Secondly, the virtues are not dispensed with after this life, but 
rather perfected.107  There will, for example, be prudence and justice.  Not that there will be 
decisions to make about the good to be done and evil avoided, since there will be no such threat 
to human integrity.  But the human person—with intellect, memory and will—will be perfected 
in the beatific vision.  In other words, says Aquinas, the virtues remain—not in their material 
element, but in their formal element.  The material element governs the virtues in respect to the 
active life, and this indeed will cease in beatitude.  But the formal element of all the virtues, 
which is love, remains since the very essence of beatitude is love and the vision of the Source of 
all love.  And there will be, by the same token, a persistence of the virtue of gratitude more 
specifically, since the sharing in the divine life is a sharing framed in gratitude for the gift of 
existence and for the gift of grace.   
The third—and most relevant to virtue and gratitude—kind of relationship established 
through memory is that based on propinquitas.  Propinquity describes a real relation and not 
simply a conceptual relationship as is the case with an act of memory based on similitude or the 
awareness of something absent established through the memory of contrast.  This propinquity 
has an affective element in the sense that we are bound to others that are nearest to us.  Thus, 
                                                          
106 De Caelo et Mundo, l.7. 
107 ST I-II, q.67. 
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every natural agent “pours forth its activity first and most of all on the things which are nearest 
to it”.108  The bestowal of gifts is an act of charity towards others who are closest to us; and the 
return of such beneficence in gratitude serves to strengthen and perpetuate this bond between 
persons.  Hence, the “memory of gifts” is essentially a memory of relationships for the properly 
grateful person.  The economy of gift and gratitude is thus preserved through memory which 
preserves the propinquity, or sense of closeness, to the giver of gifts.   
But at the same time, memory alone is not sufficient on its own to establish lasting 
propinquity between persons.  The old adage “absence makes the heart grow fonder” does not 
seem to hold water for Aquinas.  Time alone does not strengthen love; as long as the cause of 
love, like anger, is in the memory alone, it is gradually lessened by time, and not increased by 
time.109  Time is home to both generation and corruption—generation at the beginning, 
corruption at the end.  For this reason, our anger and love burns hottest when the cause of this 
anger and love is closest to us in time.  A hurt feeling or first kiss will move us more the closer 
in time to us it is.  But as time passes, the memory of hurt or love fades.  Thus, by extension, 
Aquinas reasons, simply enduring through time is not the chief purpose of the experiences of 
the rational creature.110  If that were the case, nature would be destroyed by time, not perfected 
in it.  Memory must be attended by some action through time which keeps that which is 
remembered alive.  Again, this is why gratitude does not consist in considering gifts, but rather 
the will, or love of the giver; the propinquity of love is itself an act of love.  And time cannot 
destroy true love or charity.  True gratitude therefore will be, in some way, an act of reciprocal 
love.  It is for this reason, Aquinas says, that Christ left us the ‘memorial’ of his Passion in the 
Eucharist—so that the propinquity of Christ is not lessened in time. 
It is not the effort of human reason, thinking grateful thoughts with all its might, which 
keeps the memory of the gift alive.  In the first place, Aquinas is at pains to refute the Pelagian 
heresy, which we would be committed to if we were to maintain that gratitude were something 
                                                          
108 ST II-II, q.31, a.3. 
109 ST I-II, q.48, a.2, ad.2: “Time, of necessity, weakens all things, the causes of which are impaired by 
time.” 
110 ST I, q.98, a.1. 
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temporally subsequent to the gift of grace or something supervening on some action lost in the 
past.  It is the on-going presence of the gift itself which renews our gratitude and keeps it alive 
through the passage of time.  But imagining that we can perpetuate gratitude for the gifts of 
grace through time with equal intensity on our own also reduces the notion of the gift of grace 
to something static, locked in time.  Such a notion of gift and gratitude reduces friendship to a 
historical artefact. 
Grace is both given to us in time, and yet transcends the temporal limits of the human 
creature.  In his treatise on grace, Aquinas says that the work of the Holy Spirit in infusing grace 
into the soul happens “in an instant, and without succession.”111  Time may be required to 
prepare the soul for this instantaneous infusion, but the infusion itself simultaneously removes 
sin and moves the free-will towards friendship with God.  But it is precisely this work of 
grace—that it establishes the human person in friendship with God—that also persists in, and 
transcends time.  The instantaneous act of grace is to make eternal friendship with God possible.  
It does so by making the ungodly person virtuous by turning the freewill towards the offer of 
friendship in an act of continuous gratitude. 
When we understand gratitude as a continuous—or habitual, as the virtue requires—act 
of thanksgiving, Aquinas’ intention in his reply to the objections given in article three of 
question one hundred and six become clearer.  There, in the sed contra, he quotes 1 
Thessalonians 5:18, “In all things give thanks” (in omnibus gratias agite).  Taken at face value, 
and along with the objections themselves, one would be excused for thinking that Aquinas 
simply means here that we should give thanks every time something is given to us, so that 
thanksgiving is something continual rather than something continuous.  But Aquinas means that 
gratitude should be continuous, (continuatum), which indicates an uninterrupted practice.  
Immediately following the quote from 1 Thessalonians in the sed contra, Aquinas turns 
immediately in the respondeo to Dionysius, and quotes the Divine Names where the Areopagite 
says, “God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all.”  As the effect of the 
Cause of all, Aquinas continues, the beneficiary must always be directed to the Benefactor.  
                                                          
111 ST I-II, q.113, a.7; De Veritate q.28, ad.18. 
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And what the beneficiary always owes to God is nothing less than honour and reverence (honor 
et reverentia) or, in other words, constant praise and prayer.  Indeed, Aquinas says in the 
Summa Contra Gentiles, prayer which is not constant is not efficacious (SCG III:2, c.96). 
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CHAPTER TWO: VIRTUE, AND THE VIRTUES OF INDEBTEDNESS 
 
3.1 Virtue and Gratitude as Analogous Terms 
 
Aquinas’ account of gratitude, as it falls within the context of the virtues of 
indebtedness, hinges on his understanding of virtue in general.  In this chapter, I wish to unpack 
his notion of virtue in general in order to see how the notion applies specifically to the virtues of 
indebtedness: religion, piety, observance and to gratitude in particular.   
‘Virtue’ in Aquinas’ philosophy and theology is an analogous term.  This important 
consideration is often overlooked in many treatments of his virtue theory, but it is necessary to 
keep this fact in front of us as we come to terms with his notion of ‘gratitude’.  Gratitude, like 
all virtues, can be either acquired or infused.  It can be directed to human persons, or to God.  
The kind of gratitude we offer to friends is not the same kind of gratitude we should offer to 
God, though the former kind is a participation in the archetype. 
Gratitude—and the virtues of indebtedness—in turn include the notion of debt.  There is 
therefore a threefold use of analogous terminology in reference to gratitude which must be 
outlined in order to get a handle on the function of gratitude in Aquinas’ thinking. 
Certainly, to claim that virtue is an analogous term requires immediately certain 
qualifications on account of the on-going debate about Aquinas’ use of analogous terms and his 
application of the so-called ‘analogia entis’.112 There was in medieval thinking a detailed 
philosophy of relation: relations were considered merely according to speech (relationes 
secundum dici) and also according to nature or being (relationes secundum esse).  Much of the 
debate today centres on which of these relations Aquinas has in mind in his use of analogy: is 
                                                          
112 My reading of analogy in Aquinas here will follow te Velde’s and Wippel’s accounts in order to set the 
stage.  In particular, I agree with te Velde’s assessment that, It cannot be denied that analogy is, in 
whatever way, essential to Aquinas’ philosophical account of reality. Analogy intends to express the 
unity of being, as a unity which includes its differences.”  This will become highly evident when I address 
the notion of ‘predestination’ in Aquinas’ theology and its impact on our understanding of infused 
virtue.  See Rudi te Velde, Aquinas Colloquium ‘Participation and Analogy’. Blackfriars, Oxford, 3d March 
2012. 
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analogy a purely linguistic tool, or does it have reference to something ontological?  The term is 
not unique to Aquinas; however his development of the term and use of it is.113 
‘Analogy’ for Aquinas is a wide-ranging term.  It is perhaps worth recalling that his use 
of the term is, like all of his metaphysical terminology, subject to a certain flexibility.114  This 
hermeneutic of flexibility should not be pushed to the point where the meaning in the word 
itself and the texts it supervenes on begin to dissipate, but it does need to be extended far 
enough so as not to be trapped in the sort of rigid account of analogy that preoccupied 
Cajetan.115  Aquinas does not frequently engage in any systematic discussion of analogy.  
Rather, the concept exists as a sub-text and, mostly in reference to treatments on the Divine 
Names.  That sub-text is heavily intertwined with Dionysian themes, and in particular the triplex 
via which becomes a hermeneutic for reading Aquinas, and in particular for his theology of 
grace and sacramental theology and ecclesiology, which are at the root of his virtue theory.   
 The analogia entis is not simply (as it is often characterised) merely an analytic or 
linguistic term.  Citing Roger Duncan, te Velde notes that the analogia entis needs to be 
understood as “a broad philosophical current in which it is held, against excessive metaphysical 
timidity, that being is the inescapable theme of the philosophic quest, because it is our most 
inclusive notion – there is no stopping short of it as there is no going beyond it.”116  In other 
words, the analogia entis is both a limited term which at the same time affects and informs 
Aquinas’ entire philosophical and theological system and an ontological reality which cannot be 
reduced to the field of language.   
Aquinas repeatedly affirms that something of God can be known through Creation; that 
the world of created phenomena reveals something of the “originary world of invisible being”.  
                                                          
113 Wipel 2007, p.10: “This, too, should be recognized as another important non-Aristotelian element of 
his [Aquinas'] metaphysics, and one which has been traced back to Dionysius and also to the Liber De 
Causis and to Proclus as likely influences.  Nonetheless, Aquinas’s own understanding of this notion is 
original.” 
114 See O’Rourke 2005, p.143 ff, and te Velde 2006, p.86.   
115 See McInerny 1996.  Norris Clarke also reads analogy as a ‘felxible term’ which covers a wide range of 
concepts, much like—to use te Velde’s analogy—a blanket.  At the same time, te Velde is wary of the 
term ‘concept of being’—a term which Aquinas himself never uses. 
116 Roger Duncam cited in Velde, Rudi A. te. Aquinas on God: the 'divine science' of the Summa 
Theologiae. Oxford: Ashgate, 2006. 
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At the same time, this ontological connectedness does not eliminate the ontological difference 
which stands between the cause and effect.  It is necessary to keep this in mind in order to 
understand Aquinas’ use of the term virtue and especially justice and gratitude. 
Iis necessary to clarify the way in which the term ‘analogy’ applies to the virtues, and 
by extension, gratitude.  Given that an analogical terms are those which signify and unite both 
the ratio perfecta and the ratio imperfecta, it is useful to identify which is which in the case of 
virtue.  As Gregory Rocca has shown, analogical terms for Aquinas are predicated per prius et 
posterius in such a way that there is one governing ratio (the ratio perfecta) while other uses of 
the term possess the ratio imperfecta.117  
There is no univocal predication of virtue between God and the human person because 
there is no accidents in God, as there are in creatures (ST I, q.3, a.6). Aquinas goes on to explain 
that some virtues can only be predicated of God metaphorically, and some analogically (ST I, 
q.21, a.1, ad.1).  For example, fortitude and daring are virtues which govern the passions; but 
since there are no passions in God, these virtues are only referred to God by way of metaphor.  
However, those virtues concerning the will—which include justice and prudence—can be 
predicated of God, although our reference for such a predication is our own experience of the 
ratio imperfecta.  Since gratitude falls under the virtue of justice, it is the case that gratitude can 
be predicated of God as its exemplar, or ratio perfecta. 
But in what sense can gratitude be said to be found in God?  Wouldn’t this suggest that 
we can give to God something which he is lacking?  Aquinas’ answer is quite simple: the return 
to God through the exchange of gift, gratitude and return-in-kind, consists in the creatures’ 
participation in divine love.  God’s gift emanates from his infinite love; in returning love to God 
we are returning what we have been given, and thereby we enter more perfectly into the source 
of the love which initiated the cycle of giving and return.  In reality, we can give nothing to God 
as though to augment his being; even our worship and praise, which is directed at God, does not 
accrue to God as though it adds something to his majesty; rather, our praise and worship (which 
                                                          
117 See Rocca, Gregory P. Speaking the Incomprehensible God Thomas Aquinas on the Interplay of 
Positive and Negative Theology. Washington, D.C.: Catholic U of America, 2004, p. 144 ff 
75 
 
is the essence of gratitude) accrues to ourselves, by uniting us more perfectly to the source of 
our being (ST I-II, q.114, a.1, ad.1).  Thus to speak of virtue analogically is to speak of the way 
in which virtue unites us to God, the source of being (ST I-II, q,68, a,4, ad.4). 
 The first question which may confront us is, given this ontological difference, how 
‘being’ can be applied to both God and Creation with meaning.  This issue has been raised and 
treated so many times and by such a vast array of commentators that it would be virtually 
impossible to cover them all here, or even to attempt a synthesis of the complementary and 
competing views on the subject.  But it is necessary that one start with a particular reading of 
the question in order to move on to the broader question of its application to virtue.  Thus, what 
I will sketch out here is not an overview or summary of the debate, but rather my own starting 
point in the context of the on-going debate. 
 In the first place, we must rule out any formal complementarity between God and his 
creation; nor is there any complementarity of species or genus; and yet, the notion of ‘ens’ 
applies to both God and creature, said analogically.  It is this qualification, ‘analogically’, that is 
a term designating both something real and at the same time doing so in an apophatic way.  The 
essential difference here is one of participation on the part of the creature so that ‘ens’ applies to 
God properly, and to the creature in a secondary sense: 
Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement 
in form according to the formality of the same genus or species, but 
solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, 
whereas other things are beings by participation.118  
 
 Relying on the Dionysian concept of participation, Aquinas maintains that such a 
participation flows from God to creature and not vice versa.  Thus we must understand the 
analogia entis to be a term describing both a unity and a difference; ens commune, in other 
words, expresses both unity and an ineffable diversity. 
Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, 
it must in no way be admitted that God is like creatures; because, as 
Dionysius says “A mutual likeness may be found between things of 
the same order, but not between a cause and that which is caused.” 
                                                          
118 ST I, q.4, a.3, ad.3: non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter communicantiam in forma 
secundum eandem rationem generis et speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est 
ens per essentiam, et alia per participationem. 
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For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a 
creature can be spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is 
like a creature.119  
 
 While being careful not to reduce analogia entis to a linguistic term, te Velde notes that 
the term ‘being’ is, ens dicitur, said of things: something is said to be something else: Black 
Beauty is a horse; Lewis is a man; gratitude is a virtue. Being thus describes, or rather includes, 
an essence or a nature.  Yet there is no such thing as ‘pure being’ if this is ever understood to be 
somehow detachable from a substance: there is no ‘concept of being’ in Aquinas apart from this 
ens actu.  The rational creature cannot have a concept of being, per se, apart from the idea of 
something.  Thus being always designates something ontological—something existing, even if 
the nature of this existence remains unknown to us;120 te Velde calls this ‘transgeneric 
predication’.121  That is to say, analogous terms signify, from within the limitation of a genus, 
something which is outside that genus.  Thus ‘analogy’ is a semantic reference to something 
really transcending the genus from which the predication is formed. 
 How do we move from within a genus to this ‘transgeneric’ predication in order to 
make sense of things like virtue?  Not, te Velde notes, according to a Plotinean notion of 
hierarchy of being or emanationism.  According to such a view, being is a sort of ladder (as in 
Plato’s ‘great chain of being’) according to which one ascends through degrees of being to ever-
perfect instances of being until we arrive at God.  Aquinas’ theory of participation excludes 
                                                          
119 ST I, q.4., a.3, ad.4: licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo, nullo tamen modo 
concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae, quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., in his quae 
unius ordinis sunt, recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa et causato, dicimus enim quod imago 
sit similis homini, et non e converso. Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit similis Deo, non 
tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturae. 
120 Aquinas explains in his treatise De Ente et Essentia: “Whence we say that man is a rational animal, 
and not that man is made up of animal and rational as we say that man is made up of soul and body. 
Man is said to be composed of soul and body as some third thing constituted of two other things, and 
which is neither of them. For man is neither soul nor body. But if man may be said in some way to be 
composed of animal and rational, it will not be as a third thing out of two other things, but as a third 
concept out of two other concepts. For the concept “animal” is without the determination of the form 
of the species, and it expresses the nature of a thing from that which is material in relation to the 
ultimate perfection. But the concept of the difference “rational” consists in the determination of the 
form of the species. And from these two concepts the concept of the species or of the definition is 
constituted. And thus just as the constituents of a real thing are not predicated of that real thing, so too 
the concepts which are constituents of another concept are not predicated of that concept; for we do 
not say that the definition is the genus or the difference.” (De Ente et Essentia, 37). 
121 McKay, page 9 
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such a notion of hierarchy in this sense.  God is not part of the ‘chain of being’; if such a chain 
exists (and there is no reason why such a notion can’t be employed analogically in a sense 
limited to created being), God is not part of it: God is not simply a more perfect, or the most 
perfect, member of the class of being, ens commune.  God’s substance is his own existence; the 
substance of created being is derived from the genus in which that substance finds its principle. 
The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself—for 
existence cannot of itself be a genus; but, it also signifies an essence 
that has the property of existing in this way—namely, of existing of 
itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that 
God is not in the genus of substance.122 
 
All being (ens commune) tends towards its source and origin.  The movement towards 
this source is a threefold action or what is known as the triplex via, a concept Aquinas borrows 
from Dionysius.123  The three elements of the triplex via are first, that God is the actual cause of 
all his effects (causality); secondly, that God is not to be identified with those effects 
(remotion); finally, that God is the source of perfection of those effects (eminence).   
As applied to virtue in general, the triplex via is manifest in a threefold operation of 
grace itself.  In the first place, God prepares the soul for the gifts of grace in a prevenient 
operation which moves and disposes the soul towards the good; secondly, there is nothing the 
rational creature can do to merit grace—it is the work of God, something totally other than what 
human nature can effect;  but at the same time this totally transcendent work of God does not 
eliminate the freedom of the creature, whose agency is not on the account of grace simply 
overridden by God; grace changes nature but does not destroy it; and finally, the grace moves 
the soul to perfection, by placing within it a habitual disposition to the good in general, and 
ultimately that Good which is God.  One of the clearest formulations of this doctrine in Aquinas 
is seen in the following response to question one hundred and twelve of the prima secundae 
partis: 
                                                          
122 ST I, q.3, a.5, ad.1: dicendum quod substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est per se esse, 
quia hoc quod est esse, non potest per se esse genus, ut ostensum est. Sed significat essentiam cui 
competit sic esse, idest per se esse, quod tamen esse non est ipsa eius essentia. Et sic patet quod Deus 
non est in genere substantiae. 
123 See O’Rourke, Fran. Page 33. 
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Grace is taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, 
as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in 
the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a 
form can only be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it 
signifies a help from God to move us to good, no preparation is 
required on man's part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but 
rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving 
the soul to good. And thus even the good movement of the free-will, 
whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of 
the free-will moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, 
according to Proverbs 16:1: “It is the part of man to prepare the soul”; 
yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is 
said that man's will is prepared by God, and that man's steps are 
guided by God.124  
 
 When applied to the virtues of indebtedness, the triplex via takes on an added ecclesial 
and sacramental dimension.  First, God is the cause of the indebtedness leading to gratitude in 
us; indeed, this is true of each of the virtues of indebtedness: “the cause of debt is found 
primarily and chiefly in God, in that he is the first principle of all our goods” (ST II-II, q.106, 
a.1).  
Secondly, the very nature of debt carries with it a certain antithesis to the cause of that 
debt, which in a sense transcends the limits of human justice: it is impossible for the creature to 
repay God for his gifts and the human person stands before God as before a gulf—as a 
beneficiary before a Benefactor, in which relationship between God and humans there is no 
equity.  For in a purely legal exchange, one is bound to return no more than what has been 
given; justice does not demand anything more than equality of commutation.  But since 
gratitude itself is an expression of the moral debt which is love, it is without limit (ST II-II, 
q.106, a.6, ad.2).  The way in which the debt of gratitude to God is paid is therefore not on 
account of acts of human justice, but through Christ: “Christ freed us from the slavery of sin. 
                                                          
124 ST I-II, q.112, a.2: gratia dupliciter dicitur, quandoque quidem ipsum habituale donum Dei; quandoque 
autem ipsum auxilium Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Primo igitur modo accipiendo gratiam, 
praeexigitur ad gratiam aliqua gratiae praeparatio, quia nulla forma potest esse nisi in materia 
disposita. Sed si loquamur de gratia secundum quod significat auxilium Dei moventis ad bonum, sic nulla 
praeparatio requiritur ex parte hominis quasi praeveniens divinum auxilium, sed potius quaecumque 
praeparatio in homine esse potest, est ex auxilio Dei moventis animam ad bonum. Et secundum hoc, ipse 
bonus motus liberi arbitrii quo quis praeparatur ad donum gratiae suscipiendum, est actus liberi arbitrii 
moti a Deo, et quantum ad hoc, dicitur homo se praeparare, secundum illud Prov. XVI, hominis est 
praeparare animum. Et est principaliter a Deo movente liberum arbitrium, et secundum hoc, dicitur a 
Deo voluntas hominis praeparari, et a domino gressus hominis dirigi. 
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For if a creditor holds a man captive on account of a debt that he owes, it is not enough merely 
to pay the debt; the person himself must also be freed. This is what Christ did.”125   
 Finally, Aquinas understands the perfection, or eminence, of the person perfected by the 
virtues of indebtedness and virtues in general in sacramental and ecclesial terms:  
In a body the members are joined in two ways. One way is by contact, 
as the hand is joined to the wrist, and the wrist to the forearm, and so 
on. The other way is by a connection, as being joined by nerves. And 
so Paul refers to joints and ligaments. So also in the Church, its 
members are joined by faith and understanding: “One Lord, one faith, 
one baptism”. But this is incomplete without the ligaments of charity 
and the sacraments.126 
 
 This ecclesial and sacramental dimension of virtue and the virtues of indebtedness is 
explored at length in the chapter on Ecclesiology, but for the time being it is important to note 
that for Aquinas, there is no true notion of a ‘virtuous person’ or, by extension, a ‘grateful 
person’ outside of the context of the ecclesial and sacramental vision.  First, it is necessary to 
unpack Aquinas’ notion of virtue in general, in order to recover a sense of the gratitude and the 
virtues of indebtedness, in the context of Aquinas’ Dionysian scheme. 
 
3.2 Virtues in General 
 
As Lee Yearley has noted, Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues “is astonishingly complex 
and lengthy, covering over a million words and 170 separate questions in the Summa alone.”127  
We could add to this impressive corpus Aquinas’ Disputed Questions on the Virtues, and the 
innumerable other places where he treats, directly and indirectly, of both acquired and infused 
virtue.   
                                                          
125 Commentary on Colossians 2-3, 116: Christus liberavit a servitute peccati. Detur enim quod usurarius 
propter cautionem teneat hominem captum, non sufficeret destructio cautionis, nisi liberaretur. Sic et 
Christus. 
126 Ibid, 2-4, 129: in corpore enim est duplex coniunctio membrorum, scilicet secundum contactum, quia 
manus est coniuncta ulnae, haec pectori, et sic de aliis. Alia est connexio seu coniunctio nervorum. Et 
ideo dicit coniunctum et connexum. Sic in Ecclesia est coniunctio per fidem et scientiam. Eph. IV, 5: unus 
dominus, una fides, unum Baptisma. Sed hoc non sufficit, nisi sit connexus charitatis, et connexio 
sacramentorum 
127 Yearley, Lee. Mencius and Aquinas: theories of virtue and conceptions of courage. Albany, New York: 
State University Of New York Press, 1990. Print. Page 29 
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Given this sweeping and diverse coverage of virtue in the works of Aquinas, it is hardly 
surprising to find different approaches to the question of virtue in his thinking and, not too 
infrequently, disagreements in commentaries on these.  Many of these disagreements stem from 
a confusion of the critical distinction between acquired and infused virtues (and, indeed, 
Aquinas’ own treatment of this distinction is not always clear or straightforward).  There is also 
a related tendency to confuse the object and subject of the virtues and it is this latter distinction I 
hope to clarify here by recalling three key elements of Aquinas’ virtue theory:  
(1) The acquired virtues are not virtues in the true sense of the term; they can be 
present in a subject who is in a state of sin and lack the fundamental character of 
virtue properly speaking, which is charity; 
(2) It is the infused virtues which are virtue properly speaking, and these infused 
virtues cannot exist without sanctifying grace and Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues 
properly speaking presupposes his theology of grace (charity, which is presupposed 
by grace, is the form of all the virtues); 
(3) There is a unity and interconnection of the virtues in Aquinas’ treatment that has 
close parallels with Plato’s and Augustine’s treatment of virtue; this unity does not 
simply refer to the unity of the ultimate end, to which all the virtues are disposed, 
but to the unity of the form and motive principle of all the virtues, which is love and 
friendship respectively. 
 
3.2.1 Acquired & Infused Virtue 
 
Aquinas’ virtue theory is so closely aligned to his doctrine of grace that one cannot 
possibly arrive at a proper reading of his virtue theory without due reference to this theology of 
grace according to which the infused virtues, which are virtues properly speaking, presuppose a 
nature elevated by grace. 
Some authors have maintained that the four cardinal virtues—prudence, justice, 
fortitude and temperance—are acquired, while the three theological virtues—faith, hope and 
81 
 
charity—are infused.  According to Aquinas, this in fact is only part of the story.  The picture of 
the virtues that Aquinas gives us is that for every virtue—theological, moral and intellectual—
there are two kinds: acquired and infused.  This is because the acquired moral virtues are not 
sufficient counterparts to the infused theological virtues:  “Some moral and intellectual virtues 
can indeed be caused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the theological 
virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive, from God immediately, others that are 
proportionate to these virtues” (ST I-II, q. 63, a. 3, ad.1).   
Consequently, the acquired moral virtues are not sufficient grounding for the infused 
virtues as many have claimed; nor, as Yearley and others contend, do the infused virtues 
presuppose the presence of the acquired virtues.  In short, the infused virtues, which are virtues 
properly speaking, are on account of friendship with God—and which God initiates in the first 
instance.128 
By way of example, we might consider the virtue of temperance, by which we control 
and moderate the passions, such as concupiscence.  Materially speaking, an act of acquired 
temperance and an act of infused temperance may, to an outside observer, appear to be the same 
act—for example, abstaining from meat on Friday or fasting from alcohol during Lent.  
Considered from the point of view of the observer, Aquinas would say that both acts—namely 
abstaining from meat as an act of acquired habit and abstaining from meat an act of infused 
habit—share the same natural species.  But formally speaking, or according to the moral 
species, the same material act may be differentiated according to differing moral objects, 
describing acquired and infused varieties of the action. 
But insofar as an act of temperance or courage is commanded by 
charity ordering it to the ultimate end, the acts formally are specified 
and formally speaking become acts of charity, but it does not follow 
that it is from this that temperance and courage are specified. 
Therefore, infused temperance and courage do not differ specifically 
from the acquired virtue in this, that their acts are commanded by 
charity, but rather because their acts are constituted in a mean 
orderable to the ultimate end which is the object of charity.129 
                                                          
128 See for example ST I-II, q.65, a.5 and Disputed Questions on Virtue, q.1, a.5, ad.5.  This question also 
plays a prominent role in Aquinas’ Commentary on Job. 
129 Disputed Questions on Virtue, q.1, a.10, ad.10: Ex hoc ergo quod actus temperantiae vel fortitudinis 
imperantur a caritate ordinante eos in ultimum finem; ipsi quidem actus formaliter speciem sortiuntur: 
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 What differentiates the moral object of the acquired virtue from the infused virtues is 
the kind of charity to which each is ultimately ordered; in other words, infused virtues are of the 
order of Divine Charity, and not simply other kinds of love, such as human love.  To speak of 
acquired virtue is thus not simply to speak of a virtue without love as such, but a virtue which 
does not, at God’s instigation, participate in the friendship of Divine Love.  Thus, it is possible 
says Aquinas, to acquire imperfect or natural virtue through habitual works, but so long as these 
are not constituted in the love of God, or infused by God, they are oriented to a natural end, and 
not to a supernatural end which is constituted in friendship with God. 
It is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so 
far as they produce good works that are directed to an end not 
surpassing the natural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, 
they can be without charity, even as they were in many of the 
Gentiles. But in so far as they produce good works in proportion to a 
supernatural last end, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and 
perfectly; and cannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by 
God.130 
 
Divine Charity is thus the form of all the infused virtues, while prudence is the form of all the 
acquired virtues (ST I-II q.61, a.2, ad1).131  Prudence, since it governs choices directed by 
reason (prudence is the use of right reason about things to be done), governs all the virtues.  
Indeed, Aquinas says, “there can be no moral virtue without prudence” (ST I-II, q.58, a.4).  This 
is clear from considering the nature of every virtue, including gratitude, since every virtue is 
about the good to be done (ST I-II, q,60, a.1).  So the first significant distinction between 
                                                                                                                                                                          
nam formaliter loquendo fiunt actus caritatis; non tamen ex hoc sequeretur quod temperantia vel 
fortitudo speciem sortiantur. Non igitur temperantia et fortitudo infusae differunt specie ab acquisitis ex 
hoc quod imperantur a caritate earum actus; sed ex hoc quod earum actus secundum eam rationem sunt 
in medio constituti, prout ordinabiles ad ultimum finem qui est caritatis obiectum. 
130 ST I-II, q.65, a.2: virtutes morales prout sunt operativae boni in ordine ad finem qui non excedit 
facultatem naturalem hominis, possunt per opera humana acquiri. Et sic acquisitae sine caritate esse 
possunt, sicut fuerunt in multis gentilibus. Secundum autem quod sunt operativae boni in ordine ad 
ultimum finem supernaturalem, sic perfecte et vere habent rationem virtutis; et non possunt humanis 
actibus acquiri, sed infunduntur a Deo. 
131 The prudence which Aquinas speaks about in reference to the acquired virtues is not to be 
understood as infused virtue, one of the four infused cardinal virtues; if such were the case, Aquinas 
would be forced to conclude the form of the acquired virtues is the infused virtues, which would make 
no sense.  The habitual prudence which Aquinas speaks about in reference to the acquired virtues is 
what we might call natural prudence, or synderesis.   
83 
 
acquired and infused virtues is their species, differentiated in their form as to their moral 
objects.   
Even the theological virtues have an acquired counterpart: faith can be infused or 
acquired, just as temperance and the other moral virtues can be acquired or infused.  Anything 
resembling an acquired kind of faith is not a theological virtue (which by definition is an 
infused virtue), but will retain some resemblance to the perfect virtue.  What is the difference 
between acquired and infused faith?  Human reason, Aquinas tells us, is naturally inclined 
towards the truth.  As such, reason seeks of necessity that which is true, including, as far as it is 
able, the First Truth.  Any such truth which compels the mind as the result of natural reason is 
acquired knowledge.  If such truths cannot be demonstrated conclusively through a syllogism 
but which is held to be true nonetheless, or which is believed on account of a command of the 
will, it is acquired or imperfect faith.  But when this belief is infused with charity and thereby 
becomes a rule of life so to speak—not simply an act of the intellect but also a directive for life 
borne out of love for God, it is infused faith (ST II-II.4.5).  Thus even the demons are compelled 
to believe in God on account of the evidence, though clearly this faith is unformed, without love 
(In Sent III, q.3, a.3).  Similarly, in regards to charity, Aquinas discusses the difference between 
acquired or natural love, and infused love, or charity—concluding that the former is insufficient 
to merit the title ‘virtue’ properly speaking.  And we could divide each and every virtue thus: 
into an acquired and infused counterpart but always in such a way where the definition properly 
speaking belongs only to the infused virtue.  Hence, in article two of question one in the 
Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus, Aquinas is able to speak of the “moral, intellectual and 
theological virtues, regardless of whether the virtues are acquired or infused.”132 
Of both kinds of virtue, only the infused virtues go by the name ‘virtue’ properly 
speaking.  This is because the acquired virtues, which man comes into possession through 
human effort and repetition, fit us for a more ordered existence only within the natural order, as 
determined by divine providence.  On the other hand, the infused virtues, given directly and 
                                                          
132 DQV 1.2.co: Haec autem omnia conveniunt tam virtuti morali quam intellectuali, quam theologicae, 
quam acquisitae, quam infusae. 
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predestined by God, lead man to supernatural union with God.  As such, the infused virtues 
perfect human nature in respect to beatitude. 
But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we 
spoke above are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with 
reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues 
dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and 
consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a 
participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Peter 1:4: “He has 
given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you 
may be made partakers of the Divine Nature.” And it is in respect of 
receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God.133   
 
The acquired virtues are those which we can achieve by our own effort and through 
habit or repeated action and are “caused through the principles of the soul’s [natural] powers” 
(DQV 1.3).  These acquired virtues—which might mirror acts of the infused virtues outwardly, 
though not formally—equip us for temporal happiness and help us to act as good citizens in the 
earthly state.  Thus acquired virtues are worked in us through the exercise of diligence and hard 
work; while the infused virtues on the other hand are those which “God works in us, without us” 
(ST I-II, q.55). 
Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this 
definition applies; and this is expressed in the words “which God 
works in us without us.” If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the 
definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or 
infused.134  
 
Thus the second significant distinction between the acquired and infused virtues is that 
the human agent is the efficient cause of the acquired virtues, while God is the direct efficient 
cause of the infused virtues.  
Perhaps one of the most striking and subsequently telling differences between the 
acquired and infused virtues is that the former can persists in a subject in the state of mortal sin, 
                                                          
133 ST I-II.110.3: Manifestum est autem quod virtutes acquisitae per actus humanos, de quibus supra 
dictum est, sunt dispositiones quibus homo convenienter disponitur in ordine ad naturam qua homo est. 
Virtutes autem infusae disponunt hominem altiori modo, et ad altiorem finem, unde etiam oportet quod 
in ordine ad aliquam altiorem naturam. Hoc autem est in ordine ad naturam divinam participatam; 
secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut per haec efficiamini 
divinae consortes naturae. Et secundum acceptionem huius naturae, dicimur regenerari in filios Dei.  
134 ST I-II.55.4: Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod 
dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis 
erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis.  I explore the relationship between Divine 
Providence and Predestination more fully in the next chapter. 
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while the latter cannot.  This is because acquired virtues derive their habitude from temporal 
practice and exercise of the will and not, as do the acquired virtues, from supernatural grace. 
Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if 
this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is 
compatible with humanly acquired virtue; because the use of a habit in 
us is subject to our will, as stated above; and one sinful act does not 
destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that 
is directly contrary to a habit.  Wherefore, though man cannot avoid 
mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not 
hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain 
from evil in the majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed 
to reason. There are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise 
avoid without grace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the 
theological virtues, which are in us through the gift of grace.135  
 
 The implications of this passage require a certain amount of reflection, for they are far-
reaching and help settle the question on the clear distinction between acquired and infused 
virtues.  First of all, the passage makes us wonder: if infused virtue can be lost so readily 
through mortal sin, in what way can it be meaningfully termed a ‘habit’?  This question brings 
us to a significant element of Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues, one frequently overlooked in 
discussions of his virtue theory.  Up to now we have considered the distinction between 
acquired and infused habits, but not how this distinction plays out in the reality of the lived 
experience.  That discussion flows from an understanding of the way in which ‘habit’ applies to 
both acquired and infused virtues. 
 
3.2.2 Virtues as Habits 
 
 
                                                          
135 ST I-II.63.2.ad2: Ad secundum dicendum quod virtus divinitus infusa, maxime si in sua perfectione 
consideretur, non compatitur secum aliquod peccatum mortale. Sed virtus humanitus acquisita potest 
secum compati aliquem actum peccati, etiam mortalis, quia usus habitus in nobis est nostrae voluntati 
subiectus, ut supra dictum est; non autem per unum actum peccati corrumpitur habitus virtutis 
acquisitae; habitui enim non contrariatur directe actus, sed habitus. Et ideo, licet sine gratia homo non 
possit peccatum mortale vitare, ita quod nunquam peccet mortaliter; non tamen impeditur quin possit 
habitum virtutis acquirere, per quam a malis operibus abstineat ut in pluribus, et praecipue ab his quae 
sunt valde rationi contraria. Sunt etiam quaedam peccata mortalia quae homo sine gratia nullo modo 
potest vitare, quae scilicet directe opponuntur virtutibus theologicis, quae ex dono gratiae sunt in nobis.  
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 Aquinas, following Aristotle, rejects the notion that virtues are a kind of knowledge and 
places them instead among habits (habitus), the first species of quality.136  Virtues—both 
acquired and infused—are operative habits, although this designation applies to the infused 
virtues in a different sense than it does to the acquired virtues.  But despite the difference 
between acquired and infused habits, Aquinas insists that they are very difficult to tell apart.  
This remarkable insight suggests something about the relationship between acquired and infused 
virtues which is often overlooked in treatments of them. 
 There is a temptation to think of habits as being something irrational: in English we 
often use the word ‘habit’ to describe some trained, ingrained or reflexive way of behaving that 
bypasses the need for much thought.  In some respects, habits might seem even to be opposed to 
reason.  But this is not the way that either Aristotle or Aquinas use the term in reference to what 
virtues are.  In question forty-nine of the treatise on human acts, Aquinas describes habits and 
dispositions as being qualities which are difficult to change.137 
Habits in fact facilitate reason and in no way dispense with it.  Habits are similar to 
nature in that they produce in man an operation in keeping with his powers and faculties.138  
Consider for example the skill of an expert snooker player.  His handling and alignment of the 
                                                          
136 Anthony Kenny has chosen to translate Aquinas’ use of the word ‘habitus’ in English as ‘disposition’ 
rather than ‘habit’ (see, Kenny, Anthony. Summa Theologiae: Dispositions for Human Acts. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006.; footnote b on page 5; and appendix 3 on page 115).  While Kenny 
makes a good case for this translation, which is a departure from the accepted translation of ‘habit’ but 
gaining ground among a number of scholars, I believe it runs the risk of being confusing, especially when 
it comes to contrasting habitus with dispositio, which in turn Kenny translates as ‘state’.  Hence he 
renders “omnis habitus est dispositio” as “all dispositions are states.”  In opposition to this translation, 
and hence adding to the confusion, we find a number of scholars who translate Aristotle’s hexis (ἕξις)—
which is Aquinas’ ‘habitus’—as state (for example, see the Bibliographical essay on page 164 in 
Devettere, Raymond J., Introduction to virtue ethics: insights of the ancient Greeks. Washington D.C. 
Georgetown University Press, 2002).  I have chosen to render ‘habitus’ as ‘habit’ to avoid this confusion 
and because I believe that the use of the generic word ‘state’ to translate ‘dispositio’ is not rigorous 
enough to account for Aquinas’ critical descriptions of how the differing classes of dispositions differ 
from habits. I will, in this section, be referring to good habits each time I refer to acquired and infused 
habits, unless otherwise stated.   
137 Bernard Lonergan suggests that for Aquinas habits are distinguished from dispositions in that the 
latter are not as deeply rooted as the former.  Consequently, habit, and not disposition, refers more 
properly to virtue.  I accept this distinction which seems to better fit with Aquinas’ own distinction (See 
Lonergan, Bernard J. F.. Grace and freedom: operative grace in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Toronto: 
Published for Lonergan Research Institute of Regis College, Toronto, by University of Toronto Press, 
2000; page 52). 
138 See Commentary on Metaphysics: I.1.28; and II.5.332.  This point is integral to understanding why 
acquired virtues are habits properly speaking and therefore virtue only imperfectly. 
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cue does not distance him as an agent from the game, but rather increases his involvement in it 
by perfecting his operation as a snooker player.  Certain operations to him become mechanical, 
such as the correct handling of the cue.  But this does not make his playing less rational; it in 
fact his playing becomes more rational through his skill.   
In a similar way, virtues do not remove us as rational agents in life, but increase our 
engagement in, and ultimately enjoyment of, life itself.  What (good) habits do is remove from 
reason hesitancy and confusion that often precede judgments and actions; in other words, good 
habits eliminate those things that cloud the effective operation of reason.  But habits do not 
remove the need for deliberation, but perfect the deliberative operation—otherwise, there would 
be no justification for considering prudence a virtue.   But such is the task of prudence which is 
the form of all the acquired virtues: as a habit, it does not diminish reason but rather perfects the 
ability of practical reason in respect to choice.  The person with prudence does not act without 
thinking or judging; on the contrary: the person with prudence thinks and judges between goods 
with an augmented view of circumstances and choices available to him and does so with relative 
ease.  There may be certain elements of the deliberative process that become ‘mechanical’ such 
as the automatic processing of information into a valid syllogism; but as with our snooker 
player, the mechanising of processes enhances the work of reason by making it freer. 
 Because the faculties of intellect and will can be directed to a multitude, indeed a 
potential infinitude, of possible actions (good and evil) they are non-specific until they are 
proportioned to a specific object.  It is for this reason that Aquinas tells us that the unity of a 
habit is determined by its object.  As such, he characterises habits as being the medium between 
potency, or the power to act and act itself—or, put another way, that which specifies acts 
according to a particular moral species. 
 Therefore, habits stand between the power of the soul—which the habit specifies—and 
the act, which in turn specifies the habit. In this way, we could say (as Aquinas does) that habits 
take the place of nature in that they dispose us towards acting according to our natural powers 
and faculties.  And like nature they place us in relation to the world around and are the point of 
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unity between possibility and reality in respect to human agency.  Habits form a relationship 
with a certain way of behaving in the world. 
 Human nature is naturally disposed to the acquisition of habits.  They are acquired 
through repetition and “customary activity.”  Memory plays an integral part of the acquisition of 
habit too since it holds intelligible forms in the mind even when they are not being immediately 
apprehended.  This is what makes gratitude possible: that the memory of the gift is habitually 
held in the mind, and orients the grateful person to a way of living and acting.  
With this in mind, we can see why a habit, properly speaking, is the cause of acquired 
virtues but not of infused virtues and why the term habit cannot apply univocally to both 
acquired and infused virtues. 
Acquired and infused habits are not to be classed together; for the 
habit of knowledge is acquired by the relation of the human mind to 
phantasms; hence, another habit of the same kind cannot be again 
acquired. But the habit of infused knowledge is of a different nature, 
as coming down to the soul from on high, and not from phantasms. 
And hence there is no parity between these habits.139 
 
 According to Aquinas’ doctrine of grace and salvation, the human person is not capable, 
in his present state, of that original union with God he was destined for prior to the Fall.  Human 
nature as it is now equips him for a temporal existence and even a measure of temporal 
happiness.  But none of this natural condition carries over beyond the grave as all natural habits 
are corruptible (ST I-II 69.3.ad6).  It is impossible therefore for fallen nature to enter into 
Beatitude by its own efforts or merits.  Hence no natural habit, which includes habits of human 
acquisition, can lead to eternal beatitude. 
...there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which 
exceeds the proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and 
perfect happiness of man, as stated above.  And since habits need to 
be in proportion with that to which man is disposed by them, therefore 
is it necessary that those habits, which dispose to this end, exceed the 
proportion of human nature. Wherefore such habits can never be in 
                                                          
139  ST III, q.9, a.4, ad.3. This passage also explains how an acquired habit and an infused habit can 
coexist in the same individual: Ad tertium dicendum quod alia ratio est de habitu acquisito, et de habitu 
infuso. Nam habitus scientiae acquiritur per comparationem humanae mentis ad phantasmata, unde 
secundum eandem rationem non potest alius habitus iterato acquiri. Sed habitus scientiae infusae est 
alterius rationis, utpote a superiori descendens in animam, non secundum proportionem phantasmatum. 
Et ideo non est eadem ratio de utroque habitu. 
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man except by Divine infusion, as is the case with all gratuitous 
virtues.140 
 
Clearly then, a different kind of habit will be required to fit us for beatitude since this exceeds 
the proportion of human nature as it is. 
Habits perfect powers in two senses: in reference to being and in reference to act.  In 
this regards, the habits of acquired virtue are habits more properly speaking, because they are 
habits both of being (that is, a quality of an operative habit of the soul) which inclines the agent 
towards a particular kind of activity (ST I-II.55.2; & In I Sent. d.17, q.2, a.3). So the acting 
person is the efficient cause of his own acquired moral activity.  For this reason, the acquired 
virtue rather seems to fit the designation ‘habit’ more properly.  And as paradoxical as it may 
seem initially, it is precisely because habits of the acquired virtues are habits more properly that 
they are virtues less perfectly.  
The term ‘habit’, as it applies to the acquired virtues, does not apply univocally to the 
infused virtues.  As such, the infused virtues are virtuous more perfectly.  In contrast then to the 
acquired virtues, for which man himself is the direct efficient cause, God is the direct efficient 
cause of the infused virtues.141  Aquinas tells us that the infused virtues produce the effects of 
habits within us, and so it is only in a manner of speaking that we refer to the cause of these 
infused virtues ‘habits’. 
Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, 
but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, “which 
God works in us without us.” As to those things which are done by us, 
God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He 
works in every will and in every nature.142 
 
                                                          
140 ST I-II, q.51, a.4: (Prima ratio est) quia aliqui habitus sunt quibus homo bene disponitur ad finem 
excedentem facultatem humanae naturae, qui est ultima et perfecta hominis beatitudo, ut supra dictum 
est. Et quia habitus oportet esse proportionatos ei ad quod homo disponitur secundum ipsos, ideo 
necesse est quod etiam habitus ad huiusmodi finem disponentes, excedant facultatem humanae 
naturae. Unde tales habitus nunquam possunt homini inesse nisi ex infusione divina, sicut est de omnibus 
gratuitis virtutibus.  
141 Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. (ST I-II.55.4)  God remains the 
indirect cause through nature even of the acquired virtues, since God alone is the source of all being and 
the good. 
142 ...virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et 
sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, 
Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura. (ST I-
II.55.4ad6) 
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 This distinction explains why one retains control of the acquired virtues while in a state 
of mortal sin, but why, at the same time, one loses the infused virtues in a similar state of sin.  
For, in breaking friendship with God, one does not sever the tie to the habit—which is the 
efficient cause of virtuous action—in the acquired virtues, for this efficient cause is the human 
subject himself.  But since God is the direct efficient cause of the infused virtues, to sever 
friendship with God is to sever the cause of those virtues too. 
Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work proceeding 
from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more perfect the 
action.143 
 
 It is evident from the foregoing that Aquinas uses the term ‘habit’ in reference to 
infused virtues analogically.  This is because any human habit properly speaking is of necessity 
a habit of fallen nature and therefore incapable of raising the human person to the supernatural 
state.  This suggests furthermore that Aquinas’ description of the infused virtues is so closely 
aligned with his theology of grace that it is only within the context of grace that his discussion 
of infused virtues and infused habits make sense and comes  alive: “And thus, even as the 
natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this 
natural light, so also the light of grace  which is a participation of the Divine Nature is 
something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light.”144  
 
3.2.3: Infused Habits & the Analogical Agent 
 
In question thirteen of the prima pars of the Summa, Aquinas introduces the term, 
‘analogical agent’ (agens analogicum).  Aquinas arrives at the concept of the analogical agent 
through a relatively simple logical exercise.  He says, in essence, that God—as the cause of all 
causes—cannot be a cause like other causes because this would produce a reductio ad 
absurdum for it would mean that God would be in the same species of every other cause which 
                                                          
143 Ad secundum dicendum quod homo sine gratia non potest habere aequale opus operi quod ex gratia 
procedit, quia quanto est perfectius principium actionis, tanto est perfectior actio. Sequeretur autem 
ratio, supposita aequalitate operationis utrobique. (ST I-II.14.2.2) 
144 ST I-II.110.3: Sicut igitur lumen naturale rationis est aliquid praeter virtutes acquisitas, quae dicuntur 
in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale; ita etiam ipsum lumen gratiae, quod est participatio divinae naturae, 
est aliquid praeter virtutes infusas, quae a lumine illo derivantur, et ad illud lumen ordinantur. 
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would result in our need to seek another cause for that set of causes.  So while all equivocal 
causes can be reduced to the notion of cause univocally, there must remain another cause for all 
univocal causes but which itself is not univocal along with them (ST I, q.13 a.5, ad.1).145  It is in 
this sense that we should understand ‘habit’ in relation to the infused virtues.  Infused habits are 
causes, analogically, of their corresponding virtues. 
To speak of God as being the direct cause of an infused habit in the human person is to 
speak of habit analogically, “as coming down to the soul from on high” (ST III, q.9 a.4, ad.3).  
Thus acquired habits and infused habits are not habits univocally.  And that is why “acquired 
and infused habits are not to be classed together” (ST III.9.4.ad3). God’s assistance through 
grace, as we shall see, does not necessarily make natural human endeavour easier. 
Furthermore, I do not want to suggest that an infused habit is a temporary state of 
affairs until we “get the hang of it” and are able to perform virtuous acts well and on our own, 
without further assistance from God.  This is certainly not what Aquinas has in mind: we can 
never perform meritorious acts of the supernatural kind without on-going, moment-by-moment 
guidance from above.  There is no sense consequently in Aquinas of grace “setting us up” to 
allow us to work virtuously on our own merits once we’ve been ‘trained’ (ST I-II.109.9).146  
Rather, for an infused habit to remain in a person, they must be in a state of grace or a state of 
friendship with God.  Infused habits are present in us moment by moment: “Therefore, just as 
light in the air immediately ceases if some obstacle is placed in the way, so does the habit of 
                                                          
145 For a detailed discussion of Aquinas’ treatment of this question, see Velde, Rudi A. te. Aquinas on 
God: the 'divine science' of the Summa Theologiae. Oxford: Ashgate, 2006. Page 109 ff; and Boland, 
Vivian. Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: sources and synthesis. Leiden, The Netherlands: 
E.J. Brill, 1996. Page 249. 
146 I am reminded here of the description Hans Urs von Balthasar gives of Jesus’ relationship to the 
Father during his earthly ministry.  Balthasar writes, “Now it is [Jesus’] receptivity to everything that 
comes to him from the Father that is the basis of time and temporality as these terms apply to the Son 
in his creaturely form of existence.  This receptivity is the very constitution of his being, by which it is 
perpetually open to receive his mission from the Father.” (Balthasar, Urs von, Hans. A theology of 
history. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994. Pages 33-34).  In a related way, infused habits open up the 
human person to reality and the possibility of virtuous acts moment by moment.  They are not, as with 
the acquired virtues, drawn from a store within a person, but unite a person to God in a living friendship 
(ST-I.20.1.ad3). 
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charity immediately cease in the soul when the soul turns itself away from God through sin.”147  
Thus the infused habit is identical to being in a state of grace, and the infused virtue of gratitude 
by extension refers to being in a state of grace through a certain kind of grateful activity: the 
activity of praise, worship and liturgy. 
Aquinas thus speaks of a dual action that the infused habit performs; for it is not 
sufficient that we be disposed to acting virtuously according to the infused habit; but we also 
must be provided with the ability to carry out acts according to that disposition.  Just as a person 
needs, not only a healthy set of eyes to see by, but also the light—so too do we need both the 
infused habit (grace) by which to act rightly, but also the divine light of God’s justice by which 
to see what must be done. 
...in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God:  first, 
a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after 
being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of 
everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man 
needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act.  Now with 
regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of 
grace, that is, a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace 
in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act righteously, 
and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created 
thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. 
Secondly, for this special reason—the condition of the state of human 
nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains 
corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves “the law of 
sin....” [Emphasis added]148 
 
Throughout the Summa, an indeed in those works dealing with the nature and 
distinction of acquired and infused habits, Aquinas frequently uses the language of grace 
interchangeably with descriptions of infused habit, as in the passage just cited. 
                                                          
147 DQV 1.13: Et ideo, sicut statim cessaret lumen in aere, si interponeretur aliquod obstaculum; ita 
statim cessat habitus caritatis in anima, quando anima se avertit a Deo per peccatum. 
148 ST I-II.109.9: ...homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auxilio Dei indiget. Uno quidem modo, quantum ad 
aliquod habituale donum, per quod natura humana corrupta sanetur; et etiam sanata elevetur ad 
operandum opera meritoria vitae aeternae, quae excedunt proportionem naturae. Alio modo indiget 
homo auxilio gratiae ut a Deo moveatur ad agendum. Quantum igitur ad primum auxilii modum, homo 
in gratia existens non indiget alio auxilio gratiae quasi aliquo alio habitu infuso. Indiget tamen auxilio 
gratiae secundum alium modum, ut scilicet a Deo moveatur ad recte agendum. Et hoc propter duo. 
Primo quidem, ratione generali, propter hoc quod, sicut supra dictum est, nulla res creata potest in 
quemcumque actum prodire nisi virtute motionis divinae. Secundo, ratione speciali, propter conditionem 
status humanae naturae. Quae quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen 
in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem, per quam servit legi peccati.... 
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With this in mind, we can see that infused and acquired habits are of a different species, 
and Aquinas stresses this repeatedly.  But recalling those earlier texts of his, which state that the 
acquired and infused virtues are of differing acts (unde non habent eundem actum), we need to 
ask: in what way do the moral objects of acquired habits and infused habits differ?  For “infused 
and acquired virtue differ not only in relation to the ultimate end, but also in relation to their 
proper objects.”149 
One can see this principle at work in Aquinas’ distinction between those acts proper to 
acquired habits, and those proper to infused habits.  For example, in the Quaestiones Disputate 
de Virtutibus, Aquinas notes that “through the acquired virtues we do not attain the happiness of 
heaven, but a kind of happiness that we are naturally apt to acquire through our natural 
endowments in this life. [We gain this sort of happiness] through the activity of complete virtue, 
which Aristotle discusses in Ethics X.”150  From this, and many other passages like it, we see 
that the acts proper to the acquired virtues and those acts proper to the infused virtues—which 
here we see also are ‘complete’ virtues properly speaking—have acts with different ends: 
acquired habits perfect us in our operation as citizens of the earthly city; whereas virtue properly 
speaking, orients us to, and fits us for, heaven and beatitude.  Indeed, all our good acts produced 
by acquired habits perfect us in reference to this social existence; hence, all of the acquired 
virtues are, in this sense, social. 
Again, since man by his nature is a social animal, the [acquired] 
virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his 
nature, are called “social” virtues; since it is by reason of them that 
man behaves himself well in the conduct of human affairs.151 
 
Since we are destined, however, for something greater than just a social existence here 
on earth, “there are some habits by which man is disposed to an end which exceeds the 
                                                          
149 ST I-II.63.4.ad1: ....virtus infusa et acquisita non solum differunt secundum ordinem ad ultimum finem; 
sed etiam secundum ordinem ad propria obiecta....  
150 DQV, 1.9.ad6: Ad sextum dicendum, quod per virtutes acquisitas non pervenitur ad felicitatem 
caelestem, sed ad quamdam felicitatem quam homo natus est acquirere per propria naturalia in hac vita 
secundum actum perfectae virtutis, de qua Aristoteles tractat in X Metaph. 
151 ST I-II.61.5: Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in 
homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur, prout scilicet homo secundum 
has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. 
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proportion of human nature, namely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated 
above” as we have seen.152   
 
3.3 The Distinction Between Acquired & Infused Virtue 
 
 An important clarification is needed here, for at least two potential dangers loom on the 
horizon: firstly, how are we to tell the acquired virtues and the infused virtues apart?  Secondly, 
what justification does Aquinas have for making this distinction between acquired and infused 
virtues?    
One might be excused in thinking that telling the infused virtues apart from the acquired 
is simply a question of ‘feeling’. But there is no sense in Aquinas of one feeling one’s way into 
the distinction.  Feelings are accidental to, not the subject of, habits and so are ordered by, and 
put in check by habits.  Feelings as such are not a reliable indicator of a habit because one 
cannot derive definitions of substances from accidents.  Feelings are essentially non-rational, 
despite our modern tendency to think of at least some virtues—like gratitude—as being 
principally emotional movements.   
For Aquinas, feelings, in a sense, are antithetical to habit, as they are evoked by the 
vicissitudes of life and hence cannot be the subject of permanent dispositions.  For this reason, 
gratitude cannot be merely a feeling.  This is not to say that feelings are of no use in indicating 
certain dispositions to us; but the nature of feelings is such that they are difficult to define and 
measure, as Reginald of Piperno remarks in the Supplement to the Summa (ST Supp q.3, ad.4), 
picking up where Aquinas left off. 
 Alternatively, we may seek a different understanding of virtues, one based not on an 
evaluation of feelings associated with habits but on the acts produced by those habits 
themselves.  Aquinas himself has said that habits, like powers, can only be known through their 
                                                          
152 ST I-II, q.51, a.4. 
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acts and so this would seem to be a more useful approach to the question of the distinction 
between acquired and infused habits.153 
 But on reflection we can see a further difficulty here.  It is possible to imagine, for 
example, two people performing what seems to be exactly the same act from the point of view 
of the observer—but which in fact constitutes two different acts.  A person could repay a gift, 
motivated only by the prospect of more favours in return, while another person could repay the 
same gift, genuinely motivated by love.  We might be inclined, on observation, to ascribe 
virtuous acts in both situations.  And while we might be inclined to ascribe the adjectives, 
“grateful” and “thoughtful” to both, we would not do so if we knew the real motivations of both. 
 The philosophical principle of Scholastic thought, that we do not gain knowledge of 
things from their potency or matter but rather from their act or form (Meta. IV.12.681) holds 
good for habits and virtues, too (ST I-II, q.1 a.3).  Hence, our distinction between the kind of 
acts performed by others and ourselves cannot be based on an observation of the activity in its 
material exposition, but rather on an insight into the form of the act, which is difficult to know 
with certainty—even for the acting person.   
 Indeed, Aquinas notes that it is very difficult to observe a difference between the form 
of an act ensuing from an acquired habit and one ensuing from an infused habit. 
A habit can never be known except through its acts, and the acts of the 
infused supernatural virtues greatly resemble the acts of the acquired 
natural virtues. Consequently, it is not easy to be certain that acts of 
this kind have their source in grace, unless, by a special privilege, a 
person is made certain of it through a revelation.154  
 
 This is a significant observation by Aquinas and one which opens up a totally different 
way of thinking about acquired and infused virtues.  For most of us, I suspect, are accustomed 
to thinking of infused habits as being something self-evidently different to acquired habits: the 
latter come to us through hard work and repetition, through trial and error; while the former, 
those God-given graces “coming down to the soul from on high”, are somehow mysteriously 
                                                          
153 ST I, q.87, a.2 
154 DQT, 6.5.ad3: Habitus enim nunquam possunt cognosci nisi per actus. Actus autem virtutum 
gratuitarum habent maximam similitudinem cum actibus virtutum acquisitarum, ut non possit de facili 
per huiusmodi actus certitudo de gratia haberi, nisi forte per revelationem inde certificetur aliquis ex 
speciali privilegio. 
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planted in us without the need for any work on our part at all, and hence which flow from us 
like a mysterious second-nature that comes to us with a certain facility, though how, we can’t 
really say.  And this is why some have thought that the infused virtues presuppose the acquired 
virtues—because they seem to be ‘superadded’ onto the acquired.155 
 But Aquinas is a realist when it comes to human nature.  Experience tells us that the 
temptation to think of infused habits and graces as giving us virtue without any need for effort 
on our part does not in fact cohere either with experience or with a further, systematic reflection 
on the matter.  The remarkable conclusion is, therefore, that infused habits do not bypass human 
effort but rather transform its object. It is for this reason that it is difficult to tell acquired and 
infused virtues apart; because materially, they may look identical.  Just as we couldn’t see a 
difference in merit by simply comparing external actions, so too would it be wrong to think that 
the difference between an acquired an infused virtue can in some way be observed.  It is not as 
though an acquired virtue, such as gratitude, means giving thanks to a local benefactor, while 
the infused virtue means giving thanks to God.  Both acts could be either the result of an 
acquired or an infused habit.  And both acquired gratitude and infused gratitude will become 
habitual in a person after effort and practice.  The difference between the two cannot be 
observed in the outward act.  Hence even the fact that God may be the object of an act in no way 
guarantees that such an act is the result of infused virtue.  Aquinas is conscious that such a view 
would commit us to Pelagianism.  The foregoing then suggests that the proper way of thinking 
about acquired and infused virtues is as follows:  
(1) Acquired virtues are those which are acquired by man, following effort and 
practice, flowing from his natural abilities as man, according to providence.   
                                                          
155 With this in mind, it is clear why Lee Yearley’s contention that the infused virtues presuppose the 
acquired virtues is mistaken.  First of all, God’s will does not presuppose human will, but vice versa and 
so similarly, an infused habit—which is of divine origin—would not presuppose the acquired habit.  
More importantly, the ‘presupposition’ model seems to be based on the ‘superadded’ notion of infused 
virtues.  But there would in fact be no need for an acquired virtue when one already has the infused 
virtue which includes, so to speak, the same natural species of object as presented by the acquired 
virtue.  As we have seen, an acquired act of bravery is no different, materially speaking, from an infused 
act of bravery.  The distinction between the two acts is not material, but formal, and so no 
presupposition is necessary to explain the infused variety.   
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(2) Infused virtues are those which are acquired by man, following effort and practice, 
flowing from the grace of God, according to predestination. 
One can see that italicised parts of those definitions are beyond human scrutiny: the 
acquired and infused habits differ formally not on account of their material aspect, but on 
account of their object, which determines reason and action to a particular end.  In the case of 
the infused virtues, that end is friendship with God.  This is borne out in Aquinas’ distinction 
between acquired and infused virtues in ST I-II, q.55 a.4, ad.6, where the only difference he 
gives between the acquired and infused virtues is the addition, in the case of the latter, of the 
phrase, “...which God works in us, without us.”  This distinction is beyond the reach of any 
observation of acts. 
This explains the difficulty Aquinas has in distinguishing acts of acquired habits from 
acts of infused habits; for the distinction between the two is not simply a question of identifying 
habits we get on our own from hard work, from those that we simply wake up with in the 
morning, mysteriously acquired and present in consciousness with no apparent effort on our 
part.  ‘Grace does not eliminate human nature, but perfects it’ is a well-known axiom of 
Aquinas—but we mustn’t forget that “grace perfects nature according to the manner of nature” 
(ST I, q.62, a.5).  Human nature proceeds in time, through toil and effort, through trial and error, 
through an apprenticeship in front of reality.  Grace does not eliminate this industriousness in us 
or this need to work at cooperating with grace.  Hence, neither do the infused virtues do away 
with the need for sweat and tears.  This is even true of the infused, theological virtue of faith 
which must produce, of necessity if it is to be meritorious, the outward act of confession.156  
Aquinas makes this point even more explicitly in his Commentary on First Thessalonians: “It is 
not sufficient [simply to believe in God]” he writes, “unless a person practices good works of 
faith and makes an effort”; and further on in the same passage he writes, “[St Paul] uses the 
words ‘work’ and ‘labour’, implying that he is mindful of their active and struggling faith.”157  
Nor should this be taken to mean that one can “increase grace” through the exercise of the 
                                                          
156 ST II-II, q.3, a.1 & 2. 
157 Commentary on 1 Thessaonlians, 1:1: Haec autem non est sufficiens, nisi habeat operationem et 
laborem…. Ideo dicit operis et laboris. Quasi dicat: memores fidei vestrae operantis et laborantis. 
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infused virtues.  One does not multiply the infused virtue in respect to its origin in the grace of 
God through repeated acts.  Rather, the repeated acts of infused virtue serve to open the virtuous 
person up to greater merit granted by God, and to orienting the person more and more to the 
love of God so that “through giving thanks for benefits received we merit to receive yet greater 
benefits.”158 
It is clear that charity and the other infused virtues are not actively 
increased by acts, but only as disposing and meriting; they are actively 
increased by the action of God who perfects and conserves the charity 
that he first infused.159 
 
Along with his treatments in the Summa and those from question one of the 
Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus two more significant texts highlight Aquinas’ on-going 
concern regarding the difficulty of distinguishing the works of acquired virtue from infused 
virtue. 
First, we find him setting out this difficulty at greater length in the Scriptum super 
Sententiis, suggesting, as do later works, that the issue was very much on his mind anytime he 
thought about the nature of virtue in general.  Here, he sets out the question, “Whether anyone 
can know with certainty that he has charity?”—and it turns out to be a question which he 
answers in the negative.160  He states, 
The Philosopher says that a sign of habit is when pleasure is taken in 
the carrying out of some work.  Yet it cannot be discerned, by the 
mere fact of someone’s having such a manner in his work, whether it 
comes from the habit of infused charity or from an acquired habit.  
Finally, love’s proper effect, insofar as it comes from charity, comes 
in the power of meriting.  But knowing we have merited does not in 
any way fall into our knowledge, unless it is specially revealed to us 
by God. Therefore no one can know with certainty that he has charity, 
though he may make some conjecture from probable signs.161 
                                                          
158 ST II-II, q.83, a.17: Ratio vero impetrandi ex parte petentis est gratiarum actio, quia de acceptis 
beneficiis gratias agentes, meremur accipere potiora. 
159 De Virtutibus q.1, a.2, ad.18. 
160 In the parallel text in the Lectura Romnana, Aquinas notes, within the body of the reply, that while 
the intellect has a certain recursive quality, and as such is able to reflect on its own reflecting, it is not 
readily able to reflect on the principles or causes of its own acts with the same kind of clarity, since 
these sources of action are not always clear—especially when they are considered as being from a 
“configuration to the Holy Spirit.”  One can guess that they may be acting out of infused love—and 
certainly, hope that they are; but this motivation is not something that can be phenomenologically held 
up to scrutiny.  
161 In I Sent. d.17;1.4: Modus autem quem ponit habitus in opere est facilitas et delectatio, ut dicit 
philosophus, quod signum habitus oportet accipere fientem in opere delectationem. Per istum autem 
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The reason why we cannot know whether or not our actions proceed from infused 
charity is explained by the Aristotelian principle found in Metaphysics II which Aquinas makes 
reference to earlier in the question: things which are more intelligible in themselves are less 
knowable to us; since that which is more intelligible is not in matter.  Now infused charity, since 
it is of God, is more perfectly known to God, but less so to us: we are not privy to the inner 
workings of grace, which proceed from the mind of God.  But in the case of distinguishing 
virtue, the phenomena of acquired and infused virtues often appears identical; thus we can only 
properly know acquired virtue and guess—or rather hope—that we have infused virtue.  Nor is 
it enough simply to try and establish the presence of grace by appealing to the presence of love: 
even love has acquired and infused varieties: “the act of love which we perceive in ourselves, in 
so far as it is perceptible, is not an adequate indication of charity because of the similarity 
between natural love and infused love.”162 
This reading is confirmed more generally speaking by considering Aquinas’ project in 
question one of the Quaestiones Disputate de Virtutibus.  Here, beginning with article one, he 
immediately sets to work distinguishing acquired from infused virtues.  With this distinction 
established and now taken for granted in articles one through eight, Aquinas then proceeds to 
ask in article nine, and citing Dionysius as an authority, whether or not we acquire virtues 
through repetition of acts—a question which he answers in the affirmative.  Again, he 
distinguishes acquired from infused virtues—as we would expect—saying that we do not 
acquire virtue properly speaking (i.e., the infused virtues) through our own acts, since a 
supernatural end exceeds the ability of our natural endowments.  But, he goes on to say, and in 
fact repeats this throughout the entire question more than fifty times, that virtues, both acquired 
and infused, function as perfecting the will through habitually good acts.  So while infused 
                                                                                                                                                                          
modum non discernitur utrum sit ab habitu caritatis infuso, vel ab habitu acquisito. Effectus autem 
proprius dilectionis, secundum quod est ex caritate, est in virtute merendi. Hoc autem nullo modo cadit in 
cognitionem nostram nisi per revelationem. Et ideo nullus certitudinaliter potest scire se habere 
caritatem; sed potest ex aliquibus signis probabilibus conjicere. 
162 De Veritate, q.10, a.10, ad.1: quia actus ille dilectionis quem in nobis percipimus secundum id quod de 
eo est perceptibile, non est sufficiens signum caritatis, propter similitudinem dilectionis naturalis ad 
gratuitam. 
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virtues are not directly or exclusively caused by repetition of action, the repeated actions 
produced by them are perfected through grace.  What is of interest here is that these perfecting 
acts can be considered to be simultaneous with their habits, and particularly the habit of charity, 
from which they flow (ST III.85.6). 
No amount of introspection therefore will reveal to us whether or not our actions 
proceed from acquired or infused principles because they are directly infused by the will of 
God—which causal chain we can in no way sense.163  Without a direct revelation from God 
therefore, we cannot know for certain whether or not we are performing acts which flow from 
an infused habit.  We can make a reasoned and hopeful guess based on “probable signs”; but 
such guesswork is precisely that, and fails to provide any knowledge as such.   
 
3.4 Merit  
 
An important distinction to keep in mind at the same time is that this inability to know 
whether or not our actions are of infused virtue is not because we cannot know what is good.  
We can indeed know what actions are good (if we couldn’t, no virtuous action of either kind 
would be possible because we wouldn’t know what acts we should be engaging in); we just 
can’t know if a particular good action we perform is worthy of merit.  Ultimately then, what 
distinguishes acquired and infused virtues is their meritorious efficacy which is imperceptible to 
the senses.  So Aquinas is not so concerned with a distinction between which acts are good and 
which are not; this in fact can be known through reason and application of the natural law, or by 
appealing to the Divine Law.  But what we cannot possibly know is which of our acts are 
meritorious. As it turns out for Aquinas, it is only virtue which is worthy of merit, and vice 
which is worthy of demerit: “For God loves a cheerful giver, he gives the reason, which is this: 
                                                          
163 This is due in part to the fact that intelligence arises from memory (ST I.79.7.ad3) and there can be no 
memory of what is infused. 
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everyone who rewards gives a reward for things worthy of a reward; but only acts of the virtues 
are such.”164 
 Aquinas’ teaching that we cannot know with certainty whether or not we possess 
infused virtue is a strong indication that for him virtues are not simply subjective acts, but have 
an objective value, a worthiness which comes to them from without.  Virtues are not simply the 
result of personal effort.  While they include personal effort, they also have a counterpart in 
keeping with the notion of friendship, for which they exist.  Every friendship exists between one 
loving and one loved.  Since this is the essence of virtue, we must look for something in 
addition to the individual in order to understand what virtues are.  They are personal habits to be 
sure; but they are personal habits oriented towards friendship.  This is why Aquinas is so 
insistent that virtues, like gratitude, cannot be reduced to the level of subjective affectivity.  
Gratitude is not a feeling; gratitude is a response to an invitation to friendship.  For this reason 
furthermore, gratitude cannot be conceived of independently of the gift which elicits it.  In short, 
virtues and the virtue of gratitude in particular, are by their very nature relational because the 
human agent is by nature relational. 
In concluding these reflections on the lack of certitude in reference to infused virtue, we 
should note that just because we cannot know with certainty whether or not we have infused, 
meritorious, virtue we can however know with certainty what is required to dispose ourselves to 
friendship with God, in the hope that he will bless our hope and desire with his grace.  First of 
all, we have the certainty of faith, which tells us that the Holy Spirit is working through the 
Church, in which God is revealed.  Thus we know what things we ought to be doing at least, 
given this certainty of faith.165 
 Among the things that faith points us to, is the practice of religion, which in turn 
disposes us to the sacraments of the Church.  Indeed, the virtue of faith—and theological virtues 
in general—are the cause of the virtue of religion.166  It is the virtue of religion furthermore 
                                                          
164 Commentary on 2nd Corinthians, 332: omnis remunerator remunerat ea quae sunt remuneratione 
digna. Haec autem sunt solum actus virtutum. 
165 De Rationibus Fidei, c.9; ST II-II, q.1, a.4 & 5. 
166 ST II-II, q.81, a.5, ad.1. 
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which directs us to the acts of praise and thanksgiving to God.  For it is in the act of thanking 
God that not only do we dispose ourselves to his grace, but we demonstrate the confidence that 
comes with faith in the reality of his grace given through the Church.167 
 
3.4.1 The actus humanus as an act of merit & reward 
 
In the very first question and article of the first of the second part of the Summa 
Theologiae, Aquinas draws a distinction between those human acts which are not the result of 
deliberation or choice (actus hominis) and those acts which are the result of a rational activity 
(actus humanus).  This distinction is not unique to Aquinas; it traces its origins to the ancient 
world and was, in medieval times, a common feature of Scholastic thinking.168  However, there 
is another dimension of the actus humanus in Aquinas—one that is not often the subject of 
discussion, but which is, however, central to Aquinas’ virtue theory, and that is the notion of the 
actus humanus not simply as an act of the will, but as an act of the will which is simultaneously 
an act worthy of merit or demerit on account of the gifts of God.  Without such merit, any 
deliberate action would lack any value and indeed any coherence at all.  Every actus humanus 
is, therefore, an act of merit or demerit essentially speaking.  Indeed, Aquinas declares that it is 
the task of the theologian to consider human actions as actions of merit and demerit, because 
this is requisite for a voluntary action.169  For Aquinas, merit and demerit constitute the very 
finality of human action: “Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its end” he says 
(ST I, q.62, a.9, ad.1), and all chosen acts of the will move towards some end.170 
                                                          
167 Commentary on 1st Thessalonians, 1.1. 
168 Nor is the distinction anything novel for Thomists, for whom the distinction is rather 
straightforward—although, in recent years, the distinction has been at the centre of discussions about 
what Aquinas means precisely by his reference to the moral object.  Martin Rhonheimer in particular 
has developed the notion of the actus humanus to show how such acts are synonymous with free and 
therefore moral actions which constitute personhood itself, which I address in the section on Natural 
Law. 
169 Tertio, quia theologus considerat actus humanos secundum quod sunt meritorii vel demeritorii, quod 
convenit actibus humanis; ad quod requiritur quod sint voluntarii. Actus autem humanus iudicatur 
voluntarius vel involuntarius, secundum cognitionem vel ignorantiam circumstantiarum, ut dictum est. Et 
ideo consideratio circumstantiarum pertinet ad theologum. (ST I-II.7.2) 
170 In what follows, I shall, to avoid confusion, refer to human acts properly speaking (actus humanus) as 
acts of the person in contrast to acts of the creature (actus hominis), simply as animal, without this 
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 It is necessary to keep in mind that in Aquinas’ thinking, there is no such thing as a 
morally neutral act of a person, as a morally free agent.  Every such act, because it consists in 
an act of the will, by nature and necessity, tends towards an end as specified as good (ST I, q.82, 
a.1).  In fact, the will never tends towards being as such, but always and only towards the “good 
apprehended” (bonum apprehensum; ST I-II, q.8, a.1).  Every act of the person, which is an act 
of will, no matter how small or insignificant it may seem, is a moral action and therefore an act 
of merit or demerit because every deliberately chosen action tends towards the good so 
apprehended, since “without free choice, there can be neither merit or demerit.”171 
If it is true that no action of the will is morally neutral, it would imply that seemingly 
insignificant actions like tying one’s shoelace are moral acts of a person—or acts worthy of 
merit.  But on examination, it is evident that this is in fact the case.  For central to Aquinas’ 
argument is the observation that every freely chosen act, no matter how small, aims at some 
                                                                                                                                                                          
rational differentiation.  Some commentators, such as John Trigilio Jr., in his essay, Thomistic 
Renaissance: The Natural Moral Law, suggest that the actus hominis is peculiar to the human species in 
general, but this cannot be right.  For any action that is from the human species as differentiated from 
other animals is therefore rational and, consequently, moral.  Trigilio suggests the act of laughing or 
speaking is an example of the actus hominis. However, speaking is in fact a rational activity and 
therefore an act of a person (actus humanus), not simply of man as animal.  As for laughing, Aquinas 
explains that this is an accident of a rational nature which emanates from man as rational, and is 
therefore also not an actus hominis but an actus humanus: “But the accidents that follow from the form 
are properly passions of the genus or species, and so they are found in all things participating in the 
nature of the genus or species, as risibility in man follows from the form, for laughter comes from a 
certain kind of understanding in the soul of man.” (De Ente et Essentia, c.6) ...unde inveniuntur in 
omnibus participantibus naturam generis vel speciei, sicut risibile consequitur in homine formam, quia 
risus contingit ex aliqua apprehensione animae hominis.  In evidence of this, one can see that one would 
be culpable for laughing inappropriately—hence, laughing carries with it attachment to merit and 
demerit along with our other properly personal actions.  Furthermore, Aquinas is clear that all acts of 
the person are, by nature, rational while any act of man as man (actus hominis) is never rational as such: 
“Such like actions are not properly human actions; since they do not proceed from deliberation of the 
reason, which is the proper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an imaginary end, 
but not one that is determined by the use of reason.” (ST I-II, 1.1.ad3) Ad tertium dicendum quod 
huiusmodi actiones non sunt proprie humanae, quia non procedunt ex deliberatione rationis, quae est 
proprium principium humanorum actuum. Et ideo habent quidem finem imaginatum, non autem per 
rationem praestitutum.  Aquinas lays out his clearest exposition of the difference between acts of the 
person and acts of man as animal in the Disputed Questions on Virtues, q.1, a.4, where he explains: “It is 
not just any activity found in man or engaged in by a man that is called human, since there are many 
activities shared by plants, animals, and men, but only that which is proper to him. Unlike these other 
things, it is proper to man that he have dominion over his acts. Any act over which a man has dominion 
is properly called a human act, but not those over which he does not have dominion, even though they 
occur in him, e.g., digesting and growing and the like.” Actus autem humanus dicitur qui non quocumque 
modo in homine vel per hominem exercetur; cum in quibusdam etiam plantae, bruta et homines 
conveniant; sed qui hominis proprius est. Inter cetera vero hoc habet homo proprium in suo actu, quod 
sui actus est dominus.   
171 De Veritate, q.24, a.1: sine libero arbitrio non possit esse meritum vel demeritum. 
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good, and is on this account ‘moral’.  Such acts furthermore occur within a certain orbit of 
human action: acts of the person are never isolated from an overarching project aimed at the 
good.  Giving money to the poor for example, is never an act in isolation from other acts.  
Stealing in order to give to the poor alters the nature of the act.  The end of the action, helping 
the poor, thus falls within a wider orbit of action aimed at some greater good.  Aquinas calls this 
orbit of action the ‘circumstances’ of a moral act of the person.   
These circumstances are the accidents of a given freely chosen action, and they feature 
prominently in Aquinas’ account of the virtues of indebtedness.  For example, in considering 
the mean of religion and piety, the circumstances consider the how, when and to whom worship 
and honour should be given; in the virtue of obedience, the circumstances include what and who 
is obeyed; in the virtue of gratitude, the circumstances include one’s ability and means to repay 
the moral debt.  As far as gratitude to God is concerned, the human person lacks any requisite 
means of repaying God, and so must look to another set of circumstances in which this can be 
effected, namely through the properly instituted sacraments of Christ, present in the Church.172   
While we may not be totally conscious of every detail of every part of this overarching 
action, just as we may not be aware of the far-reaching consequences of our giving money to a 
poor man, nonetheless, our actions in the context of the circumstances and particular end to 
which they are aimed together constitute a deliberate project aimed at some reasoned end and so 
are included in the act of the person.  Aquinas explains this principle at work in the example of 
a builder who, while having the general project of the house in mind, may not necessarily have 
every detail of the building materials in mind: “a builder thinks out the definite measurements of 
a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and 
definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of 
                                                          
172 Aquinas repeatedly makes this point in his various Commentaries on the Letters of Paul which deal 
with the nature of the Church and the sacraments, such as the Commentaries on 1 and 2 Corinthians, 
Colossians, Galatians, etc.  This theme is explored in greater depth in the chapter on Ecclesiology. 
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stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the 
wall”.173  
Similarly, the act of giving money to the poor occurs within a context of circumstances, 
and is aimed at a particular end, such as the alleviation of suffering or poverty.  To neutralise, so 
to speak, these subsidiary acts involves divorcing them from a reasoned project occurring within 
a temporal framework.  To do so would be to fragment the natural contiguity of human action 
extended through place and time, in which context the life of the person is an unfolding of 
meaning which is either good or bad.  It is for this reason that gratitude, for example, cannot 
simply be construed as an effective ‘giving thanks’ in the heart.  Any such reduction of gratitude 
or any virtue contingent on love (as they all are) eliminates the relevance of the very real 
circumstances in which the human agent lives and expresses himself.  The expression of the 
body in the context of the material world is a real circumstance in which our actions take place; 
the virtuous person takes full advantage of everything that is placed at his disposal for the 
production of virtuous acts.  The circumstance of my life is not irrelevant to the way in which I 
am called to express myself as a virtuous person in the world around me.  Human life consists in 
action (ST II-II, q.51, a.1).   
There is perhaps a certain tendency to forget the relationship between the lived 
experience and the virtuous life.  The virtues don’t simply respond to situations as they arise, as 
though they were simply passive responses to external forces.  The truly virtuous person makes 
use of the circumstances in which he finds himself, in order to perfect himself and the world 
around him: “A virtuous act may be considered in another way, in comparison with its first 
motive cause, which is the love of charity, and it is in this respect that an act comes to belong to 
the perfection of life.”  Virtuous acts not only do make use of circumstances; they must make 
use of the due circumstances in which human activity can only take place (ST I-II, q.18, a.3).  In 
looking to the works of gratitude therefore, we must look at the circumstances of human 
                                                          
173 ST I, q.23, a.7: Sicut aedificator excogitat determinatam mensuram domus, et etiam determinatum 
numerum mansionum quas vult facere in domo, et determinatum numerum mensurarum parietis vel 
tecti, non autem eligit determinatum numerum lapidum, sed accipit tot, quot sufficiunt ad explendam 
tantam mensuram parietis.  
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existence.  These circumstances include, in the case of natural human powers, the total inability 
of the human creature to repay God by the natural powers alone: the genuinely grateful person 
must look to some other circumstances not of his own making in which to show gratitude to 
God. 
Any set of reasoned actions which are part of a continuous motion towards fulfilment of 
a particular moral object share in the merit or demerit of the acts of the person.  Each set of 
circumstances chosen for some end provides the means for the accomplishment an act that 
seems to be, in the mind of the agent, for some overarching good or end.  It is in the context of 
these circumstances, those accidents of moral action, that we find ourselves operating from day 
to day in an effort to build a life that is either good or bad. 
I answer that, it sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its 
species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And the 
reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above, derives its 
goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also 
from the circumstances, which are its accidents, as it were; just as 
something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, 
which does not belong to him by reason of his species. And every 
individual action needs to have some circumstance that makes it good 
or bad, at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it 
belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds from 
deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact 
alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character of evil. But if it be 
directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the 
character of good. Now it must needs be either directed or not directed 
to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from 
deliberate reason, if it be considered in the individual, must be good or 
bad.174 
 
 ‘Voluntary’ action is therefore synonymous with ‘moral’ action.  We should not, with 
that in mind, simply assume however that voluntary action is somehow worthy of merit or 
                                                          
174 ST I-II, q.18, a.9: Respondeo dicendum quod contingit quandoque aliquem actum esse indifferentem 
secundum speciem, qui tamen est bonus vel malus in individuo consideratus. Et hoc ideo, quia actus 
moralis, sicut dictum est, non solum habet bonitatem ex obiecto, a quo habet speciem; sed etiam ex 
circumstantiis, quae sunt quasi quaedam accidentia; sicut aliquid convenit individuo hominis secundum 
accidentia individualia, quod non convenit homini secundum rationem speciei. Et oportet quod quilibet 
individualis actus habeat aliquam circumstantiam per quam trahatur ad bonum vel malum, ad minus ex 
parte intentionis finis. Cum enim rationis sit ordinare, actus a ratione deliberativa procedens, si non sit 
ad debitum finem ordinatus, ex hoc ipso repugnat rationi, et habet rationem mali. Si vero ordinetur ad 
debitum finem, convenit cum ordine rationis, unde habet rationem boni. Necesse est autem quod vel 
ordinetur, vel non ordinetur ad debitum finem. Unde necesse est omnem actum hominis a deliberativa 
ratione procedentem, in individuo consideratum, bonum esse vel malum.  
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demerit, but ask why this is the case, if indeed it must be.  What is it that constitutes acts of the 
will as acts of merit and demerit? 
We need to clarify here what Aquinas himself means by the word ‘merit’, for he uses 
the word in at least two significant senses:  merit of the natural order and merit of the 
supernatural order.  The first corresponds to the acquired virtues, while the latter corresponds to 
the infused virtues.   
 Each kind of merit—natural and supernatural—relate to providence and predestination.   
Merit of the natural order pertains to those things that the human agent can and does do 
according to created nature, or those things which are produced by the acquired virtues.  As 
such, they include things that fall within the direction of Divine Providence (ST I-II, q.114, a.2).  
Merit of the supernatural order on the other hand pertains to those acts of the person which are 
directed towards eternal life and beatitude—including those acts produced by the infused 
virtues.  
...predestination differs from providence in two respects. Providence 
means a general ordering to an end. Consequently, it extends to all 
things, rational or irrational, good or bad, that have been ordained by 
God to an end. Predestination, however, is concerned only with that 
end which is possible for a rational creature, namely, his eternal glory. 
Consequently, it concerns only men, and only with reference to those 
things that are related to salvation. Moreover, predestination differs 
from providence in a second respect. In any ordering to an end, two 
things must be considered: the ordering itself, and the outcome or 
result of the ordering, for not everything that is ordered to an end 
reaches that end. Providence, therefore, is concerned only with the 
ordering to the end. Consequently, by God’s providence, all men are 
ordained to beatitude. But predestination is also concerned with the 
outcome or result of this ordering, and, therefore, it is related only to 
those who will attain heavenly glory. Hence, providence, is related to 
the initial establishment of an order, and predestination is related to its 
outcome or result; for the fact that some attain the end that is eternal 
glory is not due primarily to their own power but to the help of grace 
given by God.175 
                                                          
175 DQT, 6.1: ...praedestinatio quantum ad duo a providentia differt: providentia enim dicit universaliter 
ordinationem in finem, et ideo se extendit ad omnia quae a Deo in finem aliquem ordinantur, sive 
rationalia sive irrationalia, sive bona sive mala; sed praedestinatio respicit tantum illum finem qui est 
possibilis rationali creaturae, utpote gloriam; et ideo praedestinatio non est nisi hominum, et respectu 
horum quae pertinent ad salutem. Differt etiam alio modo. In qualibet enim ordinatione ad finem est duo 
considerare: scilicet ipsum ordinem, et exitum vel eventum ordinis: non enim omnia quae ad finem 
ordinantur, finem consequuntur. Providentia ergo, ordinem in finem respicit tantum, unde per Dei 
providentiam homines omnes ad beatitudinem ordinantur. Sed praedestinatio respicit etiam exitum vel 
eventum ordinis, unde non est nisi eorum qui gloriam consequentur. Sicut igitur se habet providentia ad 
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 Providence orders all things, rational and non-rational, towards the good in general and 
the created goods which constitute life here on earth.  Predestination, which pertains only to 
rational creatures, ordains some towards a specific supernatural end, beatitude.  With this in 
mind, Aquinas explains how merit flowing from providence is of a temporal kind; while God 
himself is the cause of merit of the supernatural kind.  This is the basis for Aquinas’ distinction 
between two kinds of merit:  
We are said to merit by something in two ways.  First, according to 
merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus we merit by 
acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by the principle 
whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive power; and thus 
are we said to merit by virtues and habits.176   
 
In other words, merit is derived either naturally, according to the order of providence 
and secondly, according to some higher principle, namely God, which comes to us through the 
exercise of the infused virtues.   
 Within the order of providential goods, the common good is the highest, since no part is 
greater than the whole.  Thus the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of a 
particular individual (SCG 3.17.6).  This does not mean however that the individual exists for 
the common good, but vice versa.  The common good, when it is realised, elevates each citizen 
to be able to reach his full potential in respect to his nature.177  Thus merit, when considered in 
the context of the natural order, as directed by Providence, is for the good of society and the 
individual as a member of that society.  The merits—or benefits—of a healthy society are 
shared by all, so that the fruits of virtue from any one individual contribute to the common good 
overall (ST I.96.4).   
                                                                                                                                                                          
impositionem ordinis, ita se habet praedestinatio ad ordinis exitum vel eventum: quod enim aliqui finem 
gloriae consequantur, non est principaliter ex propriis viribus, sed ex auxilio gratiae divinitus dato.  
176 ST I-II.55.1.ad3: ...aliquo dicimur mereri dupliciter. Uno modo, sicut ipso merito, eo modo quo dicimur 
currere cursu, et hoc modo meremur actibus. Alio modo dicimur mereri aliquo sicut principio merendi, 
sicut dicimur currere potentia motiva, et sic dicimur mereri virtutibus et habitibus. 
177 ST I-II.21.3.  This relationship between the individual and the common good is the topic of Pope John 
XXIII’s 1963 Enclyclical Pacem in Terris, which draws upon this teaching of Aquinas: “It must, moreover, 
be observed that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole 
society. Wherefore, any good or evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole 
society...”  
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 It is key to remember here that these goods associated with the acquired habits of the 
individual in no way contribute, on their own, to eternal beatitude but only to temporal and 
corruptible happiness.   The term ‘merit’ when used to describe merit of the natural order can in 
no way be said to meritorious in the supernatural sense.  Gaining earthly merit contributes 
nothing, on its own, to eternal beatitude.  To suggest otherwise would be to suggest that the 
human agent can achieve salvation through his own efforts. 
A habit together with a power is enough for the act of that habit. But 
the act of the natural habit called synderesis is to warn against evil and 
to incline to good. Therefore, men are naturally capable of this act. 
However, it does not follow from this that a man with purely natural 
gifts can perform a meritorious act. To impute this to natural 
capability alone is the Pelagian impiety.178 
 
 This does not mean that acts of the person cannot be good (bonum honestum).  But 
Aquinas draws a distinction between good acts and meritorious acts.  They are not the same for 
Aquinas.  To impute merit to goodness simply speaking would mean that every act of the person 
flowing from acquired habits would of necessity be meritorious; merit then would be something 
intrinsic to human nature and would rob grace of its gratuitous character.  This is in essence 
what Pelagianism is: the belief in self-meriting action.  For Aquinas however, grace alone is the 
cause of merit, and human action in no way can cause grace (De Veritate, 6.2).   
 Aquinas unequivocally rejects the Pelagian view, and reminds us that it is Providence 
which orders all things towards good, and why we seek the good by nature.  But given that our 
acting according to Providence is a natural condition and therefore, not requiring of sanctifying 
grace, is not meritorious in itself.  “By his free choice man is capable of a good which is natural 
to him,” Aquinas says in the De Veritate; “But a meritorious good is above his nature” (De 
Veritate 24.14.ad4).  And in the De Trinitate he adds, 
                                                          
178 DQT, 16.1.ad12: Ad duodecimum dicendum, quod habitus cum potentia sufficit ad actum qui est illius 
habitus. Actus autem huius habitus naturalis, quem synderesis nominat, est remurmurare malo, et 
inclinare ad bonum: et ideo ad hunc actum homo naturaliter potest. Non autem ex hoc sequitur quod in 
opus meritorium peragendum homo ex puris naturalibus possit. Haec enim naturali facultati solummodo 
deputare, Pelagianae impietatis est. 
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The will never can will the good without divine incitement; 
nevertheless it can will the good without infusion of grace, though not 
meritoriously.179 
 
 This providentially-directed natural goodness can even help us avoid sin.  But, in 
opposition to Pelagius, Aquinas maintains that sin-avoidance cannot in any way suggest 
anything approaching supernatural merit.  Avoiding sin is a question of choosing rightly 
according to a good habit (ST I-II.78.2) and so, just as an infused habit help us avoid sin, so too 
can an acquired one.   
By performing an act that is good generically man avoids sin, though 
he does not merit a reward. Consequently, even though man can avoid 
a particular sin by his free choice, it still does not follow that he is 
capable of any meritorious good by his free choice alone.180 
 
Sin-avoidance thus helps us live well in this temporal state, but does not, on its own, 
equip us for beatitude.  For this reason, Aquinas maintains that a certain participation in 
Happiness can be had in this life; but this participatory happiness falls short of beatitude.181  
Since then we are unable to know if our actions are meritorious or not, we need some 
kind of surety that our actions are at all useful, otherwise we might be tempted to despair or 
inaction.  Hope is that virtue by which we anticipate that certain of our acts are in fact 
meritorious (ST I-II.62.4ad2).  There would be no need for hope if we had certainty that our 
faith and good works were meritorious: “if [the natural light of] reason could lead to a proving 
of those things which are of faith, it would deprive man of the merit of faith.”182  It is not 
surprising therefore to find that Aquinas’ exposition of the virtue of hope is bound up in his 
awareness that we cannot know whether or not we possess infused virtue: “a man may, of 
himself, know something, and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has 
grace.”183  Belief that our good actions are meritorious is thus the object of hope.  And along 
                                                          
179 De Trinitate, 1.1.ad7: ...voluntas numquam potest bene velle sine divino instinctu, potest autem bene 
velle sine gratiae infusione, sed non meritorie. 
180 DQT 24.14.ad3:  
181 ST I-II, q.5, a.3. 
182 De Trinitate 2.1.ad5:  
183 ST I-II, q.112, a.5: Alio modo homo cognoscit aliquid per seipsum, et hoc certitudinaliter. Et sic nullus 
potest scire se habere gratiam. 
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with faith and charity, it is this hope which causes the virtue of religion, through which gratitude 
to God rests (ST II-II, q.81, a.5, ad.1). 
 
3.5 Free Will & Predestination 
 
If man can merit nothing on his own—that is, nothing of supernatural order merit on his 
own—then how can his freely chosen actions, flowing from infused virtue, be meaningful?  In 
other words, how does Aquinas safeguard the efficacy of free will of the human person in the 
face of our inability to merit anything for ourselves independently of grace and infused virtue?  
For it seems on the one hand that while to ascribe supernatural merit to the human agent falls 
prey to ‘the Pelagian impiety’, to ascribe it solely to God on the other hand forces us into a 
Calvinist account of salvation in which free will plays little or no part at all.  For Aquinas is 
explicit in his claim that predestination causes merit, and not the other way around (ST I-
II.101.1).   
 Aquinas addresses this problem, and attempts to provide a solution in several key 
passages.  Two in particular I will focus on here: chapter seventy three of book three of the 
Summa Contra Gentiles; and question twenty two of the Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate. 
Both texts are emblematic of Aquinas’ wide ranging coverage of the issue of free will found in a 
great many of his works, not least of all, the Summa.  Neither of these two texts, singly or 
together, deal with the question exhaustively, but I focus on these two texts here simply because 
there is a complimentary discussion in them which highlights in a helpful way the relationship 
of free will to merit.   
 In the latter text, Aquinas distinguishes between man’s natural tendency towards the 
good and his freely choosing the good; while in the former text he explains how that choice is 
always participatory in the Divine Essence.  Together, both texts help bridge the gap between 
human freedom and Divine guidance, or human autonomy within the efficacious scope of grace.  
Putting gratitude into this context, we can say that moral debt represents a natural response 
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towards the good of God’s gifts, while the second indicates the sacramental framework as to 
how that debt is satisfied. 
In article seven of question twenty two in the De Veritate, Aquinas notes that the will 
cannot but help chose the good in general (bonum universale) and therefore, in respect to this 
general good, the will cannot be considered to be acting freely.  This is because the will, by its 
very nature, seeks the good.  Nothing moves the will of necessity in regards to its exercise, but 
only in regards to its specification towards the good in general.  All acts of the person are aimed 
at happiness without qualification and this happiness, which is the end of all deliberate action, 
does not fall within the remit of free will.   
What human freedom is inclined to are the proximate ends (ratio finis) which are a 
matter of choice and therefore what constitute actions as being worth of merit or demerit (ST I-
II, q.10, a.2).  In other words, the human person is free in the choice of this or that particular 
good, in reference to the moral object which he freely apprehends and chooses under the aspect 
of the good (sub ratione boni).  Thus, in being inclined to good in general, there is neither merit 
nor demerit as this is the natural disposition of the rational creature; but it is in making a choice 
for a specific good that a particular action may be meritorious.184  It is in choosing between 
contingent goods that the will is engaged in what could be described as an expression of 
personhood, and thereby exercises freedom as opposed to the will’s necessary inclination to the 
good in general and in which respect, choice plays no part (ST I-II, q.13, a.6). 
 What the passage illustrates is how, within the context of a nature directed of necessity 
towards the good (bonum apprehensum), the will can exercise autonomy relative to that nature.  
But now the task for Aquinas is to show how these freely chosen acts within that context can be 
meaningful (i.e., meritorious).  Therefore, it will be necessary to show that freely chosen acts of 
this contingent kind can be meritorious—since without merit, either of the natural or 
supernatural kind, acts have no meaning. 
                                                          
184 De Veritate, q.22, a.7: Patet igitur quod volendo id quod quis naturaliter vult, secundum se non est 
neque meritorium neque demeritorium; sed secundum quod specificatur ad hoc vel ad illud, potest esse 
vel meritorium vel demeritorium. Et hoc modo sancti merentur appetendo Deum et vitam aeternam.  
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 Aquinas seems to be aware of this challenge and so sets about to demonstrate that not 
only do the infused virtues make room for free will, they are in fact constituted by it. “Without 
the will, there is no merit” he declares.185 Why should this be so?  It is not that the will earns or 
necessitates merit; the will is not the cause of merit as we have seen because only grace is the 
cause of merit (De Veritate 6.2).  How then does Aquinas reconcile grace and free will in 
respect to virtue?  The key is in his conception of predestination and how that facilitates human 
freedom.  One often finds commentators on Aquinas’ doctrine of free will trying to ‘make 
room’ for freedom in the imposing shadow of a predestined end.  But free will is not collateral 
damage in Aquinas’ doctrine of predestination.  At least, Aquinas is at pains to show that 
freedom is not only left intact alongside predestination, but that true freedom can only exist 
within the context of predestination.   
 
3.5.1 Participation in the Divine Life through Virtue 
 
 Through a life of virtue, the human person participates in the Divine life of God.  In 
respect to the virtues, Aquinas speaks of two kinds of participation: one which might be called 
analogical, and the other, anagogical.  The infused virtues participate in the Divine life 
analogically while the acquired virtues participate in the Divine life anagogically. While 
Aquinas does not use these particular terms to describe the difference between acquired and 
infused virtue, they provide an apt explanation as to why, if the acquired virtues are not virtues 
properly speaking, they should be called virtues at all.  The analogical predication of the infused 
virtues thus posits some real relation to eternal beatitude, while anagogical predication—which 
Aquinas speaks of in reference to a trope in Scriptural interpretation—posits a virtue which is 
such by way of being a temporal sign in the “earthly city” of the eternal “city of God”.  Thus 
those virtues of indebtedness which pertain to our earthly existence, point more perfectly to that 
                                                          
185  DQV 1.7.ad5: Ad quintum dicendum, quod per actum scientiae, aut alicuius talis habitus, potest 
homo mereri, secundum quod imperatur a voluntate, sine qua nullum est meritum. 
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which is to come.  Piety, for example, by which we honour our homeland and parents, is a sign 
of our heavenly city which awaits. 
It is commonly laid upon men's souls that they hear with delight the 
praises of their homeland and of their parents. The praises of their 
homeland, that they may hasten to return to her; the praises of their 
parents, that they, by imitating them, may not become degenerate.  
But what is our homeland? That homeland for which we strive is a 
heavenly homeland. Wherefore, the Apostle state at Hebrews 13:14, 
“For we have not here a lasting city, but we seek one that is to 
come.”186 
 
 Analogical participation, by way of the infused virtues, is that participation by which 
the creature becomes formed in the image of God (imago Dei).  Such a likeness of the creature 
to God is not, to be sure, a univocal likeness, but rather “by the analogy of some kind of 
imitation” (secundum analogiam alicuius imitationis; ST I, q.44, a.3). 
Although creatures do not acquire a natural likeness to God according 
to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like to the man begetting, 
they do however attain a likeness to Him, inasmuch as they represent 
the divine idea, as a material house is like the idea of the house in the 
architect’s mind.187 
 
 Given that the analogia entis refers in Aquinas’ system to something both linguistic and 
ontological or real, the divine similitude attained by the infused virtues is a real, albeit 
analogical, likeness to God.  The virtuous person properly speaking—the person, for example, 
who possesses the virtues of indebtedness and gratitude of the infused kind—truly does share in 
the Divine Life.  The acquired virtues, however, while perfecting the human person for life in 
the “earthly city”, do not perfect him for the “City of God”. 
A man’s nature does not suffice for him to be a participant of this 
[heavenly] city; he must be elevated by the grace of God. For it is 
manifest that the virtues that are man’s as a participant in this city 
cannot be acquired by him through his natural powers; hence they are 
not caused by our acts but are infused in us as a divine gift. But the 
virtues of a man as man, insofar as he is a citizen of the earthly city, 
                                                          
186 From the introduction to Aquinas’ sermon, “Beata Gens”, given for the Feast of All Saints: inditum est 
communiter animis hominum, ut delectabiliter audiant laudes patriae suae et parentum suorum. laudes 
patriae, ut ad eam redire festinent: laudes parentum, ut eos imitando non sint degeneres. Sed quae est 
patria nostra? patria ad quam tendimus est coelestis patria. unde apostolus heb. xiii, 14: non habemus 
hic manentem civitatem, sed futuram inquirimus.” 
187 ST I, q.44, a.3, ad.1: licet creaturae non pertingant ad hoc quod sint similes Deo secundum suam 
naturam, similitudine speciei, ut homo genitus homini generanti; attingunt tamen ad eius similitudinem 
secundum repraesentationem rationis intellectae a Deo, ut domus quae est in materia, domui quae est in 
mente artificis. 
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do not exceed the capacity of human nature; hence, a man can acquire 
them through his natural capacities, by his own acts, which is 
evident.188 
 
 The earthly city, and its perfection through the acquired virtues, stands as a sign—
anagogically, in other words—of the heavenly city of God.189  The acquired virtues are thus 
anagogical; inasmuch as they do not—cannot—lead to friendship with God, they do serve as 
both concrete reminders of our deep yearning for God, and as signs of the soul’s natural 
orientation towards the good in general, which flows from God: “the virtue of man as a good 
man is not the same as the virtue of man as good citizen. But man is not only a citizen of the 
earthly city, but is also a participant in the heavenly city of Jerusalem.”190 
With this in mind, we can start drawing a distinction between kinds of gratitude and 
virtues of indebtedness: there are those which, while anagogically pointing to the city of God, 
perfect the human person in reference to the earthly city only.  On the other hand, infused 
gratitude is an expression of gratitude to God and consists of praise, worship and sacrifice found 
in the practice of religion.  This is why, gratitude, as an acquired virtue “falling short” (ab eo 
deficiens) of the virtue of religion is perfected in the virtue of religion which is the virtue by 
which we show thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) to God.  Article seventeen of question eighty 
three, identifies prayer as being the principal way through which we show gratitude to God, and 
thereby make an ascent towards him. 
                                                          
188 Ad hoc autem quod homo huius civitatis sit particeps, non sufficit sua natura, sed ad hoc elevatur per 
gratiam Dei. Nam manifestum est quod virtutes illae quae sunt hominis in quantum est huius civitatis 
particeps, non possunt ab eo acquiri per sua naturalia; unde non causantur ab actibus nostris, sed ex 
divino munere nobis infunduntur. Virtutes autem quae sunt hominis in eo quod est homo, vel in eo quod 
est terrenae civitatis particeps, non excedunt facultatem humanae naturae; unde eas per sua naturalia 
homo potest acquirere, ex actibus propriis: quod sic patet. 
189 It is possible, by way of conjecturing, that Aquinas based this idea of the anagogical function of virtue 
in the works of Gregory of Nyssa for whom “anagogical participation” through the virtues is a sign of the 
soul’s orientation to God through Christ; Aquinas is clearly familiar with Gregory’s work, and cites him 
several times in his discussion of the virtues of indebtedness although he never directly cites him for this 
reason.  Yet a certain parity of ideas can be found here.  For a discussion of anagogical participation in 
Gregory, see Boersma, Hans. Embodiment and virtue in Gregory of Nyssa: an anagogical approach. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; especially page 216, ff. 
190 De Virtutibus, q.1, a.9: non est eadem virtus hominis in quantum est bonus et hominis in quantum est 
bonus civis. Homo autem non solum est civis terrenae civitatis, sed est particeps civitatis caelestis 
Ierusalem. 
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 Hence we can speak of two modes of gratitude: gratitude to earthly benefactors 
(gratitudo) and thanksgiving to God (gratias agentes Deo).  The latter falls under the virtue of 
religion, and forms the basis of Aquinas’ ecclesiological understanding of virtue, as explored in 
chapter five. 
 For now, it is helpful to keep in mind that for Aquinas, perfect, infused gratitude is 
directed to God.  In his Commentary on 1st Thessalonians, Aquinas spells out the triplex via or 
manner in which we should show perfect gratitude: first, by acknowledging that God is the 
source of all our gifts (even if they should come via the hand of other creatures, since 
Providence directs the hearts of man to acts of generosity); secondly, our gratitude should be 
unceasing, since prayer and praise itself should be unceasing, as St Paul instructs us; and 
thirdly, perfect gratitude is universal: it recognises that everything is gift, and so gives thanks for 
everyone and everything: gratitude makes use of all the circumstances in which the virtue is 
exercised.191    
                                                          
191 Commentary on 1st Thessalonians, 1.1: “In treating the first point, Paul mentions three things that 
ought to be present in thanksgiving. First, thanksgiving should be directed to God: we give thanks to 
God: ‘He bestows favour and honour’ (Ps. 84:11). ‘Every good endowment and every perfect gift is from 
above, coming down from the Father of lights’ (Jas. 1: 17). Thanksgiving should also be unceasing or as 
St Paul says, always. It should also be universal, which is why Paul says, ‘for you all’; and later he adds, 
‘give thanks in all circumstances’.” Quantum ergo ad primum dicit tria, quae debent esse in gratiarum 
actione. Primo quod sit ordinata, scilicet ad Deum. Ideo dicit gratias agimus Deo. Ps. LXXXIII, 12: gratiam 
et gloriam dabit dominus. Iac. I, 17: omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum de sursum est 
descendens a patre luminum. Item assidua, quia semper. Item universalis, ibi pro omnibus vobis. Infra V, 
18: in omnibus gratias agite. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE GRATEFUL PERSON 
 
4.1 The Person as Virtuous 
 
 What constitutes the notion of a grateful person for Aquinas is bound up with his notion 
of person in general.  Gratitude is essentially the impetus towards friendship—as indeed are all 
the virtues in various, and specific ways.  The perfection of the human person for Aquinas is 
realised in terms of friendship, for which purpose all of the virtues exist (ST II-II, q.106, a.1, 
ad.3), and in terms of divine love, which is at the same time the form of all the (infused) virtues 
(ST II-II, q.23, a.8).  The person so perfected is necessarily a ‘grateful person’, just as he must 
be an ‘honest’ or ‘generous’ person at the same time.  The person as grateful, however, 
represents the person as incipient in a specific way. 
The perfection of personhood requires the virtues; there is no perfection of personhood 
or realisation of one’s true destiny in God without considering the person as being a person of 
the virtues, among which gratitude holds a distinctive and essential place.  Gratitude is, for 
Aquinas, not simply an element of friendship which constitutes the person: gratitude or 
thanksgiving is, in a manner of speaking, the very beginning of friendship.  It is through being 
grateful persons that we first orient ourselves towards the recognition that my very person is a 
gift, an act of love.  Gratitude is that first moment when we recognise that we have been created 
for friendship with God, and for God through others. 
 The very notion of gift and gratitude is bound up for Aquinas in his understanding of 
what it means to be a person.  The virtues of indebtedness in particular give us a picture of the 
human person which is both gift and invitation to communion.  This picture emerges most 
clearly when one places Aquinas’ understanding of person within the context of his Dionysian 
schematic of exitus et reditus: a going out from God and return to God.  Citing Dionysius, 
Aquinas notes that “God turns all things to Himself because He is the cause of all”.192  The cycle 
of going out and return is furthermore not simply an ontological description of being, but rather 
                                                          
192 ST II-II, q.106, a.3. 
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a description of the intimate relation, rooted in love, which exists between God’s ‘going out’ or 
diffusiveness, and the impetus of the creature to return to this source of Goodness, to which all 
things tend. 
For Aquinas, the human person is, by nature ‘gift’. Aquinas speaks of both the gifts of 
nature and the gifts of grace, and the latter perfect the former.  In the gift of grace, the human 
person is ‘divinised’ and made like God and exists in union with him: “By receiving this 
gratuitous gift therefore, the human person is made pleasing to God and is brought so far by the 
love of charity that he becomes one spirit with God so that he is in God, and God is in him.”193 
The ‘going out’ of God, the communication of himself with his creatures, is the essence of gift: 
the gifts of nature and the gifts of grace which bring the gifts of nature to perfection.  The 
journey of return, the response, to this gift originates in the virtue of gratitude, and culminates in 
the virtue of religion through stages of participation understood by Aquinas in both a mystical 
and analogical way.194 
  
4.2 Notion of Person in General 
 
It perhaps goes without saying that Aquinas’ concept of person has been the subject of 
significant criticism in recent times for what is perceived to be his alienation of the essential 
character of rationality from personhood, largely stemming from his adoption of the Boethian 
formula of person as an ‘individual substance of a rational nature.’  At the same time, it is 
widely accepted today among philosophers and theologians that the notion of person is only 
fully realised when considered in relation to another (or, as some commentators have it, 
dyadically).195  Aquinas, it should be noted, has been criticised by a number of scholars for 
                                                          
193 Compendium Theologiae, lib. 1:214 Ille igitur per acceptum donum gratuitum efficitur Deo gratus qui 
usque ad hoc perducitur quod per caritatis amorem unus spiritus fiat cum Deo, quod ipse in Deo sit, et 
Deus in eo. 
194 It is worth noting, in support of this reading, that in all his discussions of the nature of gift and 
gratitude, such as the question on gratitude (q.106) and beneficence (q.33), Aquinas appeals to 
Dionysius as his principal source of authority. 
195 Among the key proponents of this reading of the notion of person are Ratzinger, Moltmann, Buber, 
Barth, Balthazar and Clarke.  I will be following here work done by Clarke in particular who maintains, 
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failing to provide a properly “dyadic account” of the human person—a common contention 
being that personhood in Aquinas is expressed in an exclusively Trinitarian formula, “closed 
off” from the creaturely experience of personhood: God is, as it were, relational within himself 
but it is assumed that Aquinas’ concept of Trinitarian relation does not extend outward to 
creatures because of his emphasis on God’s self-subsistence and on the notion of substance in 
general. 
Among these critics is Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, who gave one of the more blunt 
indictments of the perceived shortcomings of both Aquinas, and Augustine—from whom, along 
with Boethius, Aquinas drew much of his inspiration—saying of them both that they were 
responsible for the diminishing of the person to the extent that “the whole dimension of the ‘we’ 
lost its place in theology”.196    
Hallman and Whitehead, along with other process theologians furthermore contend that 
Aquinas provides a somewhat deficient notion of person so as to end with a conception of God 
as little more than the ‘actus purus’ and thereby as nothing more than an inert and “self-
enclosed substance” without the possibility of potentiality which, Hallman contends, is required 
for the movement of love.197  One significant passage in particular is cited as being the 
consequence of this closed notion of person: in ST I-II, q.4, a.8, Aquinas seems to be claiming 
that the fellowship of friends is not necessary for happiness and that one can find total 
fulfilment in the interior contemplation of God alone.  We will have no need of friends other 
than God in heaven. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
despite the criticisms outlined below, that this view is shared by Aquinas following a “creative retrieval” 
of this doctrine in primary texts, particularly the Summa Theologiae. 
196 Cf. Concerning the Notion of Person in Theology.  Communio. Fall 1990.  P. 454. The quote is taken 
from a lecture the Cardinal gave in 1973; in a footnote on the page to this 1990 article he attenuates his 
view by adding that “Today, of course, I would not judge as harshly as I did in the lecture above”, but 
still leaves Aquinas with a case to be answered in defending the notion of God as one person at the 
expense of relationality extending to the creature.  The Cardinal was equally critical of Boethius, from 
whom Aquinas derives his definition of the person: cf. Marenbon, John, ed. The Cambridge Companion 
to Boethius. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. P.121, note 44.  I think Ratzinger puts a case 
to be answered, but would suggest that the loss of “we” in Thomistic thought is largely due to his later 
commentators and not to Aquinas himself. 
197 Cf. Hallman, Joseph. The Mistake of Thomas Aquinas and the Trinity of A. N. Whitehead. The Journal 
of Religion, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Jan., 1990). The University of Chicago Press.  Pp. 36-47; see also Kerr, Fergus. 
After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2002. P. 48ff. 
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Given these criticisms, it is necessary to recover a genuine reading of the notion of 
person in Aquinas, since ultimately his ecclesiology and virtue theory rests on his understanding 
of ‘person’.  If Aquinas’ notion of person is deficient in respect to the essential notion of person 
as relational, so too will be his ecclesiology.  I will aim to show in this chapter that Aquinas’ 
understanding of the person, notwithstanding some difficulties in the texts, is in fact deeply 
relational, paving the way for a coherent ecclesiology in which gratitude and the virtues of 
indebtedness play a key role.  I also wish to show why Aquinas begins with the Boethian 
definition of person, and then moves beyond it into the realm of persons as being in relation.  
I wish to begin by drawing a comparison between Aquinas’ notion of person and that of 
Richard of St Victor (d.1173) and Bonaventure (d.1274), which are often held up in apparent 
opposition to Boethius’ and Aquinas’ perceived static and self-enclosed notion of person.198  
The definition of person by Boethius, which Aquinas adopts, is “a person is an individual 
substance of a rational nature” (persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia).  Compare 
this with Bonaventure’s description of the human person as being nothing less than the self-
communication of God so that ‘person’ does not simply designate a ‘form’ or ‘substance’ but 
rather the vivifying image of God, concretised in a lived experience.  As Hans Urs von 
Balthasar puts it, Bonaventure seeks to distinguish between individuum and persona—a 
distinction Boethius’ definition is not able to account for.199  The individuum is static and self-
enclosed while the persona is, by definition, relational.   Both Richard and Bonaventure use the 
metaphor of marriage to describe the essence of union in personhood.  Aquinas’ notion of 
person, however, is not at odds with that of Richard or Bonaventure, and in many respects 
Aquinas’ notion goes further than either of these. 
Richard and Bonaventure are not infrequently held up as providing better insights into 
the nature of person, both as the term applies to God and the human being by participation. This 
is because, it is maintained, both Richard and Bonaventure remove the emphasis from God’s 
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self-subsistence to God’s self-communication and the self-diffusive nature of the Good and the 
Beautiful.  This self-diffusive account of Being provides an account of the person as ex-
sistentia: “a spiritual subject that earns the name person only by going out beyond itself (ex)—
in God, as something relative.”200  Here we find the influence of Dionysius reaching into 
Scholastic philosophy with the notion of person.  Indeed, Richard (along with Hugo, the earlier 
Victorine) was largely responsible for bringing the Areopagite into mainstream philosophy and 
theology.201  The Dionysian scheme, however, is not absent in Aquinas and, as Fran O’Rourke 
has shown, Aquinas’ notion of person as gift and oriented to gratitude is fundamental to his 
doctrine of the person as gift. 
For Richard of St Victor, drawing on Dionysius, the notion of person is bound up 
closely with the notion of friendship and love.  For Dionysius, all things that exist participate in 
friendship—even rocks and snails—since all things derive their being from the one Life; it is 
this Life which gives “peace to all things”—that is to say, harmony.  Thus, for Dionysius, 
friendship describes the state of being in harmony with, or having a proper alignment between a 
thing’s nature and the Source of that nature.202   
In Book Three of The Trinity, Richard identifies Divine Personhood with love and 
friendship, in which human personhood is reflected. Again, we find this theme explored and 
developed in chapter XVII of The Mystical Ark where Richard equates the notion of person with 
Dionysian harmony, the orienting of “outer person” to the “inner person”, and the orienting of 
the “inner person” to God.  Richard is alluding here with this reference to the inner and outer 
person to 2nd Corinthians 4:16: “So we do not lose heart; though our outer nature is wasting 
away, our inner nature is being renewed every day.”  This inner person is the locus of friendship 
because it is what participates in the beautiful. For Richard, participation in God means 
participation in the Beautiful, which is convertible with the Good, but which extends the notion 
of the Good from something appetitive to something relational.   
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Now your soul is a spiritual nature. Indeed your soul is either beautiful 
or deformed by its will. A good will makes your soul beautiful; but it 
becomes deformed by a bad will. Its goodness makes it beautiful; its 
malevolence makes it deformed. From these assertions we may 
consider what the figure of a spiritual substance is. If the Lord grants 
it, the same form of perfection can undoubtedly form your soul and 
my soul.203 
 
Norris W. Clarke especially maintains that such a dyadic account of the person is 
present though not explicitly expressed in Aquinas and therefore is one that must be creatively 
retrieved.204    What Clarke has in mind when he speaks of creative retrieval is a hermeneutic of 
the primary text that allows one to move beyond a merely compartmentalised reading of those 
texts.  The nuanced language of Aquinas, typical of scholastic practice in general, is not simply 
a detached tool for framing concepts but is also expressive of a historical context—one which is 
concerned about a great many things, not least of all the pitfalls of heresy.  Understanding 
Aquinas is not then simply a question of decoding the minutiae of technical language in 
reference to an abstract idea, but found in embracing the totality of Aquinas’ thought so as to 
retrieve a faithful reading of the entire content as it relates above all to his intentions.205  Indeed, 
an author’s intention is not always physically present in a text but which nonetheless supervenes 
upon that text.  (This is not to say that Clarke is unaware of the risks involved in trying to 
separate the text from intention, but he is insistent that such a risk is necessary to bring Aquinas’ 
thought to life). 
So while, on the surface, it seems that, in following Boethius’ account of the person as 
being an individual substance of a rational nature, Aquinas has committed himself to a static 
and inert notion of person, one which eliminates the ‘we’ from the notion of person and by 
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extension theology, and so undermines the finality of the creature, Clarke is in fact confident 
that we can retrieve from Aquinas’ philosophy of person, 
...a powerful notion of the person as self-possessing, master of one’s 
dominus sui, self-possessing and self-communicating and self-
transcending, that notion of the person, and then the notion of an 
integrating vision of the whole universe as a vast community of 
beings, all participating from the source in God, the notion of the 
universe as a community where nobody can really be alienated 
because we are in a community, a kind of connatural friendship, as St. 
Aquinas says, with all beings.206 
 
 Balthasar’s preference for Richard’s and Bonaventure’s notion of person, and his 
handling of Aquinas’ notion is somewhat more critical than Clarke’s.  Perhaps one of 
Balthasar’s more influential contributions is his interpretation of the notion of being in Aquinas, 
which he develops in the face of the perceived shortcomings of Aquinas’ treatment of the 
person.207  For Balthasar, being is dynamic in the very act of being given: gift is relational in and 
of itself.  As such, the person is radically dependent on God; this radical dependence is 
inscribed in the very essence of the person who reaches out in turn to the source of that gift.  
This is what it means to be.208  But it is precisely because esse is gift that it is at once ‘total 
fullness and total nothingness’: total fullness because it flows from the abundant generosity of 
God and nothingness because it is of itself, apart from this source, nothing.209    
To put it briefly, the question of the nature of person was, since antiquity, brought about 
by the emergence of Trinitarian theology.  In what way are the Three Persons to be understood 
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as persons?  How are we to understand this word person so as to make sense of the inner life of 
God and, by extension, the hypostasis of Christ and then finally the relationship of God with the 
created human person? Again, in general terms, it could be said that the medieval solutions to 
the question took two divergent paths: that of relationality and that of emanation.210   
Tertullian’s phrase “we see in Jesus that two states are not confused but conjoined in 
one person, God and man” was a starting point for much of the later discussion about what it 
means to be a person.  The statement was aimed at redressing the isolation of Christ from God 
posed by the Monarchians, and culminating in the decrees of the Council of Chalcedon 
(451AD) which defined that Christ was one person with two natures. The decrees of Chalcedon 
were also aimed at redressing the errors of Nestorius, so that we find that the early tracing out of 
the doctrine of the person was driven by a need to clarify a central theme in theology, the 
centrality of which is evidenced by so many distortions and heresies.   
So the problem facing the Scholastic theologian was in navigating on the one hand 
between Sabellianism—in which the notion of the Three Persons is merely a modal distinction 
of convenience—and Arianism, according to which the Father is God but the Son and Spirit are 
not and so genuine relationality is destroyed.   At the heart of these theological disputes was the 
very notion of person itself. 
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4.3 Aquinas’ use of the Boethian Formula 
 
It is with this backdrop in mind that, in his theological tractate Against Eutyches and 
Nestorius, Boethius arrives at his definition of the person which Aquinas will use as a starting 
point for his own thinking.  Boethius works out his notion of person after several careful steps 
and recognises from the outset that defining person is no easy task (II.83) but at the very least 
begins with the assumption that the definition must include nature, since “person is a substrate 
of nature”.  Next, Boethius classifies natures as being either substantial or accidental; and since 
a person—an integral whole—is not brought about among accidents but exists as a substance, 
the definition begins to take shape that the person is a substantial kind of nature. 
But what kind of substance is the person?  Boethius considers the many different kinds 
of substance there are: animate and inanimate; rational and irrational; universal and particular.  
It follows, Boethius maintains, that person cannot be predicated of a universal, but only of a 
particular. “Humanity”, for example, cannot bear the term “person” but only those individuals—
Cicero, Plato—in whom human nature subsists (II.85). 
There is an inconsistency here in Boethius which has led certain critics to dismiss his 
definition out of hand.  The problem appears to be twofold: in the first instance, Boethius seems 
to put God in a genus of persons alongside human persons, since the definition of individual 
substance would have to apply to the three Persons of the Trinity too.  Boethius does in fact 
attempt to avoid this problem by making an apophatic appeal to God’s “ultra substantiam”:  
“When we speak of God, we seem to denote a substance; but it is a substance that is 
supersubstantial.  When we say of Him, “He is just,” we mention a quality, not an accidental 
quality—rather a substantial and, in fact, a supersubstantial quality.  For God is not one thing 
because He is, and another thing because He is just; with Him to be just and to be God are one 
and the same. So when we say, “He is great or the greatest,” we seem to predicate quantity, but 
it is a quantity similar to this substance which we have declared to be supersubstantial; for with 
Him to be great and to be God are all one” (De Trinitate, 4:19). 
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In attempting to avoid this first difficulty, a second more serious one emerges, for 
Boethius must also now maintain that person is said of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit in a 
purely relational or modal and not in any substantial manner.  This is because God cannot be 
three persons if person is to be understood as a substance since this would imply a form of 
tritheism: there cannot be three substances in God.211  Again, Boethius relies on an equivocal 
and apophatic understanding of substance to circumvent this difficulty. 
Despite these problematic conclusions with Boethius’ definition of person, Aquinas is 
at pains to defend the title in question twenty nine of the prima pars—and one might reasonably 
wonder why.  Balthasar notes that the definition will give Aquinas “all sorts of difficulties in 
applying it to the triune God”.212  Aquinas is clearly seen to be at work in article two cleaning 
up some of the confusion in terminology: Boethius at times conflates person, hypostasis and 
substance; he also shifts between the use of subsistence and substance leading to some 
confusion; and admits himself that his project seems bound to fail on account of some of the 
seemingly intractable difficulties his thinking leads him to.213  But he has recognised a real need 
to provide some rational access to the revelation that God is three persons in one God.  
But—so the charges go—while Aquinas may have cleared up at least some of Boethius’ 
difficulties by providing an internal coherence to the notion of person in God as being three 
subsisting relations, his insistence that relationality in God is incommunicable seems to lock 
God off within himself (ST I, q.29, a.3, ad.4).  The persons of the Trinity are in relation with 
one another, but cut off from creation and the human race.  So, it may seem that Balthasar’s 
criticism is not unfounded: there remain a great many difficulties with this account of relational 
person as applied to God and analogically the creature.  Question twenty nine does not seem to 
leave the reader with a totally satisfactory account of the person as relational by nature.  In fact, 
in article four, Aquinas does indeed seem to deny that the created person (both human and 
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angelic) is relational by nature: “relation is contained in the signification of divine person, but 
not in that of an angelic or of a human person.”214  
Notwithstanding, Clarke notes that Aquinas does insist that “[positive] names applied to 
God signify His relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, ‘God is good,’ we mean, God 
is the cause of goodness in things” (ST I, q.13, a.2).  The question remains, however, whether or 
not Aquinas goes far enough in establishing that the person is by nature only fully realised 
within the ‘we’ and not merely as an effect of a cause as the foregoing might suggest. 
We should also not lose sight of the fact that for the medieval theologian there is a very 
real methodological concern involved in setting out the parameters of what it means to be a 
person or to be in a relationship.  In fact, this methodological concern rests with defining things 
in general.  For example, in Book VI of the Commentary on the Metaphysics, Aquinas explains 
what is at stake in the effort to know something in itself.  In the first place, there is no science of 
accidentals (among which Aristotle places relation) but only of being itself. The definition of a 
thing must capture what it is as it persists through time and change.  A dynamic relationship is 
not stable enough to count as the basis upon which something can be defined: a relationship is 
between substances.  Accidents inhere in subsisting entities and so it is to the thing itself we 
must go (as the phenomenologists would say) in order to uncover the notion of person.  It is 
therefore evident, in examining the way in which things are defined, that the definition of 
person must go beyond the accidental and singular: singulars cannot be the subject of definition, 
as the Scholastic maxim goes.  This is precisely the objection Aquinas sets out to answer in his 
treatment of the person; the very first objection of question twenty nine notes that since nothing 
singular can be subject to definition, and since the word person denotes something singular, the 
word person cannot therefore be defined.  In his reply, Aquinas concedes that indeed singulars 
cannot be defined; but general things he says pertaining to singulars can be defined.  Thus it is 
clear from the very outset of his treatment of the notion of person, he is conscious of the fact 
that he is providing a general description of what pertains to all who can lay claim to the name, 
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“person”.  But there is a limit to this definition, and so it should not be understood as being the 
end of the matter: it certainly isn’t for Aquinas. 
We must look for something more embracing than the individual, something which will 
account for the person being “what is most perfect in nature.”  The person is being in a special 
and exalted sense among other notions of being.  Hence in article three of question twenty nine, 
Aquinas picks out the feature of person as a “hypostasis [that is] distinct by reason of dignity”.  
The very definition of ‘human dignity’ is, for Aquinas, an indication of the relationality of the 
person.  One has dignity in other words in reference to one’s proper end, which is friendship 
with God.  It is on account of this destiny of friendship in God that the human creature lays 
claim to a certain inalienable and essential dignity (ST III, q.4, a.1).  But recognising the person 
as being endowed with dignity does not interfere with the person’s autonomy.  One is free to 
choose to enter into loving relationships.  Dignity describes the potential each person has to 
enter into communion with another—and ultimately with God—without doing so at the expense 
of the person’s moral freedom.  We do not lose our dignity when we refuse the offer of 
friendship, and that same dignity guarantees the possibility of a change of heart.  But for 
Aquinas, the concept of relationship—of the moral kind, including love and friendship—is not 
something that can simply be defined into existence, or counted as a part of the essence of the 
created person. 
Even so, Balthasar is not satisfied that this identification of person with dignity is 
sufficient to safeguard the notion of person from sliding into subjectivism. In fact, he holds 
High Scholasticism responsible for losing sight of the true theological meaning of person-in-
relation and for setting in motion a subjectivist notion of person that would persist until at least 
the 19th century.   
In this way the paradoxical had to come about—that after a personless 
idealism met its end in Hegel, the popular atheistic materialism of 
Feuerbach had to rediscover the elementary fact that there simply 
cannot be a single person, existing within himself, but that existence 
as a person comes about only in the relationship between the I and 
Thou.  The atheistic materialist was the one who reached beyond 
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Augustine to the insight about what man is, in Christian terms, the 
personal imago Trinitatis.215  
 
 
4.3.1 Being as Self-Communication 
 
Despite the strong criticisms, Clarke is convinced that an equally strong answer can be 
made to them on Aquinas’ behalf.  It is true, he notes, that “on a superficial reading” there are 
no explicit treatments by Aquinas of the person as being-in-relation beyond the accidental 
consideration; but, through a “creative retrieval” of all the relevant texts, Aquinas’ thinking does 
indeed provide us with a notion of real being that is “intrinsically active and self-
communicating”.216 
In fact, Norris maintains, the very nature of being itself for Aquinas is self-
communicating as can be seen in key passages in the Summa which illustrate the doctrine 
bonum diffusivum sui—that the good is, by its very nature, self-diffusive. One such passage 
Clarke appeals to is question five, article four of the prima pars in which Aquinas explains that 
since goodness is desired by all creatures by nature, and since the desire for goodness has the 
aspect of an end (ratio finis), it follows that the cause of this desire is goodness itself.  For any 
cause always brings about a likeness of itself in the thing caused.  Appealing to Dionysius, 
Aquinas uses this principle of the likeness of an effect to its cause to maintain that all created 
things participate in the Goodness of God (ST I, q.93, a.2, ad.1).  God’s goodness is thus not 
simply ‘inert’ but is a dynamic which draws all things back into itself.  Being made in the 
‘image of God’ is thus already, by the very nature of God’s dynamic goodness, the essence of a 
relationship which draws creatures back to God as the source of both their being and their desire 
for goodness. 
Similarly, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, Aquinas states that from the fact of the 
existence of a thing, it is active (SCG 1.43) since all things are, in their very nature, ordered to 
an end—which for the created person is beatitude in God, much in the way as described in 
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psalm 142: “I stretch out my arms to you, I stretch out my soul, like a land without water”.  
Beings are naturally endowed, so to speak, for the pursuit of this end in the constitution of the 
dignity of their very nature: “Every substance exists for the sake of its operations” (ST 
Ia.105.5).  Citing Etienne Gilson, Clarke notes, “Not: to be, then to act, but: to be is to act.”217  
The operation of a substance is for the purpose of its end.  As noted earlier, habits—including 
the habits of virtue—place the human person in potency towards a certain way of acting.  The 
person is thus actualised in virtuous acts since all virtue is, by definition, oriented towards 
relationship and friendship.  Since human dignity is only fully realised in the virtuous life, the 
fullness of personhood is thus relational.  Gratitude and gift are thus not simply elements of 
what it means to human; they are essential.  They constitute, together, the essence of 
relationship. 
The theological virtues and virtues under justice, including gratitude, are all ordered 
towards another.  Thus, the actualisation of the person consists in relations with others, and 
most perfectly in a relationship with God, who is the end of all virtuous action.  The route 
Aquinas takes to this conclusion, that all the virtues direct us to activity in God, is through 
noting first of all that the form of all the virtues is love and are so directed to God thereby (ST 
II-II, q.23, a.8); and secondly, that the exemplar of the virtues, the theological virtues, all have 
their end in God and likewise direct us to him (ST I-II, q.62, a.1).  One sees this principle at 
work clearly in the virtue of gratitude, in which the benefactor stands “in the relation of a 
principle” to the very being of a person who is endowed as given (ST II-II, q.106, a.3). 
The meaning of being good is therefore derived, not only from the objective goodness 
of being itself, but from the goodness derived from the actualisation of being, which in the case 
of the human person is found in the virtuous life lived in communion with others.  The good—
which is convertible with, though more extensive than, being—is, by its very nature self-
communicating; it possesses what Clarke calls “an innate fecundity and generosity” which is 
evidenced all around us in nature.  So, for Aquinas, the perfection of any created thing is 
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realised through the actualisation of its esse which is, according to Gerald Phelan, “not a state, it 
is an act and not as a static definable object of conception.”218   
It follows that, for Aquinas, finite created being, pours over naturally 
into action for two reasons: (1) because it is poor, i.e., lacking the 
fullness of existence, and so it strives to enrich itself as much as its 
nature allows from the richness of those around it; but (2) even more 
profoundly because it is rich, endowed with its own richness of 
existence, however slight this may be, which it tends naturally to 
communicate and share with others.219 
 
It is on this last point that we find something of a convergence of Balthasar and Clarke: 
in the ‘total fullness and total nothingness’—or in Clarke’s words, the richness and poverty of 
created being.  For both Balthasar and Clarke, being is by its nature self-communicating and as 
such has the character of vocation, or as Balthasar prefers to say, the character of a mission.220  
This missiological and vocational character of the human person is best described in Aquinas’ 
thinking as having its impetus in gratitude; for it is the grateful person who engages in acts of 
thanksgiving to God and thereby enacts the going-out towards the source of being. 
Much of the inspiration for Balthasar’s retrieval of the missiological concept of person 
is found in the work of Hegel.  It was Hegel, he believed, who helped bring an end to the so-
called static notion of the person.  What Hegel represents, at least for Balthasar, is a return to 
the concept of being as teleological.  Hegel’s concern with redeeming the teleological nature of 
being comes about through a dialogue with Kant who, while open to natural teleology for 
heuristic reasons, had been critical of the general application of teleology as a way of 
demonstrating the existence of God or even divine purposiveness in things.  Hegel, however, 
argued that all living things have at least an internal purposiveness and argued that Kant’s 
limitation of knowledge of such purposiveness brought about the “end of relation”.221  Being for 
Hegel, according to Balthasar’s reading of him, is diffusive on account of its participation in its 
own purposiveness; this for Balthasar represents an end to the static and inward-facing notion of 
being brought about by the limitations of the Scholastic subjective treatment of person.  For 
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Balthasar, the missiological notion of person allows him to go a step further beyond the 
limitations of Hegel’s logic and to unite being and the person to Love. 
The challenge facing any discourse on God that attempts to go beyond 
the simple affirmation of his existence is to avoid either, on one side, 
ascribing to human logic the capacity to express adequately the divine 
logic—as Hegel tried to do—or, on the other, upholding an extreme 
apophatic theology, which, in striving to free God from the clumsy 
web of human concepts, ends up not in the Gregorian “radiant 
darkness,” but in the Plotinean opacity within which nothing can be 
said about the One because the One is not.222 
 
Balthasar hoped to find a middle ground between logic and the extreme apophatic 
theology of Dionysius which he believed threatened to negate God altogether.  He found it in 
both the fullness and nothingness of being, for it is here that love emerges (in the form of gift 
and gratitude—which is the meeting of fullness and nothingness); “the intrinsic self-
diffusiveness of the Good turns into Love, self-communicating Love.”223  Thus, since God—the 
source of all being—is himself Love, that end to which the person is, and for which it exists, is 
love.  Clarke, rightly in my view, recognises that the missiological and dynamic orientation of 
the human person to God is not absent in Aquinas for whom love is the very essence of human 
agency; as Aquinas himself writes, “love (amor) is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; 
for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin.”224 
In fact, much of what Balthasar thought was lacking in Aquinas in fact seems to emerge from an 
analysis of his understanding of the interplay between grace, gift and gratitude.  
 
4.4 The Interplay of Grace & Nature 
 
For Aquinas, the perfection of human nature is not the addition of something to human 
nature as such; but since human nature is essentially relational, the perfection of human nature is 
the perfection of it as relational.  The human person is naturally capable of friendship, but not 
                                                          
222 David, Schindler L.. ed. Love Alone Is Credible: Hans Urs Von Balthasar As Interpreter of the Catholic 
Tradition (Ressourcement: Retrieval and Renewal in Catholic Thought). Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2008. P.81 
223 cf. Note 17, P.606 
224  ST 1, q.20, a.1: Unde amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et propter hoc, omnes 
alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, quasi primam radicem. 
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naturally capable of producing friendship with God, because friendship itself is a gift and not 
simply an endowment of nature.  The possession of the virtue of charity, which is the cause of 
friendship, is thus the possession of a relationship, a dynamic moving towards God through 
participation, as Aquinas explains in De Virtutibus. 
Charity is not a virtue of man considered in himself, but rather of man 
considered as becoming, through participation in grace, like to God 
and the Son of God, according to which it is written (1 John 3:1); 
Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that 
we should be called, and should be the sons of God.225     
 
Metaphorically, we can see this dynamic at work even in human relationships: we are 
capable of friendship with others, but not capable of demanding or coercing genuine friendship 
from others according to our whims and desires.  The friendship between God and the human 
person is a two-way relationship; it involves both the free act of God and the free act of man: 
“friendship consists in loving rather than in being loved. Now charity is a kind of friendship. 
Therefore it consists in loving rather than in being loved.”226  Friendship with God (not simply 
the friendship of God) is not simply the act of God at the expense of human freedom or 
conversely the act of a human at the expense of the freedom of God.  The one loved must freely 
love in return in order for there to exist anything in the order of mutual friendship.227  There is, 
nonetheless, no parity between God’s love and human love; but such a parity is made possible 
through the creature’s participation in Divine Love, which God makes possible through the gift 
of his own initiating love. 
                                                          
225 De Virtutibus, ad.15: caritas non est virtus hominis in quantum est homo, sed in quantum per 
participationem gratiae fit Deus et filius Dei, secundum illud I Ioan. III, 1: videte qualem caritatem dedit 
nobis pater, ut filii Dei nominemur et simus. 
226 ST II-II, q.27, a.1: magis existit amicitia in amare quam in amari. Sed caritas est amicitia quaedam. 
Ergo caritas magis consistit in amare quam in amari. 
227 Aquinas does consider the possibility of extending friendship even to our enemies (ST II-II, q.23, a.1, 
ad.2).  Here, Aquinas distinguishes between two kinds of friendships: that of mutual friendship, which 
exists between those who love each other; and the friendship of charity, which extends even to our 
enemies.  The friendship which is extended to us by God in grace is of the first order, which opens us up 
to reciprocal friendship with God: “He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him [1 John 
4:16]. Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to 
be in the lover, and vice versa.” (ST I-II, q.28, a.2): qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. 
Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e 
converso. 
134 
 
While the ability to realise a chosen course of action is not always in the power of the 
created agent says Aquinas, the choice of any course of action “is always in a man’s power.”228 
The love of man for God is not simply a passive openness to God, as though grace is some kind 
of ontological object transplanted into nature with or without the knowledge or choice of the 
recipient.  In the De Veritate (q.28, a.3) Aquinas asks, “Does the justification of the sinner 
require free choice?”  To which he answers in the affirmative; the work of grace requires a 
turning-toward (conversio) grace on the part of the creature.  Grace does not eliminate free 
choice, but sets it free by removing the obstacles to it.  This is not to say that the agent acts 
independently of God in the exercise of free will; grace itself makes this free choice possible; 
both operating and cooperating grace act with, and upon, free will so that neither God nor the 
creature is excluded from the mutual process of theosis (ST I-II, q.111, a.2).  The very definition 
of the person therefore is centred on a participatory freedom. 
This is why, I believe, Aquinas is reluctant to simply define the person as relational in 
the way that Richard and Bonaventure had, and in the way that Balthasar et al suppose he 
should have.  In so doing—that is, defining the person as relational, and by nature in 
relationship with God—one would run a very real and perhaps inevitable risk of placing a 
necessity on God to honour such a nature.  If true friendship with God were the very definition 
of the human person, such a friendship would have to be constituted by a debt of nature 
(debitum naturae).  Any such friendship—that imposed by nature—would not, consequently, be 
a genuine friendship at all.  A relationship must include choice if it is to be free and loving.  
Defining a person into such a relationship brings an end to the gratuity of such a friendship.   
But friendship with God is both the work of free will and the work of God’s grace 
which does not and cannot fall under the debt owed to nature (De Veritate, q.23, a.6, ad.3) but 
rather under the debt of love (debitum amicitiae).  If it were a debt of nature, everyone by 
necessity would be in a natural state of friendship with God and free will would be eliminated in 
                                                          
228 De Veritate, q.24, a.1, ad.1: in opere hominis duo est invenire: scilicet electionem operum, et haec 
semper in hominis potestate consistit; et operum gestionem sive executionem, et haec non semper in 
potestate hominis est, sed divina providentia gubernante, propositum hominis ad finem quandoque 
perducitur, quandoque vero non. 
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both God and the human person.  There is something genuinely contingent, in the sense of being 
free, in the notion of relationship.  Part of what it means to be human—in a relationship with 
God—involves choice, and is not simply a matter of definition.  Such choice closes the bridge 
between nature and grace.  This is Aquinas’ concern; and why, I believe, he begins with the 
Boethian definition of person as substance, before going on to explore the notion of person as 
participating in relationships as a matter of friendship and choice.  
There is at the same time a certain natural relationship between God and creatures, 
insofar as the human person has a natural desire for the good.  Through the infused virtues, God 
adds to this natural desire, a supernatural desire for the things of God and for union with God 
himself.229  This elevated kind of relationship with God cannot simply be defined into reality; it 
remains a possibility for the human person without absolute necessity.  What is necessary, is 
that the human person can only be truly satisfied in friendship with God, but that satisfaction is 
not an inevitability.  Personhood stands at the threshold of possibility.  And by extension, it is 
possible to damage our personhood if we make the wrong choices in life. 
This can be clearly seen in Aquinas’ consideration of the possibility of extending 
friendship even to our enemies or those who do not love in return (ST II-II, q.23, a.1, ad.2) 
without reciprocation: the unrequited variety of love.  Here, Aquinas distinguishes between two 
kinds of friendships: that of mutual friendship, which exists between those who love each other; 
and the friendship of charity, which extends even to our enemies.  The friendship which is 
extended to us by God in grace is of the first order, which opens us up to the possibility of 
reciprocal friendship with God: “He that abides in charity abides in God, and God in him [1 
John 4:16]. Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes 
the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.”230  True reciprocal friendship is based on mutual 
love (mutua amatio) and not simply on well-wishing (benevolentia) which one could have for 
an enemy or an indifferent person; but true friendship requires some kind of mutual, reciprocal 
                                                          
229 Commentary on 2nd Corinthians, 5-2:160. 
230 ST I-II, q.28, a.2: qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, 
eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso. 
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self-communication.231  Both kinds of love result in two very different kinds of relationship.  
God indeed loves everyone; but this does not automatically necessitate the relationship of love 
between creature and God, because human freedom remains a constant dynamic in the very 
notion of the person.  While God initiates friendship with the creature by an act of grace, the 
creature must respond in an act of gratitude.  Personhood, or at least its fulfilment and elevation, 
is thus not simply a metaphysical construct; it is a dynamic work of virtue: it is the 
complementarity of gift and gratitude.  The work of grace is such that it can remove an obstacle 
(prohibens) to the mutual self-communication of friendship—that is, between God and the 
human person.  Grace does not ‘create’ friendship as though it were some object; grace rather 
opens the way to friendship on the part of the human person and makes the soul worthy of such 
friendship.232 
 
4.4.1 Justification by Grace 
 
Aquinas never wrote a treatise on nature and grace as such, in a way that might give us 
his explicit thoughts on how these two realities are in relation to each other.  However, as 
Torrell notes, this does not mean that they can be considered, in reference to the human person 
at least, separately.  While it is necessary to consider each as distinct realities, they are at the 
same time bound up in each other and we derive an understanding of the one in reference to the 
other.233  It is for this reason that Aquinas begins his treatment of grace in the prima secundae 
partis immediately following and in reference to questions relating to human acts and the 
human person’s last end.   
The interplay of grace and nature thereafter become integral, in the secunda secundae 
partis, in the treatment of the virtues especially where he teaches that the human creature cannot 
                                                          
231 ST II-II, q.23, a.1: Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quaedam mutua 
amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua 
communicatione. 
232 ST II-II, q.26, a.3. 
233 Torrell, Jean-Pierre in Surnaturel: a controversy at the heart of twentieth-century Thomistic thought. 
Bonino, Serge. Editor.  Ave Maria, Florida: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2009. p155 ff.   
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virtuously fulfil the precepts of the law without grace.234  Indeed, there is a progression in 
Aquinas’ thinking on the relationship between nature and grace and even a certain hesitancy in 
his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard to commit to one of the various positions 
he considers, for the reasons given above.  By the time he is writing the Summa Theologiae 
however, “Aquinas seeks to justify his position more amply by emphasising that creation in 
grace is required by a verse in Ecclesiastes (7:29), according to which ‘God made man 
upright.’”235  In other words, God created man in a state of ‘original justice’ in which his lower 
powers were perfectly subject to reason.  This state of original justice was conferred on Adam 
and Eve through the gift of grace.236  Subsequent to original sin, and the loss of original 
innocence, we need regain what has been lost of the state of original justice similarly through 
the restorative action of grace.237   
For Aquinas, the virtues are integral to the perfection of human nature.  In other words, 
the acquired virtues are integral to and perfect the human person in his natural state, while the 
infused virtues perfect him according to his participation in the Divine Nature with God.  This 
distinction in Aquinas corresponds to his use of the terms ‘effectus naturae’ and ‘effectus 
gratiae.’238  The effectus naturae correspond to the acquired virtues while the effectus gratiae 
correspond to the infused virtues.  It is evident therefore that understanding Aquinas’ use of 
nature must be the departure point for understanding his distinction between nature and 
participation in the Divine Nature, or between the acquired virtues and the infused virtues.239 
It is not possible to separate Aquinas’ notion of nature—and by extension the notion of 
grace—from the notion of ‘end’. End, or finality, in turn can likewise only be understood in 
                                                          
234 ST I-II, q109, a..4. 
235 Note 1, ibid. p165. 
236 ST I-II, q81, a2. 
237 ST I-II, q114.a7. 
238 “In some places in his work Aquinas speaks of a distinction in God’s action between the effectus 
naturae and the effectus gratiae.  There is a division between grace and nature, although both refer to 
God’s action with respect to creatures.  The effectus naturae embraces the work of creation, by which 
creatures are established in their proper nature.  The effectus gratiae is something additional, not in 
itself something part of nature.  Grace is not in itself a gift of creation but a gift beyond the natural 
endowment of creatures, enabling the (human) creature to reach God beyond its natural power.” Velde, 
Rudi A. te.. Aquinas on God: the 'divine science' of the Summa Theologiae. Oxford: Ashgate, 2006. p148 
239 This distinction can be clearly seen in ST I-II, q63, a2 for example. 
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terms of the Dionysian doctrine of participation, which Aquinas makes his own.  The virtues 
(both acquired and infused) thus bring the human person into conformity with that end: the 
acquired virtues orient the person to the natural end of human nature, while the infused virtues, 
under the impetus of grace, orient the person to the participation in the Divine Nature.   
 
4.5 Human Nature in Aquinas 
 
To get an accurate idea of the notion of person in Aquinas, a person motivated by 
gratitude and love, it is necessary to first come to terms with this Dionysian concept of nature 
and participation, as Fran O’Rourke has shown.240  I begin by adopting Thomas White’s 
definition of nature as he understands it to be in Aquinas: “Let us take ‘nature’ to designate the 
essential determination of a created reality as it is constituted in existence such that it can 
normally accomplish certain actions by its own intrinsic powers that tend toward such actions, 
and such that it behaves according to certain stable, integral ways of being.”241  Aquinas 
frequently uses the term ‘determinatio’ to describe human actions which, if voluntary (i.e., the 
actus humanus) are always directed to this same end of human nature, either directly or 
indirectly. 
 The first among the actions or ‘determinations’ of human nature is somewhat 
paradoxical; for the end of human nature, properly speaking, is something which at the same 
time exceeds the natural faculty (or ability) of human nature: God himself.242  In his current 
state, man is not capable of attaining this supernatural end which alone properly fulfils and 
completes and gives meaning to who and what he is.  But given that God is indeed the proper 
end of human nature, there must be some sense in which this end is intrinsic to human nature 
(otherwise, we would have no grounds for calling it ‘nature’ or even ‘supernature’).  Aquinas 
                                                          
240 For what is perhaps one of the most thorough studies of the relationship between Aquinas and 
Dionysius to date, see O’Rourke, Fran. Pseudo-Dionysius and the metaphysics of Aquinas. Notre Dame, 
Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005 
241 White, Thomas Joseph, The Analogy of being: invention of the Antichrist or the wisdom of God? 
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affirms this intrinsic capacity that human nature has for God.243  Thus the human person is 
caught in a tension between the ability and the supernatural end, to which he is inclined. 
The problem of attaining one’s end by one’s own ability gave rise to at least two 
problems which Aquinas responds to.  The first was that of fatalism, which views human nature 
as totally powerless in the face of being’s flow.244  The second was that of Pelagianism, 
according to which the human person is fully equipped on his own to seek and attain his proper 
end.245  Aquinas’ response to both of these positions is what is often referred to as the doctrine 
of the exitus et reditus, the going-out-from, and returning-to, God.  Theories of exitus et reditus 
are not a Christian innovation and have their roots in Platonist theories of emanation—a kind of 
emanationism which Aquinas clearly rejects.  Emanationism (as for example in Plotinus’ 
Enneads, Book 5) sees the flow of being proceeding from the Source of all Being as a necessary 
condition of that Being.  Creation according to this theory is thus not a free act, but a necessary 
condition of Being, or the One, just as giving off light is a necessary feature of the sun.246  
Emanationism, furthermore, places God in a univocal hierarchy of being: a ladder of being so to 
speak, in which the bottom rung of the ladder leads to the top rung: but all are rungs of varying 
degrees.247 
 Aquinas is by no means an emanationist in the Plotinean sense. First of all, Creation is 
the work of God’s free choice, and in no way was God compelled to create anything due to the 
demands of his own nature.248  Nor does he compel creatures into friendship with him: created 
being is gift and therefore free and subject to the free response in gratitude.  God has no 
                                                          
243 See for example ST I, q.12, a.7 and I, q.23, a5, ad.3. 
244 ST I, q116. 
245 ST I-II, q100, a10. 
246 Wawrykow, Joseph Peter. The Westminster Handbook to Thomas Aquinas. Louisville, Ky.: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2005. p.54 
247 Paradoxically, those who think Aquinas should have defined the person in a relational way as 
envisioned by Bonaventure, for example, often proposes ‘emanationist’ kinds of solutions, which 
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248 See for example SCG 2:12, and especially SCG 2:23, “God does not act by necessity, but by will.” 
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absolute necessity for human companionship, or for creation to amuse or interest him.  God’s 
creative love is thus essentially free and creation participates in Being on account of God’s free 
act.249  Secondly, God is not a being like other beings; he is beyond being and any notion of 
being that we might have. 
This reality gives us the first piece of the puzzle in the answer to our question as to how 
to reconcile the apparent contradiction between nature’s end and nature’s ability: Creation is 
contingent, because it flows from a free act of God’s will.  There is nothing necessary in 
creation.  Thus, at its very core, creation—including human nature—is not able to satisfy the 
conditions for its own existence, its place in the universal order of cause and effect.250 
 In what does human nature consist?  What are these conditions of existence which the 
human person is not able to satisfy on his own?  The question can be accessed in a number of 
ways but at the very core human nature is relational—it consists in friendship: “the chief 
intention of the Divine Law is to establish man in friendship with God.”251  Hence the doctrine 
of exitus et reditus is perhaps best summed up in the famous line of Augustine found in the very 
beginning of the Confessions, “Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till 
they find rest in Thee.”  This restlessness is the yearning for union with God, the source of all 
creation.  The yearning is, in essence, a cosmic dialogue of the communion of friendship, or 
love. 
Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, 
inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of 
friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which 
it is written (1 Corinthians 1:9): “God is faithful: by Whom you are 
called unto the fellowship of His Son.” The love which is based on 
this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is 
the friendship of man for God.252 
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beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. De qua 
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141 
 
4.5.1 The Dionysian Hierarchy 
 
This doctrine of exitus et reditus finds its way into Aquinas via Dionysius.  In the 
Divine Names (oft quoted by Aquinas), the Areopagite explains that the yearning for God is the 
very essence of human nature.  Why, Dionysius asks is this the case (Divine Names 712C)?  
Why do we yearn for that which is Other?  His answer, which will be picked up and developed 
by Aquinas, is that God is both Yearning and Yearned-for, both Love and Beloved.  For every 
desire there is a counterpart; love is attractive by nature, and so God is attractive by nature.  
Although Dionysius does not equate these terms with gift and gratitude, they play out in the 
language of Aquinas in this way. God’s act of love for the human person is his gift; the 
response—the orientation to the beloved, the origin of that experience of, and orientation to, 
love—is realised in the virtues of indebtedness and gratitude.  The gift of human existence 
already bears within it the imprint of this Divine Love, and so already bears within it an impetus 
to the source, “by the inward instinct of the Divine Invitation” (interiori instinctu Dei 
invitantis).253   The gift calls for a response in gratitude and for this reason, Aquinas identifies 
the act of prayer and praise, in which gratitude consists, with the movement of desire (ST II-II, 
q.83).  Gratitude, expressed through acts of thanksgiving, simultaneously bears the character of 
desire.  The gift of existence is not static; it is a movement towards its source. 
Love, by its very nature, is diffusive, and self-communicating.  But this self-
diffusiveness of the Good (Aquinas speaks of the bonum diffusivum sui) is not simply a pouring 
out; God does not simply pour His Being out, says Dionysius, as water flowing out of a broken 
flask onto the floor.  God’s love is not ‘wasted’ in other words; it is not a one-way 
communication.  Rather, as it goes out, it returns again from whence it came, like the tide:  God 
is “yearning on the move, simple, self-moved, self-acting, pre-existing in the Good, flowing out 
from the Good onto all that is and returning once again to the Good.  In this divine yearning 
shows especially is unbeginning and unending nature, travelling in an endless circle through the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Amor autem super hac communicatione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia 
quaedam est hominis ad Deum. 
253 ST II-II, q.2, a.9, ad.3 
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Good, from the Good, in the Good and to the Good, unerringly turning, ever on the same centre, 
ever in the same direction, always proceeding, always remaining, always being restored to 
itself” (DN 712D-713A).254   
 In referencing this theology in the Divine Names, Aquinas sums up this doxological 
account of the self-diffusive nature of the good by noting that not only does all Good pre-exist 
in the “Yearning” but, by necessity, this must include all perfections of the Good too.255  As far 
as humans are concerned, this means that the perfection, or end, of human nature, while it can 
only be found in God, the impetus towards that perfection is already integral to human nature: 
“the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the end, which also 
moves the agent to act.”256   And consequently, “all things, in desiring their own perfection, in 
fact desire God.”257   
Aquinas repeatedly asserts that every effect bears some trace of its cause.  In the case of 
human nature, this trace is not simply inert or material, but the formal condition of humanity 
constituted in reason and love: human nature is a relation founded on the principle of exitus et 
reditus.  Aquinas himself is thus explicit in espousing the Dionysian principle of the cyclic 
movement from and return to God—as Fran O’Rourke emphasises, pointing to a significant 
passage in Aquinas’ Commentary on the Sentences (In I Sent., 14, 2, 2) to underscore the point: 
In the issue of creatures from the first principle there is observed a 
certain circulation, or gyration, in that all things are returned as to an 
end to that from which they proceed as from their origin.258 
 
4.6 The Relationship between Benefactor & Beneficiary 
 
 Throughout his treatment of gratitude in the Summa, and in the commentaries on the 
Pauline epistles, Aquinas frequently identifies God as our primary Benefactor (q.106, a.1).  The 
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256 Summa Contra Gentiles, 37:5 
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very word ‘benefactor’ means ‘to make well’ (bene facere).  To be the subject of benefaction is, 
in a certain sense, to be made.  There are, in the order of gifts, various degrees of ‘being made’, 
but the most primary sense for Aquinas is the act of being brought into existence as a person; 
first, according to the natural order, but then more perfectly according to the order of grace (ST  
II-II, q.1, a.7, ad.3).  In a secondary sense, we are ‘made’ by the gifts of earthly benefactors: we 
may be ‘made healthy’ by the gifts of medicine, or ‘made wealthy’ by the gifts of money. All 
these secondary gifts, from human benefactors, are both signs of the superlative benefaction of 
God, or else they fit within the order of providence which uses them for the perfection of the 
individual either in that natural or supernatural order.259 
 Because of the order of beneficence and the varying kinds of gifts, our first act of 
gratitude must be to God.  It is because of the participation of the second order of gifts in the 
higher order of God that we should also be grateful to human benefactors.  Earthly gifts are only 
gifts in reference to the Gifts and providence of God.   
 Furthermore, giving is a greater sign of love than simply receiving.260  And so, for the 
sake of friendship—which is the reason genuine gifts are given in the first place—we must give 
to those who have given to us.  This is the essence of gratitude: giving in return to one who has 
given to us.  And not only should we give back to those who have given to us, but we should 
give more than what we were given in the first place (q.106, a.6).  Otherwise, in giving back 
measure for measure, we would reduce the cycle of gift-giving to the level of commutative 
justice.  Since the nature of gift includes something gratis, it must of necessity exceed what it 
aims to repay. 
 But if our first and greatest gratitude is owed to God, who is our greatest benefactor, 
how do we go about honouring the friendship by giving back more than we have received?  
How can we give more than our very selves, even if that were possible?  God cannot be outdone 
in kindness and beneficence, so how then is any gratitude by way of return even possible? 
                                                          
259 Aquinas often highlights this point by drawing analogy between the work of providence and the work 
of human government, which is both a means and sign of providence.  See for example, De Regno (ad 
regem Cypri): c.13:94. 
260 See ST II-II, q.26, a.12. 
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 Aquinas is aware of this difficulty, and provides two related solutions.  First, he says 
that in cases where the obligation to repay a benefactor is limited by our ability to make such a 
repayment, we are not excused from ingratitude on that account (q.107, a.1, ad.2).  What then 
are we to do?  By way of example, Aquinas notes that a son can never repay his parents for the 
gift of his begetting.  However, there is a different kind of repayment he can make: the 
repayment of the will (q.106, a.6, a.1). In other words, genuine love, and all that it might entail 
within the scope of one’s ability, is sufficient to honour the debt.  Aquinas does not give, in 
questions one hundred and six and one hundred and seven, an indication of what this 
‘repayment of the will’ might look like specifically.  But in his treatment of the question of 
beneficence and related treatments of devotion and religion, he paints a fuller picture of what 
repayment of the will looks like in terms of being grateful to God. 
 His second, more detailed solution is found in the questions dealing with beneficence.  
Aquinas treats of charity and beneficence in questions twenty three and thirty one of the 
secunda secundae partis of the Summa.  Here, he notes that, first of all, gift-giving is primarily 
an act of love and that secondly, while we are bound to love everyone, we have a special 
obligation to give most to those who are closest to us: our friends, family and above all, God.  
The act of receiving—even receiving gratefully—is not as loving as the act of giving.  
Benefaction participates more in the order of charity than does getting, because it involves more 
perfectly the donation of self than does simply receiving of a gift.261 Thus, in the requirement to 
repay a gift in gratitude, the grateful person is elevated from the level of simply being a 
‘recipient’ to a giver too.  Gratitude calls us to repay gifts we have been given, and so calls us to 
model the donor who initiates our begetting as persons of a certain kind.  We model, in other 
words, the donor who ‘makes us’; and in so doing, we too become participants in this making, a 
production of love.  “Anyone who renders a person what is due to him,” Aquinas says, 
                                                          
261 See also the question dealing with the order of charity, which complements this question: ST II-II, 
q.26, a.12.  Here, Aquinas explains in more detail that giving is higher on the order of charity than simply 
receiving. 
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“becomes suitably proportioned to him, through being ordered to him in a becoming manner.”262 
Through the repayment of gifts, we share in the life of the donor; in repayment of God’s gifts, 
we therefore become ‘divinised’. 
 Thus genuine gratitude cannot simply be a question of ‘feeling grateful’ for having 
received a good gift.  Gratitude is not a dead-end, one-way exchange from a benefactor whose 
gift lands without return in the recipient.  Gratitude rather is a moment of awakening and 
begetting; we become “partakers” in the divine life.  In fact, this is how Aquinas explains 
Christ’s action at the Last Supper: he makes us partakers in his own life through his body and 
blood.263  Gratitude calls us out of ourselves into a communion of the exchange of love in 
friendship.  It is a dynamic virtue that gives birth to friendship because the first act of friendship 
is to give gifts;264 and so the first act of returning, or accepting, that friendship, must be 
gratitude. 
 Since we cannot give God anything which we have not already received, what we 
therefore return to God by way of gratitude is already given to us by God.  Gratitude is itself a 
gift because not only do the gifts of God benefit the human recipient, but through them the 
recipient becomes pleasing to God.265  Indeed, “whatever is pleasing to God in man is caused by 
the Divine love.”266   
Gratitude calls us into the mystical life of our primary Benefactor, by making us worthy 
of friendship with God through grace.  In particular, the interior and exterior acts of the virtue of 
religion provide the means by which we enter into the cycle of friendship, and the means by 
which we return thanksgiving (gratiarum actio) to God. 
 
                                                          
262 ST II-II, q.81, a.2. Manifestum est autem quod reddere debitum alicui habet rationem boni, quia per 
hoc quod aliquis alteri debitum reddit, etiam constituitur in proportione convenienti respectu ipsius, 
quasi convenienter ordinatus ad ipsum. 
263 ST III, q.81, a.1 
264 ST II-II, q.31, a.1. 
265 Compendium Theologiae, c.143. 
266 ST I-II, q.110, a.1: Nam illud quod est homini gratum in alio homine, praesupponitur eius dilectioni, 
causatur autem ex dilectione divina quod est in homine Deo gratum. 
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4.7 Original Sin & Original Justice 
 
In keeping with his general theory of evil, Aquinas routinely describes sin in terms of 
“privation”.  Sin is not something ontological in itself but is rather descriptive of something 
lacking—namely, in the case of original sin, for example, as the absence of original justice.267  
The nature of the privation furthermore is not simply a pure privation (privationem solam) but 
rather a privation in reference to a cause—namely, the final cause, whether this be the natural or 
supernatural beatitude of the human person.268 
A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as it is an act, it can 
have a direct cause, even as any other act; but, so far as it is 
inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a negation or privation 
can have a cause.269 
 
Specifically, this privation is in the order of human acts, and hence “sin is not a pure 
privation, but and act deprived of its due order.”270  This privation of due order in reference to 
the human person’s natural and supernatural beatitude constitutes an obstacle (prohibens) to that 
final end—an obstacle which grace removes.  Hence we find frequent references to the work of 
grace as cooperating with human freedom in removing the obstacles to man’s proper end as in, 
for example, the De Veritate: “Sin is an obstacle to grace especially from the point of view of 
turning away from God. To remove this obstacle there is accordingly required the turning of our 
free choice toward God.”271  
 Just as sin is an obstacle to virtue, so too is virtue an obstacle to sin.  Every sin, says 
Aquinas in the De Malo (q.3, a.7), involves a turning-to some inordinate desire (conversio) and 
turning-from some positive good (aversio).  Virtues thus both militate against a turning-to some 
evil and a turning-from some good since both every sin involves both a turning-to some 
disordered good and a turning-from some objective good, namely love.  At the same time, every 
                                                          
267 ST I-II, q.82, a.1, ad.1 
268 ST I-II, q.86, a.1, ad.3 
269 ST I-II, q.75, a.1: peccatum est quidam actus inordinatus. Ex parte igitur actus, potest habere per se 
causam, sicut et quilibet alius actus. Ex parte autem inordinationis, habet causam eo modo quo negatio 
vel privatio potest habere causam. 
270 ST I-II, q.72, a.1, ad.2: peccatum non est pura privatio, sed est actus debito ordine privatus. 
271 De Veritate, q.28, a.4, ad.12: peccatum prohibet gratiam praecipue ratione aversionis; et ideo ad 
removendum hoc prohibens, requiritur conversio liberi arbitrii in Deum. 
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virtuous act refers to both a turning-from such disordered acts and a turning-to some positive 
good.  In his response to an objection on the nature of ignorance, which, the objection suggests, 
seems to imply only a turning-from (the truth) and not a turning-to some perceived good (since 
ignorance is, by nature, non-reflective), Aquinas replies that even ignorance has as its cause a 
turning-to, since part of the work of sinful ‘conversio’ is the removal of obstacles to sin.  Thus, 
sin is not only an obstacle to the good, but the good is likewise an obstacle to sin: “any good 
may hinder a man from sinning.”272  Original sin is itself not simply a disorder in human nature, 
but a disorder on account of the loss of something positive: namely original justice: “a certain 
inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, 
namely, by the removal of the obstacle—that is, original justice, which hindered inordinate 
movements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements results indirectly from bodily 
sickness.”273 
 Aquinas logic of the obstacle is instructive.  Not only does he use it to describe the 
relationship between sin and virtue, but—by extension—to the working of grace: grace is that 
which removes the obstacles set up by sin, and which reinforce the obstacles against sin set up 
by virtue.   
Just as the removal of a shadow implies not only the removal of 
darkness but also the removal of the obstructing body, in the same 
way the forgiveness of guilt implies not only the removal of the 
absence of grace but also the removal of the obstacle to grace, which 
arose from a preceding act of sin. This does not mean that that act 
must be made not to have been, for that is impossible, but it means 
that the entry of grace is not hindered by it.274 
 
In other words, human freedom places the person simultaneously before that which 
hinders grace and that which enables grace to operate; it places the human person at every stage 
                                                          
272 ST II-II, q.105, a.2, ad.2: …bonum potest homo a peccato impediri. 
273 ST I-II, q.82, a.1, ad.3: obiectio illa procedit de habitu quo potentia inclinatur in actum, talis autem 
habitus non est peccatum originale. Quamvis etiam ex peccato originali sequatur aliqua inclinatio in 
actum inordinatum, non directe, sed indirecte, scilicet per remotionem prohibentis, idest originalis 
iustitiae, quae prohibebat inordinatos motus, sicut etiam ex aegritudine corporali indirecte sequitur 
inclinatio ad motus corporales inordinatos. 
274 De Veritate, q.28, a.6: Sicut ergo ablatio umbrae importat non solum remotionem tenebrae, sed 
remotionem corporis impedientis; ita remissio culpae non solum importat ablationem absentiae gratiae, 
sed ablationem impedimenti gratiae, quod erat ex actu peccati praecedente; non ut actus ille non fuerit, 
quia hoc est impossibile; sed ut propter illum influxus gratiae non impediatur. 
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of existence in a dynamic state of movement, either towards or away from love. Gratitude 
constitutes a move towards love as gift, and ingratitude, the move away.  The debt of gratitude 
flows from a debt of love (ex debito amoris); ingratitude is nothing less than a refusal to, or 
turning away from, love (ST II-II, 107, a.1, ad.3). 
On his own, and according to his natural endowments, man cannot overcome this 
obstacle to grace and satisfy this natural yearning for God born in the moment of gratitude, 
which is the form of friendship with God and therefore the proper end of human nature.275  The 
cause of this failure of human nature to fulfil the inclination to God is original sin.  In question 
eighty two of the prima secundae partis Aquinas asks, “In what way is original sin a habit?”  He 
affirms that it is indeed a habit in a secondary sense of the term in contradistinction to habits of 
action (that is, science and virtue).  In this secondary sense, original sin is a disposition of 
nature—in the way, he says, that sickness or health form in a sense a ‘second nature’ alongside 
primary nature.  In the case of original sin, this ‘second nature’ is more like a sickness in which 
the “harmony of original justice” is lost.276 
 
4.7.1 Person & Harmony 
 
 This characterisation of original sin as the loss of the harmony (concordia) of original 
justice is significant.  Aquinas often uses the Dionysian concept of harmony, or concord, in 
reference to friendship (as in ST I, q.19, a.12, ad.4 and ST I-II, q.114, a.6 for example) and to 
sin as the cause of discord (ST II-II, q.37).  Harmony is that state in which contraries or 
opposites are balanced—such as in the state of bodily health, when the complex of the body is 
harmony with itself.   
One of Aquinas’ most thoroughgoing treatments of harmony can be found in his 
Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima (Book 1:IV).  There, he rejects, along with Aristotle, the 
notion put forward by Democritus and Empedocles among others that the soul itself is best 
                                                          
275 ST I-II, q.109, a.4, ad.3 
276 ST I-II, q.82, a.1: Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in 
qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae. 
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described as a ‘Harmony’. Given that harmony means ‘mixing contraries in due proportion’ 
there is no harmony in this sense in the soul which is the unified form of the person.  Harmony 
better describes that which has contrary parts, such as the body when these parts work in unison 
or cooperate for some final good.  In his Commentary on Philippians, Aquinas identifies perfect 
harmony as existing between the gift of God and the thanksgiving of his friends: between 
members of the Church and Christ, and this, he says, is the cause and reason for our joy and 
thanksgiving.277  Harmony, in other words, is the union of gift and gratitude. 
 Harmony is an apt description of justice and friendship, of gift and gratitude, because 
these represent unified contraries: the lover and the beloved.  Thus in the Divine Names, we find 
the Areopagite speaking of the way in which the Good brings “friendship and peace to all 
beings, which is why all good things show friendship and inherent harmony” (724A).  Original 
justice likewise describes the harmonious relationship between God and the human person 
which existed as a habit in the secondary sense, or a condition of nature.  
Original justice therefore is equivalent to mutual friendship, and it is this which has 
been lost through original sin.  Friendship is not itself a virtue, but the reason why the virtues 
exist.278  Later, Aquinas will go on to describe all the virtues as being rooted in friendship, and it 
is the virtues which help restore original justice.  In particular, the virtues of indebtedness orient 
the rational creature to friendship and harmony by mapping out the trajectory of the return, as it 
were, to the source of being and friendship from which he came.  Gratitude is essentially the 
recognition and cultivation of this friendship (ST II-II, q.106, a.1, ad.3).  Indeed, Aquinas’ 
whole treatise on justice is concerned with the restoration of original justice.  One of the aims of 
justice, he says, is to reconcile two contraries—sin and justice—and to thereby bring about 
harmony (ST I-II, q,113, a.1).  All of the virtues of indebtedness therefore are oriented to 
leading the person, once alienated from God, back to divine friendship.  Gratitude is the last 
rung in descent on the ladder of those virtues, because it is the first step on the ascent back to 
God.  For this reason, in his prologue to his apology for religious orders (Liber contra 
                                                          
277 Commentary on Philippians, 2-1. 
278 Disputed Questions on Virtue, q.1, a.5, ad.5: amicitia proprie non est virtus, sed consequens virtutem. 
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impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem), Aquinas describes the birth of Christ as being the 
moment in which the possibility of this harmony through friendship with Christ becomes 
possible: “At the birth of Our Lord, an angel proclaimed this harmony (concordia) between God 
and man, saying, “Glory to God in the highest, and peace on earth to men of good will.” 
 Original justice is the unrestricted motion of the exitus et reditus according to the nature 
of God and creation—the latter expressed in a hierarchy of being.  It is the “perfect union” 
“within the transcendent cycle of divine love.”279  This union was never something simply 
imposed on the human person, but is constituted through the free consent of his will.  Our 
modern notion of ‘justice’ often conjures up ideas of compulsion and demands.  But original 
justice, for both in Dionysius and Aquinas, is better understood as the establishment of an 
original order or harmony which is founded on the impetus of Divine Love and the free 
response to that love, in love, of the human person.  In other words, the loss of original justice is 
the distortion of free will.280 
 
4.7.2 Anticipation as the Foundation for Gratitude 
 
Much has been written on the question of whether or not the human person has a wholly 
natural desire for the supernatural.281  It is not my intention here to go into, much less try to 
resolve, the well-known debate between the opponents and proponents of the nouvelle theologie 
(perhaps most notably, Henri de Lubac) on the question concerning the relationship between 
grace and nature.282  However, it is at the same time necessary to adopt a certain position in 
                                                          
279 O’Rourke, p.235. 
280 ST I-II, q.82, a.3. 
281 Nicholas J. Healy provides an excellent overview of the debate and recent developments in Healy, 
Nicholas J. Henri de Lubac On Nature And Grace: A Note On Some Recent Contributions To The Debate. 
Communio, Winter 2008. International Catholic Review. Pp. 535-564. 
282 Two useful contemporary perspectives on the debate can be found in Mulcahy O.P, Bernard. 
Aquinas's notion of pure nature and the Christian integralism of Henri de Lubac: not everything is grace. 
New York: P. Lang, 2011; and Milbank, John. The suspended middle: Henri de Lubac and the debate 
concerning the supernatural. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2005.  The late Ralph 
McInerny also provides a summary of the debate and a rethinking of the often polemicized criticisms of 
Cajetan and the commentators on the question: McInerny, Ralph. Praeambula fidei Thomism and the 
God of the philosophers. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006. 
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reference to the question of “pure nature” (in puris naturalibus) in the writings of Aquinas in 
order to set a foundation for understanding gratitude.  Gratitude is, after all, a virtue; and there is 
no notion of virtue in Aquinas that is independent of the interplay between grace and nature, and 
more specifically between the natural and infused virtues.  One passage in the Summa in 
particular can be identified as a flashpoint for the debate:  
The nature or essence of a thing is completely comprised within it: 
whatever then extends to anything beyond it is not its essence.  Hence 
we see in natural bodies that inclination to being does not come 
anything superadded to the essence, but from the matter which desires 
being before possessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such 
when once it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic 
comes from something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a 
place comes from gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make 
something like itself comes from the active qualities.283 
 
Rather than wade headlong into the debate, I would like here to focus on a Dionysian 
element in Aquinas’ thinking on human nature: what might be termed a primordial sense of 
anticipation or the “inward instinct of the Divine Invitation”, which manifests itself as 
emptiness or incompleteness, which gives rise in the human heart to a natural desire for 
something missing, something which one senses should or might be present, but which is not.  
This sense of incompleteness in turn gives rise to anticipation or longing for harmony.  Aquinas 
has various terms for this primordial sense of anticipation.  At times, he speaks of a certain 
passivity in the soul in need of healing (ST I-II, q.22, a.1), or the capacity for God (capax Dei) 
which is a unique feature of the rational creature (ST III, q.6, a.2); at other times he speaks of 
the tendency of the intellect to reach out to that which is outside it (ST I, q.59, a.2); or longing 
(ST II-II, q.180, a.1) and desire for God (ST II-II, q.28, a.3).  His most common terminology to 
express this idea however is ‘debt’ (debitum).  The notion of indebtedness is at the heart of his 
treatment of gratitude. 
                                                          
283 ST I, q.59, a.2: …natura vel essentia alicuius rei intra ipsam rem comprehenditur, quidquid ergo se 
extendit ad id quod est extra rem, non est rei essentia. Unde videmus in corporibus naturalibus, quod 
inclinatio quae est ad esse rei, non est per aliquid superadditum essentiae; sed per materiam, quae 
appetit esse antequam illud habeat, et per formam, quae tenet rem in esse postquam fuerit.  Sed 
inclinatio ad aliquid extrinsecum, est per aliquid essentiae superadditum, sicut inclinatio ad locum est per 
gravitatem vel levitatem, inclinatio autem ad faciendum sibi simile est per qualitates activas. 
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In question sixty three of the Prima Pars of the Summa, Aquinas considers the claim 
that “virtue is in us by nature.”  In his reply, he considers the two prevailing theories on the 
matter: the first is that of the Platonists, who held that the forms are in us by nature, and that 
science and the virtues pre-exist in us naturally and are “awakened” through study and practice.  
On the other hand he considers the position of the followers of Avicenna, who held that there is 
nothing in us by nature, and that all knowledge and virtue comes to us from without, as from 
external motivation.  Aquinas’ answer in question sixty three suggests that it is a bit of both: the 
virtues are in us in one sense by nature as “seeds” or principles, and in another sense they are 
not, when considered as established habits:  there is in us, he says, a certain inchoate capacity 
for the virtues, but that we do not possess the virtues as perfected habits by nature.  In other 
words, there is a natural capacity for the virtues in the human creature—a capacity which 
requires actualisation in the individual through grace at the invitation of God. 
In answering the question, Aquinas draws a distinction between what belongs to us 
according to our species, and that which belongs to us as individual persons (ST I, q.63, a.1).  
Here, it is important to make a distinction between two basic kinds of specification Aquinas has 
in mind.  The first kind of specification, which applies to all natural corporeal things, is derived 
from the form of the thing itself.  This also applies to the human creature, considered as a 
natural corporeal being like other corporeal beings.  In this sense, every human creature is 
endowed with debts of nature and a moral debt of love.  But in another way, the human agent is 
also considered from the point of view as an individual person, a responsible moral agent 
capable of a particular friendship, and acting for a particular end by responding to the debt of 
love.  As Augustine puts it, “What we have received in order to be is one thing; what we 
received in order to be holy is another.”284  Thus the definition of person on the one hand is 
subject to the first kind of specification; a definition according to the second kind, as discussed 
earlier, is not possible, since it is actualised in the moment of friendship and gratitude: in the 
response to the debitum morale, the kind of debt with which gratitude is primarily concerned. 
                                                          
284 Cited in Healy, Nicholas. Henri de Lubac On Nature And Grace: A Note On Some Recent Contributions 
To The Debate. Communio, Winter 2008. International Catholic Review. Pp. 535-564. 
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The debt of gratitude is also expressive of the anticipatory nature of the human person.  
We are not only grateful for what we have received; we are grateful for what we will receive.  In 
his treatment on the nature of vows, Aquinas has this to say: “He who promises something gives 
it already in as far as he binds himself to give it: even as a thing is said to be made when its 
cause is made, because the effect is contained virtually in its cause. This is why we thank not 
only a giver, but also one who promises to give.”285  In the anticipation of the gift, the virtue of 
hope is awakened and cultivated, along with faith—which hope itself presupposes. Gratitude is 
not simply an acknowledgement that God has given, but that he will give, according to the 
promise of his friendship.  Indeed, such an expectation of the continuation of friendship could 
not be possible without the expectation of future gifts of love.  Friendship by its very nature is 
anticipatory, just as it is mindful of the past and conscious of the present (ST II-II, q.25, a.7).   
This anticipatory nature of friendship should not be thought of as being an entitlement; 
there is no entitlement to grace or God’s friendship.  The very nature of grace is that it is 
“gratis”—free, and it is this freedom in giving which elicits gratitude in return (ST I-II, q.110, 
a.1).  There is no sense of indebtedness on the part of God to satisfy our sense of anticipation.  
Rather, the fulfilment of anticipation creates a condition of debt on the recipient of the gift. 
 
4.8 The grateful person as indebted 
 
The question of what constitutes the ‘grateful person’ hinges on Aquinas’ use of the 
term ‘debt’ (debitum). In a narrow sense, Aquinas speaks of the debitum naturae, or the natural 
endowments of human nature, beyond which it can lay no ‘claim’ to anything further—such as 
divine beatitude.286   
                                                          
285 ST II-II, q.88, a.5, ad.2: Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui promittit, inquantum se obligat ad 
dandum, iam quodammodo dat, sicut dicitur fieri aliquid cum fit causa eius, quia effectus virtute 
continetur in causa. Et inde est quod non solum danti, sed etiam promittenti gratiae aguntur. 
286 See Velde, Rudi A. te.. Aquinas on God: the 'divine science' of the Summa Theologiae. Oxford: 
Ashgate, 2006., p.152: “There is apparently some limitation inherent to nature which allows the gift of 
grace to be an additional perfection lying outside the essential ingredients of human nature (debitum 
naturae).  This limitation concerns the condition of created nature as such; not some defect of nature 
which is not intended by God’s creative will, or some deficiency on the part of divine power which has to 
154 
 
More specifically, Aquinas speaks of two kinds of indebtedness related to human 
nature: the debt which arises through legal obligation (debitum legale) and the debt which arises 
on account of some gift received, by which one becomes indebted to another (debitum 
morale).287  There is also the corresponding notion of the debt of punishment due to personal sin 
(reatus poenae), and the debt of human nature itself as a result of original sin (reatu naturae 
humanae).  Broadly speaking, the various uses of the notion of debt are summarised under the 
unifying notion of the debitum naturae—the debt of human nature itself, including its natural 
impetus fulfilling the quasi-integral demands of justice: to avoid evil and do good.  Of all these 
notions of indebtedness, for Aquinas the debitum morale is that through which human nature 
goes beyond itself and reaches out for the good in general and the divine more specifically 
through acts of gratitude and thanksgiving.  He equates this kind of debt with the debitum 
amicitiae, or the debt of friendship.288 
 While he uses these terms of debt in various senses, Aquinas employs them in a way 
which provides a unifying backdrop to his ecclesiology and treatment of the virtues in general.  
Ultimately, the term debt describes the human condition, both essentially and accidentally, in 
reference to itself and in its relations to others and ultimately to the Creator, and which enables 
us to speak of a moral debt of friendship.  The human condition is complex and varied and so is 
its indebted nature.  Simply put, the notion of debt provides us with a concept of the human 
person which has at once a nature due to it (debitum naturae); but which, at the same time 
appears to be incomplete on account of sin (reatu naturae humanae) and its own inherent 
limitations and so is incapable, without grace, of achieving union with God on account of the 
loss of original justice.  And because God calls the human person to ultimate union with him, 
there is a debt of friendship owed—a response to this call (debitum morale, debitum 
                                                                                                                                                                          
be restored by a second intervening act.  The being of each creature is established within the strict 
boundaries of its nature.  Its nature determines the range of its active power and corresponding 
operation which does not reach beyond the limits of nature.” 
287 ST II-II, q.114, a.2. 
288 ST II-II, q.78, a.2, ad.2: Alio modo tenetur aliquis ad recompensandum beneficium ex debito amicitiae, 
in quo magis consideratur affectus ex quo aliquis beneficium contulit quam etiam quantitas eius quod 
fecit. Et tali debito non competit civilis obligatio, per quam inducitur quaedam necessitas, ut non 
spontanea recompensatio fiat. 
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amicitiae)—which is facilitated through the virtuous life and gratitude.  Thus the notion of debt 
is thus a key term in Aquinas’ virtue theory and indeed, in his very concept of the person.  We 
could say that the human person is, by nature, “indebted”.289  The human person’s indebtedness 
is not simply satisfied through his own independent personal action, but within the context of 
the Church which satisfies the debt of punishment through its ministry (Commentary on 
Colossians, 1.3) and through enabling the full exercise of the virtuous life.  Indeed, Aquinas is 
insistent that it is through the Church, the mystical body, that the life of Christ flows to all its 
members.290 
 At the heart of this question of the debt of human nature is the famous question of de 
Lubac on the relationship between nature and supernature.  In what sense can we speak of 
human nature as being a “gift” in a way that necessitates a debt of gratitude?  Can there be a 
“debt” of nature which calls us to supernature and yet at the same time provides us with a 
natural capacity to attain such an end?  At stake is not simply a question of relationship between 
an individual and God, but, as Nicholas Healy notes, it is a question concerning “the 
relationship between the Church and the world, between theology and philosophy, the ecclesial 
and cosmological significance of the Eucharist, and the meaning of the universality of Christ’s 
saving mission.”291   
 
4.8.1 Gratitude and the ‘debitum morale’ 
 
Aquinas frequently mentions the link between debt (debitum) and justice (for example, 
ST II-II q.109, a.3) and consequently between debt and gratitude, since gratitude flows from the 
                                                          
289 Indebted, not in the sense of financial debt to a creditor; Aquinas is clear in his treatise on gratitude 
that the rush to repay a debt out of a sense of indebtedness (arising from the debitum legale for 
example) is in fact an act of ingratitude since it betrays any true sense of friendship “qui festinat 
reddere, non animum habet grati hominis, sed debitoris” (ST II-II, 106, a.4).  I hope to show that for 
Aquinas, indebtedness in this sense is in fact equivalent to gratitude and that the indebtedness of 
human nature is a dependence on its participation in the Divine nature (ST II-II, q.2, a.3, ad.1). 
290 See Commentary on Hebrews, Prologue. “For these three things are found in the body of the Church, 
just as they are found in the natural body, namely, the mystical body itself, its chief members, namely, 
prelates and rulers, and the head, namely, Christ, from Whom life flows to all the members.” 
291 Healy, 2008; p.536. 
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precept of justice.  Indeed, the very “essence of justice,” says Aquinas “requires debt.”292  At the 
same time, he notes that the kind of debt required of gratitude is not the same kind of debt 
required of justice—they both involve a different notion of justice.293 
The kind of debt associated with the virtue of gratitude carries within it the sense of 
indebtedness to a benefactor—chief among whom is God, who is the benefactor par excellence: 
“Now the cause of debt is found primarily and chiefly in God, in that He is the first principle of 
all our goods.”294  Typically speaking however, gratitude is that virtue which pertains to the debt 
owed to a benefactor who has shown us special favours. 
In equating gratitude with the obligation of debt (“a debt of gratitude is a moral debt 
required by virtue” ST II-II, q.107, a.1) Aquinas may make us somewhat uncomfortable!  
Shouldn’t gratitude be a spontaneous outpouring of free and loving thanks, if it is to have any 
meaning?  Isn’t the idea of ‘debt’ coercive upon the agent, to the extent that it nullifies any 
sense of freedom in a genuine act of gratitude which is the seed of friendship? The coupling of 
gratitude with obligation not only seems to eliminate the possibility of genuine gratitude, but 
furthermore eliminates the very notion of ‘gift’ by extension.    ‘Obligatory’ and ‘indebted’ 
gratitude seems to justify these concerns and trap us in an apparent paradox: we may have a 
clear and distinct notion of what a free, genuine gratitude should be; but any authentic 
expressions of it seem to evade the possibility of it in reality. 
 Our difficulty with the language of debt may arise from reading into the ‘debt of 
gratitude’ a legalistic notion of debt.  It is, perhaps, a feature of post-modernity that we struggle 
to understand the distinction between moral and juridical indebtedness in general.  Aquinas 
makes the distinction between a legal debt (debitum legale) and a moral debt (the debitum 
morale) explicit.295  It is the latter kind, the moral debt, which corresponds to the virtues of 
gratitude and friendship, while the virtue of justice more properly speaking pertains to the 
                                                          
292 De Veritate, q.23, a.6, ad.3: ratio iustitiae debitum requirit. 
293 See ST II-II, q.106, a.5, ad.2 
294 ST II-II, q.106, a.1 
295 ST II-II, q.106, a.1, ad.2, and q.106, a.4, ad.1.  A third kind of debt Aquinas speaks of is the “debt of 
Punishment”, which I explore further on in this chapter. 
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notion of legal debt.296  The moral debt of gratitude must not be confused with the notion of debt 
in the positive legal sense.  The moral debt of friendship is nothing less than the rational agent’s 
awareness of what natural law requires, namely, that one ought to seek the good and avoid evil, 
and that one should honour one’s parents and repay kindness with gratitude.  The highest good 
that one can seek and attain is the goodness of love itself.  The debitum morale is the 
recognition of love as the highest good possible to the creature; it is a debt of participation in the 
eternal law and as such cannot be simply equated with positive law since its expression is 
primarily an expression of friendship. 
As stated above, debt is twofold. One is legal debt, to pay which man 
is compelled by law; and thus man owes honour and worship to those 
persons in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other is 
moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty.297 
 
Debt, as Aquinas uses the term in this sense related to the execution of moral virtue, is 
not simply a question of a legal due but more completely of the right ordering of operations 
towards a proper or due end.  It is the natural, originary anticipation of the good.  The character 
of that end is the relationship of the human person with God.  Debt is thus an object of inner 
reflection.  It is an act of reason in conformity to the dictates of justice broadly speaking, and 
the requirements of friendship more specifically.  Since all inter-personal relationships fall in 
some way under the notion of justice, all of them fall under the notion of debt.298   
Justice in this context is thus concerned with the execution of the debitum morale, the 
moral debt of friendship.  There is also a sense in which natural justice pertains to the debitum 
legale in matters of positive law.  Aquinas deals with this kind of debt specifically in a letter to 
James of Viterbo on ‘Credit Sales and Usury’ (De Emptione et Venditione ad Tempus), which 
he wrote in 1262.  It is clear from this letter and what Aquinas says about debt in the Summa 
                                                          
296 See ST II-II, q.106, a.5: “The repayment of a favour may belong to three virtues, namely, justice, 
gratitude and friendship. It belongs to justice when the repayment has the character of a legal debt, as 
in a loan and the like: and in such cases repayment must be made according to the quantity received.  
On the other hand, repayment of a favour belongs, though in different ways, to friendship and likewise 
to the virtue of gratitude when it has the character of a moral debt.” 
297 ST II-II, q.102, a.2, ad.2: duplex est debitum. Unum quidem legale, ad quod reddendum homo lege 
compellitur. Et sic debet homo honorem et cultum his qui sunt in dignitate constituti praelationem super 
ipsum habentes. Aliud autem est debitum morale, quod ex quadam honestate debetur. 
298 ST I-II, q.60, a.3 
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and elsewhere, that he distinguishes the kind of debt demanded by positive law from the moral 
debt which pertains to those virtues which fall under the umbrella of justice and the requisites of 
the Divine and natural law (ST II-II, q.102, a.2, ad.2).  Debt is thus an analogous term. 
 It is important to note too that the moral debt of friendship, as it refers to the virtue of 
justice and its parts, including gratitude, is not simply something that is imposed on the agent 
from without.  The debitum is demanded by natural law which is properly speaking ordered by 
reason; the natural law is not simply as a ‘reading off’ the order of nature (ordo naturalis) as 
Rhonheimer has shown.  The human agent has a natural inclination to the due act or the actus 
debitus; in other words, the human agent has a natural, rational, inclination to do what is a 
positive good: ‘ad debitum actum et finem’ (ST I-II, q.91, a.2).  This natural inclination to what 
is due is nothing less than reason’s participation in the eternal law which inclines us to the good.  
Thus, on one significant level, the moral debt of friendship can be considered to be an 
inclination to those acts by which an agent participates in the eternal law, through the exercise 
of the natural law according to the order of reason.   
Thus, the notion of debt as it is derived from the moral debt in no way eliminates or 
coerces the individual to act against freedom or against conscience; rather, the moral debt is 
precisely a free act in conformity with the agent’s conscience in pursuit of the good: “through 
the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done” (ST I, q.79, a.13).  In other 
words, the notion of debt (debitum morale) simply refers to a natural inclination to the good. 
 Freedom is only called in question, and the moral debt becomes confused or conflated 
with the legal debt, as something coercive and imposed on reason in opposition to what the 
agent may otherwise wish, only when one conceives of the natural law itself as something 
imposed by nature, or ‘read off’ nature, rather than being the ordering of the natural reason 
(ordinatio rationis naturalis).  The result will be to take the legal debt as being co-extensive 
with the moral debt of friendship, or the debt of nature, as some interpreters of Aquinas have 
done.299  Aquinas, following Seneca—whom he cites more than fifty times and mostly in 
                                                          
299 For example, see John R. Lee, Is ‘Social Justice’ Justice? A Thomistic Argument for ‘Social Persons’ as 
the Proper Subjects of the Virtue of Social Justice. Baylor University. Jan 2009. p.139 .  Once can 
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reference to gratitude—clearly rejects any notion of the moral debt being something that might 
be considered part of an economic or legal exchange.  One can see why Seneca’s De Beneficiis 
is an important source for Aquinas in this respect.  Likewise for Seneca, the debt of gratitude is 
equivalent to a desire for the good—a desire for friendship.  Seneca’s notion of debt in reference 
to friendship is equivalent to the natural dictate of friendship—through which we enter into an 
intimacy with another person: “Think for a long time whether or not you should admit a given 
person to your friendship,” the Stoic writes; “But when you have decided to do so, welcome 
him heart and soul, and speak as unreservedly with him as you would with yourself.”300 
Understanding the nature of the debitum is a strong indication that Rhoneheimer is on 
the right path in his understanding of the nature of the natural law: the natural law is not 
something superadded to reason; natural law is rather the right ordering of reason to the good 
which by nature it always seeks and desires. The debitum morale is a judgement of natural law 
pertaining to what response is necessitated according to the dictates of reason in accordance 
with justice.  The natural law is the recognition of, and impetus toward satisfying, the moral 
debt. 
It is especially difficult to reconcile the notion of freedom and love with gratitude if one 
interprets Aquinas’ use of the term ‘debt’ in a positivist or physicalist way according to the 
“methodic naturalism”.301  According to such a physicalist view, the debitum morale would be 
convertible with the debitum legale.  We see this in treatments of gratitude which reduce it to 
the arena of the psychological, as discussed earlier.  When it is understood as a reaction to 
external expectations (such as Mauss describes), or deterministically according to psychological 
or cultural conditioning, gratitude loses its character as a genuinely free and loving response to 
an invitation to friendship. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
understand why some interpreters like Lee have taken this approach given that the matter of an 
acquired virtuous act may indeed be co-extensive with the matter of an infused virtuous act; however, 
there is no co-extension of form between an act of acquired virtue and an act of infused virtue.   
300 See Letter III, Seneca, Lucius Annaeus., trans. Robin Campbell. Letters from a Stoic: Epistulae morales 
ad Lucilium. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969. 
301 Rhonheimer 2000, p.xvii 
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But Aquinas tells us that something exterior cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously.  
Only an external law can coerce another to act in way in which he might not otherwise choose.  
But the debitum morale would have no efficacy if it were imposed from without. 302  It must, at 
some level, be a free act if it is to be efficacious and open to the infusion of grace.  In this sense, 
we might say that the debitum morale is self-imposed or rather “self-explicative”.303 
 For Aquinas, to be coerced means to be compelled to do something in reference to one’s 
natural activities.  The loss of freedom to enact the debitum morale however is equivalent to 
falling into sin through choosing; it is a choice, leading to the loss of freedom from sin and the 
loss of happiness (ST I, q.83, a.2, ad.3).  There can be no genuine gratitude where there is an 
experience of coercion or obligation that contradicts conscience or the impetus of the heart.  
There can be no gratitude where the debitum morale is supplanted by a debitum legale. 
Reason does not coerce us in spite of reason’s dictates; reason is, rather the free and 
proper expression of self—what Rhonheimer has in mind by the term self-explication.304  It is 
not possible to reconcile the notion of the debitum morale in Aquinas with any sense of a 
coerced positive or external rule.  The inner moral debt is nothing other than a debt of friendship 
which is an understanding of self in relationship to the Divine.  It flows from the free choice of 
love of one person for another—of the creature for God.  For this reason, Aquinas equates the 
“debt of gratitude” with the “debt of love”: gratitude flows freely and naturally from the desire 
to love another.305  Thus, we should understand the moral debt as a kind of natural exigency by 
which the agent is moved by the desire for the good and, by extension, for God.  The debitum 
morale is nothing else than the awareness that I am incomplete, and that this invitation to 
                                                          
302 Cf. ST I-II, q.90, a.3, ad.2. 
303 Rhonheimer 2000, p.277: “On the other hand, if one considers the natural law formally, as an 
ordinatio rationis, as an ordering act of the practical reason, a law formulated and constituted through 
the practical reason, and if the practical reason in this sense is itself understood to be a legislator, then 
there would be no contradiction in finding an inner dynamic of self-explication in such a law, a dynamic 
characterised by a structure of inventive explication of particular principles implicitly contained in other 
principles.” 
304 This is a theme which is taken up at considerable length in Pope John Paul II’s work, The Acting 
Person.   
305 ST II-II, q.107, a.1, ad.3: …debitum gratitudinis ex debito amoris derivatur, a quo nullus debet velle 
absolvi. Unde quod aliquis invitus hoc debitum debeat, videtur provenire ex defectu amoris ad eum qui 
beneficium dedit. 
161 
 
friendship awakens in me a longing for wholeness and harmony, and which bears within it the 
promise of the fulfilment of that desire. 
 In modern, popular use, the word ‘obligation’ often carries with it a sense of an “ought” 
in opposition to freedom, a corrective of the will and a constraint upon reason.  This opposition 
is brought about by external pressure, either through positive law or external circumstances, 
often evoked by a sense of guilt.  ‘Obligation’ in this sense is considered synonymous with 
‘onus’, which means ‘load’ or ‘burden.’  But this contemporary use is not the sense in which 
Aquinas uses the term in reference to the debt of gratitude or virtue in general.  Nor, 
furthermore, is it the sense in which the word was understood in medieval and renaissance 
moral philosophy in general. The obligation of debt, of the debitum morale, is an inner light of 
reason at the impetus of natural law.  E. Catherine Dunn has shown that in medieval and 
renaissance Europe the obligation associated with gratitude was understood as an inner guiding 
principle of natural reason—an inclination to the good. The ungrateful man distorts his own 
nature, because he violates this “elementary obligation” which guides human relations 
constituted by reason.  This obligatio gratitudinis was not seen as being an onus imposed from 
external sources, but from considering oneself in the context of inter-human relations.  
Ingratitude, simply stated, was understood to be the failure to love. 306 
That this is certainly the case for Aquinas—that is, that the debitum morale is nothing 
less than the natural inclination to the good—can further be deduced from two essential 
premises that underscore his treatment of the virtues of justice and gratitude: firstly, that the 
principle of human action (actus humanus) is the free will and such acts are more perfect when 
they flow from charity (ST I-II, q.24, a.3, ad.1); secondly, that the debitum demanded of 
gratitude likewise flows from charity (“ex carite derivatur”: ST II-II q.106, a.6, ad 2).  Thus, 
the form of the debitum morale is love, which is the subject of virtuous acts, freely chosen.  It is 
in this context that the obligations motivating gratitude and acts of justice in general must be 
considered.  We might say that the debitum morale is the awakening of charity in the human 
                                                          
306 See Dunn, E. Catherine. The Concept of Ingratitude in Renaissance English Moral Philosophy: a 
dissertation. Reprint. Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1946.  
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heart.  It provides an impetus for action, since the human person by nature desires—and can 
only desire—the good. 
 This will help explain why, in his references to the actus debitum or the act due 
according to virtue (i.e., an act following upon reason’s understanding of the debitum morale), 
Aquinas uses this particular noun phrase almost exclusively in reference to that which is 
omitted, the sin of negligence.307  He seems to be suggesting in these pairings of the actus 
debitum with sins of omission that the debitum morale is reason’s witness to what ought to be 
done according to charity’s dictate which has not yet been done, but which reason recognises as 
that which should be done for the sake of relationships.  To ignore the debitum morale is to sin 
against charity—the failure to seek what is directed by the will and commanded by reason.308  
The debt we are placed under through sin and the failure to love is the inverse of the debt which 
elicits a loving response to grace. 
 Someone who is in the clutches of sin has lost the sense of indebtedness which urges us 
on to moral perfection.  There is, in the moral debt, a kind of natural anamnesis309, which 
inclines us towards the good, which relates to the end as its proper object.  The moral ‘debt’ is 
thus on the one hand equated with a rejection of the sinful disposition and on the other, the 
invitation to “Be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect” (Matthew 5:48).   
In commenting on these words of Christ exhorting us to perfection in the Gospel of 
Matthew, Aquinas draws the distinction between the acquired or “human virtues” and the 
                                                          
307 See for example, ST II-II 54.1.ad3; De Malo 2.1.7; Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 42 q. 2 a. 2 qc. 3 ad 2, and 
Super Sent., lib. 2 d. 35 q. 1 a. 3 co. 
308 ST I-II, q.77, a.1. 
309 Aquinas notes—in a discussion on the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law (ST I-II, q.101, a.3)—that 
the ceremonial precepts were intended by God to recall his people from idolatry and the worship of 
idols to the worship of God.  The law is a teacher; and through the law of ceremonial precepts, the 
Chosen People were taught to worship God, by calling to mind his Providence and saving work in history 
through occupying their time with worship according to law.  Throughout his treatment of the virtues of 
indebtedness, we find repeated reference to the role of memory in recalling us to the propinquity of 
God through Jesus Christ.  Memory continues to be elicited by both law and custom, which serve to 
provide the impetus for worship.  For example, memory preserves within us the memory of the 
immense gift of Christ’s passion (De Rationibus Fidei, c.8) given to us in the Eucharist.  Memory, 
furthermore, as we are told in the Commentary on Colossians, also serves to remind us of our sinfulness, 
which acts as a bond upon us, which Christ himself removes through the Church and the sacraments.  
See Commentary on Colossians, c.2, a.2.  Indeed, Christ’s saving work was such that it abolished the 
memory of this bond. 
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“exemplar virtues” as they are derived from the eternal law.  The path of perfection is thus the 
transition from the human virtues towards “divine similitude” by way of what he calls 
“perfecting virtues” (virtutes purgatoriae).310  These perfecting virtues, which bear the character 
of the infused virtues, are the bridge by which we pass from potential to actual Divine 
Similitude, for “everything is called good by reason of the Divine goodness belonging to it, 
which formally is its own goodness” (ST I, q.6, a.4).  It is this movement, this flow from 
potency to actuality, from the absence of love to the reality of love, which is captured in the 
richness of the word ‘debt’ as Aquinas uses it, borrowing the theme from Dionysius. The moral 
debt is thus a dynamic relationship, a calling forth of the human agent from one inactive state to 
the active, loving state. 
Given this reading of the meaning of the moral debt in the Summa, the objection could 
be raised that, since we are called always and everywhere to love that it would seem to follow 
that the debitum morale can never be satiated.  It would essentially be an endless debt, since 
perfection can never be achieved in this life and love never surpasses its object: one can never 
fully grasp the good, since “all things in desiring perfection, desire God himself.”311 
In fact, Aquinas suggests precisely this when he considers the nature of the debitum 
morale in reference to the gratitude elicited by friendship: “The debt of gratitude flows from 
charity, which the more it is paid the more it is due, according to Romans 13:8, ‘Owe no man 
anything, but to love one another.’ And so it is not unreasonable if the obligation of gratitude 
has no limit.”312 In contrast, the debitum legale is not—cannot be—limitless as this would 
contravene the very notion of commutative justice which, not only regulates the exchange of 
gifts, also regulates the giving of punishments; such justice of its nature demands an equality or 
balance of punishment and reward commensurate with demerits and merits.313  The limits of 
legal justice can be seen, for example, in Aquinas’ defence of a ten day limit placed on a legal 
appeal.  Such a temporal limit on justice is necessary since without it, legal justice would 
                                                          
310 ST I-II, q.61, a.5 
311 ST I, q.6, a.1 
312 ST II-II, q.106, a.6, ad.2 
313 See for example, ST I, q.65, a.2, ad.3 
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“forever be suspended” and thereby no justice would be done at all.314 On the other hand, there 
is no time limit on the moral debt of gratitude or friendship since to satisfy such a debt would be 
to bring an end to what is demanded by the debt—namely love in friendship.   
 
4.8.2 Debt of Punishment 
 
 It should also be noted here that Aquinas also speaks of a third kind of debt—the debt 
of punishment (debitum poenae).  The debitum poenae is the flipside, so to speak, of the 
debitum morale.  Question eighty seven of the first of the second part contains eight articles 
dealing with the debt of punishment.  Indeed, the term debitum poenae appears in many of his 
works in which he touches on the notion of debt.315  In the article he deals with the nature of 
punishment as it occurs naturally according to the order of reason and as it occurs according to 
positive justice.  The former case arises from a “disturbance in the order of nature” in which 
situation, the “debt of punishment remains for as long as the disturbance remains” (ST I-II, q.87, 
a.3).  The latter case arises from the just indictment of either the Divine Judge or a temporal 
judge by way of participation in the eternal law.  In consideration of these two uses, two things 
should be noted about Aquinas’ treatment of the notion of debt in reference to justice. 
 First, it is clear from a comparison of the way in which the notion of debt is applied in 
these various passages that Aquinas considers the human person by nature to be in a state of 
indebtedness.  The human person is oriented towards either fulfilment in friendship or 
damnation through rejection of friendship.  Both states involve a kind of indebtedness, and so it 
is proper to say of the notion of person in general that it essentially includes indebtedness.  
There is a tension, so to speak, between the appetite for the good, and the inclination toward 
evil.  Aquinas treats of this tension between being and nothingness in several places, for 
example in his treatment on the virtue of humility (ST II-II, q.161, a.1). 
                                                          
314 ST II-II, q.69, a.3, ad.3 
315 See for example, Commentary on Hebrews, I.I.40; Commentary on Job, 20.2; and Commentary on 
Corinthians, 1.3.28. 
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In question eighty seven, Aquinas distinguishes between three kinds of debt associated 
with a corresponding due punishment: that punishment which is incurred by the agent himself, 
through the remonstrations of his own conscience and reason; that which is inflicted by 
someone in authority, such as a judge; and that which is inflicted by God, as Just Judge of all 
humanity (ST I-II, q.87, a.1).   
 Secondly, the rejection of friendship necessitates the debitum poenae.  There is no 
middle ground: either we accept the friendship of God through responding to the debitum 
morale, or we subject ourselves to the consequences of failing to fulfil the debt.  Aquinas’ 
preferred expression for the debt of punishment is reatus poenae.  Reatus, unlike debitum, 
implies not simply guilt (for which he typically uses culpa), but more specifically a liability 
according to which repayment is due or owed as a result of sin or a crime (reatus culpae), and 
the necessity or just demand to undergo punishment as a result of such a sin or crime (reatus 
poenae).  It is a penalty due according to the dictate of God’s eternal justice. Thus the reatus 
poenae is a debt of the order of the debitum legale, and not of the order of the debitum morale—
the debt of friendship and love. 
This shift in emphasis and shift in language in no way contradicts what has been said 
about the nature of the moral debt and its intrinsic link to the proper notion of love and 
friendship.  By it, Aquinas expresses the reality that human actions and inclinations, including 
those urged by the moral debt, carry objective consequences to be meted out in the final 
judgement.   
Given the reality of original sin, all of us find ourselves condemned by the loss of 
original justice.  But God’s grace transforms the debitum poenae into the positive debitum 
morale.  In this way, Aquinas is able to speak of the “debt of human nature” (reatu naturae 
humanae; see De Veritate q.29, a.7, ad.6) which alone is overcome by the grace of friendship 
with Christ.  Thus the notion of debt thus seems to place the human agent at a junction between 
love and the absence of love—namely sin, or between the possibility of friendship with God 
through Christ, or friendlessness.  As such, the moral debt is nothing less than the Divine 
Command to strive for the perfection that is constituted in friendship—and to turn away from 
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sin and to do good.  This is what Aquinas means by the quasi-integral part of justice (which he 
outlines in question seventy nine in the treatise on justice) which is to avoid evil and to do good 
(declinare a malo et facere bonum).  The debitum that virtue urges within us is at once inclined 
both to the avoidance of sin and the exigency of charity as it is directed by the will and 
commanded by reason.  “Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind not subject to 
God, may be called injustice, as being contrary to the aforesaid justice, according to 1 Jn. 3:4: 
‘Whoever commits sin, also commits iniquity; and sin is iniquity.’ And thus the removal of any 
sin is called the justification of the ungodly” (ST I-II q.113, a.1, ad.1).  The moral debt, when it 
is not answered, is the essence of sin; when its resolution is sought, it is the essence of 
friendship.   
The moral debt is, in the true sense of the word, a moment of ‘crisis,’ a turning point.  It 
is the moment in which the human person realises that he stands before life and death, between 
love and sin, between friendship with God and alienation from God.  The human person stands 
on the edge of an abyss so to speak between everything and nothing; the possession of Christ is 
everything; the abandonment of Christ is to choose nothingness.  There is no intermediary state, 
no neutral ground in this respect: “the whole human race is indebted by sin” says Aquinas; but it 
is precisely this ability to sin on the one hand, that makes the debt of friendship possible.316 
In brief, we can say that Aquinas’ notion of the moral debt differs significantly from the 
notion of a legal debt in that the latter corresponds to a due which can be measured while the 
former kind, the moral debt, corresponds to gratitude: the awareness or an inner reflection on 
the potential for friendship which cannot be measured: “God is the cause of our loving God; the 
measure is to love Him without measure.”317  The debt, consequently, of which Aquinas speaks, 
is not simply something ‘owed’ to it on account of its own nature, but rather a capacity for love 
which is, in a certain sense, limitless.  Thus, when speaking of the moral debt of friendship, and 
by extension the debt of nature, Aquinas is not simply speaking of something to which the 
created nature can lay claim or demand, but rather something which opens up the horizons of 
                                                          
316 See De Veritate, q.24, a.7: On Free Choice. 
317 ST II-II, q.27, a.6.  Here, Aquinas is quoting the De Diligendo Deo of St Bernard: quod causa diligendi 
Deum Deus est; modus, sine modo diligere. 
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human existence to the experience of divine love in the context of friendship.  It is because 
divine love is limitless that the debt of friendship is itself limitless.  Unlike a legal debt, the 
moral debt of friendship involves a certain “spontaneous gratuity”, just as love involves a 
spontaneous movement of the lover towards the loved.  Such is the nature of friendship and 
thankfulness.318  
 Finally, the debitum morale is also the cause of true joy in us—which cannot be said of 
any other kind of debt.  The person alive to the moral debt of love is a person enlivened by joy.  
For this reason, Aquinas notes that “joy is the matter of the action of thanksgiving” (gaudium 
est materia gratiarum actionis).319 Not only does the debitum morale associated with the virtues 
of indebtedness and gratitude not place a burden of legal debt on us, it opens us up to the 
fullness of nature, to joy and happiness.  It is this joyfulness which awakens the debt of love in 
us, and makes us want to satisfy it.  For this reason, Aquinas says of Philemon that he is 
indebted to Paul, “not of necessity, but of will.”320 And it is the characteristic of friendship that 
friends will the same thing.321  The debitum morale does not therefore override the desire of the 
recipient of gifts, but fulfils it. 
 
4.8.3 The Debt of Love & Friendship 
 
 Aquinas repeatedly insists that the very essence of love is friendship (for example in ST 
I-II, q.65, a.5; and In III Sent, d.27, q.2, a.4).  What this means ultimately is that the unity of all 
the virtues is friendship properly speaking (he rejects any meaningful application of the word 
‘friendship’ to relationships of mere pleasure and utility; neither of these could be ‘infused’ in 
other words) which has love (caritas) as its proper form.  In this, he is developing a line of 
thought inherited from Dionysius and Richard of St Victor which held a prominent and lively 
place of discussion among the Scholastics, thanks mainly to the question posed by Peter 
                                                          
318 See ST I-II, q.69, a.3 and ST II-II, q.25, a.2 
319 Commentary on Job, 1:4. 
320 Commentary on Philemon, 1-1:2. 
321 Contra Gentiles, II:95.5. 
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Lombard, “What is charity?”  According to Liz Carmichael, Aquinas in fact goes even further 
than this and equates friendship (amicitia) with caritas—a move which distances his view of 
friendship from that of Aristotle and goes beyond the claims of any other Scholastic, including 
Peter Abelard, Albert and Bonaventure.322 
Peter Abelard (d.1142), writing around the same time as the Master of the Sentences, 
was among the first to examine the intrinsic and causal relationship between love and friendship 
in his Theologia Scholarium.  Although Aquinas does not directly cite Abelard as an authority 
on the matter, he echoes much of what Abelard has to say on the topic.  As was common among 
the Schoolmen, Aquinas included, Abelard is already relying heavily on Cicero for his starting 
point on this question (1.4) though in typical Scholastic fashion he understands the paradigm of 
friendship as being union with God and by extension with others for the sake of this friendship 
with God.  This is right love (amor honestas) and it has as its object “a good will towards 
another for his own sake.”323  Thus friendship is a sign of the right-ordering of the will towards 
others and God.  Abelard defines friendship (amicitia) not as a particular act of the will but 
rather the disposition to all those acts which can be considered ‘friendly’.  Thus Abelard has 
already begun to understand friendship as both a something related to virtue but also as 
something which unifies and orders the virtues to their proper end, namely love of the other.  
With this Dionysian insight, Abelard sets what is to become a recurring theme in later 
Scholastic treatments of friendship.   
Similarly, when we get to Aquinas, we find this same understanding that friendship is 
not a virtue in itself, but is in fact the consequence or the effect of virtue.324  In other words, 
virtue exists for the purpose of friendship; it is what enables the person to be a friend to another 
with that friendship which is based on love and concern for the other, and not simply with quasi 
friendships based on utility and pleasure.  Only the virtuous person can be a friend in the true 
                                                          
322 Carmichael, Liz. Friendship: interpreting Christian love. London: T & T Clark International, 2004. p103 
323 See Marenbon, John. The philosophy of Peter Abelard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
p288. 
324 ST II-II, q.23, a.3, ad.1.  Unde amicitia virtuosa magis est aliquid consequens ad virtutes quam sit 
virtus. Nec est simile de caritate, quae non fundatur principaliter super virtute humana, sed super 
bonitate divina. 
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sense of the word: the person with the acquired virtues can be a true friend to his fellow human 
beings in the world at large; and by extension, only the person with the infused virtues can 
enjoy that ultimate friendship: friendship with God.  Both cases involve love. 
Aquinas frequently expresses the notion of friendship in keeping with his doctrine of 
indebtedness; debt and the obligations of one friend to another arise from the debt of friendship 
(ex debito amicitiae).325  It is important to note here that for Aquinas friendship is both aligned 
to the cardinal virtue of justice and surpasses it.  Formally speaking, acts of friendship bear a 
resemblance to justice, which is the repayment of a debt (debitum morale).  There is at the same 
time a certain indebtedness which accompanies friendship, and in this respect, friendship is a 
kind of justice.  But at the same time, Aquinas uses the term ‘debt of friendship’ as a response to 
“gratuitous favour”.326 Thus a debt may be compelled by a binding rule established by law or 
contract; but it also describes the sense of obligation brought about by the inner promptings of 
conscience, desire or attraction.  All of these senses of the word debt however are unified, along 
with justice itself, under the aspect of the right ordering of parts to their whole or acts to their 
ends. 
In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigency or necessity 
of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be 
considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is directed to 
another, as the parts of the whole, accident to substance, and all things 
whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are 
ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations debt may be regarded in 
two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God 
pays what is due. It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in 
creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His 
goodness.327 
 
Thus it is not surprising to find that Aquinas uses the terms debt and debtor to describe 
incipient friendship, since it is a primary dictate of reason that one should return kindness to 
those who have shown kindness.328   
 
                                                          
325 See for example ST II-II, q.78, a.2, ad.2. 
326 See ST II-II, q.23, a.3, ad.1 and ST II-II, q.78, a.2, ad.2. 
327 ST I, q.21, a.1, ad.3 
328 ST I-II, q.100, a.7, ad1: Inest autem primo dictamen rationis quod homo debitor est beneficii vel 
obsequii exhibendi illis a quibus beneficia accepit, si nondum recompensavit.  
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4.9 Gratitude & Natural Law 
 
 While commutative justice typically concerns a legal debt, the virtues of indebtedness 
are concerned with the moral debt, which is rooted in natural law.  Aquinas holds, along with 
Cicero from whom he derives his list of virtues of indebtedness, that these virtues are derived 
from certain innate principles and not simply from custom.  Gratitude itself is a precept of the 
natural law.   
Much of the contemporary debate about Aquinas’ natural law theory attempts to find 
the origin of natural law in the decision making process of the individual.  On the one hand, 
referring to the experience of the individual can be a legitimate methodology as a means of 
confirming certain judgements, but individuals or singulars cannot be the subject of definition 
as we have seen.  A problem arises then when natural law is considered in purely individualistic 
terms, isolated from what pertains to natural law in general, which includes those relational 
considerations required to understand the virtues.  Natural law and the virtues are closely linked; 
natural law is not itself a habit, but the virtues render the precepts of the natural law habitual.329   
The natural law, according to Aquinas, is properly basic to human reason; it should not 
be understood to mean that the human person is endowed by nature with a set of innate 
instructions that dictate the matter of each and every moral action, as though an individual can 
figure out what needs to be done in a given situation simply by reflecting on these innate 
principles within him. Aquinas is quite clear rather that the essence of law consists in a work of 
reason.330 
Cicero and Seneca both hold gratitude to be a matter of natural law: one has a moral 
obligation to repay favours and gifts, according to the dictate of reason.  When Aquinas picks 
up this theme, he will apply it to all the related virtues of indebtedness, along with gratitude.  
                                                          
329 See ST I-II, q.94, a.2 
330 ST I-II, q.90, a.1: Respondeo dicendum quod lex quaedam regula est et mensura actuum, secundum 
quam inducitur aliquis ad agendum, vel ab agendo retrahitur, dicitur enim lex a ligando, quia obligat ad 
agendum. Regula autem et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio, quae est primum principium actuum 
humanorum, ut ex praedictis patet, rationis enim est ordinare ad finem, qui est primum principium in 
agendis, secundum philosophum. In unoquoque autem genere id quod est principium, est mensura et 
regula illius generis, sicut unitas in genere numeri, et motus primus in genere motuum. Unde relinquitur 
quod lex sit aliquid pertinens ad rationem. 
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For example, the Commandment to ‘honour your father and mother’, which falls under the 
virtue of piety, is a prescript of the natural law (Commentary on Colossians, 3-4:174), as is 
offering thanksgiving by way of prayer and sacrifice under the virtue of religion (ST II-II, 85, 
a.1).  Already there is, in Aquinas’ identification of the virtues of indebtedness with the natural 
law, a move towards placing the natural law within the context of inter-personal relationships. 
Natural law, which governs our moral acts, is, by its very nature, ordered toward the 
good. It is the very nature of human reason to seek the good; all human inclinations are ordered 
towards the good and away from what is perceived to be evil.  It is therefore the very nature of 
reason to fulfil the first precept of natural law: to seek the good and to avoid evil.  Any sense of 
reason being “commanded”, therefore, cannot be understood as an extrinsic command imposing 
itself on the reason and will, from some principle or law outside of itself; this “command” of 
natural law is simply the exigency with which reason naturally operates by its own nature: 
“reason rules and commands the other powers [of the rational animal], so all the natural 
inclinations belonging to the other powers must needs be directed according to reason.”331  
Hence the “natural” aspect of natural law refers to the nature of human practical reason itself 
and its own inner life.  Otherwise, it could not be the basis of virtue, since no external force or 
compulsion can bring about virtue in a person.332   
At the same time, this does not mean that practical reason is detached from, or “other” 
than, nature; such a view—that human reason looks at nature as if from a neutral standpoint 
(what Thomas Nagel famously called the “View from Nowhere”)—would simply return us to 
an individualistic understanding of natural law.  Rather, human reason is part and parcel of the 
order of creation; the human person derives an understanding of self and other precisely because 
of his experience of nature from within nature and as a part of nature; to use an expression of 
Luigi Giussani, “Man is that level of nature where nature itself becomes conscious of itself, that 
level of reality where reality…begins to become reason.”333  Whatever the dictates of gratitude 
are therefore, they have been planted in us by the Creator.  Already, in the moment of creation, 
                                                          
331 ST I-II, q.94, a.4, ad.3 
332 ST I-II, q.90, a.3, ad.2 
333 Giussani, Luigi. The religious sense. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1997, p.25 
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the impetus towards friendship with God through gratitude is inchoate within us in the natural 
law. 
The order of reason is not independent of the order of creation, because it seeks God 
through the mediated world of created goods and all of creation provides evidence of the reality 
of God.334  Or, according to Dionysius, “The human mind has a capacity to think, through which 
it looks on conceptual things, and a unity which transcends the nature of the mind, through 
which it is joined to things beyond itself.”335  That Aquinas held this understanding of the 
identity of the natural law with the work of practical reason seems clearly evinced in question 
ninety four and elsewhere in his work. 
The first precept of the natural law—to do good and avoid evil—is thus the first 
principle of practical reason itself: “whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man’s 
good belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.”336  This 
precept therefore is not something that reason discovers “out there” in the world; it is the 
intrinsic principle itself by which reason operates.   
It is precisely the essence of law to direct action to a proper or due end; and therefore 
this is also the task of practical reason.337  This is the second basic precept of the natural law, 
namely that mutable goods (which is all created goods that are not identified with Dionysius’ 
One Good) be not chosen as ends in themselves.  The pursuit of mutable good entails such 
things as cultivating friends purely for the purpose of utility or pleasure.   
Hence the work of natural law, through the exercise of practical reason, is to direct 
moral action towards a due end and to avoid the inordinate choosing of mutable goods.  This is 
the basis for the precepts of the natural law and it is the end of all matters of practical reason: 
                                                          
334 This is the principle behind the so-called “cosmological argument” of Aquinas (ST I, q.2, a.3): The First 
Cause is known through its created effects.  Furthermore, creation is order towards reason because the 
very principle of nature is rational by virtue of the fact that it pre-exists in the Divine mind. 
335 The Divine Names, 865D. 
336 ST I-II, q.94, a.2: …omnia illa facienda vel vitanda pertineant ad praecepta legis naturae, quae ratio 
practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana. 
337 ST I-II, q.90, a.1 
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“this principle cannot be called into question, but must be presupposed in every [moral] 
enquiry.”338 
 
4.9.1 Consequentialist and essentialist readings of Natural Law 
 
Without wishing to oversimplify the often complex arguments which are used to defend 
various interpretations of Aquinas’ natural law theory, for the sake of discussion, many of them 
can be summarised as attempts in their own way to evaluate moral action of an individual—that 
is, the moral object—from either the point of view of the third person observer 
(consequentialism), or from an analysis of nature itself, or from an analysis of psychological 
processes which may or may not be taking place in the mind of the individual acting agent 
(essentialism).   
One often finds in many of these discussions about natural law and the debates between 
those arguing for consequentialist and essentialist concepts of natural law that a key challenge 
lies in trying to account for ways in which the specific objects of moral action (that is, 
intentional acts of the individual) can be measured against the general requirements of the 
natural law (whatever they may be understood to be).  How should I act gratefully in this given 
situation and in this particular time and place?  What does the natural law require of me in 
repaying this gift in these unique and nuanced set of circumstances?  What form should my 
prayer of praise take, and what duration and in what place?  One cannot answer these kinds of 
question simply by appealing to the natural law since the natural law itself is the principle that 
“good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided; all other precepts of the natural law 
are based upon this.”339  As a principle, the natural law does not tell us however what particular 
grateful act should be performed in a given circumstance; the natural law is not a list of 
proscribed and prescribed activities.  Aquinas tells us that the natural law functions as a 
principle of action furthermore, and it does not provide a list, or determinate content of each and 
                                                          
338 ST I-II, q.14, a.2 
339 ST I-II, q.94, a.2: Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, quod bonum est faciendum et 
prosequendum, et malum vitandum. Et super hoc fundantur omnia alia praecepta legis naturae….  
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every action of the agent: “the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason what the 
first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident 
principles.”340   
The natural law covers everyday practical actions, frequently subtle and complex ones: 
a beneficiary may wonder, for example, “What is the motivation for this gift?  How should I 
repay it?  When should I repay it?”  All of these considerations fall under the virtue of justice, 
which is rooted in natural law.  How then can natural law help me answer these kinds of 
questions? 
Consequentialists may seem at first to be better equipped for answering these subtle 
kinds of questions than the essentialist, since the consequentialist can point to the effects of 
choices we make; they may even support such observations with statistical evidence.  
Essentialists, on the other hand, typically struggle to provide an answer to these kinds of 
question, because an analysis of human nature or metaphysical principles (such as the nature of 
‘gifts’) will not really yield any clear directives that are not already somehow presupposing 
consequentialist methodology or circular reasoning.  An analysis of the nature of gifts, in other 
words, will not provide a beneficiary with the best course of action in dealing with the 
repayment of gifts as the virtue requires.  But the consequentialist view does not itself stand up 
to scrutiny for long either, since it ultimately forgets the first person experience in the process of 
evaluating moral actions from the third-person perspective.341  
Human agency can be incredibly complex, and often fraught with anxiety and limited 
intellectual visibility.  The explication of natural law by some commentators often seems to 
overlook the fact that human existence is a struggle and moral decision making can be laborious 
and not very clear; Aquinas is aware of this, and much of his Pauline commentaries addresses 
                                                          
340 ST I-II, q.94, a.2: praecepta legis naturae hoc modo se habent ad rationem practicam, sicut principia 
prima demonstrationum se habent ad rationem speculativam, utraque enim sunt quaedam principia per 
se nota. 
341 For a useful and thorough critique of these positions, see Rhonheimer, Martin, and William F. 
Murphy, ed. The perspective of the acting person: essays in the renewal of Thomistic moral philosophy. 
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the very real challenge of the Christian’s struggles—the kind we see in this rather plaintive cry 
of Teilhard de Chardin,  
If you knew the bitterness of giving in when one does not have the 
inner certitude that it is right to give in, and when one fears, in spite of 
everything, to be unfaithful to true courage and true renunciation!342 
 
One could imagine Aquinas empathising with this cry; we have seen how he recognises 
that we can have no certitude in laying claim to the possession of the infused, meritorious 
virtues.  And while we are always inclined to the good as apprehended, we are not always clear 
on the choices that circumstance place before us. 
 Defenders of the essentialist view will argue that the precepts of the natural law are 
contained within the nature of things and circumstances themselves, so that the natural law can 
be “read off” nature, or discovered through an analysis of the ways things are.  Such a view 
tends to undermine the whole concept of human freedom in respect to the law because moral 
actions are necessitated by what is thought to be an extrinsic or self-explicating law.  Reason is 
thus reduced to the level of an interpreter of, rather than a participant in, the divine law.   
That is not to say the alternative position holds us to the claim that we are free from 
objective standards, and free to make up ‘natural laws’ in our heads; rather that the natural law 
is the rectitude of reason; as such, it is also the origin of genuine freedom of agency because 
natural law enables us to evaluate an almost infinite number of possible actions, while at the 
same time remaining within the boundaries of rightly chosen proximate ends.343  But this ability 
to evaluate possible actions is limited precisely because the natural law is a principle of action 
and not a prescriber and proscriber of particular action; natural law only introduces us to true 
courses of action “to a certain extent” (ST I-II, q.93, a.1). 
There is good reason why Aquinas does not try to provide a “list of natural laws”, 
because there is no such list and none is possible.  Natural law—at least as far as Aquinas 
conceives of it—operates within the parameters of human freedom and choice-making.  It 
provides “principles” of action, such as “obey your parents”, “worship God” and “repay 
                                                          
342 Cited in Balthasar, Hans Urs von. The theology of Henri de Lubac: an overview. San Francisco: Ignatius 
Press, 1991, p.26 
343 See for example ST I-II, q.60, a.1, ad.3. 
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kindness shown to you.”  How these principles are to be expressed in particular acts will not be 
clear from a simple appeal to the principles of natural law.  For guidance on particular acts, we 
need a different kind of guide: one which will help us determine what specific acts should be 
done to fulfil the requirements of the natural law, and acts of gratitude and the virtues of 
indebtedness especially. 
 
4.9.2 Natural Law & Divine Law 
 
 What guides the natural law in respect to the virtues of indebtedness is the divine law.  
Indeed, one of the very first precepts of the natural law is that we should obey the divine law.  
The reason for this is that the supernatural end of the human agent transcends what he can 
achieve or work out on his own; thus he needs a law in addition to the natural law to know how 
he should act.344  Thus the natural law only pertains to what belongs properly to human nature.  
It cannot direct the human person to act according to the infused virtues, because—as we have 
seen—these are beyond the natural powers of the human agent.  And so when he says that 
natural law is at the root of virtue, Aquinas means that the natural law is at the root of virtue in a 
general sense, as in the case of the acquired virtues, inasmuch as all virtue is a question of the 
basic precept of justice to do good and avoid evil.345  But not all virtue is subject to the natural 
law, because some virtuous action requires what natural law could not reasonably work out on 
its own—for example, what action is consequent on the dictates of revelation, such as obtaining 
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root of all the virtues: that is the case when we understand virtue in general; but, he goes on to say, that 
it is not the case that the natural law is at the root of every virtue, because some virtuous acts (such as, 
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baptism, and other such works of the Church.  For this reason, we need another law in addition 
to the natural law: the divine law.   
 Throughout his corpus, Aquinas returns to the principle that the human person does not 
simply access the truths of God—such as those derived from the eternal law and divine law—
entirely on his own, but through the teaching authority of the Church and Scripture which 
contains the Decalogue, which help direct the human person toward the good.  Natural law is 
not purely autonomous as though self-directing independently of some context; if it were, there 
would be no sense in calling obedience a virtue, and much less a virtue of the natural law.346   
Rather, the natural law orders the rational creature not simply to act, but also to receive 
instruction in many circumstances as to how and when he should act.  The individual “could not 
suffice for himself in the matter of this training” required to achieve perfection through virtue; 
rather, the individual “needs to receive this training from another in order to arrive at the 
perfection of virtue” (ST I-II, q.95, a.1).  Simply being in possession of the natural law by virtue 
of nature is not sufficient to know what to do with it.  Natural law directs us to seek assistance; 
it identifies its own limitations. 
For the same reason says Aquinas, citing Cicero’s treatment of the virtues of 
indebtedness, we are bound by natural law to follow human law and due customs—including 
the customs of the Church.  Thus what is prescribed for the human person by the natural law is 
that he obey the “dictates of reason, which is a starting point of virtue.”347  Given that virtue 
includes gratitude, obedience, observance, piety, and religion, it stands to reason that natural law 
directs us to these things so as to receive instruction from them. And each of those virtues 
requires a certain submission to authority to custom and law.  In the case of gratitude, natural 
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his superiors in the execution of his vows.  Natural law does not stand above obedience to authority, but 
inclines the human person to legitimate authority, which one should obey. 
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law dictates that the repayment of gifts be directed to God.  And it is the virtue of religion which 
provides us the means of doing this.  Thus gratitude, as the initiation of friendship with God, 
directs us to the practice of religion.   
It is for this reason that Aquinas considers the precepts of religion to be a matter of the 
natural law, and that in particular, the offering of sacrifices falls under the natural law (ST II-II, 
q.85, a.1).  Consequently, all are bound to offer sacrifices of praise and thanksgiving to God, 
since all are bound by the precepts of the natural law (q. 85, a.4).  The natural law, which is so 
“inscribed in human reason”, directs us to thanksgiving.  Indeed, thanksgiving is one of the 
primary obligations of the natural law.  Consequently, gratitude, as a dictate of natural law, falls 
within an ecclesiological framework for Aquinas.  Natural law itself directs us to the worship of 
God through thanksgiving and praise; and this obligation only finds its fulfilment in the Church. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AQUINAS’ ECCLESIOLOGY 
 
5.1 The Virtuous Person in the Context of the Ecclesial ‘Communio’ 
 
We often tend to think of treatments of the virtues as being somehow concerned 
exclusively with the interests of the individual, disembodied from any overarching communio or 
ecclesiology.  This is equally true for many commentaries on virtue in the writings of Aquinas, 
which frequently consider virtues as detached from his broader picture of life within the mystery 
of that Christian communio.  Consequently, we may be inclined to think of gratitude as being 
nothing more than the individual’s personal response to a perceived personal gift, or the virtue 
of piety being nothing other than the personal obligation to one’s own parents.  But Aquinas 
holds that the plenitude of divine goodness cannot be transmitted to individuals as such.   
Since the divine goodness could not be adequately represented by one 
creature alone, on account of the distance that separates each creature 
from God, it had to be represented by many creatures, so that what is 
lacking to one might be supplied by another.348 
 
Of course, he goes on to say, not even an entire universe of creatures would be 
sufficient to perfectly represent the infinite divine goodness.  But the diversity of creatures is 
not simply a question of representing the divine goodness, but equally it is a question of 
Providence, and the way in which the divine goodness is diffused throughout creation: we assist 
one another in climbing to God in the diversity of our existence.  Such is the nature of virtue, 
that it not only perfects the virtuous person, but also perfects and helps others at the same time. 
While we may acknowledge that the virtues—most notably charity and justice—do 
indeed govern our personal relationships with others, these relationships are all too often 
conceived of in an individualistic way that ultimately treats of the ‘other’ as an abstract entity, 
while the focus remains on the actions of the individual isolated from an embracing and 
unifying community and ecclesial theology.  Aquinas’ treatise on the virtues however is only 
properly understood within a unifying ecclesiology and in particular a sacramental 
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quod deest ex uno, suppleretur ex alio. 
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ecclesiology.  The person cannot reach the perfection as an individual apart from perfection 
within the communion of saints or ecclesial community.  This is especially true of the virtue of 
gratitude which Aquinas ties not only to an understanding of the general notion of gift, but to 
the very essence of the person.  For Aquinas, the notion of person furthermore is only fully 
understood within the perfecting mission of Christianity itself, and more broadly, within an 
understanding of religion itself, which, Aquinas tells us, “is chief among the moral virtues.”349  
The virtuous individual is not virtuous on account of personal acts independent of the 
good of the community but precisely because of the Church community, which defines him and 
the very exercise of his virtue.350  The good of the person is the good of the community, and 
vice versa.  Aquinas’ vision of the Church surfaces in most of his scriptural commentaries, such 
as the Commentary on the Gospel of John, where the vision of the Church clearly places the 
spiritual life of the individual within the context of the Church community.  Being a member of 
the Church community brings with it an indebtedness to that community of faith, through the 
practice of all that the virtue of religion requires: “For one who professes a religion makes 
himself a debtor to all that pertains to the observances of that religion.”351 
In a nutshell then we could characterise Aquinas’ understanding of the virtues thus: 
there can be no real (infused) virtue without grace; and there can be no grace without Christ, 
who is manifested in the world through the mediation of the Church and the sacraments.352  The 
virtues of indebtedness in particular order the human person to this end.  While Aquinas does 
not doubt God’s ability to directly infuse virtue or grace into anyone he chooses, the normative 
means by which we obtain the grace of infused virtue is through the Church and the “Divine 
gifts” of the sacraments.   
The sacraments of the New Law produce a character, in so far as by 
them we are directed to the worship of God according to the rite of the 
                                                          
349 ST II-II, q.81, a.6: religio est praecipua inter virtutes morales. 
350 “For, since one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs to the 
community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole” (ST I-II, q.96, a.4).  I will examine in the 
next chapter Aquinas’ notion of personhood and virtuous personhood which is in fact tied to his notion 
of community. 
351 Commentary on Galatians 5:1 Nam quicumque profitetur in aliqua religione, facit se debitorem 
omnium quae ad observantiam illius religionis pertinent. 
352 ST I-II, q.108, a.2. 
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Christian religion. For this reason Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. ii), after 
saying that God “by a kind of sign grants a share of Himself to those 
that approach Him,” adds “by making them Godlike and 
communicators of Divine gifts.” Now the worship of God consists 
either in receiving Divine gifts, or in bestowing them on others.353  
 
For this reason, the superlative work of Divine Providence is to bring people into the 
Church, through which they can hope to attain perfection and the hope of eternal life: “Now, the 
citizens who are ruled most perfectly by divine providence form the society of the Church 
triumphant, which is also called the City of God in Scripture. Hence, the enrolment or 
representation of those who are to be admitted to that society is called the book of life.”354 
Aquinas sets the stage for this communal vision of virtue in his Commentary on 
Hebrews, where he says that when we wish to define a virtue perfectly, we need to consider 
both its matter and its end—since good habits (or virtues) are known through their acts, and acts 
are known through their determinate ends.  In illustration of the point, Aquinas considers the 
virtue of fortitude, which, he says, deals with fear and daring as its matter and the good of the 
republic as its end.355  It is through the perfection of the community in other words in which we 
find the proper definition of the virtue of fortitude which originates in the will of the individual 
but which act of the will is only properly realised in the perfection of the community.  And so it 
is with all the virtues—both natural and infused: the end of each virtue is for both the good of 
the individual and of the community: 
Now it is evident that all who are included in a community, stand in 
relation to that community as parts to a whole; while a part, as such, 
belongs to a whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be 
directed to the good of the whole. It follows therefore that the good of 
any virtue, whether such virtue direct man in relation to himself, or in 
                                                          
353 ST III, q.63, a.2 
354 De Veritate, q.7, a.1: Multitudo autem illa quae eminentissimo modo divina providentia gubernatur, 
est collegium Ecclesiae triumphantis, quae et civitas Dei nominatur in Scripturis; et ideo conscriptio 
eorum qui ad illam societatem sunt admittendi, sive repraesentatio, liber vitae dicitur. 
355 Commentary on Hebrews, 11, 1: Unde sciendum est, quod volens perfecte diffinire virtutem aliquam, 
oportet quod tangat materiam eius propriam, circa quam est, et finem eius, quia habitus cognoscitur per 
actum et actus per obiectum. Et ideo oportet tangere actum et ordinem ad obiectum et finem. Sicut 
volens diffinire fortitudinem, oportet tangere propriam eius materiam circa quam est, scilicet timores et 
audacias, et finem, scilicet bonum reipublicae, ut dicatur quod fortitudo est virtus moderativa illorum, 
propter bonum reipublicae. 
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relation to certain other individual persons, is referred to the common 
good.356 
 
Similarly, the person possessed of the infused virtues (that is, virtues properly speaking) 
is not virtuous simply through an unmediated and purely individual relationship with the 
Divine, but on account of the grace of God mediated through the Church.  It is only within such 
a context that both the notion of person, and by extension the treatise on virtues, finds 
coherence.  This can be seen through an analysis of Aquinas’ understanding of the ecclesial 
communio. 
 
5.2 Aquinas’ notion of the Church 
 
Part of the problem in identifying Aquinas’ ecclesiology to begin with, it has been well-
noted, is that Aquinas does not provide any specific treatment of the Church as such and that 
there is no section in the Summa which treats of the Church itself in a systematic way.  Rather, 
his ecclesiology is “hidden and diffused throughout his corpus, and accessible to a large degree 
only by his Christology, pneumatology, and sacramentology.”357  Yet despite this apparent lack 
of any ostensive ecclesiology, Aquinas’ conception of the Church is integral to his 
understanding of the virtues and the role of grace in the justification of the human person.   In 
fact, Aquinas’ ecclesiology is integral to his whole theological and philosophical enterprise.358  
The whole structure of Aquinas’ enterprise in the Summa for example, as Chenu famously 
noted, can be read as a framework of exitus-reditus: a flowing of all being from God which in 
                                                          
356 ST II-II, q.58, a.5: Manifestum est autem quod omnes qui sub communitate aliqua continentur 
comparantur ad communitatem sicut partes ad totum. Pars autem id quod est totius est, unde et 
quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. Secundum hoc igitur bonum cuiuslibet virtutis, 
sive ordinantis aliquem hominem ad seipsum sive ordinantis ipsum ad aliquas alias personas singulares, 
est referibile ad bonum commune…. 
357 See Hutter, Reinhard, and Matthew Levering. Ressourcement Thomism sacred doctrine, the 
Sacraments, and the moral life : essays in honor of Romanus Cessario, O.P.. Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2010., p.69, fn115. 
358 Consider, for example, the way in which Aquinas relies on Metaphysics V in his explication of 1 
Corinthians where the notion of one is employed in his ecclesiology.  Throughout Aquinas’ works, 
metaphysical insights, belonging properly to philosophy, are nevertheless only properly understood in 
reference to the divine. 
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turn is drawn back into the Divine.359  The point of turnaround—or the point where the rational 
creature is able to return to God—is found exclusively in the person of Christ, who is the Head 
of the Church.360   
Aquinas never separates the operation of the Church from the operation of Christ.  Like 
Chenu, Yves Congar also understood this, and found the reason for it in Aquinas’ understanding 
of creaturely participation in the Divine, through the person of Jesus Christ sustained and 
effected in the virtuous life.  Even the hierarchy of the Church is for this purpose—namely, the 
instruments by which the members of the Church have access to Christ. 361   
For this reason, Congar understood the lack of any discrete treatise on ecclesiology in 
the Summa as being indicative of the fact that Aquinas does not understand “the Church” to be a 
sub-divided topic among other topics (for example, as a topic distinct from sacramentology or 
soteriology) but is in fact the underlying foundation or medium through which the entire 
creature-Divine relationship is established.362  Aquinas’ treatment of the Church, therefore, is 
infused throughout the entire Secunda Pars, and so his notion of the Church is to be understood 
as the broad context in which he considers the economy of salvation itself.  In his essay for the 
first edition of the Thomist, Congar wrote that “For St Thomas, the Church is the whole 
economy of the return towards God, motus rationalis creaturae in Deum, in short, the Seconda 
                                                          
359 Chenu remarks, “Beyond the scientific world of Aristotle, Saint Thomas appeals to the Platonic theme 
of emanation and return. Since theology is the science of  God, all things will be studied in their relation 
to God, whether in their production or in their final end, in their exitus et reditus.” Chenu, Marie-
Dominique. Toward Understanding Saint Thomas. Chicago: Henry Regnery Press, 1964, p.304.  Rudi te 
Velde rejects Chenu’s famous reading of the exitus-reditus scheme into the structure of the Summa.  I 
will treat more of this controversy in the Chapter on Gratitude.  See Velde, Rudi A. te. Aquinas on God: 
the 'Divine Science' of the Summa Theologiae. Oxford: Ashgate, 2006, p11 ff. 
360 See for example, ST I, q.2, proemium:  Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in 
Deum. 
361 Thomas O’Meara explains, “For Yves Congar, Aquinas’ ecclesiology is found in his lengthy treatment 
of the Christian life; Aquinas views the Church as a communio to nourish faith, hope, and love. Congar 
observes the influence of Platonism in this ecclesiology of grace…. All grace flows to the members of the 
Mystical Body from the caput, Christ.  Citing Pseudo-Dionysius, the Commentary on the Sentences 
explains that episcopal power has for its goal the purification, illumination, and leading to perfection of 
the ranks of Church members below it.”  See O’Meara O.P., Aquinas Franklin. Philosophical Models in 
Ecclesiology. Aquinas Institute of Theology. Dubuque. Online journal edition: 
http://www.ts.mu.edu/readers/content/pdf/39/39.1/39.1.1.pdf. P.7 
362 For an excellent discussion on Congar’s treatment of Aquinas’ ecclesiology, see Boersma, Hans. 
Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009; p. 265 ff. 
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Pars of his Summa Theologiae.”363  In short, the economy of salvation is summed up for 
Aquinas in the person of Jesus Christ who, as head of the Church, is the means by which we 
return to God, and through whom the exitus et reditus is completed.   
 
 
5.2.1 Sacramental Theosis & the Twofold Operation of Christ 
 
Christ acts upon the members of the Church in both an interior and exterior way: 
interiorly, through the grace given to each member through the infused virtues; externally 
through the manifestation of Christ’s continued presence in the world through the visible 
structure and governance of the Church and, as we shall see, in the action in the sacraments: 
I answer that, the head influences the other members [of the body] in 
two ways. First, by a certain intrinsic influence, inasmuch as motive 
and sensitive force flow from the head to the other members; 
secondly, by a certain exterior guidance, inasmuch as by sight and the 
senses, which are rooted in the head, man is guided in his exterior 
acts. Now the interior influx of grace is from no one save Christ, 
Whose manhood, through its union with the Godhead, has the power 
of justifying; but the influence over the members of the Church, as 
regards their exterior guidance, can belong to others; and in this way 
others may be called heads of the Church….364 
 
 Thus, Aquinas’ ecclesiology is founded on a twofold configuration of the individual to 
Christ.  In the first instance, this configuration is an internal configuration of the individual—a 
‘configuration of the heart’—and in the second instance, there is an external configuration of 
both of the individual participating in the Church itself: “just as internal actions belong to the 
heart, so do external actions belong to the members of the flesh.”365  This dual configuration is 
                                                          
363 Congar, Yves. "The Idea of the Church in St Thomas Aquinas." Thomist 1, no. 3 (1939): 339. 
364 ST III, q.8, a.6: Respondeo dicendum quod caput in alia membra influit dupliciter. Uno modo, quodam 
intrinseco influxu, prout virtus motiva et sensitiva a capite derivatur ad cetera membra. Alio modo, 
secundum exteriorem quandam gubernationem, prout scilicet secundum visum et alios sensus, qui in 
capite radicantur, dirigitur homo in exterioribus actibus. Interior autem effluxus gratiae non est ab aliquo 
nisi a solo Christo, cuius humanitas, ex hoc quod est divinitati adiuncta, habet virtutem iustificandi. Sed 
influxus in membra Ecclesiae quantum ad exteriorem gubernationem, potest aliis convenire. Et 
secundum hoc, aliqui alii possunt dici capita Ecclesiae…. 
365 ST II-II, q.81, a.7.  I do not intend—as Aquinas does not intend—by the use of the distinction of terms 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ to suggest that there is a twofold order of grace, one internal and one external; 
all grace acts upon the soul of the individual internally insofar as the human person participates in grace 
accidentally (ST I-II, q.112, a.4, ad.3); but whereas the grace of the sacraments is signified by external 
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in keeping with Aquinas’ general description of the virtue of religion, which consists of both 
internal actions of the heart and external actions of worship (ST II-II, q.81, a.7). 
 The internal configuration of the heart to Christ corresponds to the possession and 
exercise of the virtues.  And since what Christ offers us through the Church is totally gratuitous, 
the first virtue to respond is gratitude.  There is an analogy then between gift and gratitude and 
the sacraments of grace and faith-filled reception of these.   
Such a configuration is a perfection of the operation of the will and intellect, which are 
the principle of human actions, thus these powers of the soul are the subject of the virtues.  But: 
the happiness of eternal beatitude, to which man is invited in Christ, surpasses the natural 
powers of the intellect and will, and so a second configuration in Christ is needed—something 
which opens up human nature to the fullness of beatitude.366  This secondary configuration takes 
place through the work of the visible Church, and primarily through the sacraments, which are 
superadded by Providence through the Church for the perfection of human nature in grace. 
The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers of 
the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary conduct: but as regards certain 
special effects which are necessary in a Christian life, sacramental 
grace is needed.367 
 
 Thus it makes no sense in Aquinas to speak of a person who possesses the perfect or 
infused virtues independently of sacramental grace outside the Church, and vice versa.  Both are 
required for the perfection of the Christian life which is lived in the context of the communio.  
Consider, for example, Aquinas’ fourfold distinction of the virtues in question sixty one, article 
five, of the Prima Pars.  Here, Aquinas adopts the division of Macrobius who, in his Super 
Somnium Scipionis (Commentary on the Dream of Scipio), classifies the virtues according to the 
social (or human), the perfecting, the perfect and the exemplary.  All of the virtues can be 
considered as existing originally in God since all perfection flows from the divine mind.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                          
signs (ST III, q,84, a.1 ) the goodness or malice of every action originates in the internal act of the will 
and not, in the first instance, in the external action (ST I-II, q.20, a.1). 
366 ST I-II, q.5, a.5. I will treat of this theme in greater depth in the discussion on the relationship 
between grace and nature and the de Lubacian debate over the natural endowment of the human 
person. 
367 ST III, q.62, a.2, ad.1: gratia virtutum et donorum sufficienter perficit essentiam et potentias animae 
quantum ad generalem ordinationem actuum. Sed quantum ad quosdam effectus speciales qui 
requiruntur in Christiana vita, requiritur sacramentalis gratia. 
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social virtues (which Aquinas variously refers to as human, acquired and natural) are those 
virtues which enable humans to live together productively in society; they make for a peaceful 
state, efficient and just government, honest commerce, and so on.  These kinds of virtues, on 
their own, do not require sacramental grace, since they are purely natural and do not lay claim to 
the name of virtue properly speaking.368  The perfecting and perfect virtues however (which 
Aquinas also refers to as ‘infused’) have God directly as their efficient cause.369 In other words, 
they are ‘infused with grace’. 
 The perfecting virtues, as the gerund suggests, do not yet signify a perfection in the 
human person, but signify that someone is striving on the way to perfection—namely, that 
someone is developing a tendency towards ‘Divine similitude’—while those who possess virtue 
perfectly speaking (and such people, Aquinas tells us, are rare) are about to attain such 
perfection in this life.370  But when we consider Aquinas’ conception of the ‘perfected’ human 
creature, such a person has attained divine similitude on account of Christ, mediated through the 
sacramental life of the Church. There is no distinction therefore to be found in Aquinas between 
the perfectly virtuous person, and the person divinised through the instrumental power of the 
sacraments.  While there is indeed a formal distinction (distinctio formalis: not to be understood 
in a Scotist sense) between the infused virtues and the sacraments, there is no distinction 
between the virtuous person and the person who is vivified by the grace of the sacraments and 
vice versa.  This is the basis of Aquinas’ doctrine of theosis, or divinisation, and it explains the 
way in which the virtuous person attains divine similitude: the process of theosis, for Aquinas, 
is initiated sacramentally. 
Hence, the internal configuration brought about by the infused virtues is disposed 
towards the external configuration brought about by the sacramental life of the Church in Christ, 
which again in turn presupposes the internal ordering to God through Christ.  The two 
configurations to Christ—internal and external—are not separable, but form a unified 
                                                          
368 ST I-II q.110, q.3 
369 These virtues are not directly equated with grace; they are different from, but oriented to, grace: ST 
I-II q.110, a.3; but grace is at the same time the principle and root of the infused virtues: ST I-II, q.110, 
a.3, ad.3. 
370 ST I-II, q.61, a.5 
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participation in the life of Christ.  Both operations are united in the single operation of 
Providence, which governs both the temporal and eternal destiny of the human person.371   
What this points to is that the life of virtue properly speaking is not separable from the 
supplementary and consummating action of sacramental grace.  The internal disposition of the 
human person towards the good in general—that is, according to the natural disposition of the 
creature—is more proper to human nature as such because it concerns things which are within 
the rational agent’s natural powers.  However, this natural disposition on its own is not enough 
for the rational agent’s beatitude, since this lies totally beyond his natural powers.   
Consequently, Aquinas is at pains to refute the Pelagian tendency to stress man’s ability 
to establish friendship with God on his own merits (see for example ST I-II, q.109, a.4).  The 
human person is totally incapable of bridging the gap between the creature and God.  Thus, 
Providence has provided something above and beyond the natural capacity of his human nature, 
namely the sacraments and gifts of the Holy Spirit through the treasury of the Church.372  
 The virtues therefore fall within the scope of the human person’s natural powers, but 
this is not sufficient for salvation and sanctification.  For this reason it falls within the scope of 
providence to provide those visible and external remedies in the form of the sacraments to aid 
the human person in establishing friendship with God.  The reason that the sacramental life is 
established in the visible, external order is, Aquinas tells us, because sin has the tendency to 
cling unduly to the things of the physical world and so Providence provides us with something 
we readily identify with and have immediate contact with, while at the same time re-
establishing the goodness of the created order as pointing to Christ. 
                                                          
371 ST I, q.22, a.1.  Strictly speaking, Aquinas holds that the sacraments are governed more perfectly by 
providence; the virtues do not fall in the same way under the direction of Providence since they are 
formalised by an act of the will.  However, we can speak of a role of Providence that providence plays in 
providing the virtuous person with the circumstances and opportunities through which such acts of the 
will are enacted. 
372 See for example, ST III, q.61, a.1: …the condition of human nature…is such that it has to be led by 
things corporeal and sensible to things spiritual and intelligible. Now it belongs to Divine providence to 
provide for each one according as its condition requires. Divine wisdom, therefore, fittingly provides 
man with means of salvation, in the shape of corporeal and sensible signs that are called sacraments.  
…ex conditione humanae naturae, cuius proprium est ut per corporalia et sensibilia in spiritualia et 
intelligibilia deducatur. Pertinet autem ad divinam providentiam ut unicuique rei provideat secundum 
modum suae conditionis. Et ideo convenienter divina sapientia homini auxilia salutis confert sub 
quibusdam corporalibus et sensibilibus signis, quae sacramenta dicuntur. 
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Thus it was fitting that through the visible things themselves the 
remedies of salvation be applied to men…. Nor is it unsuitable that by 
things visible and bodily a spiritual salvation is served. For visible 
things of this kind are the instruments, so to say, of a God who was 
made flesh and suffered. Now, an instrument does not operate by the 
power of its nature, but by the power of its principal agent who puts it 
into operation. Thus, also, then, do visible things of this kind work out 
a spiritual salvation-not by a property of their own nature, but by 
Christ’s institution, and from the latter they receive their instrumental 
power.373 
 
 Given this twofold order of grace—the internal established through virtue and the 
external established through the sacraments of the Church—it is not possible to separate them 
out in Aquinas and to treat of virtue simply as an unmediated participation in the Divine.  The 
infused virtues, or virtues properly speaking, are only coherent concepts in Aquinas’ system in 
fuller context of his sacramental ecclesiology.  This model of virtue as mediated participation is 
totally in keeping with Aquinas’ notion of the person which he explicates largely through the 
lens of Scripture (most notably in his exegesis of the Pauline Epistles) and the mysticism of 
Dionysius, for whom the interior motion of the soul is unified to its external source in Christ.374  
Christ is the source of both the virtues and the sacraments.375  And in Christ, the interior life of 
virtue and the external gifts of the sacraments are unified; sacramental grace completes the 
virtuous life.  There is one movement between the efficacy of the sacraments and the efficacy of 
the virtues through Christ, who is the cause and reason for the efficacy of both.376  This is why, 
as Aquinas explains, quoting the Venerable Bede, that the Devil will often attack Christ’s work 
of salvation, brought about through the work of the Church through the sacramental economy, 
through an attack on virtue: “often, when after falling into sin we strive to return to God [in the 
Church], we experience further and more grievous attacks from the old enemy. This he 
does…that he may inspire us with a distaste (odium) for virtue….”377 
 
                                                          
373 SCG IV, c.56, n.5 & n.7. 
374 See for example The Divine Names, 705A.   
375 See ST I-II, q.20, a.3 and ST III, q.62, a.2 
376 The virtues are define as being that which God works in us, without us: ST I-II, q.55, a.4; and God 
alone is the source of the efficacy of the sacraments, as Reginald of Piperno adds in the Supplement (ST 
Supp. q.29, a.3) and this is consistent with what Aquinas says of the sacraments throughout his corpus. 
377 ST III, q.44, a.1, ad.4: dum converti ad Deum post peccata conamur, maioribus novisque antiqui hostis 
pulsamur insidiis. Quod facit vel ut odium virtutis incutiat…. 
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5.2.2 Complementarity of the Grace of Virtue and Grace of the Sacraments 
 
 In question sixty-two of the Treatise on the Sacraments (tertia pars), Aquinas 
specifically deals with the question whether or not sacramental grace confers anything in 
addition to the grace obtained through the virtues.  The first objection notes that, since the grace 
of the infused virtues and gifts perfect the soul in both its essence and its powers, this seems to 
make the grace conferred by the sacraments superfluous.  In his reply to the objection, Aquinas 
draws the distinction between what the grace required for “ordinary conduct” and the grace 
necessary for living a “Christian life.”  At first glance, this short reply to the objection is 
troubling, because it seems to suggest that the infused virtues are only suitable for a life 
established in “pure nature” while beatitude requires something superadded to “pure nature” by 
way of the sacraments in order to elevate the subject to divine beatitude.  Such a conclusion 
would be troubling furthermore, because it would seem to undermine what Aquinas has said 
about the efficacy of the infused virtues in the treatise on virtues in the prima secundae partis. 
 But it is precisely the wider context of the treatise on virtues (and what is said in the 
Quaestiones disputatae de virtutibus) that, when read in conjunction with the treatise on the 
sacraments, this first-glance reading is not adequate, nor should it be taken as support for the 
“pure nature” thesis.  Rather, a short-cut to Aquinas’ thinking on this issue is found in question 
one hundred and nine on the prima secundae partis on the necessity of grace: grace is needed 
both for the perfected and corrupt states; and not only for attaining eternal life, but the rational 
creature in both the perfected and fallen state requires grace simply to fulfil the commandments 
of the Divine Law.  The perfected human creature can, Aquinas says, carry out the substance of 
the works required by the Divine Law.  In other words, the perfected agent can, by his own 
natural powers, conduct virtuous acts of justice, temperance and fortitude, etc.  But without 
grace, the rational creature is not capable—either in the corrupt or perfected states—of fulfilling 
the precepts of the Divine Law out of charity (ST I-II, q.109, a.4).  To suggest otherwise would 
be, Aquinas insists, to commit the “Pelagian heresy”; for charity is the essence of friendship 
with God, and no one can simply establish friendship with God (or anyone for that matter) by 
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his own efforts.  Friendship with God cannot be attained without grace, either in a pre-fallen or 
post-fallen state. 
Grace is, in its simplest conception for Aquinas, the friendship of God (ST II-II, q.26). 
Both the virtues and the sacraments make this friendship possible, for two distinct reasons.  In 
the first place, the virtues make friendship possible with Christ by perfecting the powers of the 
soul and thereby making the possibility of Divine friendship a reality.  The virtues are thus 
dispositive in that they orient the creature internally towards friendship with the Divine.378  The 
sacraments on the other hand actualise this friendship and make it an external reality.  The 
sacraments are Christ’s initiative towards the human person, while the virtues are the creature’s 
openness to this Divine initiative.  Aquinas in fact repeatedly appeals to the notion of friendship 
so actualised in his treatise on the sacraments.  For example, in his discussion of the Eucharist, 
he says that it was out of love that Christ became incarnate and it is a special feature, 
furthermore, of his desire for friendship with us that he continues to make himself available, 
bodily-speaking and not just figuratively, among his friends.379 
 
5.3 Incarnational Ecclesiology 
 
 What Aquinas proposes is a genuinely incarnational ecclesiology in which the creature 
participates in both body and soul in friendship with Christ.  Aquinas’ ecclesiology is not 
understood in terms of mental acts, but in terms of the whole person—body and soul—operating 
in a determinate time and place.  Acts of worship, furthermore, require tangible signs in the 
physical order, and the proper use of these tangible signs, including sacramental signs, occurs in 
a specific place.  The “communion of saints” is not simply a gathering of people with a common 
interest, but a gathering of a unified people in a time and place in which each individual is part 
of a whole which brings about his or her perfection. 
                                                          
378 ST II-II, q.180, a.2, ad.1: ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vita contemplativa habet 
motivum ex parte affectus, et secundum hoc dilectio Dei et proximi requiritur ad vitam contemplativam. 
Causae autem moventes non intrant essentiam rei, sed disponunt et perficiunt rem. Unde non sequitur 
quod virtutes morales essentialiter pertineant ad vitam contemplativam. 
379 ST III, q.75, a.1. 
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Grace is mediated through the created order, whether this mediation is through the signs 
of the sacraments or interiorly within the rational creature himself and outwardly through 
virtuous actions.  Virtue is not simply a matter of internal reflection, but which is united to its 
proper objects, its acts exercised in the body.  Hence, Aquinas is able to speak of “virtues of the 
body”—those virtues pertaining to playing and recreation and to the graceful and modest 
movement of the human body.380 There is a certain aesthetic quality to the virtues; spiritual 
beauty is manifest in physical beauty.  Virtues are not simply about disembodied action, but 
involve a flourishing of the spirit in the body itself, as it moves through life in the created order 
in time and place.  In this, Aquinas’ notion of flourishing goes beyond Aristotle’s use of 
eudaimonia; for Aristotle, the virtues are indeed about the good life in the world, life of 
individuals interacting among family members, among friends, among fellow citizens engaged 
in the political life, and among commercial enterprises aimed at and the acquisition of various 
kinds of legitimate wealth.  This is not to say that Aristotle leaves no room for beauty in his 
ethical system; but Aquinas, while allowing for much of what Aristotle has in mind in his 
concept of human flourishing, delves deep into the transcendental notion of beauty and draws 
much from Dionysius’ on this topic.  For Dionysius, the beauty of God is mediated through the 
beauty of the created order, and the recognition of beauty in that created order is the first step in 
the ascent towards the divine origin of all beauty.  Human happiness is not a disembodied 
experience but a lived experience in the flesh in time and place.  So too for Aquinas, the 
perfection of the human person is not simply a perfection of the soul, but also a perfection of the 
human body through spiritual perfection as its proper form.  The beauty of the soul is 
complemented by the beauty of the human body.381   
In citing chapter four of Dionysius’ Divine Names, Aquinas remarks that beauty is a 
feature of every virtue, and in an especially evident way it is seen in the virtue of temperance.  
This is because, as Dionysius notes, beauty is the proper proportion of things—both in terms of 
internal and unifying coherence, and in proportion of a thing to its exemplar.  In the virtue of 
                                                          
380 ST II-II, q.168. 
381 ST I-II, q.4, a.5 
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temperance in particular Aquinas notes we find occurring one such beautifying proportion 
between what is lowest in man—that is, his baser, animal appetites—and what is more excellent 
in him, namely his rational powers, his will and ability to love.382  The virtue of temperance 
provides a harmony between the powers and appetites of the human person, providing a 
unification of the body and soul—which relation has been otherwise destabilised through 
original sin. 
 The exercise of the virtues is not only manifested in the body; the body too exercises the 
virtues in time and place.  In question eighty-four of the secunda secundae partis, he treats of 
adoration (adoratione) and the “exterior acts of latria” (exterioribus actibus latriae).  Article 
two specifies that adoration involves both a spiritual and a bodily worship:  
…since we are composed of a twofold nature, intellectual and 
sensible, we offer God a twofold adoration: namely, a spiritual 
adoration, consisting in the internal devotion of the mind; and a bodily 
adoration, which consists in an exterior humbling of the body.383 
 
 Given that the body exists in a time and place, Aquinas then goes on to say—in article 
three—that the bodily signs of adoration “must of necessity be in some definite place and 
position” (corporalia signa necesse est quod in determinato loco et situ sint).  Aquinas’ 
ecclesiology understands the Church to be manifest both in the spiritual order (following what 
he identifies as the “spiritual truth of the Gospel”) and the tangible, physical order of creation 
through which God’s goodness is communicated to the creature. 
 Aquinas gives three reasons why God needs to be adored and worshiped in a 
determinate location (ST II-II, q.84, a.3, ad.2): firstly, because the Church is consecrated to 
God, which increases the devotion of the adorers and places them in a suitable frame-of-mind 
for worship in which to be heard by God; secondly, because the determinate location contains 
those sacred objects set aside for worship; and thirdly, on account of the “concourse of adoring 
crowds” (concursum multorum adorantium) who come together to praise and worship God, 
                                                          
382 See ST II-II, q.141, a.2, ad.3 
383 ST II-II, q.84, a.2: quia ex duplici natura compositi sumus, intellectuali scilicet et sensibili, duplicem 
adorationem Deo offerimus, scilicet spiritualem, quae consistit in interiori mentis devotione; et 
corporalem, quae consistit in exteriori corporis humiliatione. 
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according to the exhortation in Matthew 18:20, “where two or three are gathered in my name, 
there am I among them.” 
 With this in mind, it becomes clear that for Aquinas, the “communion of the saints” is 
to be understood in two ways: as both embodying the community of believers and as being a 
determinate place in which the believers are drawn to God through sacred signs.  As Jean-Pierre 
Torrell, O.P explains,   
…the Latin expression, communio sanctorum has two possible 
meanings.  The word sanctorum can be the genitive plural of sancti 
(“saints,” that is to say, the faithful, as we find it used in St Paul), and 
thus it describes the communion among the faithful.  It can also be the 
genitive plural of sancta (“holy things”) and thus designate a 
communion in holy things (in the sacraments, in grace, in God 
himself).  The grammar of the expression does not allow us to sever 
these two meanings from each other, since they are both possible 
meanings of the Latin words.  Neither does history allow for this, 
because both meanings are well attested in the most ancient preaching 
on the Apostle’s Creed.  For faith and for theology, however, there is 
no doubt: the second meaning alone makes the first possible.  It is 
because Christians commune in holy things, because they gather 
around the sancta, these goods that they hold in common, that they can 
together form the communion of saints gathered in the Holy Spirit.384 
 
It is clear that Aquinas has both these interpretations of ‘sanctorum’ in mind as Torrell 
describes them.  Among the holy things are those sacred signs pertaining to the exercise of the 
sacraments, which are manifest in the visible and tangible order, add something to nature so as 
to elevate it beyond what is visible.  Thus the worship of God is both of the internal and external 
order, an expression of Divine Participation exercised both bodily and spiritually. 
Now the Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since 
man is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to 
the worship of God; the soul by an interior worship; the body by an 
outward worship: hence it is written in Psalm 83, ‘My heart and my 
flesh have rejoiced in the living God.’ And as the body is ordained to 
God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the 
internal worship. Now interior worship consists in the soul being 
united to God by the intellect and affections.  Wherefore according to 
the various ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who 
worships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are 
applied in various ways to the Divine worship.385 
                                                          
384 Torrell, Jean. Christ and spirituality in St. Thomas Aquinas. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of 
America Press, 2011, p.48. 
385 ST I-II, q.101, a.2: Est autem duplex cultus Dei, interior, et exterior. Cum enim homo sit compositus ex 
anima et corpore, utrumque debet applicari ad colendum Deum, ut scilicet anima colat interiori cultu, et 
corpus exteriori, unde dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, cor meum et caro mea exultaverunt in Deum vivum. Et 
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 This incarnational ecclesiology in which the members of the Church participate is itself 
a participation in the life of Christ.  Christ is not simply head of our souls, but of our bodies 
too;386 virtuous actions are incarnate, as are the sacraments. Given that the soul is the form of 
the body, the perfection of the body in reference to its moral acts implies the perfecting of its 
formal principle and the perfecting of the soul through grace; and by extension, the intellect—
which is the principle of the virtues—is perfected through the perfection of the soul.387 
 
5.4 Christ as the Source of Grace of the Virtues & Sacraments 
 
In his treatise on the Person of Christ in the Tertia Pars of the Summa, Aquinas explains 
that neither the natural or perfected nature of the human agent is sufficient to establish 
friendship in God.  This requires grace which perfects the very essence of the soul, while the 
virtues perfect the intellectual and bodily operations which flow from that essence.  Christ, 
furthermore, is the paradigm of all the virtues, in whom the virtues find their perfection.  Hence, 
it is from the grace of Christ that the virtues flow. 
Hence it is necessary that as the powers of the soul flow from its 
essence, so do the virtues flow from grace. Now the more perfect a 
principle is, the more it impresses its effects. Hence, since the grace of 
Christ was most perfect, there flowed from it, in consequence, the 
virtues which perfect the several powers of the soul for all the soul's 
acts; and thus Christ had all the virtues.388 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
sicut corpus ordinatur in Deum per animam, ita cultus exterior ordinatur ad interiorem cultum. Consistit 
autem interior cultus in hoc quod anima coniungatur Deo per intellectum et affectum. Et ideo secundum 
quod diversimode intellectus et affectus colentis Deum Deo recte coniungitur, secundum hoc diversimode 
exteriores actus hominis ad cultum Dei applicantur.  Psalm 83 is one of Aquinas’ favourite psalms; he 
quotes from it at least a dozen times in the Summa and elsewhere, and generally as a means to show 
the hylomorphic nature of the human person in reference to acts of worship and the exercise of the 
dulia and latria. 
386 ST III, q.8, a.2 
387 ST I-II, q.110, a.4; and q.56. 
388 ST III, q.7, a.2: Unde oportet quod, sicut potentiae animae derivantur ab eius essentia, ita virtutes sunt 
quaedam derivationes gratiae. Quanto autem aliquod principium est perfectius, tanto magis imprimit 
suos effectus. Unde, cum gratia Christi fuerit perfectissima, consequens est quod ex ipsa processerint 
virtutes ad perficiendum singulas potentias animae, quantum ad omnes animae actus. Et ita Christus 
habuit omnes virtutes. 
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 It is thus that the natural virtues need the infusion of grace to become rooted in Divine 
charity and thus efficacious for salvation.389  Aquinas goes on to explain in his response to the 
objections in the above passage that Christ does not need grace in the way that the creature does, 
but rather he is the “dispenser of grace.”390  Indeed, it is not simply the Church that dispenses 
the sacraments in isolation from Christ, but it does so through the reality of the presence of 
Christ in the Church: “Christ Himself perfects all the sacraments of the Church: it is He who 
baptizes; it is He who forgives sins; it is He, the true priest, who offered Himself on the altar of 
the cross, and by whose power His body is daily consecrated on the altar—nevertheless, 
because He was not going to be with all the faithful in bodily presence, He chose ministers to 
dispense the things just mentioned to the faithful.”391  Hence, the graces which come to us 
through virtue and the graces which come to us through the sacraments find their origin and 
source in the person of Christ. 
The Church according to Aquinas is thus nothing less than the continuation of this work 
of Christ; for example, those who seek universal truth sincerely—even if they do not yet know 
Christ—are seeking nothing less than conformity to the doctrines of the Church.392 Thus Christ 
is mysteriously but concretely manifest in the Church through the working of the Holy Spirit 
through the creatures’ participation in the Divine, enacted in part by the virtues, completed by 
sacraments, intellectually nourished by the doctrines of the Church and directed ultimately 
toward eternal beatitude. 
Aquinas frequently identifies this work of grace through Christ with the work of the 
Church.393  Characteristically, in his Commentary on the Colossians he states that “Christ and 
the Church are one mystical person, whose head is Christ.”394  It is fair to say that Aquinas 
                                                          
389 ST I-II, q.109, a.4 
390 ST III, q.7, a.7, ad.2: Sic autem non competit sibi habere gratiam, sed potius esse gratiae largitorem. 
391 SCG IV, c.76, n.7: Manifestum est enim quod omnia ecclesiastica sacramenta ipse Christus perficit: 
ipse enim est qui baptizat; ipse qui peccata remittit; ipse est verus sacerdos, qui se obtulit in ara crucis, et 
cuius virtute corpus eius in altari quotidie consecratur: et tamen, quia corporaliter non cum omnibus 
fidelibus praesentialiter erat futurus, elegit ministros, per quos praedicta fidelibus dispensaret…. 
392 ST II-II, q.11, a.2, ad.3 
393 See for example SCG IV.50.9; ST II-II, q. 2, a.7:  
394 Emphasis added. See Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Colossenses lectura, 1-6: Christus et Ecclesia est una 
persona mystica, cuius caput est Christus…  I am conscious here of de Lubac’s (et al) insistence that there 
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routinely treats the Church in purely Christological terms—and, vice versa, Christ in ecclesial 
terms, since our knowledge of Christ is derived from the Church.  Hence, “The Church’s 
ordinances are Christ’s own ordinances.”395   
It would be going much too far to assert that Christ and the Church are univocal terms 
for Aquinas; but the fact remains that for Aquinas, the Church is the means by which we come 
to know Christ and encounter him. 
After grace had been revealed, both learned and simple folk are bound 
to explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, chiefly as regards those 
which are observed throughout the Church, and publicly proclaimed, 
such as the articles which refer to the Incarnation….  As to other 
minute points in reference to the articles of the Incarnation, men have 
been bound to believe them more or less explicitly according to each 
one’s state and office.396 
 
 Humans have no natural knowledge of Christ’s divinity says Aquinas, as there is for the 
existence of God, which we can come to know—albeit with great difficulty and by nature in a 
“general and confused way”—through the light of natural reason (ST I, a.2, q.1).  But such 
knowledge of Christ-as-divine is not possible.  For to know simply the historical fact of the man 
Jesus of Nazareth’s existence is not to know Christ, the Son of God; rather, to know Christ as 
divine is to know the Incarnation, Passion and Resurrection of Christ—namely, the Mysteria 
Christi.  These mysteries of Christ are not accessible to the light of natural reason, and require 
the infusion of faith without which salvation is not possible (ST II-II, q.2).  How then do we 
come to know Christ in the mysteries of his person? The knowledge of Christ is not a natural 
knowledge, or a knowledge of a particular kind of datum, but a kind of practical knowledge in 
which the truth is experienced and lived as an encounter with Christ in God: “Thus the one who 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is a necessary distinction between Christ and the Church—a distinction which I believe Aquinas himself 
maintains; however, it remains true that Christ is the necessary form of the very life of the Church: 
“Christ is our life, because the whole principle of our life and activity is Christ” (Commentary on 
Philippians, 1.3.18).  
395 ST III, q.83, a.3: [Sed contra est quod] ea quae per Ecclesiam statuuntur, ab ipso Christo ordinantur. 
396 ST II-II, q.2, a.7: Post tempus autem gratiae revelatae tam maiores quam minores tenentur habere 
fidem explicitam de mysteriis Christi; praecipue quantum ad ea quae communiter in Ecclesia 
sollemnizantur et publice proponuntur, sicut sunt articuli incarnationis, de quibus supra dictum est. Alias 
autem subtiles considerationes circa incarnationis articulos tenentur aliqui magis vel minus explicite 
credere secundum quod convenit statui et officio uniuscuiusque. 
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lives in a holy way knows God’s will.”397  “Knowing Christ” is inextricably linked to virtuous 
living, the fullness of which requires sacramental grace from Christ as a condition for salvation 
(ST III, q.61).  Christ is thus both the source and object of virtuous living—the mediatory point 
of the exitus et reditus; we are spiritually reborn in Christ in baptism (ST III, q.68, a.1) and 
return to the Father through him: the Incarnation is the means of the restoration of human nature 
(ST III, q.1, a.2: ad humanae naturae reparationem). 
 Because Christ himself is the source of our rebirth and return to God, the knowledge of 
Christ is not simply a one-way knowledge of the rational creature of Christ; in the first initiating 
movement, it is Christ’s knowledge of the rational creature: “Therefore, the soul of Christ 
knows all creatures not only according to their natural properties, as the angels also do, but even 
in so far as they are subject to divine providence and are ordered to the end of human salvation 
and the gifts of grace. Therefore, He knows all individual things and every single act of all 
things, even the secret thoughts of men’s hearts.  This can be said of no other creature.”398  The 
knowledge of Christ is relational; it consists, on the part of the human person in virtuous living; 
and on the part of Christ in the governance of Providence, which finds its perfection in the 
exercise of the ministry of the Church: “the citizens who are ruled most perfectly by divine 
providence form the society of the Church triumphant, which is also called the City of God in 
Scripture.”399 
This is in keeping with a key principle of Aquinas, namely that the work of divine 
providence is always, in reference to creatures, mediated through the created order.400 This work 
of Providence is achieved primarily through what we might say has the nature of fate (rationem 
fati) but in a more ordered and systematic way through the work of the Church.  The 
                                                          
397 Commentary on Colossians, 1.3.19: Ille ergo cognoscit voluntatem Dei, qui in sanctitate vivit. 
398 De Veritate, q.20, a.7: Scit igitur anima Christi omnes creaturas, non solum quantum ad naturales 
proprietates, quod et Angeli habent, sed etiam secundum quod substant divinae providentiae ordinatae 
in finem salutis humanae et donorum gratiae: et ideo scit omnia singularia, et omnes singulares actus 
omnium, et etiam cordis abscondita; quod de nulla alia creatura dicere oportet. 
399 De Veritate, q.7, a.1: Multitudo autem illa quae eminentissimo modo divina providentia gubernatur, 
est collegium Ecclesiae triumphantis, quae et civitas Dei nominatur in Scripturis. 
400 ST I, q.116, a.2 
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government of the Church has been disposed by Providence in Christ for the benefit of all the 
members.401   
 
5.5 The Nature of the Church as perfecting 
 
Aquinas finds throughout the Pauline Epistles ample transcendental imagery of Unity, 
Oneness, Goodness, and Beauty as paradigms of the Church.  By extension, the members of the 
Church, by the operation of the Church, are unified, made one, good and beautified through 
their association with the Church. 
All of Aquinas’ commentaries on the Epistles can be read as a single exposition of his 
christology and ecclesiology derived from Paul, as each of them intertwines common themes 
and cross-references the other epistles.  Continuing his exposition of Colossians, Aquinas gives 
us a useful starting point for understanding this ecclesiology and the unity of the virtues and 
sacraments within it.402   
In the prologue to the Colossians, Aquinas describes this present life as “a battle waged 
by soldiers who live in a camp.”403  The soldiers are the Christian faithful, while the camp 
represents the Church.  Within the camp, the soldiers find succour and strength for the battle 
outside and they remain in the camp just so long as they resist sin and live as children of God: 
“therefore, it is necessary to act according to virtue.”404  It is through the exercise of virtue that 
the individual becomes “rich in power” of Christ which flows through the Church and which 
unites the members with the “camp of the Church” (castra Ecclesiae).405  It is thus within the 
                                                          
401 SCG IV, c.76 
402 The Commentary, which was perhaps penned by a student with notes transcribed from a lecture of 
Aquinas, and with Aquinas’ approval, was written roughly around the same time as the Summa 
Theologiae, and so provides a useful gloss on Aquinas’ mature treatment of virtues and sacraments 
found in the Summa. 
403 Commentary on Colossians, prologue: “huius vitae est in pugnatione militantium.”  The battle motif is 
a popular one with Aquinas; the life of the Church is akin to an army, and the sacraments and virtues are 
the weapons and armour by which we do combat.  See also for example SCG IV.60.2 in which the 
sacrament of confirmation is likened to battle, and ST II-II, q.123, a.5 in which the virtue of fortitude is 
described as being pre-eminently suited to those engaged in warfare. 
404 Ibid, 21 
405 Commentary on Colossians, 22 
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context of this communio that the virtues reach their full and proper expression: one cannot be 
truly virtuous independently of the Church.   
The virtues are not simply for the sanctification of the individual detached from the 
people of God.  “It is clear,” Aquinas writes in his De Regno, “that the end of a multitude 
gathered together is to live virtuously.”  Not that the communio is an end in itself; the 
communio—both secular and ecclesial—exists ultimately for the benefit of each individual, who 
is ordained to a higher end, namely union with God: “Yet through virtuous living man is further 
ordained to a higher end, which consists in the enjoyment of God, as we have said above. 
Consequently, since society must have the same end as the individual man, it is not the ultimate 
end of an assembled multitude to live virtuously, but through virtuous living to attain to the 
possession of God.”406  But the fact remains that individuals cannot achieve this union with God 
on their own; personal union with God is achieved through a relationship with others.  The 
earthly state, as we have noted, is the locus in which one attains and exercises the acquired 
virtues; the castra Ecclesiae is the celestial state, through which one attains and exercises the 
infused virtues. 
Within the Epistle itself, Paul speaks of putting on the “new self” through which we 
become divinised, or like the Creator (3:10ff).  In his Commentary, Aquinas equates this “new 
self” with the possession and exercise of the virtues which, continuing the military motif, are the 
armour against all evil and the path to perfection: “Paul says: If you have put on the new self, 
you should put on the parts of the new self, that is, the virtues: ‘Let us then cast off the works of 
darkness and put on the armour of light’. We put these on when our exterior actions are made 
pleasing by the virtues.”407   
 The darkness which we are called upon by the Epistle to fight against is not simply an 
abstract darkness, but is concretised in the antithetical powers arrayed against the Church: “For 
we are not contending against flesh and blood, but against the principalities, against the powers, 
                                                          
406 De Regno, 15.106: Videtur autem finis esse multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem; and 
15.107: Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum virtutem, sed per virtuosam 
vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam. 
407 Commentary on Colossians, 158 
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against the rulers of this present darkness.”408  And it is the principal duty of those in the clerical 
state to lead the war against these powers of darkness: by forgiving sins, by sound teaching 
which refutes heresy, and by the example of patience—in other words, through the dispensation 
of the sacraments, through the exposition of scripture, and through the example of personal 
holiness.409 All of these works of the Church are aimed at making the virtuous life both possible 
and fruitful.  The Church exists, Aquinas tells us in the Commentary, for the perfection of the 
individual.  Without this communio, it is not possible to achieve the perfection of the infused 
virtues because the communio—the castra Ecclesiae—provides us with the means of exercising 
charity and the sacraments.   
The sacraments are more diverse in their matter and form than are the infused virtues, 
but the form of all the sacraments consists in what the sacrament accomplishes.410  This 
accomplishment is twofold: first, the sacraments bring about a “spiritual effect” of grace in the 
individual through grace—whether the remission of sins, the conferring of orders, and so on.411  
Secondly, the sacraments (and in particular the Eucharist) bring about the unity of the mystical 
body—the Church.412   
This latter effect is central to Aquinas’ concept of salvation, which is not simply an 
event in the life of the individual, but one in which the individual is intimately bound up in a 
relationship with others.  Here again, Dionysian theology forms the subplot of Aquinas’ 
ecclesiology. 
 
  
                                                          
408 Commentary on Colossians, prologue; (cf. also 258).  Aquinas’ reference to the “works of darkness” 
and corresponding “armour of light” is taken from Ephesians 6:12.  In fact, his selective use of other 
pertinent imagery found in Scripture gives us a further insight into Aquinas’ ecclesiology. 
409 Ibid 
410 ST III, q.78, a.2. 
411 ST III, q.62, a.4, ad.1: Et hoc modo vis spiritualis est in sacramentis, inquantum ordinantur a Deo ad 
effectum spiritualem. 
412 See for example, ST III, q.73, a.3: res sacramenti est unitas corporis mystici…. 
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5.5.1 Aquinas’ Pauline & Dionysian Ecclesiology 
 
 In chapter three of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Dionysius provides us with a sketch of 
the doctrine of synaxis, which is common to Eastern theology, and which is rendered communio 
in Latin.413  We find Aquinas invoking this Eastern concept of synaxis specifically just once in 
the Summa Theologiae, although his implicit references to it in reference to his treatment of the 
mystical body of Christ is suffused throughout his corpus.  There, we find that his use of 
‘communio’ (or ‘gathering’) in this ecclesial sense is consistent with what we find in the 
treatments of synaxis by Dionysius and John Damascene.414 
For a start, let us reverently behold what is above all characteristic of 
this, though also of the other hierarchic sacraments, namely, that 
which is especially referred to as “Communion” and “gathering 
[synaxis]”.  Every sacredly initiating operation draws our fragmented 
lives together into a one-like divinisation.  It forges a divine unity out 
of the divisions within us.  It grants us communion and union with the 
One.415 
 
Together, the virtues and sacraments are like the ligaments and joints of the Church, 
providing coherence for the individual, but through the binding of all the members together in a 
“synaxis” of the salvific work of Christ.  The communio is the binding together not only the 
various members of the Church, but the binding of all the members of the Church into faith and 
baptism: that is, into a sacramental life. 
And so Paul refers to joints and ligaments. So also in the Church, its 
members are joined by faith and understanding: “One Lord, one faith, 
                                                          
413 Dom Gregory Dix explains that the term ‘synaxis’, which was inherited directly from Judaism (and 
which forms the basis of the meaning of ‘synagogue’) and was, at first, considered separable from the 
term ‘Eucharist.’  In time, these two terms became to be understood by the Christian community as 
being inseparable: the gathering (synaxis) of the people was precisely identified with the celebration of 
the Eucharist; the one existed on account of the other: hence, the development of the term ‘communio’ 
in the Western tradition especially now represents both the ‘communion’ of the people and the 
‘communion’ which is the Eucharist; one is born in the other, and there is no longer a distinction 
between the two.  This is the inherited use of Aquinas throughout the Summa, and his use of the term 
‘communio’ seems to be consistent with the development of the term from its original synaxis as Dix 
explains.  See: Dix, Gregory. The shape of the liturgy. [New ed. London: Continuum, 2005, p.36, ff. 
414 See ST III, q.73, a.4.  Aquinas borrows the term from St John Damascene, along with the notion of 
‘metalepsis’, by which we are understood to be “assumed” into the Godhead of the Son through the 
sacrament. 
415 Cf. Luibhéid, Colm, and Paul Rorem. Pseudo-Dionysius: the Complete Works. New York: Paulist Press, 
1987; p.209. 
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one baptism” (Eph 4:5). But this is incomplete without the ligaments 
of charity and the sacraments.416 
 
St Paul’s ecclesiology plays an integral role in Aquinas’ own understanding of the 
synaxis or communio, which he finds echoed in the Church Fathers and which is even, albeit 
inchoately, present in some classical Roman thought.417  As Aquinas understands him, Paul 
always sees the Church in the context of its source—namely, Christ, the Incarnated God.  Thus 
‘Church’ is never simply a sociological entity, but always a synaxis understood in a unity with 
God through Christ, brought about in the sacramental communio.  Each time he writes to the 
Romans, Galatians or Thessalonians, etc., Paul refers the concrete local Church to the universal 
Church in Christ.  Hence the Church is not simply a “camp of the Church” in a given location 
but, the camp of the Church of God (castra Dei sunt haec) which at the same time transcends 
geography and time.  Thus typically we find in his commentary on the First Letter to the 
Thessalonians that Aquinas remarks that “Paul greets the Church, which is the assembly of 
believers, in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, that is, in the faith of the Trinity and of 
the divinity and humanity of Christ, because our beatitude will consist in knowing them.”418 
The external unity is preserved through the interior unity or the “internal configuration 
to Christ” of each member in the first place.419  Such internal unity is brought about by the 
virtues, and sustained by the sacraments.  Hence, in all of Aquinas’ Pauline commentaries, we 
find repeated reference to the role of the virtues in maintaining ecclesial unity: “This unity 
consists in the unity of the truth of faith and the rectitude of good action; and both must be 
                                                          
416 Commentary on Colossians, 129: “Et ideo dicit coniunctum et connexum. Sic in Ecclesia est coniunctio 
per fidem et scientiam. Eph. IV, 5: unus dominus, una fides, unum Baptisma. Sed hoc non sufficit, nisi sit 
connexus charitatis, et connexio sacramentorum….” 
417 For a useful discussion on the roots and exposition of Pauline ecclesiology, which is the basis of 
Aquinas’ thinking, see Paul's Ecclesiological Dimension by Pope Benedict XVI, given during the General 
Audience of October 15th 2008. 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2008/documents/hf_ben-
xvi_aud_20081015_en.html 
418 Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Thessalonicenses, 1.1. Salutat autem Ecclesiam, quae est congregatio 
fidelium. Et hoc in Deo patre et domino nostro Iesu Christo, id est, in fide Trinitatis, et divinitatis et 
humanitatis Christi, quia in horum cognitione erit nostra beatitudo. 
419 See note 8, above. “One thing was immediately clear to Paul in his new situation: the fundamental, 
foundational value of Christ and of the "word" that he was proclaiming. Paul knew not only that one 
does not become Christian by coercion but also that in the internal configuration of the new community 
the institutional element was inevitably linked to the living "word", to the proclamation of the living 
Christ through whom God opens himself to all peoples and unites them in one People of God.” 
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preserved.”420  We could go so far as to say that the Unity of the Church, which has as its 
principal God, is a participated unity through the virtuous life rooted in faith in Christ. 
Now it is evident that unbelief is a sin committed against God 
Himself, according as He is Himself the First Truth, on which faith is 
founded; whereas schism is opposed to ecclesiastical unity, which is a 
participated good, and a lesser good than God Himself.421 
 
Aquinas never separates the virtues from this overarching participated ecclesial unity, 
since such a participation is a participation of individuals and the individual is perfected in his 
operation through virtue.  Virtue is even required to receive the sacraments worthily, and so 
virtue becomes the foundation of ecclesial communion.422  Indeed, the telos of the Church, 
which is beatitude, cannot be reached at all without the possession and practice of the virtues in 
the first instance.423 
The communio, or sacramental assembly of the Church is found principally in unity 
with its source and summit, namely Jesus Christ, God incarnate—born, crucified and 
resurrected in the flesh.  The unity of the Church is a unity furthermore of its members in 
fellowship with Christ whose telos is located in ultimate beatitude with God.  It is through this 
unity that the telos is achieved.  This unity of the Church is not simply a functional unity, but an 
ontological unity in which its members collectively participate in the Divine through both the 
virtues and the sacraments—through the interior and exterior configuration to Christ.  Christ 
himself enacts this unity through his own crucified body which provides us both with the 
paradigm of the virtuous life, and the fruits of the “sacraments of his passion.”424  The cross, 
says Aquinas quoting and explicating a sermon of Gregory of Nyssa, is both the means and the 
symbol of universal salvation (“competit universali salvationi totius mundi”): just as the cross 
                                                          
420 Super Epistolam B. Pauli ad Philipenses, 3.3. Quae unitas Ecclesiae consistit in unitate veritatis fidei, et 
rectitudinis bonae operationis. Et utraque servanda est. 
421 ST II-II, q.39, a.2 
422 ST III, q.62, a.2.  
423 SCG, IV.54.7. Similiter etiam manifestum est quod beatitudo virtutis est praemium. Oportet igitur ad 
beatitudinem tendentes secundum virtutem disponi. Ad virtutem autem et verbis et exemplis 
provocamur. Exempla autem alicuius et verba tanto efficacius ad virtutem inducunt, quanto de eo firmior 
bonitatis habetur opinio. De nullo autem homine puro infallibilis opinio bonitatis haberi poterat: quia 
etiam sanctissimi viri in aliquibus inveniuntur defecisse. Unde necessarium fuit homini, ad hoc quod in 
virtute firmaretur, quod a Deo humanato doctrinam et exempla virtutis acciperet. 
424 ST III, q.46, a.4 & a.11. 
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extends symbolically in all four directions of the universe, so too does the Church reach out into 
all four corners of the earth with the salvific mission entrusted to her by Christ.  The cross of 
Christ is at once, therefore, both the means of salvation, and the symbol of the Church in which 
all the virtues and the sacraments are united in Christ. 
 
5.6 The Integral Relationship between the Virtues & Sacraments 
 
 What has been said about the inter-relatedness of the infused virtues and the sacrament 
raises an important question about the relationship between this so-called internal and external 
configuration to Christ.  How does Aquinas understand the efficacy of the virtues and 
sacraments in their own right?  Surely the sacraments do not require the virtues for their own 
efficacy; and surely one could be virtuous without the sacraments in at least some situations, as 
for example when the faithful of France were placed under Papal interdict in 1200, or the 
faithful in England between 1208 and 1213 and thus deprived of some or all of the sacraments 
for a time?  In what meaningful sense can we consider the virtues and sacraments as constituting 
a unified foundation of Aquinas’ ecclesiology in light of the distinct nature of each? 
 Aquinas is not unaware of these difficulties.  In question sixty two of the Tertia Pars, 
he insists that the sacraments differ essentially from the virtues and further, they do indeed 
confer something in addition to the graces conferred by the infused virtues.  The sacraments and 
virtues are not simply convertible in terms of their efficacy, nor is the grace conferred by the 
sacraments superfluous to the grace obtained through the virtues—or vice versa.  The 
difference, he explains in article two of this question, is that the virtues perfect the human 
person in reference to the soul’s natural powers.  “Grace…perfects the essence of the soul,” he 
declares; and in the case of the virtues, grace operates so as to perfect the natural powers of the 
soul which flow from its essence, and by these natural powers of the soul are the actions of the 
human agent perfected through virtue.  Thus the grace of the virtues “perfects the essence and 
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powers of the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary conduct.”425  But the sanctification of 
“ordinary conduct” (ordinationem actuum)—of those actions flowing from the natural capacity 
of the human person—while a necessary condition for salvation, are not a sufficient condition 
for salvation.  That sufficiency is supplied by the grace which flows from participation in the 
sacraments, which enable a new, higher level of participation in the Divine which would not 
otherwise be possible by the merits of the virtues on their own. 
 It is in this sense we can speak of an internal configuration—namely, a configuration of 
the human person according to his natural powers—and the external configuration, which 
completes the natural condition of humans by which they are elevated to supernatural life in 
Christ through the Church.  The external configuration moreover is signified by the external 
signs which accompany the sacraments as their matter.  The human person is configured to the 
world through the senses; sense perception is the way therefore we become configured through 
the tangible order to the merits of Christ’s passion.426   
 So while the natural powers of the human person are not sufficient for divine beatitude, 
they are nonetheless necessary.  Salvation does not override human agency, but perfects it; that 
human agency is still required for salvation; we must cooperate with Christ in his saving work. 
That saving work of Christ itself was instrumentally caused by the “power of the humanity of 
Christ.”427  Human agency cooperates with the work of grace begun in Christ. 
 
5.6.1 Certainty & Uncertainty in Reference to the Virtues and Sacraments 
 
 A further element of this distinction between the internal and external configuration can 
be found in the relationship of the virtues and sacraments to the natural law and the divine 
law.428  Reginald of Piperno sums up explicitly what can be pieced together from various 
                                                          
425 ST III, q.62, a.2, ad.1: gratia virtutum et donorum sufficienter perficit essentiam et potentias animae 
quantum ad generalem ordinationem actuum. 
426 SCG IV, c.56, n.5 & n.7. 
427 Commentary on 1 Thessalonians, 4-2. 
428 There has been, it is evident, much debate among scholars about Aquinas’ idea of the nature of the 
natural law and its relationship to the Divine law.  Here, I follow the reading and interpretation of Martin 
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sources in Aquinas himself: the virtues are part of the natural law, but the sacraments are not, 
but rather part of the Divine law directly.429  The natural law does indeed cooperate with the 
Divine law; but the natural law is the law of human reason which participates in the eternal law 
through its own natural powers. 
 In his treatise on law, in which he explores the different kinds of law (ST I-II, q.91, a.4), 
Aquinas notes that the natural law—to which the virtues are configured internally—is not, on its 
own, sufficient to direct the conduct of the creature in all things to God.  Thus, a higher and 
external law—namely, the Divine law—is needed to complete the creature’s orientation towards 
God.  There are, Aquinas tells us, four principal reasons for this. 
 First of all, the natural law orders human conduct to those ends which are proportionate 
to his natural faculties.  Natural law, in other words, pertains to natural human conduct.  But 
since the human person is ordained to an end which surpasses the powers of his natural 
faculties, i.e., eternal beatitude, a higher law is needed to illumine this path.  Secondly, because 
human reason is frail on account of sin, it can and does err in its own judgement, especially in 
reference to contingent and particular things.  Thirdly, the human person has competency in 
respect to laws which govern his external actions, but humans do not have competency with 
respect to the hidden things of creation, to those things which are not manifest or obvious.  
Finally, the natural law is not sufficient for removing all evil, nor can it forbid or punish all evil 
deeds.  Humans are not always in a position, even when they recognise evil, to affect a desired 
change for the good, even in themselves.  This is certainly true of our spiritual condition and the 
evil brought about by original sin.  While natural reason may point out privations in creaturely 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Rhonheimer, who I believe correctly understands natural law to be the proper ordering of natural 
reason in respect to its acts.  Such an interpretation seems to me to be consistent with my 
understanding of Aquinas’ treatment of the virtues within the context of his sacramental ecclesiology.  
See Rhonheimer, Martin. Natural law and practical reason: a Thomist view of moral autonomy. New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2000; and Rhonheimer, Martin, and William F. Murphy. The perspective 
of the acting person: essays in the renewal of Thomistic moral philosophy. Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2008. 
429 ST Supp. q.6, a.2.  For Aquinas on this subject, we have for example, ST I-II, q.94, a.3: Sed contra est 
quod Damascenus dicit, in III libro, quod virtutes sunt naturales. Ergo et actus virtuosi subiacent legi 
naturae; and  
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existence, natural law on its own is not capable of remedying all that besets the human 
condition. 
Natural law therefore, while participating in the eternal law, is clouded by uncertainty 
and for this reason in particular, the virtues on their own cannot be understood to be sufficient to 
guarantee salvation. Not that we should read into this claim that the natural law itself is 
uncertain, but it stands to reason that given that the human condition is fallen, that the exercise 
of natural reason can and does err in respect to its judgements about the natural law.430 
At work in Aquinas’ understanding of the interior prompting of the natural law and the 
exterior beckoning of the Divine law is his inspiration drawn from Dionysius.  In chapter four of 
The Divine Names, for example, the Areopagite teaches that the concept of the good can be 
spoken of in various ways—both perfect and imperfect as created being climbs ever higher 
towards its source, the Good itself.  The human person is not simply an object among many on 
this ladder of perfection with a single, static degree of perfection, but within the individual 
human person there exists a participation in various ways in the Good, some more, some less, 
perfect than other modes of participation.  When human reason participates in the divine truth, it 
participates more perfectly than when it participates in human philosophy or mere human 
activity.  Human reason, Dionysius says furthermore in The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, begins 
with the internal fact of creaturely existence; but “divinisation requires a divine birth”, namely, 
the external “illumination of truths received from God”, which is the essence of the divine 
law.431 
 Aquinas incorporates this thinking of Dionysius into his understanding of the efficacy 
of the law in article one of question 98 of the prima secundae partis. Drawing on chapter four of 
The Divine Names, he further comments that, since the end of the divine law is everlasting 
happiness, participation in this law is the more perfect for the human person.  But, on its own, 
                                                          
430 Aquinas explains in greater depth how human reason frequently errs in trying to attain universal 
judgements in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Book 1, Lecture 12 (74a4-b4).  
Primarily, such errors obtain from fact that human reason by nature is always contingent on limited 
experience.  By extension, since we have no experience of the Divine apart from knowledge gained 
through sense experience in this life, our understanding of universal truth is always limited and 
incomplete. 
431 See The Divine Names, chapters III-IV; and The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Chapter II.  
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the internal natural law is not capable of directing the human person to this beatitude, and hence 
an outward or external law is required to assist the creature in his ascent to God.  Therefore the 
virtues, since they are stem from the operation of natural law, are less perfect than the 
sacraments, which originate from the divine law. 
Consequently, just as under the state of the law of nature man was 
moved by inward instinct and without any outward law, to worship 
God, so also the sensible things to be employed in the worship of God 
were determined by inward instinct. But later on it became necessary 
for a law to be given from without: both because the Law of nature 
had become obscured by man’s sins; and in order to signify more 
expressly the grace of Christ, by which the human race is sanctified. 
And hence the need for those things to be determinate, of which men 
have to make use in the sacraments.432 
 
If the natural law, to which the action of the virtues is configured, is “obscured by 
man’s sins”, it would seem that, given the uncertainty of human reason in respect to natural law, 
one could never be totally sure that he is in possession of the infused virtues, as discussed in 
chapter three.  How could any one of us say with certainty that our actions are infused with 
grace?  Experience shows us time and time again that what we thought was a reasonable course 
of action in hindsight seems to have been something altogether lacking in prudence or even 
charity.  We confuse, Aquinas tells us, a sense of justice with the balance of mercy; we often 
mistake indecision for caution, sloth for relaxation, a deficient course of action for the best 
course of action.  But we have a hint as to the presence of the infused virtues “from probable 
signs” (ex aliquibus probabilibus signis).  Of these probable signs Aquinas includes love, which 
we can see at work in spiritual works, including a worthy engagement in the sacraments.433   
This difficulty was of real concern for Aquinas and is an on-going concern throughout 
his corpus.  On the one hand, he is, without doubt, totally committed to working out a coherent 
theory of the virtues which he considers to be of real efficacy in human perfection and indeed 
necessary for salvation.  The virtues are in fact what make us truly human; they perfect not 
                                                          
432 ST III, q.60, a.5, ad.3: Et ideo, sicut in statu legis naturae homines, nulla lege exterius data, solo 
interiori instinctu movebantur ad Deum colendum, ita etiam ex interiori instinctu determinabatur eis 
quibus rebus sensibilibus ad Dei cultum uterentur. Postmodum vero necesse fuit etiam exterius legem 
dari, tum propter obscurationem legis naturae ex peccatis hominum; tum etiam ad expressiorem 
significationem gratiae Christi, per quam humanum genus sanctificatur. Et ideo etiam necesse fuit res 
determinari quibus homines uterentur in sacramentis. Emphasis added. 
433 De Veritate, q.10, a.10. 
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simply exterior actions, but the very essence of the human person.  It is through the virtues 
moreover that we become more like Christ, the exemplar of all the virtues, and hence divinised 
through him in grace.  But at the same time Aquinas is convinced that human action on its own 
is not enough.  Our actions need to be made into actions of friendship with God if they are to 
have true efficacy.  This is not something we can do on our own; no effort on our part is 
sufficient to bridge the gap between human nature and eternal beatitude.  Even with the infused 
virtues on their own, we are still at a disadvantage: firstly, because the virtues only perfect the 
natural operations of the human person and beatitude requires something above and beyond this; 
and secondly, because we could never know with clarity if we are in possession of them.  Thus 
there is a risk, Aquinas notes, between presumption and despair: presumption, that we have 
obtained all the grace we need from God and have no cause for fear of his justice, and despair 
that we do not and so lose confidence in his eternal mercy.434   Aquinas’ solution to the problem 
is his sacramental ecclesiology.  Sacramental grace goes a long way in solving this dual 
problem of insufficiency and uncertainty.  Indeed, in both Commentaries on Galatians and and 
Second Corinthians, Aquinas describes the Church as the place where we receive the spiritual 
consolation that we need. 
 
5.6.2 Consolation and Sufficiency of the Sacraments 
 
 Firstly, the insufficiency is overcome in the sacraments which perfect the human person 
in the practice of the Christian life: “the sacraments of the Church were instituted for a twofold 
purpose: namely, in order to perfect man in things pertaining to the worship of God according to 
the religion of Christian life, and to be a remedy against the defects caused by sin.”435  Virtue 
can help avoid the likelihood of future sin, but it cannot remedy actual, past sin.  For this we 
need baptism, penance and final unction.  Additionally, the sacraments, because they were 
                                                          
434 ST II-II, q.21, a.1 
435 ST III, q.65, a.1: sicut supra dictum est, ordinantur sacramenta Ecclesiae ad duo, scilicet, ad 
perficiendum hominem in his quae pertinent ad cultum Dei secundum religionem Christianae vitae; et 
etiam in remedium contra defectum peccati. 
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instituted by Christ, bring about our sanctification: “the sacrament is completed where 
sanctification is completed.”436 
 Secondly, the sacraments remove from us the doubt associated with the virtues.  One of 
the reasons for this is that “the things which need to be used in the sacraments, are either in 
everyone's possession or can be had with little trouble.”437 In other words, the proper matter of 
the sacraments is easy to come by, while the matter of the virtues gives, as we have noted, no 
guarantee as to its efficacy.  The efficacy of the sacraments is brought about through a formula 
given to the Church, guaranteed by Christ and exercised through his ministers.  Hence, there is 
no such ambiguity about the efficacy of the sacraments as there is with the virtues, which can be 
assessed through consideration of their matter and form, unlike the virtues. 
 This is not to say that for Aquinas, the sacraments are nothing more than surety for 
epistemological uncertainty about the efficacy of the virtues.  The uncertainty about the efficacy 
of the virtues is linked, not simply to a clouding of the intellect, but to a real limitation of the 
power of the infused virtues.  We are uncertain about them because they are indeed uncertain in 
limit themselves.  They carry no guarantee of salvation because they are incapable of giving or 
providing any such guarantee.  As we have noted, they are necessary for salvation, but not 
sufficient.  The virtues are only part of the story; the individual virtuous person is only fully 
vivified in the Church; his virtues are only brought to completion through the salvific work of 
sacramental grace. 
 
5.7 “Extra Ecclesiam Nulla Salus” 
 
 The foregoing suggests what is in fact held by Aquinas, that outside the Church, there is 
no salvation.  Personal virtue is not sufficient for salvation; a necessary infusion of grace 
obtained through the sacraments of the Church is required: “The reality of the sacrament is the 
                                                          
436 ST III, q.66, a.1: ibi perficitur sacramentum ubi perficitur sanctificatio. 
437 ST III, q.60, a.5, ad.3: …res quarum usus est necessarius in sacramentis, vel communiter habentur, vel 
parvo studio adhibito haberi possunt. 
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unity of the mystical body, without which there can be no salvation, for there is no entering into 
salvation outside the Church.”438   
Aquinas’ doctrine of salvation holds that both an interior and exterior configuration to 
Christ is required.  This in effect means that what is required for salvation is a personal 
relationship with Christ through the virtues, and most notably through the theological virtues of 
faith, hope and charity which inform and enliven the virtues of indebtedness.  This personal 
relationship is both signified by and consummated in a participation in the sacraments of the 
Church.  We have already seen that this notion of the inner and outer person is present in the 
like of Richard of St Victor who, in commenting on 2nd Corinthians 4:16 writes in chapter XVII 
of the Mystical Ark, “So we do not lose heart; though our outer nature is wasting away, our 
inner nature is being renewed every day.”  Aquinas’ language of the interior and exterior 
expression of the person finds its culmination in his understanding of the person being an 
individual subsistence (the radically unique individual) and constituted by a rational nature 
(oriented towards others). 
 It is precisely in this doctrine that Aquinas’ conception of the relationship and unity of 
the virtues and the sacraments can be more clearly seen.  Not only are the sacraments—and 
most notably, baptism—required for salvation, but the virtues are required for the efficacious 
reception of the sacraments. This is not to suggest that the sacraments for Aquinas have a 
relative character, in that their efficacy is drawn exclusively from personal intent or personal 
orientation towards them; but, in keeping with his overall conception of the unity between 
virtues and the life in the Church through the sacraments, the one supports the other.  Desire 
plays a role in bringing the efficacy of the sacraments to life in the individual; we see this 
clearly in, for example, Aquinas’ treatment of both the sacrament and virtue of penance (or 
sorrow) which he treats of in questions eighty four and eighty five of the tertia pars of the 
Summa respectively.  The sacrament has its own efficacy; but the desire of the penitent for 
forgiveness and sorrow for sins, which is elicited by the virtue, predispose the penitent to the 
                                                          
438 ST III, q.73, a.3: Dictum est autem quod res sacramenti est unitas corporis mystici, sine qua non potest 
esse salus, nulli enim patet aditus salutis extra Ecclesiam. 
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sacrament while the sacrament elicits and infuses virtues.  Similarly, in reference to baptism, 
Aquinas considers the case of Cornelius in the Acts of the Apostles who was so moved by the 
words of Peter that he desired baptism—and received its grace—even before he received the 
sacrament in reality.  “But afterwards,” he goes on, “when [those who desire baptism receive it 
in fact], they receive yet a greater fullness of grace and virtues.”439  
 Those who desire the sacraments, whether explicitly or implicitly, can be said to have 
obtained the graces given by the sacraments in a way that predisposes the recipient to the 
sacrament properly speaking.  In this way, Aquinas does allow for those who do not yet know 
Christ concretely in the Church or in a manifest way to gain salvation, through an orientation to 
what the sacraments promise.  Hence, Aquinas distinguishes prevenient grace from subsequent 
grace: the former disposing one to grace through a desire for the good or through actions which 
pave the way for sacramental reception or virtuous acts; the latter—subsequent—grace which 
brings to fruition that desire and strengthens the recipient in fact.  Prevenient grace can be 
likened to being called by God, while subsequent grace can be likened to being glorified.440 
 
5.7.1 Predestination of the Church 
 
The doctrine of extra Ecclesiam nulla salus brings us to the question of predestination 
of the Church since it appears that for Aquinas, salvation and membership in the Church are 
intimately linked and so predestination to glory would seem to be on account of that 
membership.  For Aquinas, the predestination of the individual takes place within the context of 
the predestination of the Church itself.  The notion of the predestination of the Church is an 
essential element in Aquinas’ ecclesiology.  The doctrine furthermore puts his emphasis on the 
                                                          
439 ST III, q.69, a.4, ad.2: Ita etiam ante Baptismum Cornelius et alii similes consequuntur gratiam et 
virtutes per fidem Christi et desiderium Baptismi, implicite vel explicite, postmodum tamen in Baptismo 
maiorem copiam gratiae et virtutum consequuntur. 
440 ST I-II, q.111, a.3 
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virtue of religion into context, and why religion should be considered “chief among the 
virtues”.441  
One who is predestined is so on account of the Church, and not simply on account of 
any merit obtained as an individual independently of the Church.  There is no such concept of 
“independent merit” divinely obtained in Aquinas, for all merit comes through Jesus Christ, the 
Head of the Church.  Aquinas explicitly rejects the view, held by some he says, that the gifts of 
grace are given because of a person’s individual merit (Commentary on Colossians 1-3:24); 
rather, all merit of salvation which we obtain come to us through the Passion of Christ (ST III, 
q.48, a.1) and that Christ, through the merits of his passion, leads creatures to salvation 
“inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church” (ST I-II, q.114, a.6). 
Grace was bestowed upon Christ, not only as an individual, but 
inasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, so that it might overflow 
into His members; and therefore Christ's works are referred to Himself 
and to His members in the same way as the works of any other man in 
a state of grace are referred to himself.442 
 
It is useful to sketch out here some further insights into Aquinas’ teaching on 
predestination as it pertains to his ecclesiology.  According to Aquinas, we receive infused 
habits from God on account of the fact the he has predestined us to beatitude.  All supernatural 
merit is earned on account of this predestination to beatitude.  But predestination is in no way 
caused by any merit on our part.443  
Given that merit is won for us by Christ through the Church, it follows that Aquinas’ 
doctrine of predestination of the Church supervenes on his doctrine of the predestination of the 
individual.  As Henri de Lubac has said, “Our predestination in Christ is the predestination of 
the Church.”444  Again, the tendency in debates about the doctrine of predestination has been to 
stress or focus on the predestination of the individual, detached from the communio.  This 
                                                          
441 Aquinas’ attempt to answer the doctrine of predestination is modelled somewhat on Augustine’s, 
who Aquinas takes to be the major authority on the issue in his exegesis of the Pauline version of the 
doctrine found especially Romans 8:30: “And those whom he predestined he also called, and those 
whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified”.   
442 ST III, q.48, a.1: Christo data est gratia non solum sicut singulari personae, sed inquantum est caput 
Ecclesiae, ut scilicet ab ipso redundaret ad membra. Et ideo opera Christi hoc modo se habent tam ad se 
quam ad sua membra, sicut se habent opera alterius hominis in gratia constituti ad ipsum. 
443 See for example De Veritate 6.2; & SCG III(2).163; & ST I, q.23, a.5.   
444 Lubac, Henri de. The splendor of the Church. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999, p.44 
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failure to understand the link between the individual and the communio is the origin of 
confusion about what Aquinas intends to say about predestination in general.  Like his virtue 
theory, Aquinas’ predestination theory is ecclesial. 
As Peter J. Thuesen has catalogued, Aquinas’ doctrine of predestination has been both 
controversial and misrepresented; as a result, it has undergone numerous “facelifts” by some in 
an attempt to “rescue” it from a perceived Calvinist reading, especially since not a few 
commentators have indeed argued that there are significant parallels between Aquinas’ doctrine 
and Calvin’s doctrine of predestination.445   For example, Aquinas entertains along with Calvin, 
according to Louis Berkhof and James Smith, the notion of double predestination when he says, 
“God does reprobate some” (Deus aliquos reprobate) in his treatment of predestination  (ST I, 
q.23, a.3).446  The double-predestinarian view was anathematised by both the Councils of 
Orange and Trent;447 thus, if Berkhof and Smith et al are correct in associating this doctrine with 
Aquinas, it would place the Angelic Doctor outside the tradition of the Church in this matter.  
This does not seem likely for several reasons, not least of which is that Aquinas was familiar 
with the decrees of Orange, and cites it in the Summa.448   
Rather, it seems as though Berkhof and Smith have attributed the doctrine of double-
predestination to Aquinas incorrectly.  Aquinas distinguishes predestination from reprobation 
and he uses both terms analogically, by virtue of the fact that we cannot speak univocally of the 
causal power or will of God.449 Aquinas remarks that the former term—predestination—only 
pertains to those who are destined to eternal beatitude.  Reprobates however are “abandoned” by 
                                                          
445 Thuesen, Peter Johannes. Predestination: the American career of a contentious doctrine. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
446 See Berkhof, Louis. Systematic theology. New ed. Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 
1996, page 110; and Smith, James K. A. Introducing radical orthodoxy: mapping a post-secular theology. 
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2004, page 193. 
447 Council of Orange (529 AD): “If any one says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but 
that the works that are evil God works well as those that are good, not permissively only, but properly, 
and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation 
of Paul; let him be anathema.”  And the Council of Trent (Canon VI of the Decrees on Justification) 
declares that God predestines no one to go to hell. 
448 See for example, ST III, q.80, a.9.  It’s also worth noting that Aquinas was never criticised for a 
perceived teaching of double-predestination either in his life nor immediately after it; there is no 
condemnation of his work in this regard, as we might expect from the Paris Condemnations of 1270 and 
1277 for example. 
449 See ST I, q.13, a.5 
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God.  But such language, it becomes clear, is metaphorical language for Aquinas, since causally 
speaking, God is only the cause of salvation and not of damnation; the cause of “abandonment 
by God” is in fact not God himself, but mortal sin on the part of the reprobate.450  Consequently, 
no one is predestined to evil by God, since this would necessitate God’s willing of evil.451  
“Predestination and election impose no necessity,” he says, “by the same reasoning whereby we 
showed above that divine providence does not take away contingency from things.”452   
A number of other interpreters, in an effort to avoid the presumed fatalist view have 
read Aquinas’ doctrine through the language of libertarian versus compatibilist theories.453  
Where should we place Aquinas on this spectrum?  Kevin M. Staley has argued that Aquinas is 
neither purely a compatibilist nor a libertarian but rather somewhere in between.454  I think the 
whole framing of the discussion in these terms however is misconceived: on examination, the 
doctrine of predestination does not require us to try and “accommodate” freewill with 
predestination according to either a compatibilist or libertarian view.  Freewill does not need to 
be thought of as an awkward afterthought in the doctrine of predestination that somehow needs 
to be shoe-horned in against the potentially freedom-nullifying action of predestination.  The 
basic aim of all compatibilist or libertarian theories is to find a way to accommodate freewill 
with predestination because they seem to begin with definitions of freewill and predestination 
which cause tension between them from the outset.455  In fact, predestination for Aquinas 
                                                          
450 ST I, q.23, a.3, ad.2 
451 There appears to be, among a number of these commentators, a confusion between good as the 
cause of evil and good as the will of evil. 
452 SCG II, c.163, a.2: praedestinatio et electio necessitatem non inducunt, quibus et supra ostensum est 
quod divina providentia contingentiam a rebus non aufert.  The confusion among a number of these 
commentators seems to stem from a failure to distinguish between Good as an accidental cause of evil, 
and Good as positively willing evil as its efficient cause.  It is true that good accidentally causes evil 
because, while evil is a privation, a cause is in fact something, a being, which is by definition good (ST I, 
q.49, a.1); but this is an altogether different thing than saying God wills evil: God, says Aquinas, does not 
will evil (ST I, q.19, a.9).   
453 According to Thuesen, drove certain Puritans to suicide in 17th century America; and which  
prompted Augustine, in De Dono Perseverantiae to warn preachers against teaching this doctrine too 
explicitly for fear of driving people to despair. 
454 See Staley, Kevin M., Aquinas: Compatibilist or Libertarian?. St Anselm Journal. 2.2. 2005. Pages 73-79 
455 This is not to make light of the apparent and significant difficulties with Aquinas’ own attempts to 
defend and explain the doctrine of predestination.  The differences between the Calvinist view of 
predestination and Aquinas’ own view notwithstanding, Aquinas’ doctrine remains notoriously 
problematic, giving rise to the efforts of Ressourcement theology to attempt a recapitulation of the 
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necessitates the rectitude of reason and free will: “there is no distinction between what is from 
free will, and what is from predestination.”456   
 
5.7.2 Providence & Predestination in Aquinas 
 
Aquinas deals with the question of predestination throughout his writings, and most 
directly in his Commentary on the Sentences (I, d.40-41), Commentary on Romans(c.8:30), 
Commentary on Ephesians (c.1), De veritate, Summa Contra Gentiles (III:163), and the Summa 
Theologiae—most notably in question twenty three of the first part; he also treats of the 
predestination of Christ in question twenty four of the third part (this question is an important 
element in his doctrine, because it adds the Christological element to the doctrine which is 
absent in his other treatments).  In nearly all of these treatments the notion of predestination is 
placed within a broader treatment of the Church and Christ’s headship of it.  The exception to 
this appears to be question twenty three of the prima pars, where neither the Church or Christ 
are explicitly discussed.  However, the focus of question twenty three is salvation; and when the 
question is read in conjunction with question twenty four of the tertia pars, in which Aquinas 
resumes his discussion of predestination in the treatment of Christ’s predestination, we find that 
he says quite clearly that Christ’s predestination is the means of our own predestination, both in 
time and mode, because he is the means of our salvation (ST III, q.24, a.4). 
Aquinas also regards predestination as the completion, in effect, of Providence; 
providence ordains all human beings to salvation in principle, but predestination confirms only 
some in that end in fact: 
                                                                                                                                                                          
doctrine in cosmic and Christological terms—a major project of Henri de Lubac and an important 
question for Vatican II theologians.  As it stands, Aquinas’ doctrine appears to split hairs with the 
Calvinist notion of predestination; on the one hand, Aquinas denies that God predestines anyone to 
damnation; but God does reprobate some—that is, allow them to earn damnation on their own.   But, 
as it turns out, such choosing is also on account that God withholds his grace: “reprobation includes 
[God’s] will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account 
of that sin.” ST I, q.23, a.3: reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et 
inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpa. 
456 ST I, q.23, a.5: Non est autem distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et ex praedestinatione. 
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Providence, therefore, is concerned only with the ordering to the end. 
Consequently, by God’s providence, all men are ordained to beatitude. 
But predestination is also concerned with the outcome or result of this 
ordering, and, therefore, it is related only to those who will attain 
heavenly glory.457 
 
In this way, Aquinas attempts to reconcile the apparently opposing notions that Christ 
came to offer salvation to all (ST III, q.36, a.1, ad.3) and that God offers salvation gratuitously 
to whomever he please and without absolute necessity (ST I-II, q.98, a.4, ad.2).  Aquinas 
understands this to be consistent both with the received tradition of the Church (he cites 
Augustine and John Damascene in support) and Scripture (most notably he finds the doctrine 
confirmed by the words of Christ himself in the Gospels, and by Paul in various epistles). 
Aquinas not only defends the notion that human freewill is not overturned by God’s act 
of predestination but argues that an understanding of genuine freedom is not possible without a 
doctrine of predestination.  Agents are indeed blameworthy and praiseworthy on account of 
their choices.  At the same time, this freedom is limited; the human agent is only able to choose 
in accordance, inasmuch as it lies within the natural power of the person to do so, with the 
good.458  It is this natural orientation towards the good which is the root of Aquinas’ 
understanding of virtue, natural law and predestination: human intellect, by nature, is designed 
to be a good-seeking faculty.459  Freewill only seems to be an issue against predestination first of 
all when freewill is conceived of in terms of being totally arbitrary and non-oriented, as though 
it were not inclined to anything in particular, good or evil, and stands in front of moral decisions 
in a detached and totally neutral way.  This is precisely the definition of freewill Aquinas argues 
against in ST I, q.83, a.1.  The first objection in this question suggests an impossible model of 
freewill which sets the human agent adrift in an endless sea of choice without any orientation 
for such choices: “whoever has freewill does whatever he wills” (Quicumque enim est liberi 
arbitrii, facit quod vult).  But Aquinas rejects the idea that freedom is simply a matter of “doing 
whatever one wills.”  Freedom, rather, consists in pursuit of the good (ST I, q.83, a.2), to which 
the person is oriented by nature. 
                                                          
457 De Veritate, q.6, a.1 
458 ST I-II.13.6. 
459 ST I-II, q.94, a.2 
218 
 
Aquinas also rejects the notion of freedom as “doing whatever one wills” since any 
moral action of the person (the actus humanus) always involves a relationship with God, for 
good or ill: we cannot, in other words, but help or harm our relationship with God through our 
freely chosen acts.  As we have seen in this chapter, that relationship with God is mediated 
through the Church in Jesus Christ.  It follows therefore that for Aquinas the predestination of 
each person is linked to membership and participation in that Church.  This is clear from his 
understanding of the Church, whose very mission is to dispose the human person to salvation in 
Jesus Christ. 
It seems clear then that the truly virtuous person then is so, not independently of the 
sacramental life of the Church, which Aquinas equates with the salvific work of Christ, but 
precisely because of the communio, in which such a person is predestined to eternal beatitude.  
In the scheme of virtues, gratitude represents that first step in the journey towards being restored 
in original justice through baptism and the Eucharist in particular.  The grateful person is the 
one who both acknowledges the free gift of grace being offered by Christ; those gifts of grace 
come through the sacraments.  As such, gift and gratitude bear the character of religious 
worship and the sacraments: the interior, and exterior, configuration to Christ.  The interior 
configuration is the movement of free will, and embodied in virtue; the exterior configuration is 
totally the work of Christ.  In both, friendship is established, as between two freely loving 
parties. 
 
5.8 Harmony, Worship & Sacraments 
 
In the chapter in this study on The Grateful Person, I argued that Aquinas built on the 
Dionysian concept of harmony (concordia) to describe the restoration of original justice in the 
mutual friendship between God and the human person.  Aquinas again uses this same language 
of harmony and concord to describe the union of the members of the Church to Christ through 
worship and the sacraments: the virtuous person is harmonised with the sacramental person. 
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Harmony is in fact a common theme of Aquinas throughout his Pauline commentaries.  
For example, in the Commentary on Philippians, Aquinas quotes a line from Romans, in which 
St Paul says, “May the God of steadfastness and encouragement grant you to live in such 
harmony with one another, in concord with Christ Jesus, that together you may with one voice 
glorify the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ” (Romans 15:5).460 In his exegesis on this 
passage, Aquinas notes that this harmony requires that we “have the same love” for one 
another—that is, a shared faith, rooted in the same love of God in Christ.  God uses this concord 
he says in a gloss on Psalm sixty seven, to “make people of one mind, to dwell in one house”, in 
other words, in the Church.  And the effect of this shared love is, he goes on to say, “that 
together, you may glorify God with one voice.”  
Aquinas goes on in the Commentary with what could be described as a near-frenetic 
pace, invoking passage after passage from the Psalms, Pauline epistles and Gospels to reinforce 
the notion that the Church itself consists in an act of praise and adoration of God, through 
Christ.  One can see Aquinas’ own mystical passion emerge in these strings of citations which 
follow, one on top of another, in a stream of praise all of its own. 
Then when he says, “[at the Name of Jesus let] every tongue confess 
[and every knee bow]”, he touches on the reverence shown by 
confessing with the mouth: Every tongue, namely, in heaven and on 
earth and under the earth. This does not refer to a confession of praise 
from those in hell, but to a confession compelled by recognising God: 
“And the glory of the Lord shall be revealed, and all flesh shall see it 
together” (Is. 40:5); “Let them praise your great and terrible name! 
Holy is he!” (Ps. 99:3). And this confession will recognise that Jesus 
Christ is Lord [in] the glory of God the Father. He does not say in a 
similar glory, because it is the same glory: “That all may honour the 
Son, even as they honour the Father” (John 5:23). It should be noted 
that earlier he had said that, he was in the form of God, but here he 
says in the glory, because it would come to pass that what He had 
from all eternity would be known by all: “Father, glorify me in your 
own presence with the glory which I had with you before the world 
was made” (John. 17:5).461 
                                                          
460 Deus autem patientiae et solatii det vobis idipsum sapere in alterutrum secundum Iesum Christum, ut 
uno ore glorificetis Deum. 
461 Commentary on the Letter to the Philippians, c.1, 2.3. Deinde cum dicit et omnis lingua confiteatur, 
etc., ponitur exhibitio reverentiae in confessione oris. Omnis lingua, scilicet caelestium, terrestrium et 
Infernorum. Non de confessione laudis dicitur hoc respectu Infernorum sed de coacta, quae fit per 
recognitionem Dei. Is. XL, 5: videbit omnis caro pariter, quod os domini locutum est, et cetera. Ps. XCVIII, 
3: confiteatur nomini tuo magno, quoniam terribile et sanctum est, et cetera. Et hoc, quia dominus Iesus 
Christus, etc., iste scilicet homo, in gloria, et cetera. Non dicit in simili, quia in eadem. Io. V, 23: omnes 
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 There are many such passages in the Commentary, and indeed all the Commentaries, in 
which Aquinas engages in his own ecstasy of praise, moving from the Commentary under 
discussion to cite passages that inspire him as he goes along.  Indeed, each of his Pauline 
Commentaries are in fact in many respects collective commentaries on Scripture, in which he 
aims to show not only how the passages under comment speak of harmony, but of how they are 
harmonious in themselves, in directing the members of the Christ’s faithful to shared praise and 
adoration.   “It profits one nothing to praise with the lips if one praise not with the heart”, he 
writes, “For the heart speaks God’s praises when it fervently recalls “the glorious things of His 
works.” Yet the outward praise of the lips serves to arouse the inward fervour of those who 
praise, and to incite others to praise God.”462 
 The recurring theme in each of the commentaries on the Pauline epistles reinforces this 
triplex via: that love brings harmony, and that the expression of harmony is praise and worship.  
A favourite reference of Aquinas, from Paul’s letter to the Colossians (3:14), is “Above all put 
on love, which binds everything together in perfect harmony.”  Each time he returns to it, as in 
his commentaries on Colossians, Thessalonians and 2nd Corinthians for example, it is to lay out 
his ecclesial vision of Church as a body unified in love and praise.  Indeed, in each of these 
instances, the harmony of love and praise are expressions of thanksgiving.  And so he couples 
this passage with another from Colossians (2:6-7), “continue to live your lives in [Christ], 
rooted and built up in him, strengthened in the faith as you were taught, and overflowing with 
thankfulness.” 
 In the harmony of friendship between God and the human person, brought about 
through praise, Aquinas places the sacraments in special consideration.  Praise on its own is not 
enough to bring about salvation, because salvation is not a human work, or a work of virtue.  
Salvation is the work of Christ.  And so the sacraments provide a special nexus in the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
honorificent filium, sicut honorificant patrem. Et notandum est, quod in principio dicit qui cum in forma, 
etc., hic dicit in gloria, quia futurum erat quod illud quod ab aeterno habuit, omnibus innotesceret, ut Io. 
XVII, 5: clarifica me tu, pater, apud temetipsum claritate quam habui priusquam mundus fieret apud te. 
462 ST II-II, q.91, a.1, ad.2: laus oris inutilis est laudanti si sit sine laude cordis, quod loquitur Deo laudem 
dum magnalia eius operum recogitat cum affectu. Valet tamen exterior laus oris ad excitandum 
interiorem affectum laudantis, et ad provocandum alios ad Dei laudem. 
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relationship of God and the human person, in the exchange of gift and gratitude.  Two things 
need to be considered, Aquinas says, in the gift of the sacraments: the first is the worship and 
praise of God.  The second is the sanctification of the person (ST III, q.60, a.5).  Thus, not only 
do the sacraments provide the means of sanctification, but also the means of our returning praise 
in thanksgiving for that gift.   
 In the Commentary on the Galatians, Aquinas again gives a threefold order found in the 
sacraments: first, they bring grace.  This grace in return brings harmony between us and Christ.  
Thirdly, he says, we can give thanks (gratiarum actio) for these immeasurable goods.463  It is 
proper, therefore he says in his treatise on the Eucharist, that the celebration of the sacrament 
should end with thanksgiving, “for having received this mystery” (ST III, q.82, a.4).  This 
mystery consists of the participation in the divine life of God, through Christ and in the Holy 
Spirit. 
 
5.8.1 Holy Spirit as “Gift”& Source of Harmony 
 
 For Aquinas, the source of all harmony is the Holy Spirit, who guides and enlivens the 
Church and gives it life.  Indeed, the word ‘Gift’ is properly the Divine Name for the Holy 
Spirit (ST I, q.38).  The reason the Holy Spirit is properly called ‘Gift’, is because he proceeds 
from the Father and Son in Love; in fact, the Holy Spirit is the first love because he is the First 
Gift, Procession by nature; and through him, all gifts are given.  The nature of a gift is such that, 
before it is given, it belongs entirely to the giver.  But when it is given, it belongs to the one to 
whom it is given (q.38, a.2, ad.3).  The gift of God, therefore, is not simply some intermediary 
thing, something symbolising God’s love; God’s gift is the gift of himself.  And in giving 
himself, he becomes one with the one to whom he is given. 
This treatment in question thirty eight provides Aquinas’ most succinct formulas for the 
process of theosis, by which the human creature is ‘divinised’.  That is not to say that we 
                                                          
463 Commentary on Galatians, 1:1. 
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become essentially equal to God, but it is through a participated likeness that we become so 
divinised by God.464 
 Two questions later in the Treatise on Grace, in question one hundred and ten, Aquinas 
gives three related meanings for the word grace as an extension of the discussion on the Dinve 
Name ‘Gift’ and the method of theosis this Gift offers.  Grace has three meanings, Aquinas 
says: first, it refers to love; secondly, it refers to a gift as something freely given; thirdly, it 
refers to gratitude, which is the response to that which is freely given.  All three meanings 
depend on each other he says; every true gift is a gift of love; every gift of love elicits the love 
of gratitude in return.  Thus one word—gratia—unifies a threefold operation of gift and 
gratitude: the gift is love; and the response is love.  Grace is thus both the gift, and the means by 
which thanksgiving for the gift is rendered.  This is pre-eminently the meaning of gratitude for 
Aquinas; all other forms and expressions of gratitude, acquired or natural, are a mere 
participation in this paradigm.   
 This love is not limited by time; the same Spirit has moved, Aquinas says, throughout 
human time; first, in the precepts of the Old Law, then according to the sacraments and the 
precepts of the New Law: “Hence the ancient Fathers, by observing the legal sacraments, were 
borne to Christ by the same faith and love whereby we also are borne to Him, and hence the 
ancient Fathers belong to the same Church as we.”465  The Holy Spirit works among us as a 
human family, as a Church, and not simply as individuals.  The Holy Spirit furthermore does 
not come to us at our own behest, but through Jesus Christ; it is exclusively through Christ that 
God gives the gifts of grace and the Holy Spirit.466  We are thus divinised by the Holy Spirit 
through the sacraments of the Church dispensed by Christ.   
 
  
                                                          
464 ST I-II, q.112, a.1. 
465 ST III, q.8, a.3, ad.3: Et ideo antiqui patres, servando legalia sacramenta, ferebantur in Christum per 
fidem et dilectionem eandem qua et nos in ipsum ferimur. Et ita patres antiqui pertinebant ad idem 
corpus Ecclesiae ad quod nos pertinemus. 
466 Ibid., a.1. 
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5.8.2 Knowing the mind of God 
 
 In his treatment of gratitude in question one hundred and six, Aquinas says—more than 
once—that in considering the repayment of gift, we should consider the intention or will of the 
giver, and not simply what is given; we should not, in other words, consider a gift qua gift, but 
rather consider a gift as a sign of intention.  To consider the gift apart from the intention of the 
donor is to cut the donor’s motive out of the act of giving, and to reduce the gift to something as 
valued in and of itself.  In such circumstances, a gift could be interpreted as a right, or as an 
object whose value is simply one of utility.  A gift is essentially a sign of the will of the donor 
and, in the case of God’s gifts, it is divine life itself. 
 But how are we to assess the intention of God in the giving of his gifts?  How can the 
finite, rational creature scrutinise the inscrutable mind of God?  Even in beatitude, when we 
shall get to see God in his essence, complete knowledge of God’s will and inner life will always 
be beyond the capacity of finite creatures.  And yet, Aquinas insists that gratitude to God 
through praise and worship “is not to be dismissed as impossible.”467  Otherwise, if praise and 
worship of God was impossible, then the human person would seem to have been made in vain, 
in which case, “the desire of nature, whereby all men naturally desire to know something of the 
Divine perfections, would be fruitless.”468  
 On his own, the human person then cannot know how to praise God appropriately, 
because he does not have knowledge of God’s will.  But what we do have, says Aquinas, is 
Revelation: God himself has revealed something of himself to us; and among the things he has 
revealed to us is the way in which we should worship him.469  Without Revelation, any 
supposed gratitude to God would be no gratitude at all; one cannot show gratitude to oneself 
(q.106, a.3, ad.1) and worship of the subjective idea of God would simply be tantamount to 
idolatry.  As Robert Spaemann puts it, “To believe that God exists means to believe that he is 
not our idea, but that we are his idea. It implies precisely what Jesus demanded from us: a 
                                                          
467 Compendium Theologiae, c.8. 
468 Ibid. 
469 ST II-II, q.81 
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transformation of perspective. Conversion.”  When gratitude is reduced to the subjective, 
psychological arena, the reality of another will engaged in self-communication to us is lost.  
Gratitude is not simply a gesture; but it is above all the awareness that something totally other 
has penetrated the horizon of my own existence.  The gift of grace calls me out of my own 
limitations, and draws me into something deeper and beyond my understanding and control. 
It is then, according to Aquinas, Revelation which introduces us to the very mind of 
God.  Aquinas draws a clear connection between the impenetrability of the mind of God and the 
path the Christ lays out for us in his Commentary on First Corinthians where he says that while 
no one can judge the mind of God, the members of the Church “have the mind of Christ” in its 
place and as a guide for living and judging the things of God.470  
By extension, possessing the mind of Christ is the reason for the propinquity through 
which the memory holds God’s gift present.  The propinquity of God through the memory of 
gratitude is not simply the memory of the individual, but the memory of the Church.  And this 
memory is kept alive through the Eucharist. 
Since people are cleansed of sin through the suffering and death of 
Christ, in order to preserve constantly in us the memory of such an 
immense gift, when the time of his suffering was drawing near, the 
Son of God left his faithful a memorial of his suffering and death that 
would be constantly recalled, giving his disciples his own body and 
blood under the forms of bread and wine. The Church of Christ 
continues celebrating this memorial of his venerable suffering up to 
the present day all over the world.471 
 
Aquinas refers to the Eucharist as the sacrificium laudis—the sacrament of praise in 
several places, such as in his Commentary on Hebrews, Commentary on the Psalms, and in the 
treatise on the Eucharist (ST III, q.83).  The Eucharist is the pre-eminent form of praise and 
gratitude for Aquinas, for it is the living memory for us of Christ’s Passion, by which we are 
saved. 
 
                                                          
470 Commentary on First Corinthians, 2-3: 121. 
471 De Rationibus Fidei, c.8: Quia ergo per passionem et mortem Christi homines a peccato purgantur, ut 
huius tam immensi beneficii in nobis iugis maneret memoria, filius Dei passione appropinquante, suae 
passionis et mortis memoriam fidelibus suis reliquit iugiter recolendam, suum corpus et sanguinem 
tradens discipulis sub speciebus panis et vini, quod usque nunc in memoriam illius venerandae passionis 
ubique terrarum Christi frequentat Ecclesia. 
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5.9 “Before all else, be thankful” 
 
 Because gratitude is the first act by which we respond to God’s gifts, and the Gift of the 
Holy Spirit and grace through Christ, the praise and honour due to God is the ‘first act’ of 
worship.  The act of thanksgiving is the first act of gratitude, because it recognises God’s grace 
is the beginning of life.  For this reason Aquinas says that, “Latria, which is the worship of God 
as the Beginning of all things, is the duty of man in this life. Hence religion, primarily and 
chiefly, signifies latria, which renders worship to God by the expression of the true Faith.”472  
Nor is latria best understood as the praise of an individual; “prayers of the multitude are more 
easily heard” he says and that we individuals, as weak as we are, “become great” when united in 
one mind with the people of God in acts of praise.473 Thanksgiving is a collective work of the 
communio, and not simply an act in isolation.   
 God initiates the divine life, in an instant, through the work of grace in individuals, 
through the Church.  The first response of the recipient of such grace is thanksgiving, before 
anything else.  This is why, Aquinas notes, that in the Letter to Philemon, the very first thing 
Paul does after introducing himself is to give thanks and then admonishes Philemon, to likewise 
always present himself as being thankful.474  We are, before anything else “given” and therefore, 
before anything else, we must be thankful.  The essence of this thankfulness at recognising 
being given, is to give praise: “Thanks, in a special way praise, is due to the giver of gifts.”475  
In fact, Aquinas repeatedly associates the act of praise with acts of thanksgiving; they are 
essentially the same.  For this reason, every praiseworthy act is deserving of gratitude.476 
 In commenting on the Our Father, Aquinas again places praise and thanksgiving as 
being due to God above all else.  The very first petition in the Our Father he notes, quoting 
                                                          
472 Liber contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, 1: Huius quidem fidei protestatio, latria est, quae 
cultum Deo exhibet, quasi recognoscens eum esse principium: unde religio primo et principaliter latriam 
significat, quae Deo cultum exhibet in verae fidei protestationem. 
473 ST II-II, q.83, a.7, ad.3 
474 Commentary on Philemon, 1. 
475 Ethics IV, 1:662. 
476 ST II-II, q.106, a.5, ad.1. 
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Chrysostom, is “hallowed be thy name.”  Why does the Lord’s Prayer open with an expression 
of praise?  
Because, as Chrysostom observes, ‘he who would offer a worthy 
prayer to God should ask for nothing before the Father’s glory, but 
should make everything come after the praise of Him.’  Therefore, 
Praise, or thanksgiving, is the first step: we acknowledge God before 
asking for more blessings; thanks first of all, and only then petition.477 
 
 Why, we might ask, is praise identified with thanksgiving?  What is it about the nature 
of gratitude that necessitates praise, rather than, say, fear, or humility, or joy?  Certainly, there 
may be elements of all these, and other things, as elicited by gratitude.  But Aquinas’ reason for 
linking praise with thanksgiving is based on his observation about the nature of communication. 
 The communication of love, through genuine gift-giving, is a communication of 
goodness and not excellence (ST II-II, q.81, a.4, ad.3).  One does not, should not, seek praise in 
giving a gift; this would render the gift insincere, since the gift on that account would not be out 
of gratuitous love, but with the return of praise in mind: such a gift would be self-seeking.  
Excellence, however, is the acknowledgement of another’s goodness, or the recognition of 
honour due to a person on account of something of value seen in them.  Just as gift and gratitude 
are counterparts, so too are goodness and excellence counterparts.  We praise the giver of gifts, 
therefore, not because they seek such praise, but because we want to honour them for their 
goodness.   
With this in mind, Aquinas notes that the praise elicited by the virtue of religion is not 
commanded by God as though by an act of commutative justice: we do not ‘exchange’ praise 
for gifts.  God does not need our praise.  Praise is, for Aquinas, a natural and totally free 
response to the gifts of grace, because the act of praise is equal to an act of recognising 
something of great value, something excellent, worthy of honour.  In the Divine Names, 
Dionysius speaks of praise as being a profound expression of joy, where words alone are not 
sufficient to express the depths of the heart’s gratitude: “The Divine Goodness surpasses every 
name and every splendour, and every description of every sort.”  We are totally incapable of 
                                                          
477 Compendium Theologiae, c.8: haec petitio primo ponitur, quia, sicut Chrysostomus dicit, digna est 
Deum deprecantis oratio nihil ante patris gloriam petere, sed omnia laudi eius postponere. 
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praising God as we should; and so God himself gives us the means by which we desire to praise 
him. 
In this respect, even gratitude itself is a gift of God.  We cannot elevate ourselves to the 
station of giving thanks to God; we do not possess the means by which to express the deepest 
longings of the human heart.  Gratitude is thus given to us on account of God’s mercy, to enable 
us to give satisfying expression to our natural impetus to give thanks.  And because it is given to 
us by God, it already bears within itself the hope that the greatest gift for which we give thanks, 
salvation, is in fact already a reality for us. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I have attempted to present in this thesis a systematic understanding of the virtue of 
gratitude as found in the works of St Thomas Aquinas, but with a wider view too, of the way in 
which this understanding of the virtue of gratitude has been lost in contemporary discourse.  It 
is, as far as I am aware, the only systematic treatment of gratitude in Aquinas done to date.  
There has been much discussion about the concept of gift, in Aquinas and elsewhere.  Certainly 
in recent years, there has been a resurgence of interest in a theology of gift and grace.  My aim 
has been to show that a study of the virtue of gratitude is necessary to complete this theology of 
gift and grace, since the gift—by definition—is intended to initiate a response. 
Frequently today, and perhaps more often than not, gratitude is reduced to the realm of emotion.  
While the affective element of gratitude and love is an important consideration, an over-
emphasis on the affective, or even reduction of the virtue to the affective state, has obscured the 
real value of gratitude.  Gratitude is often considered little more than a point of etiquette 
whereas, in reality, it is bound up in the very notion of what it means to be a person. 
 Aquinas’ teaching on gratitude touches on the very meaning of human existence in its 
relation to the divine goodness.  Existence itself is a gift, but the gift is only actualised, so to 
speak, in the expression of gratitude as a giving of self in return.  The gift remains in a manner 
inert, without the actualising principle of freewill on the part of the recipient.  The actualisation 
of the gift requires a “yes”; and this “yes” is not possible, until what is offered is understood as 
something not only profoundly attractive, but more importantly, as corresponding to the 
realisation and accomplishment of the self.   
One can only discover oneself in the awareness that one is given, and that the givenness 
of self is not simply to be identified with bodily or earthly existence, but with the invitation to 
friendship with God and all that entails.  The self as gift is not simply something, but is rather 
someone; a someone in whom the awareness of another breaks in upon the limited horizon of 
human experience and self-awareness.  One begins, however to think of oneself as a something, 
when one does not or cannot see oneself as given—not simply as given in the present, but also 
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given in the fullness of time.  The gift, which intrudes into the limitation of the self, corresponds 
to the very longing of the human heart.  The person is already predisposed to the gift since it 
flows from the Divine Mind, and so it naturally refers back to its source.  Original sin prevents 
it from seeing its true destiny; original sin, which allows the cacophony and distraction of the 
world to dominate, prevent the heart from realising that the gift is already anticipated in the 
person’s very act of existing.  But unless the person finds restoration in original justice, and is 
given the eyes through grace to see it, the gift of self will remain elusive: seeing oneself as given 
is not a foregone conclusion simply in virtue of being born.  For this reason, and in this context 
at least, I think it is proper to think of Aquinas’ notion of the person as having, as Kierkegaard 
and Sartre would say, though maybe for different reasons, an existence that precedes essence. 
This understanding of gratitude—which I propose is in fact Aquinas’ own 
understanding—will seem very alien to modernity.  It will certainly seem alien to the person 
who is overcome by the process of secularisation, or whose starting point is rooted in relativism, 
or un-rooted from the certainty that God exists, or the certainty that, even if he does exist, I am 
something significant in his mind and plan, something in fact given, something gratuitously 
willed for its own sake.  God today is often thought of as an object, a datum to be examined, 
proven or disproven.  The concept of God-as-relation, and the person, by analogy, as a being-in-
relation, cannot have any real currency in this sort of ambivalence.   
Aquinas’ understanding of gratitude seems to become even more complicated and 
further removed from modernity when it is placed, as Aquinas himself places it, in the context 
of a sacramental ecclesiology.  While many of us are still on the first rung of the ladder of 
uncertainty, Aquinas paints a picture of gratitude which requires not only unwavering belief in 
God, but a commensurate belief in the sanctity of the Church, and the real efficacy of the 
sacraments. His concept of gratitude seems possible only for a small percentage of the 
population today—if any mortal at all!  So perhaps for reasons other than what Derrida 
suggests, the gift seems impossible after all from the perspective of modernity: the standard of 
Aquinas’ gift is set too high. 
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But Aquinas has a solution, and it is simply this: gratitude is not the highest ladder on 
the rung; it is in fact the first step towards encounter with God; perhaps even before we know it 
is God we are seeking.  We have by nature a desire for fulfilment, a capacity for being given 
even when we can’t identify what it is we want; “to know that someone is approaching,” he 
says, “is not the same as knowing that it is Peter who is approaching” (ST I, q.2, a.1, ad.1).  
Everyone longs for happiness, for the satisfaction of the heart’s desire, even before we know 
where to look.  We recognise beauty and joy before knowing who the giver of that beauty and 
joy is. 
  Gratitude is not the conclusion of understanding that we are given; it is in fact a 
primordial instinct and so a starting point in the quest for God, corresponding to the Socratic 
notion of aporia.  It is one of the reasons why Aquinas places gratitude last in his virtues of 
indebtedness, because it is our first point of access to the notion of gift on the ladder of ascent, 
not our last point of access.  Aquinas believes that the human person is naturally inclined to 
thankfulness, and he counts it as being part of the natural law which corresponds to a deep sense 
of givenness which comes with an analogous exigency; and this sense is born out in history and 
culture, time and time again.  It is not part of human nature to have the faith, says Aquinas, but 
it is part of human nature to have the instinct of, or impetus towards, faith (ST II-II, q.10, a.1, 
ad.1).  Unless concerted acts of unbelief thwart this instinct, it remains alive in anyone who is 
seeking, as does the impulse towards thanksgiving.  The person who wrote, “Thank you Mother 
Earth!” on the park bench validates the point; not knowing who he or she wanted to thank—but 
the desire to thank was there all the same, born in that moment of awe and wonder at creation.   
 If what I have proposed about gratitude is correct, what does it suggest for the next 
steps in this area of study?  There are a number of issues that still need to be resolved, and there 
is also room for practical, pastoral considerations as well.   
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Critique of Aquinas’ Doctrine of Grace & Sacrament 
 
Further study is required in the area of Aquinas’ sacramental theology, for it is not 
without its challenges.  Perhaps the most significant critique of Aquinas’ sacramental theology 
and related doctrine of grace—a critique levelled at Scholastic theology in general—is that it 
reduces God’s free and loving grace to “metaphysical categories”.  The mysterious and 
transcendent love of God, which invites the human person into dynamic communion seems to 
be lost or threatened when the sacramental life is reduced to the language of cause and effect.  
This is indeed the contention of Louis-Marie Chauvet (perhaps one of the most influential 
theologians of sacramental theology in recent years and one who represents well many of the 
criticisms levelled at Thomistic ecclesiology examined above).   
Chauvet has argued that Aquinas has failed to understand the sacraments as 
transcendent signs of “Presence,” and that he instead reduces the sacraments to an ‘onto-
theology’ in which the sacraments are, according to Bernhard Blankenhorn’s reading of 
Chauvet, rendered little more than a “human model of mechanistic production” of grace, or 
causal instruments of grace.478  
Blankenhorn recognises at least three major critiques which Chauvet directs at Aquinas’ 
theology of sacrament and grace, and two in particular which I wish to focus on here: the first is 
that this “model of mechanistic production” does not, and indeed cannot, properly account for 
God’s dynamic love present in the sacraments.  Love is not a product, brought about 
mechanistically through a ritual; nor is divine love something which can be understood 
independently of the relationship between the lover and the beloved and which flows freely 
within the context of such a relationship, which necessarily resists metaphysical categories of 
causation.479  Following upon this critique is Chauvet’s second observation; namely, that love, 
                                                          
478 See Blankenhorn O.P., Bernhard. The Instrumental Causality of the Sacraments: Thomas Aquinas & 
Louis-Marie Chauvet. Nova et Vetera, English Edition,Vol. 4, No. 2 (2006): 255–94. 
479 Chauvet explains, “The initial question of the present study may be formulated as follows: How did it 
come about that, when attempting to comprehend theologically the sacramental relation with God 
expressed most fully under the term “grace,” the Scholastics (and here we will consider only Thomas 
Aquinas) singles out for privileged consideration the category of “cause”?  Let us make explicit what 
underlies this question.  On the one hand, grace can in no way be considered an object or a value….. On 
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like grace, is not a ‘thing’ or a ‘value’.  Grace resists the metaphysical language of cause and 
effect, because love itself resists such categories.  Chauvet identifies in this tendency of 
Scholastic theology to place values on grace and love a methodological problem at root: 
namely, the habit of conflating various kinds of “language games”—the poetic, the religious, 
the liturgical, the philosophical, and so on.  According to Chauvet, the Scholastic method has 
the tendency to ignore the limitations of language which Wittgenstein has identified and instead 
to treat the objects of metaphysical language as constituting reality itself. 
Nor is Chauvet satisfied with Thomistic appeals to Dionysian mystical theology as 
evidence of his recognition of the transcendence of grace.  For although Dionysius and the neo-
Platonic tradition of apophatic theology goes some way in overcoming this onto-theology 
enacted by metaphysical language, negative theology still attempts to constitute what can and 
cannot be known of God in terms of metaphysical language.  To say that God is ‘super-
abundant love’ for example is, for Chauvet, to categorise God according to what can and cannot 
be expressed in metaphysical language; the limitation of knowing God is nothing more than an 
admitted limitation of metaphysics.  Dionysian onto-theology is thus no remedy for Aquinas’ 
own onto-theology.  “Put another way,” says Chauvet, “negative theology, even in its most 
sublime moments where it transcends, through negation, the notion of being as cause, 
nonetheless remains viscerally connected to a type of language that is irredeemably causal and 
ontological.”480  Chauvet proposes a solution in Symbol and Sacrament to this Scholastic and 
Thomistic ‘onto-theology’. His solution characterises the “sacraments as revealers” of an 
already-present and dynamic relationship: 
That the sacraments are revealers which make symbolically visible 
what identifies as Christian human existence anterior to them; that 
consequently they manifest the “already-there” of grace in the 
experience of faith; that they therefore have an expressive function of 
response to what God has done, and of gratitude for what God has 
done: not only we not deny all this, but we insist on it.481 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the other hand, in Scholastic discourse, the category of causality is always tied to the idea of production 
or augmentation; thus it always presupposes an explanatory model implying production….” Chauvet, 
Louis Marie. Symbol and sacrament: a sacramental reinterpretation of Christian existence. Collegeville, 
Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1995; p.7. 
480 Chauvet, p.42 
481 Ibid,  p.431. 
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 Blankenhorn however notes that there is a shift in thinking in Aquinas’ writings which 
Chauvet misses.  He argues that the early Aquinas of the Sentences favoured the Avicennian 
account of disposing causality as a tool to explain sacramental causality (according to which the 
sacrament itself disposes one to grace, while God remains the principle efficient agent which 
acts upon the form, or the soul, of the recipient).482  However, as his writings and thinking 
matures, Aquinas moves from a strict adherence to disposing sacramental causality—first to an 
occasional causality following Bonaventure (in which the sacraments provide the occasion for 
grace, but in which God choses to infuse grace freely), and then to an Aristotelian instrumental 
causality (which Blankenhorn finds as early as the De Veritate written just shortly after the 
Sentences in the 1250s).  Crucially, according to Blankenhorn, Aquinas’ shift in thinking first 
notably found in the De Veritate (q.27, a.7) indicates that Aquinas is open to the notion that the 
perfecting instrumentality of the sacraments; that is, the sacraments do not simply dispose us to 
grace, but are the instrumental causes of grace.  But Aquinas goes further, and his understanding 
of instrumental causality is not the culmination of his thinking on sacramental causality, but 
rather the beginning of a trend towards an innovative understanding of the relationship between 
the sacraments and grace. 
 That innovation understands instrumentality—the perfecting instrumental cause of the 
sacraments as a means of grace—not in a way which reifies grace, but in a way which 
understands ‘causality’ as an analogical term in which the sacraments are understood as 
‘signs’—indeed, pace Chauvet—as signs of the presence of Christ.  In question 60 of the Tertia 
pars of the Summa, Aquinas speaks repeatedly of sacraments as being ‘signs’.  In article 3 of the 
question, he explains that a sacrament is that which is “ordered to signify our sanctification” 
(ordinatur ad significandam nostram sanctificationem).  That signification encompasses three 
realities: first, the cause of our sanctification, which is the Person of Christ’s through his 
passion; secondly, the form of our sanctification, which is grace and the virtues; thirdly, the 
ultimate end of our sanctification, which is eternal beatitude (vita aeterna).   
                                                          
482 Several of the Scholastics made use of the Avicennian notion of disposing causality, including 
Alexander of Hales, St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure. 
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It is not clear however that an appeal to something as subtle as the distinction between 
Avicennian disposing causality and Aristotelian instrumental causality is necessary to counter 
Chauvet’s charge that Aquinas reifies sacramental grace.   Philip Reynolds for example argues 
that scholars who attempt to make such distinctions between disposing and instrumental 
causality in Aquinas are on “shaky ground”.483  If Aquinas’ virtue theory is intimately linked to 
his sacramentology, which all indications from the primary texts suggest it is, then 
understanding his sacramentology and its relationship to his virtue theory is a major area of 
necessary further study.  But while much of the Thomistic scholarship has been dedicated to 
addressing Aquinas’ virtue theory and natural law theory, there has been relatively little 
commensurate study of his sacramental theology.  Part of the reason for this is that there is a 
prevalent view among some scholars that Aquinas’ does not have a sound account of the human 
person, nor consequently does he have a well-worked out ecclesiology.  W. Norris Clarke and 
Martin Rhonheimer, et al, have contributed much in attempting to recover this ‘prosopological’ 
dimension in Aquinas.  The next step would seem to be seeing this theology of the person in the 
context of Aquinas’ sacramental ecclesiology. 
 
Pastoral & Catechetical Implications 
 
 Aquinas’ notion of gratitude also raises some practical considerations—for pastors, 
homilists and teachers. There is a certain anxiety today about capitalist structures and financial 
markets; there is concern about the environment and the damage we are doing to it through our 
rapacious thirst for earth’s natural resources.  There is, in short, a very real uneasiness today 
about the future of human societies and the fear of the subjugation of the human person to 
                                                          
483 “Scholars who see a positive development from merely dispositive to real or physical instrumental 
causality in Aquinas’s treatment of the sacraments and of Christ’s saving work are on shaky ground, for 
Aquinas himself abandons the distinction.  Even in the Sentences, Aquinas uses the term ‘disposing’ and 
its cognates more broadly, to include modes of causality different from the merely preparatory one 
defined above.” See Reynolds, Philip Lydon. Efficient Causality and Instrumentality in Thomas Aquinas’s 
Theology of the Sacraments in Walter H., James R. Ginther, and Carl N. Still ed,. Essays in medieval 
philosophy and theology in memory of Walter H. Principe (CSB: fortresses and launching pads. Aldershot, 
England: Ashgate, 2005) p75 
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technocratic advances.  Pope Francis’ apostolic exhortation, Evangelii Gaudium spells out and 
addresses many of those concerns.   
 In such a setting as this in which we find ourselves today, the possibility of genuine 
gratitude seems to be supplanted by fear.  It is difficult to see oneself as gift, or the earth as gift, 
in this context.  And yet, the psychological benefits of gratitude are now well documented, as 
shown by the clinical tests of Emmons and McCullough (2003).  Emmons’ latest book even 
goes so far as to make the claim that gratitude can increase one’s overall happiness by “as much 
as twenty-five percent”.484   
But apart from this pragmatic, quality-of-life benefit to gratitude, the virtue of gratitude 
presents a rich source of inspiration for homilists, teachers, pastors and parents.  What the 
psychological studies do indicate, which is consistent with my reading of Aquinas on gratitude, 
is that the desire to be grateful, and the primordial sense of needing to be grateful, runs very 
deep in us: it is an innate orientation to the source of our being, an instinctive capacity to reach 
out to others in thankful joy and friendship. 
  Merely inculcating grateful attitudes seems to be sufficient to orient this perspective, 
that life is, in essence, something given.  The nature of gratitude is such that one does not arrive 
at gratitude to God following catechesis and theological instruction.  Given that gratitude is 
something akin to aporia, it is the natural starting point of friendship.  One always initiates 
friendship before knowing what one is getting into; one does not, for example, examine and test 
potential friends before making reasoned judgement, pace Abercrombie, that one wants to be 
friends.  Friendships tend to be spontaneous and unplanned; others constantly break into our 
horizon in much the same way that God does. 
 Gratitude then offers a potential method of catechesis.  In celebrating the things we 
have cause to be grateful for, the natural object of this thankfulness will begin to emerge if it is 
coupled with further instruction that God is primarily a Giver of Gifts.  Understanding God in 
                                                          
484 How Emmons and McCullough are able to quantify and calculate happiness, I do not know, and I 
remain a little sceptical! But even from a purely anecdotal point of view, the research suggests that 
grateful people do seem, by and large, more at peace than those who are not.  See Emmons, Robert A. 
Thanks!: how the new science of gratitude can make you happier. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2007. 
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this way should be the first moment of catechesis: all too often, it is not.  I think that there is 
much to be gained from reflecting on the nature of the human person as a being-in-relation, 
grateful-in-response-to-gifts by nature. There is, then, a certain aesthetic quality to gratitude: it 
is attractive and the idea of gifts is deeply attractive to us. 
 From a personal perspective, as a secondary school teacher for many years, I’ve become 
aware that in all the schooling years a pupil endures, the notion of self as given does not occur 
as part of a formal curriculum even once.  Gratitude has become, by and large, a mere point of 
etiquette; we’ve lost sight of it as being the method by which we realise ourselves as persons. 
The late Stratford Caldecott understood well the connection between an appreciation for 
the virtue of gratitude and the recovery of an authentic liberal arts education, rooted in an 
awareness of the givenness and beauty of being, a project to which he dedicated much of his life 
and energy before his death this year. I had the good fortune of getting to know Stratford at a 
colloquium on the Gift in Oxford, and at a subsequent lunch we talked much about the 
importance of an education in gratitude, beginning in our secondary school curricula.  Stratford 
understood the link between an appreciation for beauty as being at the heart of a liberal arts 
education, and the way in which cultivating gratitude was a necessary first step in helping 
students appreciate beauty and to recognise it in creation. 
He also saw that the failure to recognise beauty at the origins of human desire and 
motivation gave way to a cannibalising consumerism and economy, not of gift, but of demand.  
John Milbank among others has also alerted us to this trend in contemporary society.  Milbank 
recognises that modernity is losing the very ability to understand human interaction in terms of 
gift and gratitude.  
Yet in the long run, if all human interaction is bypassed, we start to 
lose the skill for it.  We trust only ourselves and no others, and 
certainly not the government.  Neither does the government trust us: 
thus one gets the pursuit of private profits whose ease of gaining is to 
do with the fact that they merely transfer and do not grow real wealth; 
thus one also gets a number of posh criminals who calculate that they 
can flout the social contract and get away with it; thus again one gets 
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increasingly criminalized politicians who bleed the system for their 
own private interests.485 
 
In my own work in secondary education, I have witnessed an increasing and inherited 
scepticism among young people towards politics, organised religion and science, and the 
authority figures representing these, who are often only understood by means of caricatures 
established in popular mass media.  Underlying this scepticism is an ambivalence about the 
meaning of truth, the meaning of life and the reality of the divine.486  Worse yet, there is an 
ambivalence about the meaning of love, and there has entered into this vacuum an 
unprecedented increase in the use of pornography among young people in its place.  
Pornography, is in essence, a direct consequence of the failure to understand the self and other 
as given.  This is clearly confirmed by the numerous studies showing the link between 
pornography addiction and the break down in the ability—of adolescents especially—of those 
with such addictions to form healthy bonds of authentic friendship and love, born in the 
experience of gratitude. A recovery of gratitude, not as something simply abstract, but as a lived 
and experience of self and others in friendship, is necessary to tackle this phenomenon. 
Young people are, in a sense, detached or even unhinged from the Christian patrimony of 
contemporary culture, so that this patrimony no longer is seen as something coherent or relevant 
to them.  And yet it is precisely within this patrimony—including the contributions of 
philosophy and theology over the centuries—that a rich anthropology giving sense to the human 
person as gift is found.  Milbank goes on, 
For despite the many wars over truth—and are they not more noble 
than liberal wars over money and less terrible than the wars of power 
that have been instigated by nihilists who have taken liberal logic to 
its limits?—human culture could never have arisen without practices 
of trust: of gratuitous gift, counter-giving, and gratuitous giving again 
which anthropologists have long known form the main bond of all 
                                                          
485 Milbank, John in Aran Murphy, Francesca, ed. Beauty of God's House: Essays in Honor of Stratford 
Caldecott. Eugene: Cascade Books, 2014, p.199. 
486 Conor Cunningham provides a rather convincing account of the influence of nihilism throughout the 
history of philosophy, and the way in which nihilistic thought has attempted to eliminate the notion of 
difference in philosophy, or to make nothing into something.  Along with this trend has been the 
elimination of the difference between gift and gratitude; the human person is, in this nihilist view, 
simply there, a brute fact.  This is perhaps, the dominant view in secular discourse today.  See 
Cunningham, Conor. Genealogy of Nihilism: Philosophies of Nothing & the Difference of Theology. 
London: Routledge, 2002. 
238 
 
human societies.  In this sense, “society,” as socialists and anarchists 
argued against the liberals, is indeed more fundamental than either law 
or contract, either politics or economics.487 
 
Stratford Caldecott attempted, before his death, to set up a committee to develop a new 
secondary school theology specification aimed at the recovery of this patrimony, and to 
overcome the reduction of the gift to economies of monetary exchange at the expense of a true 
humanity.  I was invited to be a part of this committee, though I do not think it ever got off the 
ground given Stratford’s  waning health.  But it is something that needs to be revisited, and with 
some urgency.  Key to this enterprise will be methods by which students can rediscover self as 
something given, and the gratuitous response to this gift.  It is hard to imagine how such a 
recovery is possible without a rediscovery of the contribution of this Christian inheritance and 
what Milbank calls the “political soul”.  This problem has recently been highlighted in a series 
of studies produced by a variety of philosophers and theologians in a landmark study published 
by Springer in 2006.  In it, one of the contributors, Randall Zachman remarks, 
Since the fall of Adam, human beings have been kept from properly 
beholding and enjoying [the benefits of life] by their own blindness 
and ingratitude.  Human blindness keeps us from judging the works of 
God aright, so that we do not see in them the living image of the 
Creator, but are rather left to the worship of false gods devised by the 
human imagination.  Human ingratitude means that even when we do 
enjoy the powers of God, we do not seek their source in God, and 
glorify God in our gratitude, but rather enjoy them without ever lifting 
our hearts and minds to their source in God…. [It] is significant to 
note that the self-disclosure of God in the Word is subordinate to the 
self-manifestation of God in the universe by making the proper 
contemplation of God in God’s works possible.488  
 
It is with this in mind that we see that the recovery of gratitude is not simply a question 
of recovering a pleasant etiquette, but rather recovering the very concept of what it means to be 
a person.  It’s hard to see how this might be accomplished within contemporary society, but 
certainly it is time for all interested parties to think a response through.   
                                                          
487 Milbank, John in Aran Murphy, Francesca, ed. Beauty of God's House: Essays in Honor of Stratford 
Caldecott. Eugene : Cascade Books, 2014, p.199. 
488 Zachman, Randall in Cherry, Mark J, Ed. The Death of Metaphysics, the Death of Culture: 
Epistemiology, Metaphysics, and Morality. Dordrecht: Springer, 2006, p.79-80 
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Along with the realisation of Stratford Caldecott’s vision for a new curriculum, there is 
also a real challenge here to churches to revisit and clarify the theological concept of person, 
and to find ways to make this accessible to the public—both in and out of the pews.  Currently, 
our pastoral approach to Christian anthropology appears as something piecemeal and lacking 
grounding in a unified starting point.  The various crises in modernity—human life issues, 
social justice issues and the proclamation of the Gospel itself—are often tackled or presented to 
the world in piecemeal fashion, without any explicit prosopology forming the criteria for these.  
Christians often raise the banner of the poor and marginalised, or speak about the dignity of 
human life, without grounding these in a theology of grace explicating the reality of the person 
within the context of gift and gratitude.   
Perhaps the task is not as daunting as it may seem at first.  Because we are beings who 
are given, and that gratitude is the natural response to this gift, there is, naturally, something 
innate in us which responds enthusiastically to gift-exchange and gratitude.  Everyone loves 
receiving gifts!  And most of us enjoy giving them, too.  The language of gift-exchange flows 
from our very being, and so there is a ready audience to receive this message and to find within 
it the bigger picture of salvation and theosis. 
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